Appointments To Reserved Vacancies Meant Only For Members Of Reserved Community Alone: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court observed that the appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of reserved community alone.

If any person other than a member of the reserved community is appointed, it would clearly constitute an infringement of the rights of the genuinely deserving members of the said community, the bench comprising Justices KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy observed.

The appellant was terminated from service after it was found that she does not belong to the Scheduled Tribe community to which she applied and was given appointment. The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru, dismissed her plea challenging the termination. Later, the Karnataka High Court also dismissed her writ petition.

Before the Apex Court bench, in appeal, the appellant relied on Section 4(4) of Karnataka Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointments, etc.) Act, 1990 which provides that the appointment in contravention of Section 4(1) is voidable. The appellant contended that no notice was served on her before the order of termination was issued. 

While addressing this contention, the bench observed

The scheme of the Act appears to be in tune with the Constitutional mandate which is to reserve appointments in favour of the deserving categories as are covered under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, inter alia. In other words, appointments are to be made inter alia in favour of the Scheduled Tribes. If an appointment is made in contravention of the said mandate then it is, no doubt, declared voidable. The expression 'voidable' in the context of the Act and the object of the Act and more importantly, and the constitutional value of equality would mean that appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of the said community alone. If any person other than a member of the reserved community is appointed, it would clearly constitute an infringement of the rights of the genuinely deserving members of the said Scheduled Tribes which is the category with which we are concerned. Furthermore, even the applicants applying under the general categories could be adversely affected.

The court, taking note of factual aspects of the case, observed that the appointment of the appellant was clearly tentative and dependent on the appellant producing the proof of her certificate being valid and genuine. While rejecting the 'natural justice' argument, the bench observed:

"True, the principles of natural justice have been highlighted by the appellant which is a part of the mandate of Article 14 itself. However, an exception to the principle would be a case where it is entirely futile to provide an opportunity. Giving an opportunity to the appellant under the circumstances in question when the finding as regards her not belonging to the Scheduled Tribe has become final, in our view would have been a futile exercise. No other course could have been adopted by the employer in the circumstances concerned. We are of the view that keeping in mind the fact that her continuance in service would deprive a member of the Scheduled Tribe community of an opportunity which was usurped by the appellant in the first place would be sufficient answer to the case that it would not have been a futile exercise. The termination of service of the appellant in the face of the finality attained regarding her not belonging to Scheduled Tribe community is a crucial fact which deprives an employer of any discretion in the matter of terminating her services. At the time of the termination of service, the appellant was 40 years. It is not as if the appellant was on the verge of retirement. Being voidable under Section 4(4) of the Act, and bereft of any choice, the facts not being in dispute, and to allow an usurper to continue being a palpable illegality and a constitutional sin, in the context, action by the competent authority terminating the services is perfectly valid. Therefore, we do not agree with the argument that the order of termination was bad in law. "

Case : Jayashree vs Director Collegiate Education | CA 1559/2022 | 22 Feb 2022
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 237
Coram: Justices KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy
Counsel: Sr. Adv S. N. Bhat for appellant, Adv V. N. Raghupathy for respondent

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