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Low Conviction Rates In ED Cases Not A Ground To Decide Validity Of PMLA Provisions, Says Supreme Court During Hearing
Mehal Jain
17 Feb 2022 7:31 PM IST
The Supreme Court on Thursday remarked that the constitutional validity of the provisions of the PMLA Act cannot be judged on the basis of the performance of the Executive or the police or the inability to take the prosecution to its logical end or the low rate of conviction or the low rate of appeals against acquittal.On Wednesday, Senior Advocate Maneka Guruswamy, for one of the...
The Supreme Court on Thursday remarked that the constitutional validity of the provisions of the PMLA Act cannot be judged on the basis of the performance of the Executive or the police or the inability to take the prosecution to its logical end or the low rate of conviction or the low rate of appeals against acquittal.
On Wednesday, Senior Advocate Maneka Guruswamy, for one of the petitioners, had told the Court that of the 1700 raids conducted and 1569 specific investigations by the ED- with rates increasing by 20% every year, and then doubling and tripling- since 2011, only 9 convictions have been secured. "What the agency has been able to secure in hundreds and hundreds of cases has been attachment of property, arrest, months of scheduled and unscheduled interrogation, seizing of properties, signing of documents, self-incrimination, resulting in a violation of well-established principles that we agreed to in 1950 when the Constitution came in", she had urged.
On Thursday, Dr. Guruswamy highlighted the big jump in the number of asset attachment orders from 2019-2020 onwards. "The idea is not to show that it happened during 'A' regime or 'B' regime'", she clarified.
She continued to submit that in view of the number of investigations initiated, attachments, arrests and interrogations made, investigations concluded, and juxtaposed with this low rate of conviction, the logical expectation would be of more appeals. But she indicated that the reality could not be more different- "That is the disturbing bit. In 2010-11, no appeals were filed! Again in 2011-12, no appeals!"
Justice A. M. Khanwilkar asked, "Is it a reflection on investigation or the trial? Maybe the trial assistance is such...?"
The judge continued to ask if, with this data, Dr. Guruswamy was hinting that the Act is being abused.
She replied, "The larger question that I ask myself as an officer of the court is that if this is the effort being made for initiating investigations, if this is the effort being made to conclude the investigation, then what is causing this state of affairs (of few convictions and low rate of appeals)"
Justice Khanwilkar observed, "This argument can also be used by the other side to say that this argument of bogey of presumption affecting the accused concerned is untenable because despite that presumption, there are acquittals. Such arguments cannot be the basis..."
"But then the process is the punishment! The ED will make attachments, you won't get a copy of the ECIR, lawyers won't know the template because there is no procedural manual!...There are 220 cases where the ED does not know what the predicate offence is! And 959 crores have been seized in respect of them!", submitted Dr. Guruswamy.
Justice Khanwilkar noted, "Maybe that is because they are 3rd parties and they haven't committed the predicate offence. We cannot use this material to hold against them. They must be collaborators in money laundering, not named accused in the predicate offence. That is a possibility...This doesn't take us anywhere, don't focus on this. We cannot judge the validity of the provision on the basis of the performance of the executive or the police; it has to be valid or invalid on its own, not on the basis of inefficiency or the inability to take the prosecution to its logical end, ending with conviction only"
Justice Dinesh Maheshwari added, "Even if very good returns are there, and if it is otherwise violative of the constitutional scheme, good returns will also not make it constitutional. The figures, numbers, statistics, maths don't lead us to that conclusion. What has happened and what has not happened in a particular individual case will not lead us anywhere"
Justice Khanwilkar continued, "We have reservations about this proposition that the number of convictions will determine the validity of the Act- unless you can support it with some precedent"
Next, she urged that by virtue of section 50(3) of the PMLA, the person summoned must give a statement which comports with the perception of truth of the agency, failing which they are threatened with consequences under section 63, whereunder they can be imprisoned. Dr. Guruswamy also emphasised the impact of such evidence in view of the fact that the Act envisages the same court to try both the PMLA offence as well as the scheduled offence.
"The issue in the joint trial, so to speak, is that in such parallel proceedings, you are appreciating the same evidence with regard to the same parties, but then you have to exclude it for one part of the offence and include it for the other part of the offence. And sometimes on the same day and at the same time, at the same moment. As a judge, I have a file which has evidence that I cannot rely on in one trial. The judicial mind is here expected to not only distinguish different journeys of what is admissible and what is not, but in fact distinguish between two different sets of rights, two different universes of rights, essentially pertaining to the same accused, the same witness and essentially the same cause of action", she submitted.
Justice Khanwilkar asked, "There are situations where the same persons have been sometimes investigators, sometimes prosecutors, and sometimes judges also. It is multitasking which is done at the highest level. The training is already there, only then they are able to perform that way"
Justice Maheshwari added, "On our boards also, we have a petition under Article 136 in a leave to appeal, a statutory appeal under 62 of IBC, etc. The approach is different for all. But judicial minds are trained for that. The special judge is also dealing with a variety of matters- there are bailable offences, non-bailable offences. Even in the criminal trials, they are having parallel trials in relation to the same event"
Justice Khanwilkar continued, "Your mind is trained that way, it is part of training. As judges, you know the distinction between revision, first appeal and second appeal and jurisdiction under 226. The same judge is doing all this. That doesn't mean he is not able to decipher what is the substantial question of law and for the purpose of 136, what is the substantial question of law of great public importance. That is no basis to question the procedure itself"
Justice Maheshwari noted, "The so-called evidence as you are referring to in section 50, if the two trials are continuing together, then in the PMLA case, the 'proceeds of crime' is the conclusion foregone so far as the ED is concerned- that there is not only the crime but proceeds also. Once it is suggested that you have that document before you in relation to the predicate office, are we then jumbling or clubbing the 2? They are separate trials"
Justice Khanwilkar opined, "The jurisdictional facts are different in both the trials. Here, it starts with the presumption that there are proceeds of crime from the offence committed by the same person. This trial proceeds on that basis. It is not to inquire into the fact whether the predicate offence has been committed. The Special Court has no jurisdiction to do that"
Continuing, the judge asked, "You are presuming that at the same time he is going to record evidence. It cannot happen that way. How can you be recording evidence for both the trials together? That observation we will make if you give us a specific case where the trial court has recorded one evidence and then recorded it separately, for two trials. Show us one case at least?"
"When the judge is hearing both these arguments, he has to appreciate it with different levels of what is excluded and what cannot be included...", pressed Dr. Guruswamy.
Justice Maheshwari noted, "This particular line of argument is from the presumption that some inadmissible evidence would indeed be inserted or taken into consideration in either of the trials. What we feel is that it will depend on a given situation. If the inadmissible portion of the statement or evidence is taken into consideration, that can always be dealt with. but the provision does not envisage that"
Dr. Guruswamy relied on a 2021 decision of the Supreme Court in a suo motu matter taking note of common deficiencies which occur in the course of criminal trials and certain practices adopted by trial courts in criminal proceedings as well as in the disposal of criminal cases and causes, where the Draft Criminal Rules on Practice were enunciated. She indicated the Rule regarding the marking of confessional statements, that "Presiding Officers shall ensure that only admissible portion of Section 8 or Section 27 Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is marked and such portion alone is extracted on a separate sheet and marked and given an exhibit number"
"This is the care which your lordships have taken when it comes to issues of admissibility and inadmissibility of confessional statements. As regards section 50, the concern about the admission of the inadmissible is that it will also come into the predicate offence", she submitted.
[Section 50(3), PMLA] 'Article 20(3) protection applicable only in predicate offence or even in subsequent offence of money laundering under PMLA?; What is admissible in evidence is a matter for trial, how does 50(3) become bad?'- SC
Senior Advocate Aabad Ponda, on the petitioners' side, advanced that while he is not challenging the ED's power to summon under section 50(2), his challenge is to the three arenas of section 50(3) in as much as it requires that all the persons so summoned shall be- 1. bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined; 2. or make statements, and 3. produce such documents as may be required.
He indicated that analogous provisions to section 50(3) are found in 4 different statutes- section 171A of sea customs act, section 108 of customs act, section 14 of the central excise act, and section 40 of fera, which dont take into account the Cr. P. C. or police route.
"All these are also not enquiry- Section 40 of the FERA is an investigation unlike the other three. Therefore, the argument of the other side, which I am anticipating, is that these persons are not police officers, that they are equivalent to FERA/FEMA and that when you have equivalent provisions there, you cannot challenge the vires of 50(3) under PMLA", he submitted.
He indicated the 1968 constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in ramesh chandra mehta's case where it was held that in customs and in Fera, the person does not stand in the character of an accused because there is no FIR and no complaint and so Article 20(3) cannot apply.
"In PMLA, in a given case maybe they don't have to register an FIR, but the normal rule in PMLA, which is different from customs and FERA, is that you must have an FIR which is the predicate offence FIR. Once that FIR is lodged, the person stands in the position of accused. That is the difference between PMLA and customs. When that person was summoned under customs and FERA, there was no FIR and therefore 20(3) was not hit. That is why the constitutionality of FERA and customs was upheld. Under PMLA, while he can be summoned, while he must attend, he cannot be forced to make incriminating statements against himself", he submitted.
"A person is duty-bound to attend if summoned. But my submission is that when the accused appears, he cannot be asked to give incriminating answers or make oral statements or give incriminating documentary evidence, unless voluntary", he continued.
Justice Khanwilkar said, "The exception is that he must produce all the relevant records. You are saying he cannot be forced to be a witness against himself. But how can you say I will not give the records if you have them? How will investigation of crime proceed then?
Mr. Ponda replied that documents are also evidence and that the person summoned must answer only non-incriminating questions. "The law is very settled now that testimental compulsion is not only for oral evidence but documents also. Under 20(3), the protection to the person who stands in the character of an accused in an FIR is not just limited to oral", he submitted.
Justice Khanwilkar asked, "Just because there is a predicate offence against you, can you say that the agency will have no access to your records for the purpose of investigation? Admissibility part can be gone into later"
In response, Mr. Ponda indicated the 1964 Supreme Court decision in Shyamlal Mohanlal's case where it was held that "Art. 20(3) has been construed by this Court in Kalu Oghad's case to mean that an accused person cannot be compelled to disclose documents which are incriminatory and based on his knowledge. Section 94, Criminal Procedure Code, permits the production of all documents including the above mentioned class of documents. If s. 94 is construed to include an accused person, some unfortunate consequences follow. Suppose a police officer and here it is necessary to emphasise that the police officer has the same powers as a Court-directs an accused to attend and produce or produce a document. According to the accused, he cannot be compelled to produce this document under Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. What is he to do ? If he refuses to produce it before the Police Officer, he would be faced with a prosecution under s. 175, Indian Penal Code, and in this prosecution he could not contend that he was not legally bound to produce it because the order to produce is valid order if s. 94 applies to an accused person...Thus it seems to us that if we construe s. 94 to include an accused person, this construction is likely to lead to grave hardship for the accused and make investigation unfair to him"
"They can seize the documents, ask my manager to provide the same- I can't stop that. But me being forced is the issue", submitted Mr. Ponda.
Justice Khanwilkar observed, "The local police cannot compel. But under the statutory law, if FIR is registered, he won't even produce before the income ax authorities or before the ED? Say, under the GST Act, for verification purposes, documents are asked to be produced. You will say my FIR is registered so I will not produce documents?"
"In case of PMLA, ED officer is operating on the assumption that FIR is registered in respect of an offence from which the property is derived. He is registering FIR for money laundering offence which is subsequent to the predicate offence. 20(3) will be applicable to predicate offence and not to subsequent offence. PMLA offence works on its own. It is governed by PMLA provisions. Can 20(3) protection be invoked there?", asked the judge
Justice Maheshwari observed, "The Evidence Act is not ruled out in its applicability to PMLA. As to a fact specifically within your knowledge, in terms of the requirements of 106 evidence act, you are not duty-bound to state that which is specifically in your knowledge? Even with the safeguards which are already available under section 27 of the evidence act, with reference to the decisions of this court? Also, once you attend section 50 proceedings, thereafter in the trial, what is to be used and what is not to be used with reference to the safeguards of article 20 is a matter different. But say, when you are charged for travelling without a ticket, the onus that you had the ticket is on you. Because you are called under section 50, to make statement or divulge the documents, how does that provision become bad, with reference to all the safeguards already available? Ultimately, what is admissible or acceptable in evidence in trial is a different matter"
Mr. Ponda responded, "106 has no applicability at the stage of investigation. Where the person chooses to remain silent, he stands to suffer the risk of his silence at trial. I am travelling without ticket, if I choose not to say I have the ticket, I will pay the price for it"
Justice Maheshwari repeated, "All that is a matter for consideration at trial. How does section 50 become bad?"
"My submission is that today, the officials are arresting people for not confessing before them- they rely on 50(3) and say you are not cooperating or giving information incriminating in nature and so we will arrest you- and they are using it to extend remand. It is in violation of 20(3), and not a matter to be taken up in trial, it affects my spinal cord of liberty!", urged Mr. Ponda. He clarified that his submission applies only to those persons named as accused in the FIR.
Justice Khanwilkar noted, "PMLA offence is another offence, it is not the predicate offence. The course of action in PMLA is independent of predicate offence. There has to be property generated in that predicate offence which becomes actionable under the PMLA. It is a separate event altogether. In respect of it, whether there will be this embargo is what you have to point out"
"Suppose I am charged with cheating. There is an FIR. If PMLA authorities investigate proceeds of crime which relate to cheating, I may say that it will affect my case in the cheating FIR and I have the right to stay silent", responded Mr. Ponda
Case : Vijay Madanlal Choudhury and others vs Union of India and others Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 4634/2014 and connected cases.
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