Assassination Or Bodily Injury Not Necessary For Offence Under Sec 121A IPC : Supreme Court Upholds Life Sentence In IISc Terror Attack Case

While doing so, a three judge bench of Justices UU Lalit, Hemant Gupta and S Ravindra Bhat observed that under section 121 A of the Indian Penal Code [Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by section 121-waging war against India], the expression "overawe" would imply creation of an apprehension or situation of alarm and it would not be necessary that the danger should be one of assassination or bodily injury.

In this regard the judgment reads as follows,

"As the text of the relevant Section shows, persons who plan to overawe the Central or the State Government by criminal force or show of criminal force would be guilty of offence of entering into conspiracy in terms of Section 121A of the IPC. The dictionary meaning of the expression "overawe" is to subdue or inhibit with a sense of awe. The expression "overawe" would thus imply creation of apprehension or situation of alarm and as rightly held by the Division Bench (in the case of Mir Hasan Khan v. State (or Ramanand v. State), it would not be necessary that the danger should be one of assassination of or of bodily injury to the members of the machinery or apparatus of the Government but the danger might as well be to public property or to the safety of members of the general public."

The Court held that conspiracy in the instant case, the intent of which was clear from the minutes of the meetings and the consequential acquisition of arms and explosives to effectuate the purpose and intent of said conspiracy, would thus come well within the latter part of the conspiracy dealt with in Section 121A of the IPC.

"As the explanation to Section 121A of the IPC discloses, for an offence of conspiracy, it would not be necessary that any act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance thereof. Thus, even though no untoward incident had actually of the IPC, the matter would still come within the four corners of Section 121A of the IPC", the bench said.

These pertinent observations came in an appeal plea filed by Mohammad Irfan and three others against the Karnataka High Court's decision to enhance their sentence from seven years to life term.

On December 28, 2005, two armed persons had entered the IISc campus in Bengaluru in a car and fired indiscriminately at the students and delegates who had come to attend a conference.

Out of the seven accused, one was acquitted of all the charges while one was awarded an eight year sentence and the other five were awarded a life sentence by the High Court.

On December 17, 2011, the trial court had awarded the accused a punishment of seven years.

Arguments of parties

Seeking to set aside the High Court order, the counsel appearing for the accused (appellants) contended that 8 prosecution witnesses failed to support the prosecution's case and that there was no substantial evidence on the basis of which allegations against the accused could be substantiated.

It was then argued that the basic charges, under Sections 121 (Waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India), 153A (Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony) and 153B (Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national-integration) of the IPC were not established and the only subsisting charge was one under Section 121A of the IPC, which was also devoid of any substance.

Further, the recovery of explosive substances, diary and other material, by themselves were insufficient to sustain the charge under Section 121A of the IPC.

As per Section 120B(1) and Section 115 of the IPC, where the basic offence under Section 121 was not committed, therefore, the sentence could not be greater than seven years. Moreover, the trial court had awarded a substantive sentence of imprisonment for seven years under Section 121A of the IPC. Under the circumstances, there was no reason for the High Court to enhance the quantum of punishment to life imprisonment. The facts on record did not justify such exercise, claimed the accused.

The counsel for Accused one (A-1) also argued that he wasn't involved in the said conspiracy. The only involvement of A-1 was the fact that he had attended the first meeting of the Trust, but since A1 did not understand Kannada language, signature below the text in Kannada would not make A-1 liable in any manner in the absence of any other substantial evidence or material, it was argued.

Finally, it was argued that under Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sanction to prosecute the Accused for having committed offence punishable inter alia under Chapter VI of the IPC was mandatory and the sanction placed on record did not satisfy the requirements.

In an attempt to resist the submissions of the accused, the counsel for the State government argued that,

The material on record, especially huge quantities of explosive substances as well as the literature and books recovered at the instance of the concerned accused put the matter beyond any doubt. It also made a case for enhanced punishment.

Also, the movements of A-1, who was not a local person in the town around the time when the meetings had taken place lent further corroboration and supported the evidence concerning his involvement.

It was also pointed out that the sanction accorded under Section 196 of the CrPC was rightly held to be valid.

What the Supreme Court held

Firstly, the court affirmed the findings rendered by the Courts below that the sanction in terms of Section 196 of the Code was valid and proper.

The Bench noted that on December 10, 2003, a meeting was organised and all 4 accused along with other members including few of the prosecution witnesses attended the same. The minutes of the meeting disclosed the intent and the objective with which the materials, such as guns and bombs were to be procured or collected. Also, the recoveries made at the instance of the other accused show that the very intent and object as discussed in the first meeting was being carried forward by these accused with the acquisition of the arms.

These facts not only show that the basic elements of the conspiracy have been well established but also prove the involvement of A-1, the court pointed out.

"Going by the law laid down by this Court, A-1 cannot escape the liability only on the ground that no arms and ammunition or any inflammatory material or literature were actually recovered from him."

Along with this, the court added,

"The conspiracy, the basic features of which were structured in the first meeting of 2003, was a continuing one; which is evident from the minutes of the subsequent meetings and translation of the intent into procurement of arms and explosives. It can neither be stated that the thread which was running through subsequent events and circumstances was broken or that the link between the first meeting and the subsequent stages was in any way snapped."

Coming to Section 121-A of the IPC, the court reiterated that the provision dealt with conspiracy to commit offences punishable under Section 121 of the IPC as well as conspiracy to overawe by force, the Central Government or any State Government. So in terms of its application, the width of Section 121-A is not confined to conspiracy to commit offences punishable under Section 121 of the IPC alone, the court added.

"The conspiracy in the instant case, the intent of which was clear from the minutes of the meetings and the consequential acquisition of arms and explosives to effectuate the purpose and intent of said conspiracy, would thus come well within the latter part of the conspiracy dealt with in Section 121A of the IPC. As the explanation to Section 121A of the IPC discloses, for an offence of conspiracy, it would not be necessary that any act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance thereof. Thus, even though no untoward incident had actually happened as a result of the conspiracy, the matter would still come within the four corners of Section 121A of the IPC."

While rejecting the appeal pleas, the court highlighted that the conspiracy in the present case, if executed, would have resulted in great damage to life and well-being of the public. Therefore, such conspiracies have to be dealt with seriously.

"The conspiracy as disclosed in the instant matter, if it had been carried out, would have resulted in great damage and prejudice to the life and well-being of the members of the general public as well as loss to the public property. Such conspiracies to cause danger to public property or to the safety of the members of the general public ought to be dealt with strictly. Considering the acquisition of substantial quantity of arms and explosives as well as the intent disclosed by diary Exh. P-92, and other materials on record, the High Court was right in enhancing the sentence after accepting the appeal preferred by the State in that behalf."

Case Title: MOHAMMAD IRFAN VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA

Citation : 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 590

Summary  : Supreme Court upheld the conviction and life sentence of four persons for causing the terror attack at the Indian Institute of Science in Bengaluru in December, 2005.

Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 121A - Conspiracy to wage war against India- The dictionary meaning of the expression "overawe" is to subdue or inhibit with a sense of awe. The expression "overawe" would thus imply creation of apprehension or situation of alarm and as rightly held by the Division Bench (in the case of Mir Hasan Khan v. State (or Ramanand v. State), it would not be necessary that the danger should be one of assassination of or of bodily injury to the members of the machinery or apparatus of the Government but the danger might as well be to public property or to the safety of members of the general public.

Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 121A -  As the explanation to Section 121A of the IPC discloses, for an offence of conspiracy, it would not be necessary that any act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance thereof. Thus, even though no untoward incident had actually of the IPC, the matter would still come within the four corners of Section 121A of the IPC.

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