Delay & Laches Vital In Service Matters, Can Be Seen As Acquiescence: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court, while rejecting the belated service-related claim made by one Bichitrananda Behera pertaining to the post of Physical Education Trainer, held that ground of delay and laches in such cases amounts to acquiescence which means an implied and reluctant consent to an act.The Court also noted that Behera, in the period of over 12 years had not moved before any forum, be it a Court of Law or a Tribunal or an Authority asserting his claims qua the solitary post of PET in the School in question. In view of this, the Court held:“On an overall circumspection, thus, in the present case the Respondent No.5(Behera) should have been non-suited on the ground of delay and laches, which especially in service matters, has been held consistently to be vital, juxtaposed with the sign of acquiescence.”Reliance was placed upon Union of India v. N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25 wherein with respect to Acquiescence, it was observed:“Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place.”The present appeal assails the Judgment dated 18.01.2017 passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack wherein it dismissed the appeal filed by one Bichitrananda Behera against judgment of the State Education Tribunal, Orissa directing the State to approve the appointment of one Pramod Kumar Mohanty/ Respondent No.5 on the post of Physical Education Trainer (PET) in the Gram Panchayat School, Sailo at Nadhana (School) and release of block grant in his favour with effect from 01.01.2004.Brief Facts After the constitution of first stop management committee, in the aforementioned School, as a as a stop gap arrangement, the Committee was reconstituted by the Inspector of Schools, through its order dated 15.12.1992. However, the Inspector of Schools on 28.12.1992 modified the composition of the Managing Committee by substituting some names. Pursuant to this, before the High Court, the approval given to the Managing Committee constituted on 28.12.1992 was challenged by the Secretary of the Managing Committee constituted on 15.12.1992. The High Court, by its interim order dated 11.01.1993, stayed the operation of the order dated 28.12.1992. At this stage, it must be noted that the Managing Committee constituted on 15.12.1992 appointed the appellant on the post of PET on 14.05.1994.After around two years, the interim order of the High Court was vacated on 18.12.1995, as term of the Managing Committee approved on 15.12.1992 stood expired. Later, when applications were invited to receive block grant(s) under the Grant-in-Aid Order, 2004 with effect from 01.01.2004, the Inspector of Schools passed an order on 02.04.2005 approving the appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff, where the name of Bichitrananda Behera/ appellant found place and he was held entitled to receive the Block Grant.Consequently, Pramod Kumar Mohanty/ Respondent No.5 challenged the approval order of the appellant before the Tribunal. The Respondent No.5 claimed to be continuing as the PET in the school in question w.e.f. 10.01.1993 on the basis of Resolution dated 07.01.1993 issued by the Managing Committee constituted on 28.12.1992.The Tribunal vide judgment dated 15.11.2008 quashed the order dated 02.04.2005 by which approval was given to the service of the appellant and further directed approval of the appointment of Respondent No.5 and for release of block grant in his favour w.e.f. 01.01.2004. The challenge by the instant appellant to the same before the High Court came to be rejected by the Impugned Judgment.Court's ObservationsAppointment of Appellant and Respondent No. 5To begin with, the Court while addressing the facts of the present case, noted that the appellant was appointed by the Managing Committee constituted on 15.12.1992 and given appointment on 14.05.1994 during the time when a stay order granted by the High Court in favour of the Managing Committee constituted on 15.12.1992 was continuing i.e., since 11.01.1993.“Thus, the appointment made by the said Managing Committee (constituted on 15.12.1992) of the appellant cannot be labelled illegal per se nor termed void ab initio.,” the Court opined. Further, on the legal aspect, the Court also took into consideration that the Managing Committee constituted on 15.12.1992 continued for its full term by virtue of the interim and final order of the High Court, the appellant continued to discharge the duties on the post right since his appointment on 14.05.1994. The same is also backed up by the relevant...

Delay & Laches Vital In Service Matters, Can Be Seen As Acquiescence: Supreme Court

Gyanvi Khanna

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