Supreme Court Criminal Law Digest February 2022

Army Act, 1950 - Section 125 - Section 125 not only recognizes that an element of discretion has been vested in the designated officer, but it also postulates that the designated officer should have decided that the proceedings be instituted by the court -martial in which event the court -martial would take place. (Para 44) State of Sikkim v. Jasbir Singh | 1 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 116

Army Act, 1950 - Section 125 - The criminal court will have jurisdiction to try a case against an army personnel if the Commanding Officer does not exercise the discretion under Section 125 of the Army Act to initiate court -martial with respect to the offence - If the designated officer does not exercise this discretion to institute proceedings before a court -martial, the Army Act would not interdict the exercise of jurisdiction by the ordinary criminal court. (Para 30) State of Sikkim v. Jasbir Singh | 1 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 116

Army Act, 1950 - Section 70 - The ingredients of Section 70 are: (i) The offence must be committed by a person subject to the Army Act; (ii) The offence must be committed against a person who is not subject to military, naval or air force law; and (iii) The offence must be of murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder or rape. (Para 43) State of Sikkim v. Jasbir Singh | 1 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 116

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Appeal against High Court order setting aside criminal proceedings on the ground that taking cognizance by magistrate was barred by limitation - Allowed - The High Court made a fundamental error in assuming that the date of taking cognizance i.e., 04.12.2012 is decisive of the matter, while ignoring the fact that the written complaint was indeed filed by the appellant on 10.07.2012, well within the period of limitation of 3 years with reference to the date of commission of offence i.e., 04.10.2009 - Rejected the contention that Sarah Mathew's case requires reconsideration on the ground that some of the factors related with Chapter XXXVI CrPC have not been considered. Amritlal v. Shantilal Soni | 28 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 156(3) - Applications under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant -With such a requirement, the persons would be deterred from causally invoking authority of the Magistrate, under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. In as much as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka | 18 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 181 (Para 27 -29)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 167(2) Proviso - Default Bail - Filing of a charge -sheet is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 167 CrPC - An accused cannot demand release on default bail under Section 167(2) on the ground that cognizance has not been taken before the expiry of 60 days. (Para 10) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Rahul Modi | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 167(2) Proviso - Default Bail - There is no additional requirement of cognizance having to be taken within the period prescribed under proviso (a) to Section 167(2), CrPC, failing which the accused would be entitled to default bail, even after filing of the charge -sheet within the statutory period. (Para 15) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Rahul Modi | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 167(2) Proviso - The accused continues to be in the custody of the Magistrate till such time cognizance is taken by the court trying the offence, which assumes custody of the accused for the purpose of remand after cognizance is taken. Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Rahul Modi | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 173 - Magistrate to have due regard to both the reports, the initial report which was submitted under Section 173(2) as well as the supplementary report which was submitted after further investigation in terms of Section 173(8). It is thereafter that the Magistrate would have to take a considered view in accordance with law as to whether there is ground for presuming that the persons named as accused have committed an offence. Luckose Zachariah @ Zak Nedumchira Luke v. Joseph Joseph | 18 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 230

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 173(2) - Evidentiary Value of a Final Report - Final Report, is nothing but a piece of evidence. It forms a mere opinion of the investigating officer on the materials collected by him. He takes note of the offence and thereafter, conducts an investigation to identify the offender, the truth of which can only be decided by the court - The final report itself cannot be termed as a substantive piece of evidence being nothing but a collective opinion of the investigating officer. (Para 25, 37) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 354(3) - Death Sentence - The evolution of legal position and norms for dealing with the question of sentencing and the connotations of 'special reasons' for awarding death sentence discussed - Court has found it justified to have capital punishment on the statute to serve as deterrent as also in due response to the society's call for appropriate punishment in appropriate cases but at the same time, the principles of penology have evolved to balance the other obligations of the society, i.e., of preserving the human life, be it of accused, unless termination thereof is inevitable and is to serve the other societal causes and collective conscience of society. This has led to the evolution of 'rarest of rare test' and then, its appropriate operation with reference to 'crime test' and 'criminal test'. The delicate balance expected of the judicial process has also led to another mid -way approach, in curtailing the rights of remission or premature release while awarding imprisonment for life, particularly when dealing with crimes of heinous nature. (Para 40) Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh | 9 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 354(3) - Death Sentence - When the accused is not shown to be a person having criminal antecedents and is not a hardened criminal, it cannot be said that there is no probability of him being reformed and rehabilitated - His unblemished jail conduct and having a family of wife, children and aged father would also indicate towards the probability of his reformation. (Para 43.1) Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh | 9 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 436 -439 - Bail - Grant of bail, though a discretionary order, requires such discretion to be exercised in a judicious manner and on the application of certain settled parameters. More heinous the crime, greater is the chance of rejection of bail, though the exercise also depends on the factual matrix of the matter - The Court, amongst others, must consider the prima facie view of whether the accused has committed the offence, nature of the offence, gravity, likelihood of the accused obstructing in any manner or evading the process of justice. Grant of bail draws an appropriate balance between public interest in the administration of justice and protection of individual liberty in a criminal case. The prima facie examination is on the basis of analysis of the record, and should not be confused with examination in detail of the evidence on record to come to a conclusive finding. Jameel Ahmad v. Mohammed Umair Mohammad Haroon | 15 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 222

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 438 - Indefinite adjournment in a matter relating to anticipatory bail, that too after admitting it, is detrimental to the valuable right of a person - When a person is before the Court and that too in a matter involving personal liberty, least what is expected is for such a person to be given the result one way or the other, based on the merit of his case and not push him to a position of uncertainty or be condemned without being heard, when it matters. Rajesh Seth v. State of Chhattisgarh | 21 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 200

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 439 - Bail - In the case of murder (under Section 302 IPC), it is expected that at least some reason would be given while reversing the order of the Trial Court, which had rejected the bail application by a reasoned order. (Para 4) Sabir v Bhoora @ Nadeem | 15 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 210

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 468 - The relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. Amritlal v. Shantilal Soni | 28 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Complainants are defendants in civil suits with regard to the same transactions - Complaint under Section 156 (3) CrPC filed after a period of one and half years from the date of filing of written statement - Ulterior motive of harassing the accused - Continuation of the present proceedings would amount to nothing but an abuse of process of law. (Para 22, 30) Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka | 18 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 181

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Case of fabrication of documents can't be quashed saying there is no revenue loss to state. Missu Naseem v. State of Andhra Pradesh | 1 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 132

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Although it is true that it was not open for the Court to embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR, but at least there has to be some factual supporting material for what has been alleged in the FIR. (Para 19) Shafiya Khan @ Shakuntala Prajapati v. State of U.P. | 10 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Power of quashing of criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in rarest of the rare cases and it was not justified for the Court in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the inherent powers do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims and fancies. (Para 17) Shafiya Khan @ Shakuntala Prajapati v. State of U.P. | 10 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Though the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are wide and are in the nature of inherent power yet, the said power cannot be exercised suo motu in a sweeping manner and beyond the contours of what is stipulated under the said Section. (Para 7) Registrar General v. State | 23 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 204

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 173(6) - Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 - Section 44 – National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 - Section 17 - The objective of Section 44, UAPA, Section 17, NIA Act, and Section 173(6) is to safeguard witnesses. They are in the nature of a statutory witness protection. On the court being satisfied that the disclosure of the address and name of the witness could endanger the family and the witness, such an order can be passed. They are also in the context of special provisions made for offences under special statutes. (Para 24) Waheed -Ur -Rehman Parra v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir | 25 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 216

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 173(6), 161, 207 - Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 - Section 44 - Even for protected witnesses declared so under Section 173(6) CrPC read with Section 44 UAPA, the accused can exercise their right under Sections 207 and 161 of the Cr.P.C to obtain copies of their redacted statements which would ensure that the identity of the witness not disclosed. Waheed -Ur -Rehman Parra v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir | 25 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 216

Criminal trial - Circumstantial evidence - Motive - absence of motive in a case of circumstantial evidence weighs in favour of the accused - motive not relevant in a case of direct evidence. Nandu Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh | 25 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 229

Criminal Trial - Circumstantial Evidence - The conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested on the touchstone of law relating to the circumstantial evidence that all circumstances must lead to the conclusion that the accused is the only one who has committed the crime and none else - Circumstances howsoever strong cannot take place of proof and that the guilt of the accused have to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 11, 14) Satye Singh v. State of Uttarakhand | 15 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 169

Criminal Trial - Eye Witness - The evidence of eye -witness cannot be discarded only for the reason that he allegedly did not raise any alarm or did not try to intervene when the deceased was being ferociously assaulted and stabbed. Suresh Yadav @ Guddu v. State of Chhattisgarh | 25 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Criminal Trial - Long adjournments being given after the completion of the chief examination, only helps the defense to win them over at times, with the passage of time - The trial courts shall endeavor to complete the examination of the private witnesses both chief and cross on the same day as far as possible - The trial courts to take up the examination of the private witnesses first, before proceeding with that of the official witnesses. (Para 39) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Criminal Trial - Murder - Where, however, the only evidence against an accused person is the recovery of stolen property and although the circumstances may indicate that the theft and the murder must have been committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw the inference that the person in possession of the stolen property was the murdered. Suspicion cannot take the place of proof. Tulesh Kumar Sahu v. State of Chattisgarh | 24 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Criminal Trial - The approximate time of death before examination, as indicated in the post -mortem report, cannot be applied as something of mathematical precision. (Para 36) Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh | 9 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Criminal Trial - The evidence of the investigating officer is not indispensable. The evidence is required for corroboration and contradiction of the other material witnesses as he is the one who links and presents them before the court - Even assuming that the investigating officer has not deposed before the court or has not cooperated sufficiently, an accused is not entitled for acquittal solely on that basis, when there are other incriminating evidence available on record. (Para 25) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act - Section 106 - Last Seen Theory - When 'last seen' evidence is cogent and trustworthy which establishes that the deceased was lastly seen alive in the company of the accused; and is coupled with the evidence of discovery of the dead body of deceased at a far away and lonely place on the information furnished by the accused, the burden is on the accused to explain his whereabouts after he was last seen with the deceased and to show if, and when, the deceased parted with his company as also the reason for his knowledge about the location of the dead body. (Para 31) Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh | 9 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Evidence Act, 1872 - "Matters" - Matters are necessary, concomitant material factors to prove a fact. All evidence would be "matters" but not vice versa. In other words, matters could be termed as a genus of which evidence would be a species. Matters also add strength to the evidence giving adequate ammunition in the Court's sojourn in deciphering the truth. Thus, the definition of "matters" is exhaustive, and therefore, much wider than that of "evidence". However, there is a caveat, as the court is not supposed to consider a matter which acquires the form of an evidence when it is barred in law. Matters are required for a court to believe in the existence of a fact - Matters do give more discretion and flexibility to the court in deciding the existence of a fact. Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - A mere non -examination of the witness per se will not vitiate the case of the prosecution. It depends upon the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses and its importance. If the court is satisfied with the explanation given by the prosecution along with the adequacy of the materials sufficient enough to proceed with the trial and convict the accused, there cannot be any prejudice. Similarly, if the court is of the view that the evidence is not screened and could well be produced by the other side in support of its case, no adverse inference can be drawn. Onus is on the part of the party who alleges that a witness has not been produced deliberately to prove it. (Para 31) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - Chance Witness - A chance witness is the one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A person walking on a street witnessing the commission of an offence can be a chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed though a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an aspect which is to be looked into in a given case by the court. (Para 26) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - Classification of evidence - circumstantial evidence, corroborative evidence, derivative evidence, direct evidence, documentary evidence, hearsay evidence, indirect evidence, oral evidence, original evidence, presumptive evidence, primary evidence, real evidence, secondary evidence, substantive evidence, testimonial evidence, etc. Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - Definition of "Proved" - The definition of the word "proved" though gives an impression of a mere interpretation, in effect, is the heart and soul of the entire Act. This clause, consciously speaks of proving a fact by considering the "matters before it". The importance is to the degree of probability in proving a fact through the consideration of the matters before the court. What is required for a court to decipher is the existence of a fact and its proof by a degree of probability, through a logical influence. (Para 13) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - Evidence Act is an "Adjective Law" highlighting and aiding substantive law - It is neither wholly procedural nor substantive, though trappings of both could be felt. (Para 12) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - Hostile Witness - Testimony of a witness turning to depose in favour of the opposite party -A witness may depose in favour of a party in whose favour it is meant to be giving through his chief examination, while later on change his view in favour of the opposite side. Similarly, there would be cases where a witness does not support the case of the party starting from chief examination itself. This classification has to be borne in mind by the Court. With respect to the first category, the Court is not denuded of its power to make an appropriate assessment of the evidence rendered by such a witness. Even a chief examination could be termed as evidence. Such evidence would become complete after the cross examination. Once evidence is completed, the said testimony as a whole is meant for the court to assess and appreciate qua a fact. Therefore, not only the specific part in which a witness has turned hostile but the circumstances under which it happened can also be considered, particularly in a situation where the chief examination was completed and there are circumstances indicating the reasons behind the subsequent statement, which could be deciphered by the court. It is well within the powers of the court to make an assessment, being a matter before it and come to the correct conclusion. (Para 21) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - Related Witness - A related witness cannot be termed as an interested witness per se. One has to see the place of occurrence along with other circumstances. A related witness can also be a natural witness. If an offence is committed within the precincts of the deceased, the presence of his family members cannot be ruled out, as they assume the position of natural witnesses. When their evidence is clear, cogent and withstood the rigor of cross examination, it becomes sterling, not requiring further corroboration. A related witness would become an interested witness, only when he is desirous of implicating the accused in rendering a conviction, on purpose. (Para 28) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 106 - Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution from discharging its duty to prove the guilt of the accused - Burden could not be shifted on the accused by pressing into service the provisions contained in section 106 of the Evidence Act when the prosecution could not prove the basic facts as alleged against the accused. (Para 15 - 16) Satye Singh v. State of Uttarakhand | 15 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 169

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 3 - Definition of "Evidence" - Factor or material, lending a degree of probability through a logical inference to the existence of a fact. (Para 12) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 32 - Dying Declaration - Principles as to the circumstances under which a dying declaration may be accepted, without corroboration: (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. State of U.P. v. Veerpal | 1 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 32 - Dying Declaration - There can be a conviction solely based upon the dying declaration without corroboration - If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base its conviction on it, without corroboration. State of U.P. v. Veerpal | 1 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 33 - Section 33 is an exception to the general rule which mandates adequate facility for cross examining a witness. However, in a case where a witness after the completion of the chief examination and while subjecting him to a substantial and rigorous cross examination, did not choose to get into the witness box on purpose, it is for the court to utilize the said evidence appropriately. The issues over which the evidence is completed could be treated as such by the court and then proceed. Resultantly, the issues for which the cross examination is not over would make the entire examination as inadmissible. Ultimately, it is for the court to decide the aforesaid aspect . (Para 24) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - The entire enactment is meant to facilitate the court to come to an appropriate conclusion in proving a fact. There are two methods by which the court is expected to come to such a decision. The court can come to a conclusion on the existence of a fact by merely considering the matters before it, in forming an opinion that it does exist. This belief of the court is based upon the assessment of the matters before it. Alternatively, the court can consider the said existence as probable from the perspective of a prudent man who might act on the supposition that it exists. The question as to the choice of the options is best left to the court to decide. The said decision might impinge upon the quality of the matters before it. (Para 17) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - When the court is convinced with the quality of the evidence produced, notwithstanding the classification, it becomes the best evidence. Such testimony being natural, adding to the degree of probability, the court has to make reliance upon it in proving a fact. (Para 29) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - When the court wants to consider the second part of the definition clause instead of believing the existence of a fact by itself, it is expected to take the role of a prudent man. Such a prudent man has to be understood from the point of view of a common man. Therefore, a judge has to transform into a prudent man and assess the existence of a fact after considering the matters through that lens instead of a judge. It is only after undertaking the said exercise can he resume his role as a judge to proceed further in the case. (Para 18) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Evidence Act, 1872 - While appreciating the evidence as aforesaid along with the matters attached to it, evidence can be divided into three categories broadly namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. If evidence, along with matters surrounding it, makes the court believe it is wholly reliable qua an issue, it can decide its existence on a degree of probability. Similar is the case where evidence is not believable. When evidence produced is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, it might require corroboration, and in such a case, court can also take note of the contradictions available in other matters. (Para 20) Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 - Section 7A - The plea of juvenility has to be raised in a bonafide and truthful manner. If the reliance is on a document to seek juvenility which is not reliable or dubious in nature, the accused cannot be treated to be juvenile keeping in view that the Act is a beneficial legislation. (Para 38) Manoj @ Monu @ Vishal Chaudhary v. State of Haryana | 15 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 170

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 - Section 7A - Date of Birth certificate be obtained after filing of the application under Section 7A of the Act cannot be relied upon. (Para 9) Manoj @ Monu @ Vishal Chaudhary v. State of Haryana | 15 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 170

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 - Section 7A - Ossification test varies based on individual characteristics and hence its reliability has to be examined in each case - It cannot be reasonably expected to formulate a uniform standard for determination of the age of the union of epiphysis on account of variations in climatic, dietetic, hereditary and other factors affecting the people of the different States of India. (Para 15 -17) Manoj @ Monu @ Vishal Chaudhary v. State of Haryana | 15 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 170

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 - Rule 12(3) - U.P. Panchayat Raj (Maintenance of Family Register) Rules, 1970 - Birth certificate issued by corporation or municipal authority or a panchayat is a relevant document to prove the juvenility. The family register is not a birth certificate. Therefore, it would not strictly fall within clause (iii) of Rule 12(3) of the Rules. (Para 37) Manoj @ Monu @ Vishal Chaudhary v. State of Haryana | 15 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 170

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 – Even when the Criminal Court refers the matter under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in order to make it executable, it will be treated as if it were a decree. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (Noida) v. Yunus | 3 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Appeal against HC judgment upholding conviction of appellant under NDPS Act - Dismissed. Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab | 22 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 245

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 21 - The quantity of the neutral substance is not to be excluded and to be taken into consideration along with the actual content of the weight of the offending drug while determining small and commercial quantities. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Karuna Shanker Puri | 9 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 173

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - The physical nature of the material is not relevant for determining whether the contents of the sample analyzed were actually opium or not, and physical analysis is not prescribed under the provisions of the NDPS Act for testing the opium. Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab | 22 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 245

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 10 - Definition of 'payment in due course' - Ascertainment of whether the act of payment is in good faith and without negligence is by examination of the circumstances in which payment is made. In other words, antecedent and present circumstances should not afford a reasonable ground for believing that the person to whom payment is made is not entitled to receive payment of the amount mentioned.9 While it would not be advisable or feasible to strait -jacket the circumstances, albeit value of the instrument, other facts that would raise doubts about the reliability and identity of the person entitled to receive payment and genuineness of the instrument in the payer's mind are relevant considerations. (Para 17) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 10 - Definition of 'payment in due course' - The requirement in Section 10 that the payment should be in both good faith and without negligence is cumulative. Thus, mere good faith is not sufficient. (Para 17) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 10 - General Clauses Act, 1897 - Section 3(22) - Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act which defines 'good faith' as an act done honestly, whether done negligently or not, is not sufficient to hold that the payment made was 'payment in due course' under the NI Act. (Para 18) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 13 - Different principles apply for discharge from liability when the negotiable instrument is payable to bearer or has been indorsed in blank, in which case payment must be made in terms of Section 10, whereas when the negotiable instrument is payable to order, the maker, acceptor or endorser would be discharged from liability when payment is made to the 'holder' of the instrument. (Para 14) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 13 - Kisan Vikas Patra Rules, 1988 - Kisan Vikas Patras (KVPs) are negotiable instruments in terms of Section 13 of the NI Act - It cannot be said that the KVPs are simple bearer instruments payable to anyone who presents the same for encashment and discharge. (Para 12, 29) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 and 142 - A.C. Narayanan vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2014) 11 SCC 790 - The employment of the terms "specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power of attorney holder" and such assertion about knowledge should be "said explicitly" as stated in A.C. Narayanan (supra) cannot be understood to mean that the assertion should be in any particular manner, much less only in the manner understood by the accused in the case. All that is necessary is to demonstrate before the learned Magistrate that the complaint filed is in the name of the "payee" and if the person who is prosecuting the complaint is different from the payee, the authorisation therefor and that the contents of the complaint are within his knowledge. What can be treated as an explicit averment, cannot be put in a straitjacket but will have to be gathered from the circumstance and the manner in which it has been averred and conveyed, based on the facts of each case. The manner in which a complaint is drafted may vary from case to case and would also depend on the skills of the person drafting the same which by itself, cannot defeat a substantive right. However, what is necessary to be taken note of is as to whether the contents as available in the pleading would convey the meaning to the effect that the person who has filed the complaint, is stated to be authorized and claims to have knowledge of the same. In addition, the supporting documents which were available on the record by themselves demonstrate the fact that an authorized person, being a witness to the transaction and having knowledge of the case had instituted the complaint on behalf of the "payee" company and therefore, the requirement of Section 142 of N.I. Act was satisfied. (Para 17, 14) TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. v. SMS Asia Pvt. Ltd. | 22 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 and 142 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Entertaining a petition under Section 482 to quash the order taking cognizance by the Magistrate would be unjustified when the issue of proper authorisation and knowledge can only be an issue for trial. (Para 17) TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. v. SMS Asia Pvt. Ltd. | 22 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 and 142 - When a company is the payee of the cheque based on which a complaint is filed under Section 138 of N.I. Act, the complainant necessarily should be the Company which would be represented by an employee who is authorized. Prima­facie, in such a situation the indication in the complaint and the sworn statement (either orally or by affidavit) to the effect that the complainant (Company) is represented by an authorized person who has knowledge, would be sufficient - Such averment and prima facie material is sufficient for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance and issue process. If at all, there is any serious dispute with regard to the person prosecuting the complaint not being authorized or if it is to be demonstrated that the person who filed the complaint has no knowledge of the transaction and, as such that person could not have instituted and prosecuted the complaint, it would be open for the accused to dispute the position and establish the same during the course of the trial. (Para 17) TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. v. SMS Asia Pvt. Ltd. | 22 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 3 - 'Banker' includes any person acting as a banker and any post office savings bank. In terms of this section, a post office savings bank is a banker under the NI Act. (Para 11) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 8 - A holder means a person (i) entitled to possession of a promissory note, bill of exchange or a cheque, and (ii) entitled to sue the maker, acceptor or indorser of the instrument for the recovery of the amount due thereon in his name - The requirements of Section 8 are two -fold, and both requirements have to be satisfied. (Para 15) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 131 and 131A - The standard of care expected from a collecting banker does not require him to subject the cheque to a minute and microscopic examination, yet disregarding circumstances about the cheque, which on the face of it gives rise to suspicion, may amount to negligence on the part of the collecting banker. Further, the question of good faith and negligence is to be judged from the standpoint of the true owner towards whom the banker owes no contractual liability but statutory duty by these provisions - Allegations of negligence against the paying banker could provide no defence for the collecting banker who has not collected the amount in good faith and without negligence. (Para 20) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 15 and 16 - 'Indorsement', 'indorsee', 'indorser' and 'indorsement in blank' and 'in full' - Indorsement for the purpose of negotiation is made by the maker or holder of the negotiable instrument when he signs on the back or face of thereof, on a slip of paper annexed thereto or on a stamp paper for the purpose of negotiation. The person signing is called the indorser. If the instrument is signed by the indorser in his name only, it is an indorsement in blank. If the indorser also specifies the person to whom payment is to be made, the indorsement is said to be 'in full', and the person so specified is called the indorsee. (Para 12) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 8 and 78 - Payment made to a person in possession of the instrument, but not entitled to receive or recover the amount due thereon in his name, is not a valid discharge. (Para 15) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 138 - It is surprising that on the one hand, the bank managers have specifically deposed that no such bank account was opened and maintained in their bank while on the other hand the cheque drawn by the respondent in favour of the appellant, was returned with the remark "account frozen" in respect of the same cheque. The bank account has been mentioned on the cheque and the endorsement to the effect "Account Frozen" will presuppose that an account existed". Vikram Singh v. Shyoji Ram | 18 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 223

Penal Code, 1860 - Appeal filed by two accused concurrently convicted in a murder case by invoking Section 34 IPC - Allowed - They are entitled to the benefit of doubt on the ground that it cannot be with certainty held that they had common intention - Given the acts attributed to them, the assault by the main accused and the resultant outcome were unexpected. Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu vs State of Karnataka | 16 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 220

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 300 - Point whether culpable homicide would tantamount to murder or not discussed. (Para 6) State of Uttarakhand v. Sachendra Singh Rawat | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 300 - The fact that the accused gave several blows/multiple blows on the vital part of the body – head which resulted into grievous injuries and he used "Phakadiyat" with such a force which resulted in Skull fracture and a frontal wound on left side and wounds with 34 stitches on the left side of the skull extended from mid of the left side of the skull along with coronal sutures of 16 cm, we are of the opinion that the case would fall under Clauses thirdly and fourthly of Section 300 IPC. (Para 7) State of Uttarakhand v. Sachendra Singh Rawat | 4 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Penal Code, 1860 – Section 300 and 376– Rape and Murder - Death Sentence - Abhorrent nature of crime alone cannot be the decisive factor for awarding death sentence - Due consideration to be given to the equally relevant aspect pertaining to mitigating factors before arriving at a conclusion that option of any other punishment than the capital one was foreclosed. (Para 42) Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh | 9 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 - Appeal against concurrent conviction under Section 302 - Excessive number of injuries do not ipso facto lead to an inference about involvement of more than one person; rather the nature of injuries and similarity of their size/dimension would only lead to the inference that she was mercilessly and repeatedly stabbed by the same weapon and by the same person - The evidence of the eye -witness to the incident, remains unimpeachable and has been believed by the two Courts - Do not find the present one to be a case of manifest illegality so as to call for interference. Suresh Yadav @ Guddu v. State of Chhattisgarh | 25 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 - Trial Court does not have the jurisdiction to sentence an accused to life imprisonment which is to extend to the remainder of their life. Narendra Singh @ Mukesh @ Bhura v. State of Rajasthan | 28 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 247

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 34 - A co -perpetrator, who shares a common intention, will be liable only to the extent that he intends or could or should have visualized the possibility or probability of the final act. If the final outcome or offence committed is distinctly remote and unconnected with the common intention, he would not be liable - Merely accompanying the principal accused may not establish common intention - A co -perpetrator, who shares a common intention, will be liable only to the extent that he intends or could or should have visualized the possibility or probability of the final act - The ambit should not be extended so as to hold a person liable for remote possibilities, which were not probable and could not be envisaged. (Para 13, 19) Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu vs State of Karnataka | 16 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 220

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 34 - For Section 34 to apply, it is not necessary that the plan should be pre -arranged or hatched for a considerable time before the criminal act is performed. Common intention can be formed just a minute before the actual act happens. (Para 18) Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu vs State of Karnataka | 16 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 220

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 34 - Relevant Facts - The manner in which the accused arrived, mounted the attack, nature and type of injuries inflicted, the weapon used, conduct or acts of the co -assailants/perpetrators, object and purpose behind the occurrence or the attack etc. are all relevant facts from which inference has to be drawn to arrive at a conclusion whether or not the ingredients of Section 34 IPC are satisfied. (Para 18) Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu vs State of Karnataka | 16 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 220

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 34 - Section 34 IPC comes into operation against the co -perpetrators because they have not committed the principal or main act, which is undertaken/performed or is attributed to the main culprit or perpetrator. Where an accused is the main or final perpetrator, resort to Section 34 IPC is not necessary as the said perpetrator is himself individually liable for having caused the injury/offence. A person is liable for his own acts. (Para 18) Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu vs State of Karnataka | 16 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 220

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 34 - The expression "common intention" should also not be confused with "intention" or "mens rea" as an essential ingredient of several offences under the IPC - For some offences, mental intention is not a requirement but knowledge is sufficient and constitutes necessary mens rea. Section 34 IPC can be invoked for the said offence also - In some cases, intention, which is ingredient of the offence, may be identical with the common intention of the co -perpetrators, but this is not mandatory. (Para 18) Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu vs State of Karnataka | 16 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 220

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 354 - Accused was convicted under Section 354 IPC - Sessions Court/ High Court dismissed his appeal/revision - Before Apex Court the accused submitted that a compromise has been entered into between him and the complainant/victim - Dismissing his SLP, the Supreme Court held: No reason to grant any credence to such compromise which is being entered into after the conviction has been confirmed by the High Court. Bimal Chandra Ghosh v. State of Tripura | 11 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 157

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 498A - Allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against relatives of husband would simply result in an abuse of the process of law - If allegations made against them are general and omnibus, they do not warrant prosecution. (Para 19 - 21) Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam v. State of Bihar | 8 Feb 2021 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 498A - Concern over the misuse of section 498A IPC - the increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, if left unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceeding against the relatives and in -laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them. (Para 18) Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam v. State of Bihar | 8 Feb 2021 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 498A - General and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant's husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged. (Para 22) Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam v. State of Bihar | 8 Feb 2021 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 498A - Incorporation of section 498A of IPC was aimed at preventing cruelty committed upon a woman by her husband and her in -laws, by facilitating rapid state intervention. However, it is equally true, that in recent times, matrimonial litigation in the country has also increased significantly and there is a greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage, now, more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as 498A IPC as instruments to settle personal scores against the husband and his relatives. (Para 12) Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam v. State of Bihar | 8 Feb 2021 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 499 - Defamation - Exceptions. (Para 18) Shri Babuji Rawji Shah v. S. Hussain Zaidi | 24 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 213

Practice and Procedure - Anticipatory Bail Applications - When an application for anticipatory bail accompanied by an application for ad -interim relief is listed before the court, it should decide the same one way or the other, so far as the ad -interim prayer or should have taken up for consideration after giving some reasonable time to the State. Even if admitted, the court should list the same for final disposal on a specific date - Not giving any specific date is not a procedure which can be countenanced. Rajesh Seth v. State of Chhattisgarh | 21 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 200

Practice and Procedure - Procedure adopted by the High Court which, on the 'special mentioning' made by the Additional Public Prosecutor, directed transfer of the cases/final reports filed/pending in the Special Courts exclusively to deal with the Land Grabbing Cases to the respective jurisdictional Courts is unknown to law - The practice of passing such orders on a 'special mentioning' that too, in a disposed of matter is to be deprecated. (Para 4) Registrar General v. State | 23 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 204

Premature Release - Relevant Considerations - Prior criminal history, conduct and behaviour in jail, possible danger to society, etc. are relevant considerations - The application has to be considered on the basis of the policy as it stood on the date when the applicant was convicted of the offence. (Para 6, 7) Sharafat Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh | 10 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 179

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 17A - Section 17A does not have retrospective operation - It could not possibly have been the intent of the legislature that all pending investigations upto July, 2018 should be rendered infructuous. (Para 11 -12) State of Rajasthan v. Tejmal Choudhary | 16 Dec 2021 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 158

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 7, 13 - The proof of demand of bribe by a public servant and its acceptance by him is sine quo non for establishing the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act - The Failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder. (Para 7) K. Shanthamma v. State of Telangana | 21 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 192

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - Section 5 - The satisfaction to be recorded by the authorised officer in terms of Section 5 of the PMLA is in two respects. The first is that the property in question had been acquired through proceeds of crime and involved in an offence of money laundering; and the second satisfaction specific in terms of Section 5(1) of the Act is that the owner/occupant of the property, who is in possession, is likely to conceal, transfer or deal with the same in any manner. This satisfaction is recorded for the purpose of interim arrangement during the pendency of the adjudication proceedings for securing the property in question. Kaushalya Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Union of India | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 161

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - Section 5(1) - The fact that the provisional attachment order is set aside by the High Court, does not per se result in nullifying the adjudication proceedings, which, can proceed and need to be taken to its logical end by the Adjudicating Authority in accordance with law. Kaushalya Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Union of India | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 161

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - Section 5(1) - The power to provisionally attach tainted property is only of the authorised officer upon being satisfied about the existence of circumstances referred to in Section 5(1). Kaushalya Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Union of India | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 161

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - Section 5, 17 and 18 - The adjudication gets triggered after the complaint under Section 5(5) is filed before the adjudicating authority or on an application under Section 17(4) and also 18(10) of the Act. Kaushalya Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Union of India | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 161

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - Section 8 -The adjudication under Section 8 entails finally in confiscation of the tainted property or release thereof. Kaushalya Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Union of India | 7 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 161

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, Section 6 - Once, prima facie, it appears from the material before the Court that the appellant was barely thirteen years of age on the date when the alleged offence took place, both the grounds, namely that "there was a love affair" between the appellant and the second respondent as well as the alleged refusal to marry, are circumstances which will have no bearing on the grant of bail. Having regard to the age of the prosecutrix and the nature and gravity of the crime, no case for the grant of bail was established. The order of the High Court granting bail has to be interfered with since the circumstances which prevailed with the High Court are extraneous in view of the age of the prosecutrix, having regard to the provisions of Section 376 of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO. X (Minor) v. State of Jharkhand | 22 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 194

Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Any act of sexual assault or sexual harassment to the children should be viewed very seriously and all such offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment on the children have to be dealt with in a stringent manner - Cases of sexual assault or sexual harassment on the children are instances of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of such debased sexual pleasure. (Para 10) Nawabuddin v. State of Uttarakhand | 8 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - No leniency can be shown to an accused who has committed the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012 and particularly when the same is proved by adequate evidence before a court of law - By awarding a suitable punishment commensurate with the act of sexual assault, sexual harassment, a message must be conveyed to the society at large that, if anybody commits any offence under the POCSO Act of sexual assault, sexual harassment or use of children for pornographic purposes they shall be punished suitably and no leniency shall be shown to them. (Para 10) Nawabuddin v. State of Uttarakhand | 8 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Section 3(b) - Penetrative sexual assault - When it has been established and proved that the accused penetrated his finger in the vagina and because of that the victim girl felt pain and irritation in urination as well as pain on her body and there was redness and swelling around the vagina found by the doctor, the case would fall under Section 3(b) of the POCSO Act. (Para 8) Nawabuddin v. State of Uttarakhand | 8 Feb 2022 | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 142