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Complete Supreme Court Half Yearly...

Complete Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest 2024 [Part-1]

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK

8 Oct 2024 2:17 PM IST

Acquittal

Appeal from acquittal – Principles of deciding – Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive i.e. inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary. Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge. If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed. If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal. If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts. In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court. (Para 36) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Reversing the order of acquittal into conviction – The High Court had erred in reversing the decision of acquittal, without arriving at any finding of illegality or perversity or error in the reasoning of the Trial Court. Setting aside an order of acquittal, which signifies a stronger presumption of innocence, on a mere change of opinion is not permissible. A low standard for turning an acquittal into conviction would be fraught with the danger of failure of justice. In reversing the order of acquittal, what is required is an illegality or perversity in order of trial court. (Para 34 & 39) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Administration of Justice

In the instant case, we find initiation of criminal proceedings before a forum which had no territorial jurisdiction by submitting incorrect facts and giving frivolous reasons to entertain such complaints. A closer look at the respondent's actions reveals more than just an inappropriate use of jurisdiction. The core issue of the dispute, which involves financial transactions and agreements, clearly places it in the realm of civil and commercial law. Yet, the respondent chose to pursue criminal charges in a quest to abuse the criminal justice system with a motive to seek personal vengeance rather than seeking true justice. This unnecessary turning of a civil matter into a criminal case not only overburdens the criminal justice system but also violates the principles of fairness and right conduct in legal matters. The apparent misuse of criminal proceedings in this case not only damages trust in our legal system but also sets a harmful precedent if not addressed. Dinesh Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : AIR 2024 SC 574

Supreme Court delivers split verdict on appointment of Shiksha Karmi's in Madhya Pradesh. Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 279

Unscrupulous litigants should not be allowed to go scot-free. They should be put to strict terms and conditions including costs. It is time to check with firmness such litigation initiated and laced with concealment, falsehood, and forum hunting. Even State actions or conduct of government servants being party to such malicious litigation should be seriously reprimanded. Dinesh Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : AIR 2024 SC 574

Vulnerable Witnesses Deposition Centres (VWDCs) - All the High Courts to take necessary steps for setting up of VWDCs in all districts. This exercise must be completed on or before 30 April 2024. (Para 2) Smruti Tukaram Badade v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 43

Administrative Law

While the primary duty of constitutional courts remains the control of power, including setting aside administrative actions that may be illegal or arbitrary, it must be acknowledged that such measures may not singularly address repercussions of abuse of power. It is equally incumbent upon the courts, as a secondary measure, to address the injurious consequences arising from arbitrary and illegal actions. This concomitant duty to take reasonable measures to restitute the injured is our overarching constitutional purpose. This is how we have read our constitutional text, and this is how we have built our precedents on the basis of our preambular objective to secure justice. (Para 19) Manoj Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 143 : AIR 2024 SC 1265 : (2024) 3 SCC 563

In public law proceedings, when it is realised that the prayer in the writ petition is unattainable due to passage of time, constitutional courts may not dismiss the writ proceedings on the ground of their perceived futility. In the life of litigation, passage of time can stand both as an ally and adversary. Our duty is to transcend the constraints of time and perform the primary duty of a constitutional court to control and regulate the exercise of power or arbitrary action. By taking the first step, the primary purpose and object of public law proceedings will be subserved. (Para 20) Manoj Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 143 : AIR 2024 SC 1265 : (2024) 3 SCC 563

Recruitment - Reserved Female Category - Non-Creamy Layer (NCL) - The Appellant i.e., a candidate who was scrupulously following the terms and conditions of the Impugned Advertisement was constrained to apply under the 'Open General Category' only on account of certain logistical limitations preventing her from obtaining a valid NCL Certificate. Held, the Appellant cannot be unfairly deprived of the benefit of female reservation merely on account of the Appellant's honesty and restraint which did not allow her to mark 'yes' against a column inquiring about a prospective candidates' status as a person belonging to the NCL, in the absence of the underlying supporting document. (Para 16 & 17) Priyanka Prakash Kulkarni v. Maharashtra Public Service Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 107

Adverse Possession

Declaration of title can be sought based on adverse possession. (Para 5) IDU v. Nizam Din, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 82

Tenants cannot claim adverse possession against their landlords since their possession is permissive in nature. (Para 9.4) Brij Narayan Shukla v. Sudesh Kumar @ Suresh Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : AIR 2024 SC 241 : (2024) 2 SCC 590

Guidelines for Prevention of Misleading Advertisements and Endorsements of Misleading Advertisements, 2022; Guideline No. 8, 12 & 13 – Held, advertisers/advertising agencies and endorsers are equally responsible for issuing false and misleading advertisements. Such endorsements that are routinely made by public figures, influencers, celebrities etc. go a long way in promoting a product. It is imperative for them to act with a sense of responsibility when endorsing any product and take responsibility for the same. It is the duty of manufacturers, service providers, advertisers and advertising agencies to ensure that the trust of the consumer is not abused or exploited due to sheer lack of knowledge or inexperience. Due diligence is to be undertaken for endorsement of advertisements and requires a person who endorses a product to have adequate information about, or experience with a specific good, product or service that is proposed to be endorsed and ensure that it must not be deceptive. (Para 21) Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 381

Advocate

After the change of power from one political party to another, the States/Union Territories are changing their panel of Advocates appearing in this Court. Therefore, this Court is required to grant adjournments from time to time on the ground of change. It is true that the States/Union Territories have power to change their empanelled Advocates, but while doing so, they must ensure that the Court's functioning is not adversely affected. Therefore, it will be appropriate if the States/Union Territories while changing the panel of Advocates continue the old panel for at least 06 weeks so that the Courts are not forced to grant adjournments. Sachin Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 270

Issue of delayed payment of fees to lawyers representing the State - Continual instances where Advocates are forced to resort to legal action to recover fees from the State may dissuade skilled Members of the Bar from representing the State. Hence, it is imperative to implement a fair and efficient policy ensuring prompt and timely payment of fees to Advocates representing the State. (Para 2) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Gopal K. Verma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 137

The High Court has imposed costs on the ground that the advocate had made an attempt to mislead the court. An advocate who appears before the court is first and foremost an officer of the court and is expected to discharge duties in that capacity. The advocate in this case is a junior at the Bar. Being a junior at the Bar is not an immunity from observing proper code of behaviour, particularly in dealing with the court. Soneshwar Deka v. Birsing Deka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Act, 1966

Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Act, 1966 (Andhra Pradesh) – Ghee as a product of livestock – The inclusion of “ghee” as a livestock product cannot be faulted merely because it is not directly obtained from milk, which is a product of livestock, it would still be a “product of a product of livestock”. 'Ghee' is derived out of 'milk' by undergoing a process, yet it still remains a product of livestock, for the purposes of the Act and payment of “market fee”. (Para 10) Sangam Milk Producer Company Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : AIR 2024 SC 1423

Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Act, 1966 (Andhra Pradesh) – Section 3 & 4 – Difference between the notification made under Section 3 of the Act and notification made subsequently under Section 4 of the Act – Notification under Section 3 is a onetime measure where the Government notifies an area where purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock can be made. Whereas under Section 4 the Govt. declares the 'notified market area' in respect of any notified product (products which have already been notified under section 3 of the Act). A draft notification and hearing of objections to the draft notification is mandatory under Section 3 but a prior hearing or prior publication of the draft notification is not a requirement under Section 4. The notification in question is a notification under Section 4, hence, no prior process was required to be followed as contemplated under Section 3 of the Act for working the scheme under Section 4 of the Act. Hence, the challenge to the notification has rightly been turned down. (Para 11) Sangam Milk Producer Company Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : AIR 2024 SC 1423

Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Act, 1966 (Andhra Pradesh) –Section 4(3) – Liability to pay market fee – Unjust enrichment – Section 4(3) empowers Market Committees to establish markets within the notified area, also directs that these Market Committees have to provide facilities in the markets for the purchase and sale of notified products. The appellants have availed the facility given by the Market Committee and hence they are liable to pay the fee. (Para 13) Sangam Milk Producer Company Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : AIR 2024 SC 1423

Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Act, 1966 (Andhra Pradesh) – Purpose – To consolidate and amend the laws regulating the purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock, along with establishment of markets in connection therewith. The aim was to secure effective and remunerative price of commodities by bringing producers and traders face to face thereby eliminating middlemen and do away with some other earlier unethical trade practices, which were exploiting agriculturists and farmers. (Para 2) Sangam Milk Producer Company Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : AIR 2024 SC 1423

Ancient Monuments

Notwithstanding any liberal recommendation on undertaking blasting operations nearer to the Chittorgarh Fort, keeping in perspective the continuous exposure of ancient monuments to peak particle velocity (PPV) arising from blasting, a radius of five kilometres from the compound wall of the Fort shall not be subjected to mining by blasting or use of explosives for mining of any minerals. In other words, the manual/mechanical mining operations permitted within a radius of five kilometres are allowed to be continued, subject to the lessees possessing a valid lease in accordance with law. (Para 24.3) Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Bhanwar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : AIR 2024 SC 833

The Chittorgarh Fort represents the quintessence of a tribute to nationalism, courage, medieval chivalry, and sacrifice exhibited between the seventh and the sixteenth centuries by several rulers, like the Mewar rulers of Sisodia, their kinsmen, women, and children. The Chittorgarh Fort has weathered and withstood many battles and has been a witness to the power and pride of the kings who occupied the Fort. The history is replete with brave, extraordinary and indomitable courage exhibited by the rulers and occupants of the Fort. The Chittorgarh Fort is a notified monument under the Ancient and Historical Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains (Declaration of National Importance) Act, 1951 and the Ancient Monuments Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958, and also a notified UNESCO World Heritage Site. The Fort attracts tourists from far and near for sightseeing and to look at the tall and strong structures on the hilltop of Chittorgarh, evidencing the grit and ability to withstand all adversities. Despite the passage of centuries, from the time of construction, the Chittorgarh Fort retains some significant, world-class structures, including the Vijay Stambh, Kirti Stambh, Padmini Palace, Kumbha Palace and Meera Mandir. The Fort's history and legacy make it a preferred destination for tourists. The serene hillock, which had less populated surroundings at one point, is subject to contemporaneous development, urbanisation, etc. (Para 1 & 2) Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Bhanwar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : AIR 2024 SC 833

The Chittorgarh Fort was constructed in the Mauryan period, and from time to time, the rulers of the kingdom rebuilt, expanded and continued the legacy inherited. The Report of CSIR-CBRI, Roorkee, deals with the impact on the Chittorgarh Fort from the explosives used in mining and the peak particle velocity (PPV) on the structures existing in and around the Fort. The Report also deals with the ancillary causes for the present state of affairs, i.e., footfall of tourists, the presence of monkeys and haphazard maintenance by the ASI and local authorities. We are of the view that the approach to preserving the monument must be multidimensional. With the passage of every year, the need to preserve monuments increases. The prohibition and regulation of blasting would address only one front of the problems identified in the Report. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that the Chittorgarh Fort, a heritage monument, must be maintained and preserved under all the circumstances. (Para 22) Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Bhanwar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : AIR 2024 SC 833

Anticipatory Bail

Custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating into the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also not be a ground to release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for the purpose of investigation. (Para 12) Ashok Kumar v. State of Union Territory Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 223

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

An award could be said to be against the public policy of India in, inter alia, the following circumstances: 1. When an award is, on its face, in patent violation of a statutory provision 2. When the arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal has failed to adopt a judicial approach in deciding the dispute. 3. When an award is in violation of the principles of natural justice. 4. When an award is unreasonable or perverse. 5. When an award is patently illegal, which would include an award in patent contravention of any substantive law of India or in patent breach of the 1996 Act. 6. When an award is contrary to the interest of India, or against justice or morality, in the sense that it shocks the conscience of the Court. (Para 27) S.V. Samudram v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : AIR 2024 SC 447 : (2024) 3 SCC 623

Section 29A - A High Court which does not have original civil jurisdiction does not have the power to extend the time limit for passing of the arbitral award. Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC & C and C JV, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 425

Sections 34 and 37 - Modification of Arbitral Award not allowed under Section 34. Court could have at best set aside the award and could not modify the same. (Para 32.8) S.V. Samudram v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : AIR 2024 SC 447 : (2024) 3 SCC 623

Sections 34 or 37 - Whether the courts have the power to modify the arbitral award ? Referred to a larger Bench. Gayatri Balasamy v. Isg Novasoft Technologies Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 149

Section 34 & 37- Scope of interference of courts with arbitral awards – A judgment setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 is appealable under Section 37. The jurisdiction under Section 37 is akin to the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 and restricted to the same grounds of challenge as Section 34. As per section 37(3) of Arbitration Act, a recourse to Section 37 is the only appellate remedy available against a decision under Section 34 and no second appeal shall lie from an order passed under Section 37. Held, nothing in the section 37(3) takes away the constitutional right under Article 136 to grant Special Leave to Appeal against a decision rendered in appeal under Section 37. This is the discretionary and exceptional jurisdiction of this Court to grant Special Leave to Appeal and it is a third stage at which this court tests the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts acting under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. (Para 41, 42) Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : AIR 2024 SC 2070

Section 34 (2-A) – Grounds for setting aside an arbitral award – A domestic award may be set aside if the Court finds that it vitiated by 'patent illegality' appearing on the face of the award. It is patent illegality, if the decision of the arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at it; or the construction of the contract is such that no fair or reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the arbitrator is not even a possible view. A 'finding' based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside under the head of 'patent illegality'. An award without reasons would suffer from patent illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by deciding a matter not within his jurisdiction or violating a fundamental principle of natural justice. (Para 40) Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : AIR 2024 SC 2070

Section 25 – Termination of arbitral proceedings – The learned Arbitrator is bound to terminate the proceedings on grounds of failure of the claimant to file his statement of claim in accordance with Section 23, in view of Section 25(a). If the respondent to the proceedings fails to file a statement of defence in accordance with Section 23, in the light of Section 25(b), the learned Arbitrator is bound to proceed further with the arbitral proceedings. Even if the claimant, after filing a statement of claim, fails to appear at an oral hearing or fails to produce documentary evidence, the learned Arbitrator is expected to continue the proceedings as provided in Section 25(c). Held, The fact that clause (c) of Section 25 enables the Arbitral Tribunal to proceed in the absence of the claimant shows the legislature's intention that the claimant's failure to appear after filing the claim cannot be a ground to say that the proceedings have become unnecessary or impossible. (Para 10, 12 & 15) Dani Wooltex Corporation v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : AIR 2024 SC 2958

Section 32 – Grounds for termination of arbitral proceedings – Section 32 provides for the termination of the arbitral proceedings in the following contingencies: a. On making final arbitral award; b. On the Claimant withdrawing his claim as under Section 32(2)(a); c. Parties agreeing on termination of arbitral proceedings as under Section 32(2)(b); or d. When the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible for any other reason, as under Section 32(2)(c). Held, Section 32(2)(c) can be invoked for reasons other than those mentioned in Section 32(2)(a) & 32(2)(b). Under Section 32(2)(c), mere existence of a reason for terminating the proceedings is not sufficient and reason must be such that the continuation of the proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible. Further held, if, after filing a claim, the claimant fails to appear at an oral hearing or fails to produce documentary evidence, it cannot be said that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary and the learned Arbitrator can proceed with the arbitral proceedings. (Para 14 & 15) Dani Wooltex Corporation v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : AIR 2024 SC 2958

Section 32(2)(c) - Termination of arbitration proceedings on grounds that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible – Abandonment by the claimant of his claim makes the arbitral proceedings unnecessary. Mere absence in proceedings or failure to participate does not, per se, amount to abandonment. Only if the established conduct of a claimant is such that it leads only to one conclusion that the claimant has given up, his/her claim can an inference of abandonment be drawn. Held, there is no material on record to conclude that claimant had abandoned its claim. The finding of the learned Arbitrator that there was abandonment of the claim is not based on any documentary or oral evidence on record. Hence, the finding is entirely illegal. (Para 16 & 20) Dani Wooltex Corporation v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : AIR 2024 SC 2958

Section 32(2)(c) - Termination of arbitration proceedings on grounds that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible – Abandonment by the claimant of his claim makes the arbitral proceedings unnecessary. Only because a claimant, after filing his statement of claim, does not move the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for the hearing, the failure of the claimant, per se, will not amount to the abandonment of the claim. Held, the failure of the claimant to request the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for hearing, per se, is no ground to conclude that the proceedings have become unnecessary. (Para 21) Dani Wooltex Corporation v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : AIR 2024 SC 2958

Section 34 & 37 – Interference in arbitral award has limited scope under Section 34 and 37 – As far as the construction of the terms of a contract is concerned, it is for the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate upon. If, after considering the material on record, the Arbitral Tribunal takes a particular view on the interpretation of the contract, the Court under Section 34 does not sit in appeal over the findings of the arbitrator. The majority opinion of technical persons need not be subjected to a relook, especially when the learned Single Judge had also agreed with the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal. The findings of the majority in the Arbitral award is upheld. No merit in appeal. (Para 13 & 15) National Highway Authority of India v. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : AIR 2024 SC 2383

Withdrawal of arbitrator – An Arbitrator always has the option to withdraw for any reason. Therefore, he can withdraw because of the parties' noncooperation in the proceedings. But in such a case, his mandate will be terminated, not the arbitral proceedings. (Para 13) Dani Wooltex Corporation v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : AIR 2024 SC 2958

Section 48 – Enforcement of foreign award in India challenged on grounds of arbitral bias – In India, courts must adopt an internationally recognized narrow standard of public policy, when dealing with the aspect of bias. Refusal of enforcement of foreign award should only be in a rare case where, non- adherence to International Standards is clearly demonstrable. Held, cannot infer bias or likelihood of bias of the Presiding Arbitrator, hence there is no violation of the public policy, which would render the foreign award unenforceable in India. The award debtors have failed to substantiate their allegation of bias, conflict of interest or the failure by the Presiding Arbitrator to render disclosure to the parties, as an objection to the enforcement of the award. Courts across the world have applied a higher threshold of bias to prevent enforcement of an Award than the standards set for ordinary judicial review. The award debtors have failed to meet the high threshold for refusal of enforcement of a foreign award under Section 48 of the Indian Arbitration Act. The decision given by the High Court for enforcement/execution of the foreign award stands approved. (Para 22, 25, 36, 42 & 43) Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. Hsbc Pi Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 267

Section 48 – Challenge of Arbitral bias raised at the enforcement stage – Held, challenge of arbitral bias is raised at the enforcement stage, must be discouraged by Courts to send out a clear message that Indian Courts would ensure enforcement of a foreign Award unless it is demonstrable that there is a clear violation of morality and justice. No setting aside challenge based on bias was raised before the Singapore Courts by the appellants within the limitation period. Since the objection of bias was not raised in appropriate proceedings it could not be raised at the post-award Stage. Held, the Award Debtors should have applied for setting aside of the Award before the Singapore Courts at the earliest point of time. (Para 27, 29 & 42) Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. Hsbc Pi Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 267

Section 78(5) – Arbitration clause – Two-Contract Case – When the parties enter into a contract, making a general reference to another contract, such general reference would not have the effect of incorporating the arbitration clause from the referred document into the contract between the parties. The arbitration clause from another contract can be incorporated into the contract only by a specific reference to arbitration clause. A reference to the document in the contract should be such that shows the intention to incorporate the arbitration clause from another document into the contract between the parties. The present case is a 'two-contract' case. Clause 7.0 of the L.O.I. which also forms part of the agreement specifically provides that the redressal of the dispute between the NBCC and the respondent shall 'only' be through civil courts having jurisdiction of Delhi alone. When there is a reference in the second contract to the terms and conditions of the first contract, the arbitration clause would not ipso facto be applicable to the second contract unless there is a specific mention/reference thereto. The present case is not a case of 'incorporation' but a case of 'reference' and a general reference would not have the effect of incorporating the arbitration clause. The learned single judge of the Delhi High Court has erred in allowing the appointed the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. (Para 10, 12, 13, 21 & 23) Nbcc (India) Ltd. v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 246 : AIR 2024 SC 1941

The Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to proceedings for appointment of arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("A&C Act"), and a Court may refuse to make a reference if the claims, on the date of commencement of arbitration proceedings, are ex-facie barred. (Para 50) Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : AIR 2024 SC 1347

The Parliament should consider bringing an amendment to the Act, 1996 prescribing a specific period of limitation within which a party may move the court for making an application for appointment of arbitrators under Section 11 of the Act, 1996. (Para 94) Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : AIR 2024 SC 1347

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007; Section 31 - The recruitment was not confined to the priority / reserved class rather it was open for general category also in case vacancies remain available. The Recruitment application(s) clearly establishes that the appellants have applied as a general category candidate(s) against the surplus seats/vacancies remaining unfilled after considering the priority/reserved quota for relatives of servicemen/ex-servicemen, etc. In a situation, when they have not claimed any enrollment/recruitment on the basis of relationship with servicemen/ex-servicemen, there was no occasion for them to submit any relationship certificate. The discharge/dismissal of the appellants from service is vitiated on grounds that they have actually not produced any relationship certificate for selection/recruitment as they never applied in the reserved category. The discharge/dismissal order of the appellants is certainly invalid for want of nonconsideration of the plea taken by the appellants. (Para 17, 24) No.2809759H Ex-Recruit Babanna Machched v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 102 : AIR 2024 SC 921

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007; Section 31 - It was not the case of the respondents ever that the vacancies on which the appellants have been enrolled/recruited were only for the alleged reserved category and not for general category. Subsequent improvement in defence and supplementing reasoning of discharge/dismissal which is not contained in the order impugned is not permissible in law. (Para 23) No.2809759H Ex-Recruit Babanna Machched v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 102 : AIR 2024 SC 921

Bail

An accused, while joining investigation as a condition for remaining enlarged on bail, is not expected to make self-incriminating statements under the threat that the State shall seek withdrawal of such interim protection. Bijender v State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 209

Bail prayers are not to be indefinitely adjourned. Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate Of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 430

Bail condition restraining political activities violates fundamental rights, can't be imposed. Siba Shankar Das v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 259

Anticipatory bail cannot be granted merely because the accused is willing to pay an interim compensation. State of Jharkhand v. Md. Sufiyan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 54

Expeditious adjudication of bail matters - High Court's duty to ensure timely justice - Supreme Court's directive to High Court of Bombay - Constitutionality of Article 21 - Liberty of citizen paramount - Urgency in deciding bail applications emphasized. (Para 3 - 6) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159

Application for anticipatory bail was not decided for a period of more than four years. The Judges are not deciding the matter on merits but find an excuse to shunt the case on different grounds. Held, decide the matter pertaining to bail / anticipatory bail as expeditiously as possible. (Para 4 - 6) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159

Bail cannot be cancelled merely due to non-appearance of accused before court. Krishna Sharma v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Cancellation of Bail - Merely because the accused did not appear personally could not have been a ground for cancellation of bail. The parameters for grant of bail and cancellation of bail are totally different. The bail already granted may be cancelled, if it is found that the person who has been granted the benefit of bail has violated any of the conditions or misused the liberty by influencing the witnesses or tampering with the evidence. Krishna Sharma v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Cancellation of Bail – Grounds – Misuse of liberty – Participation in protest and expression of strong views – Non-violation of bail conditions. A. Duraimurugan Pandiyan Sattai @ Duraimurugan v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 313

Delays in the disposal of bail applications - Need for expeditious delivery of judgments - Bail applications should ideally be disposed of within two weeks, and anticipatory bail applications within six weeks. Despite these guidelines, the Court noted persistent delays and directed all courts to strictly adhere to the issued directions. The High Courts were left with the discretion to devise mechanisms for monthly checks on pending cases. (Para 5 – 9) Rajanti Devi @ Rajanti Kumari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 50

In the matters relating to liberty of a citizen every single day counts. Keeping the matter for regular bail pending for a period of almost 11 months deprives the petitioner of his valuable right of liberty. Amandeep Singh Dhall v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 399

No specific prayer for bail in appeal petition – Held, the plea for bail in the context of the present appeal is implicit. Since the appeal, in substance, is against the judgment by which prayer for bail was refused, merely based on the manner of framing of reliefs or prayers in the subject-petition, the actual relief sought by the appellant would not stand eclipsed. (Para 16) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Banking Law

A bank cannot be held responsible for illegal activities carried out by the borrower in mortgaged premises. Punjab National Bank v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 127

Rate of Interest on loan amount is a policy decision – The respondent No.1 being a NBFC and as a corporate body would be bound by its policies and procedures with regard to lending and recovery. In that regard, the applicability of the rate of interest to be charged is also a matter of policy and cannot be case-specific unless the individual agreement entered into between the parties indicate otherwise. (Para 10) Rajesh Monga v. Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : AIR 2024 SC 1305

Recipients of a fixed deposit cannot suffer at the cost of the criminal conduct of the Bank officials and that, in such an event the Bank would be held vicariously liable for the conduct of their employees. Leelawati Devi v. District Cooperative Bank Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 346

Bar Association

The Supreme Court directs minimum 1/3rd women's reservation in Supreme Court Bar Association posts from 2024 elections. Supreme Court Bar Association v. B.D. Kaushik, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 340

Cable Television Networks Rules, 1994

Rule 7 – Directions against misleading ads – Held, before an advertisement is printed/aired/displayed, a Self-declaration shall be submitted by the advertiser/advertising agency on the lines contemplated in Rule 7 of the Cable Television Networks Rules, 1994. The Self-declaration shall be uploaded by the advertiser/advertising agency on the Broadcast Sewa Portal run under the aegis of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. No advertisements shall be permitted to be run on the relevant channels and/or in the print media/internet without uploading the self-declaration as directed above. Further held, the directions shall be treated as the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. (Para 23 & 24) Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 381

Cash Transfer of Food Subsidy Rules, 2015

Cash Transfer of Food Subsidy Rules, 2015 – Object – To provide food subsidy in cash directly into the bank accounts of entitled households to purchase the entitled quantity of food grains from the open market. (Para 6) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

Caste / Religion

In cases where the scrutiny committee has decided the validation of the caste claim, the Courts should refrain from interfering unless the committee's decision suffers from any perversity. Navneet Kaur Harbhajansing Kundles v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, DeNotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000; Section 6, 7 & 9 and Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Denotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Rules, 2012; Rule 13, 14 & 17 – The power to deal with such verification has been specifically vested with Scrutiny Committee and it falls within the exclusive domain of it in view of Rule 13(b) of 2012 Rules and Section 6. Section 7 further empowers the Scrutiny Committee with suo motu powers or otherwise to call for record and enquire into correctness of a caste certificate if it is of the opinion that such certificate was obtained fraudulently and also vests the Committee with the power to cancel and confiscate the certificate in question in accordance with law. Such order of Scrutiny Committee is said to be final and protected from any challenge before any authority except High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India. For the purposes of verification, the Scrutiny Committee has all the powers of Civil Court while trying a civil suit. (Para 10 & 12) Navneet Kaur Harbhajansing Kundles v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Denotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000; Section 3 & 4 - The Caste Certificate issued by the Competent Authority under Section 4 would be valid subject to the verification and grant of Validity Certificate by the Scrutiny Committee. The certificate attains finality only if it is authenticated with a Validity Certificate. (Para 5) Sudhir Vilas Kalel v. Bapu Rajaram Kalel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : AIR 2024 SC 1010 : (2024) 3 SCC 679

We see no reason for mentioning the caste/religion of any litigant either before this Court or the courts below. Such a practice is to be shunned and must be ceased forthwith. It is therefore deemed appropriate to pass a general order directing that henceforth the caste or religion of parties shall not be mentioned in the memo of parties of a petition/proceeding filed before this Court, irrespective of whether any such details have been furnished before the courts below. A direction is also issued to all the High Courts to ensure that the caste/religion of a litigant does not appear in the memo of parties in any petition/suit/proceeding filed before the High Court or the Subordinate Courts under their respective jurisdictions. The above directions shall be brought to the notice of the members of the Bar as well as the Registry for immediate compliance. A copy of this order shall be placed before the Registrar concerned for perusal and for circulation to the Registrar Generals of all the High Courts for strict compliance. (Para 11 & 12) Shama Sharma v. Kishan Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 62

Central Excise Act, 1944

Central Excise Act, 1944; Section 11B - It entitles any person claiming refund of any duty of excise and interest to make an application for refund of such duty and interest before the expiry of one year from the relevant date (prior to 12.05.2000, it was six months instead of one year). (Para 9.2) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645

Central Excise Act, 1944; Section 11BB - It provides for interest on delayed refund. It says that if any duty ordered to be refunded under sub-section (2) of Section 11B to any applicant is not refunded within three months from the date of receipt of the application under subsection (1) of that section, there shall be paid to such applicant interest at such rate not below five percent and not exceeding thirty percent per annum as for the time being fixed by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette. (Para 9.3) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645

Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985

Note 3 to Chapter 18 and Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; Section 2(f) – Activities amounting to “manufacture” – Whether the labelling/re-labelling or putting additional labels on the product amounted to manufacture? – Note 3 contemplates three different processes and if either of the three processes are satisfied, the same would amount to manufacture. The three processes are: (i) labelling or re-labelling of containers; or (ii) repacking from bulk packs to retail packs; or (iii) the adoption of any other treatment to render the product marketable to the consumer. Held, in terms of Note 3 to Chapter 18, the process of re-labelling on both sides of the packs containing goods in the present case would amount to 'manufacture'. Hence, view taken by CESTAT that the credit and the rebate were rightly availed of by the respondent is correct and no interference is required. Appeal is dismissed. (Para 13.3, 15 & 16) Commissioner of Central Excise Belapur v. Jindal Drugs Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 374

Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004; Rule 3 – Held, rule 3 allows cenvat credit only in a case where the process undertaken amounts to manufacture. (Para 5.5) Commissioner of Central Excise Belapur v. Jindal Drugs Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 374

Central Goods and Services Act, 2017

Section 157 – Defense of 'Good faith' of statutory functionary– A good faith clause, is a provision of immunity to a statutory functionary against prosecution or legal proceedings. This immunity is limited and confined to acts done honestly and in furtherance of achieving the statutory purpose and objective. It is for the court or a judicial body to consider, adjudicate, and determine whether the claim that the action was done in good faith is made out or not depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. Held, observations made by High Court on the principle of good faith, is in the nature of advance rulings. Such tentative opinion of High court, even before the initiation of a suit, prosecution or legal proceeding, will affect the integrity and independence of that adjudication, compromising the prosecution and the defence equally. (Para 8, 9, 10 & 11) State of Gujarat v. Paresh Nathalal Chauhan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 295

Failure to implead necessary parties – Court must apply its mind whether the parties who are likely to be affected by an order have been impleaded to the proceedings. On failure to implead them, court must decline to pass an order of disposing of the petition in terms of the “Minutes of Order”. Only if the Court is satisfied that an order in terms of the “Minutes of the Order” would be legal, the Court can pass an order in terms of the “Minutes of Order”. An order passed without hearing the necessary parties would be illegal. While passing an order in terms of the “Minutes of Order”, the Court must record brief reasons indicating the application of mind. Held, on failure to implead the necessary parties, the High Court will be well within its power to dismiss the Writ Petition and pass an order of restoration of status quo. (Para 17, 19 & 22) Ajay Ishwar Ghute v. Meher K. Patel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 335

“Minutes of Order” – Object is to assist the Court – An order passed in terms of the “Minutes of Order” tendered on record by the advocates representing the parties to the proceedings is not a consent order. It is an order in invitum for all purposes. Before tendering the “Minutes of Order” to the Court, the advocates must consider whether an order, if passed by the Court in terms of the “Minutes of Order,” would be lawful. After “Minutes of Order” is tendered before the Court, it is the duty of the Court to decide whether an order passed in terms of the “Minutes of Order” would be lawful. (Para 19) Ajay Ishwar Ghute v. Meher K. Patel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 335

Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949

Section 11 (1) and Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955; Rule 27 – Punishment of compulsory retirement is challenged – The respondent was part of a disciplined force and has been found guilty of assaulting his colleague. The punishment of compulsory retirement is not shockingly disproportionate to the proven misconduct. Hence, there is no reason to interfere with the punishment awarded. The punishment of compulsory retirement awarded to the respondent is affirmed. (Para 35 & 36) Union of India v. Santosh Kumar Tiwari, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : AIR 2024 SC 2405

Section 11 (1) and Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955; Rule 27 – Validity of Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules – Whether Rule 27 to the extent it provides for punishments other than those specified in Section 11 of the CRPF Act, ultra vires the CRPF Act and as such inoperable and void? – Held, Section 11 expressly uses the phrase “subject to any rules made under this Act” which conveys the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other provisions subject to which it is made. When the enabling Act itself permits its modification by rules, the rules made prevail over the provision in the Act. Hence, the Central Government in exercise of its general rule-making power, can prescribe punishments other than those specified in section 11, including the punishment of compulsory retirement. Prescribing the punishment of compulsory retirement under Rule 27 cannot be said to be ultra vires Section 11 of the CRPF Act. (Para 28, 29, 32, 33) Union of India v. Santosh Kumar Tiwari, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : AIR 2024 SC 2405

Chartered Accountants Act, 1949

Chartered Accountants Act, 1949; Section 29A and 21A(4), Chartered Accountants (Procedure of Investigation of Professional and Other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007; Rule 9(3)(b) - Rule 9(3)(b) of subordinate legislation challenged as being ultra vires, on the ground that it exceeds the Rule making power under Section 29A(2)(c) of the parent Act. The power to make rules generally for carrying out the provisions of the Act is found in Section 29A(1). Section 29A(2) is only illustrative and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the general power of the Central Government to make rules under Section 29A(1). Even if specific topics are not explicitly listed in the statute, the formulation of rules can be justified if it falls within the general power conferred, provided it stays within the overall scope of the Act. The impugned Rule 9(3)(b) falls within the scope of the general delegation of power under Section 29A(1). Hence the Impugned Rule is not ultra vires the Parent Act. (Para 34 & 37) Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : AIR 2024 SC 1139

Principle of 'Generality vs Enumeration' - Where a statute confers particular powers without prejudice to the generality of a general power already conferred, the particular powers are only illustrative of the general power, and do not in any way restrict the general power. The illustrative list of subjects set out in Section 29A(2) cannot be read as exhaustive since the legislature has deployed the expression 'without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions' before enumerating the specific heads for exercising the rule-making power. (Para 32) Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : AIR 2024 SC 1139

Chartered Accountants (Procedure of Investigation of Professional and Other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007; Rule 9(3)(b) and The Chartered Accountants Act, 1949; Section 21A(4) and 29A - Rule 9(3)(b) of subordinate legislation challenged on the ground of being 'ultra vires' to Section 21A(4) of the parent Act. In cases where the Board disagrees with the opinion of the Director, under Section 21A(4) the Board may advise the Director to further investigate the matter. However, Rule 9(3) does not limit itself to directions for further investigation. It also enables the Board to straightaway proceed to act by itself or refer the matter to the Disciplinary Committee, depending on whether the alleged misconduct relates to the First Schedule or Second Schedule. The 'prima facie' opinion of the Director will become nothing but a final opinion if the Board will have no option except to direct the Director to further investigate the matter. The impugned Rule falls within the scope of the general delegation of power under Section 29A(1). (Para 19 & 37) Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : AIR 2024 SC 1139

The Supreme Court upheld a rule issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) barring Chartered Accountants from accepting more than the "specified number of tax audit assignments" (at present, the upper limit is set at 60) in a financial year. The rule (para 6.0 of Chapter VI of the Council Guidelines No. 1-CA(7)/02/2008 dt. 08/08/2008 and the subsequent amendments) are not violative of the fundamental right to practise profession guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The clause will be deemed to be effective from 01.04.2024 and quashed the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the members for violation of the clause. The ICAI will be at liberty to enhance the number of audits that a CA can undertake. Shaji Paulose v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 397

Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) - Role of the ICAI - ICAI has, over time, received recognition as a premier accounting body domestically and globally for maintaining the highest standards. The ICAI has also played a significant role in ensuring the dynamism of the CA course and the credibility of the examination. We commend that the ICAI must be committed towards the convergence of accounting and ethical standards with international standards. The true test, however, lies in enforcement of these standards. (Para 48) Shaji Paulose v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 397

Child Custody

Welfare of the child is of paramount consideration and will override any personal law or statute. The wishes/desire of the child who is capable of forming an opinion has to be considered by the court while deciding any matter of child custody. On interaction by the court with the child, it is found that the child is intelligent and capable of understanding her welfare and wishes to live with the Appellant. The welfare of the child lies with custody of the appellants. (Para 14, 16, 17 & 20) Shazia Aman Khan v. State of Orissa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 193 : AIR 2024 SC 1299

Civil Appeal

Application for condonation of delay filed by stranger to suit – Held, the approach of the trial court in entertaining an application filed at the behest of a stranger for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the subject suit is totally unsustainable in law and illegal. (Para 9) Vijay Laxman Bhawe v. P and S Nirman Pvt. Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : AIR 2024 SC 2280

The appellant was an elected representative. Held, the elected members cannot be removed at the whims and fancies of the civil servants or their political masters only because some of such elected members are found to be inconvenient within the system. The removal of the appellant from the office of Councilor/Vice-President with a further ban on him to contest election for six years is highly excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the so-called misconduct attributed to him. (Para 10, 11, 12) Makarand @ Nandu v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 354

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Amendment in pleadings – No evidence could be led beyond pleadings – Specific amendment in the pleadings was sought by the plaintiffs with reference to oral partition but the same was rejected by the trial court. In such a situation, where no further challenge was made to the rejection, the plaint attained finality and evidence with reference to oral partition cannot be considered. The Trial Court had rightly ignored the plea taken in the replication by the plaintiffs regarding oral partition, as amendment sought to that effect had already been declined. What was not permitted to be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. The High Court committed a grave error in placing reliance upon the partition which was not even the pleaded case. (Para 14, 15 & 16) Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai v. Kumar Vamanrao @ Alok, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : AIR 2024 SC 1310

Order 5 Rule 25 - Original Side Rules; Order IV - Institution of ordinary suits and service of summons - Service where defendant resides out of India and has no agent - In the present case, the appellant had appeared before the High Court at the stage when leave to sue was sought by the respondent. Leave to sue was granted on 24 January 2020. It was over two years thereafter on 9 March 2022 that an advocate's notice was issued to the appellant. From the advocate's notice, it is evident that the requirement of the High Court OS Rules, which have been noted earlier, were not complied with. The Advocate's notice contained no annexures or documents. It is not evident from the suit number referred to in the notice whether it was the same plaint in respect of which leave to sue had been granted two years earlier. (Para 19) Trois Corporation HK Ltd v. National Ventures Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Order 8, Rules 3 & 5 – Specific admission and denial of the pleadings in the plaint – A general or evasive denial is not treated as sufficient. Rule 5 provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied in the written statement, shall be taken to be admitted by the defendant. In the written statement filed by the appellants, no specific para-wise reply was given. The failure of the defendant to give a para wise reply against the claim made by the plaintiff would make the allegations made in the plaint as admitted against the defendant. As there is no specific admission or denial with reference to the allegation in different paras, it becomes a roving inquiry for the Court to find out as to which line in some paragraph in the plaint is either admitted or denied in the written statement filed. (Para 15) Thangam v. Navamani Ammal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : AIR 2024 SC 1324

Order 8 Rule 10 - Mere failure or neglect of a defendant to file a written statement controverting the pleaded facts in the plaint, in all cases, may not entitle him to a judgment in his favour unless by adducing evidence he proves his case/claim. (Para 18) Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : AIR 2024 SC 602

Order 9 Rule 13 - The order of the High Court directing a deposit of 75% of the suit claim as a condition precedent for condoning the delay and for setting aside the ex parte decree was unwarranted. The ends of justice would have been met if an order of costs was imposed on the appellant as a condition precedent for condoning the delay and for setting aside the ex parte decree. Imposing a requirement of a deposit of 75% of the suit claim is disproportionate and would have to be set aside. (Para 20) Trois Corporation HK Ltd v. National Ventures Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Order 14 Rule 2 - The question of jurisdiction would assume importance even at the stage a court considers the question of grant of interim relief. Where interim relief is claimed in a suit before a civil court and the party to be affected by grant of such relief, or any other party to the suit, raises a point of maintainability thereof or that it is barred by law and also contends on that basis that interim relief should not to be granted, grant of relief in whatever form, if at all, ought to be preceded by formation and recording of at least a prima facie satisfaction that the suit is maintainable or that it is not barred by law. Such a satisfaction resting on appreciation of the averments in the plaint, the application for interim relief and the written objection thereto, as well as the relevant law that is cited in support of the objection, would be a part of the court's reasoning of a prima facie case having been set up for interim relief, that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant and non-grant would cause irreparable harm and prejudice. It would be inappropriate for a court to abstain from recording its prima facie satisfaction on the question of maintainability, yet, proceed to grant protection pro tem on the assumption that the question of maintainability has to be decided as a preliminary issue under Rule 2 of Order XIV, CPC. That could amount to an improper exercise of power. If the court is of the opinion at the stage of hearing the application for interim relief that the suit is barred by law or is otherwise not maintainable, it cannot dismiss it without framing a preliminary issue after the written statement is filed but can most certainly assign such opinion for refusing interim relief. However, if an extraordinary situation arises where it could take time to decide the point of maintainability of the suit and non grant of protection pro tem pending such decision could lead to irreversible consequences, the court may proceed to make an appropriate order in the manner indicated above justifying the course of action it adopts. In other words, such an order may be passed, if at all required, to avoid irreparable harm or injury or undue hardship to the party claiming the relief and/or to ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous by reason of non-interference by the court. (Para 39) Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : AIR 2024 SC 602

Order 21, Rule 54(1) & 66 – Valuation of sale property – Either whole of the attached property or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree shall be sold in auction. The valuation of the property mentioned in attachment Panchanama (prepared under Rule 54) can always provide the estimated value of the property, otherwise the provisions enabling the court to auction only a part of the property which would be sufficient to satisfy the decree would be unworkable or redundant. The sale held without examining this aspect and not in conformity with this mandatory requirement would be illegal and without jurisdiction. Held, when only one of the attached properties was sufficient to satisfy the decree there was no requirement for effecting the sale of the entire attached properties. Further held, when the valuation of three attached properties is mentioned in the attachment Panchanama, it was the duty of the Court to have satisfied itself on this aspect and having failed to do so the Court has caused great injustice to the judgment debtor by auctioning his entire attached properties causing huge loss to the judgment debtor and undue benefit to the auction purchaser. (Para 22 & 25) Bhikchand v. Shamabai Dhanraj Gugale, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : AIR 2024 SC 2903

Order 33 and Order 44 – Suits by indigent persons and appeals by indigent persons – These provisions “exemplify the cherished principle that lack of monetary capability does not preclude a person from knocking on the doors of the Court to seek vindication of his rights.” (Para 11) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414

Order 41 Rule 31 – Omission to frame points of determination by the first appellate court – Held, even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard is sufficient. (Para 30) Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 369

Order 44, Rule 1 – Appeal filed as an indigent person – The grounds on which the claimants application to file appeal as an indigent person was rejected, that the claimant had received compensation by way of the Award of the Tribunal, and therefore, she was not indigent is incorrect. Held, this observation cannot be accepted as the claimant had received no money at that point of time. So even though she had been awarded a sum, her indigency was not extinguished thereby. Hence, the impugned order is set aside. (Para 15) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414

Order 44, Rule 3(2) – Inquiry as to whether applicant is an indigent person – No further inquiry would be required in respect of a person who was allowed to sue or appeal as an indigent person if they make an affidavit to the effect that they have not ceased to be an indigent unless the Government pleader objects or disputes such claim in which case an inquiry shall be held by the Appellate Court or under the orders thereof. Held, the statutory requirement under the C.P.C., was not met. Hence, the impugned order is set aside. (Para 18) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414

Section 11 – Res judicata – Res judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been conclusively determined by a court. Held, the previous decision of this Court in the first round would not operate as res judicata to bar a decision on the lead matter and the other appeals, because this rule may not apply hard and fast in situations where larger public interest is at stake. In such cases, a more flexible approach ought to be adopted by courts, recognizing that certain matters transcend individual disputes and have far-reaching public interest implications. Hence, the applicability of res judicata is negated. (Para 23 & 25) Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 420

Section 13 – Bar of Res Judicata – Maintainability of suit challenged – Held, the suit is filed with a different set of facts and another set of litigants have raised additional contentions. Therefore, the writ petition should not be dismissed on the ground of res-judicata. (Para 23) Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Judicature at Patna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : AIR 2024 SC 2596

Section 144 – Objection of restitution on grounds of being a bona fide purchaser – Held, one who has purchased property from decree holder with full knowledge of pending restitution proceedings is not entitled to object restitution on the ground that he is a bona fide purchaser. (Para 18) Bhikchand v. Shamabai Dhanraj Gugale, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : AIR 2024 SC 2903

Section 144 – Restitution – A decree for realisation of a sum in favour of the plaintiff should not amount to exploitation of the judgment debtor by selling his entire property. The right of a decree holder should never be construed to have bestowed upon him a bonanza only because he had obtained a decree for realisation of a certain amount. Restitution application is allowed. Sale of the attached properties belonging to the judgment debtor is set aside and the parties are restored back to the position where the execution was positioned before the attachment of the immovable properties. (Para 27 & 28) Bhikchand v. Shamabai Dhanraj Gugale, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : AIR 2024 SC 2903

Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 – Review Jurisdiction – To declare reserved forest land as private land – Review of earlier order where it had given a clear finding that the title over the reserved forest land wasn't proved by the private person. Held, the High Court showed utmost interest and benevolence in allowing the review by setting aside the well merited judgment in the appeal by replacing its views in all material aspects. The High Court which is expected to act within the statutory limitation went beyond and graciously gifted the forest land to a private person who could not prove his title. The High Court could not interfere by placing reliance upon evidence produced after the decree which states that the land is forest land which has become part of reserved forest. (Para 54 & 56) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466

Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 – Scope of review - Mistake or error apparent on the face of record would debar the court from acting as an appellate court in disguise, by indulging in a re-hearing. Such a mistake or error should be self-evident and an omission so glaring that it requires interference in the form of a review. There is absolutely no room for a fresh hearing or of adjudication for a second time. (Para 20) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

'Absurdity' : Supreme Court quashes FIR which alleged book in Indore law college library hurt religious sentiments. Inamur Rahman v. State of M.P. 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 423

Power of courts to alter charge – It is permissible for Courts to alter charges but it can only be done by careful analysis of evidence and the reasons for the same must be recorded in the judgment. The “proof” of “common intention” is necessary to alter conviction from Section 149 to 34 of IPC. In the present case no charge under Section 34 of the IPC was laid against the accused by the Prosecution but when the charge under Section 149 IPC was dropped, the trial Court decided to conveniently alter the charge and with the aid of Section 34 IPC, ordered for conviction of the accused. Held, common intention of the appellants is not established by the prosecution. Further held, the Court while altering the charge from Section 149 to Section 34 IPC omitted to furnish any reasons. Hence, the appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt and their conviction is unsustainable. (Para 17, 19, 20, 21) Madhusudan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 418

Appeal against conviction – Held, Conviction is confirmed. The impugned judgments do not suffer from any infirmity warranting any interference. (Para 49 & 50) Sukhpal Singh v. NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : AIR 2024 SC 2724

Enhancement of sentence – Held, enhancement in sentence is not justified nearly 35 years after the incident. (Para 14) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : AIR 2024 SC 2395

Code of Criminal Procedure SVT., 1989 – Retrospective application of Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973 – Held, CrPC, 1973 will apply to Jammu and Kashmir only with effect from 31.10.2019, the date when the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019 came into effect. CrPC, 1973 would govern the field only from the appointed day and consequently the CrPC, 1989 stands repealed. (Para 30 & 31) National Investigation Agency v. Owais Amin @ Cherry, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 389 : AIR 2024 SC 2919

Code of Criminal Procedure SVT., 1989; Section 196 & 196A – Under section 196, a jurisdictional court shall take cognizance only upon a complaint made by the order of, or under the authority from the Government, or a District Magistrate, or such other officer as empowered by the Government for the aforesaid purpose. The compliance under section 196 mandatory, failing which a Court cannot take cognizance. Section 196A only deals with specified classes of criminal conspiracy. Section 196-A(1) speaks of the object of the conspiracy qua an illegal act other than an offence, a legal act by illegal means, or an offence to which Section 196 applies. For taking cognizance of such an offence, a complaint can only be made either by an order of the Government, or under its authority, or by an officer empowered by it. In the case of Section 196-A, cognizance of a complaint can be taken by a Court only after satisfying itself of the due compliance of Section 196-A(1) with respect to competence of the authority. Though Sections 196 and 196-A seem to be similar insofar as the authority competent to convey a complaint is concerned, under Section 196 a District Magistrate can lodge it by himself, whereas, the same provision is not available under Section 196-A. Hence, Section 196-A of CrPC, 1989 is pari materia to Section 196A. Held, the appellant may comply with the mandate of Section 196-A by seeking appropriate authorization or empowerment as the case may be. If such a compliance is duly made, then the Trial Court shall undertake the exercise of taking cognizance, and proceed further with the trial in accordance with law. (Para 15, 16 & 17) National Investigation Agency v. Owais Amin @ Cherry, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 389 : AIR 2024 SC 2919

Delay in registration of FIR – The FIR suffers from a serious delay of three years which is totally unexplained. The unexplained inordinate delay in bringing allegations to the police's attention despite knowledge of previous inquiry, adds a layer of scepticism to the authenticity of the claims. Deepak Kumar Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2024 Cri LJ 1388 : (2024) 3 SCC 601

Issue of non-bailable warrant – Held, non-bailable warrants cannot be issued in a routine manner and that the liberty of an individual cannot be curtailed unless necessitated by the larger interest of public and the State. Nonbailable warrants should not be issued, unless the accused is charged with a heinous crime, and is likely to evade the process of law or tamper/destroy evidence. (Para 46) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322

Object and purpose of police investigation – Includes the need to ensure transparent and free investigation to ascertain the facts, examine whether or not an offence is committed, identify the offender if an offence is committed, and to lay before the court the evidence which has been collected, the truth and correctness of which is thereupon decided by the court. (Para 26) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322

The Police Officer seems to be under an impression that the accused has to appear before him and prove his innocence. Such an approach cannot be countenanced. Md Tauhid v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 106

Sections 61, 70, 204, 437 - An accused cannot be taken into custody when he voluntarily surrenders before the Court even though the Court which has taken cognizance of the chargesheet has not issued a summoning order against him. Bail application filed by such an accused, who voluntarily surrendered even in the absence of a summoning order, cannot be entertained. (Para 10) Souvik Bhattacharya v. Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata Zonal Office - II, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : (2024) 3 SCC 597

Section 82(1) - An accused would not be entitled to pre-arrest bail if the non-bailable warrant and the proclamation under Section 82(1) Cr.P.C. is pending against him. (Para 5) Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : AIR 2024 SC 1600

Section 82 and 83 - Mere filing of an anticipatory bail application by the accused could not be treated as his appearance before the court which had initiated proceedings under Section 82/83 Cr.P.C. against the accused. (Para 20) Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : AIR 2024 SC 1600

Section 91 - Courts cannot issue processes under Section 91 Cr.P.C. to compel the production of things / documents based on the application made by the accused at the stage of framing of charges. The accused's entitlement to seek an order for the production of things or documents under Section 91 of Cr.P.C. would ordinarily not come till the stage of defence. (Para 6) State of Rajasthan v. Swarn Singh @ Baba, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 136

Section 102 (1) – Grounds to challenge seizure – The order of seizure can be challenged on the ground that the seizing officer lacked jurisdiction to act under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. or that the seized item does not satisfy the definition of 'property' or on the ground that the property which was seized could not have given rise to suspicion concerning the commission of a crime, in order for the authorities to justify the seizure. (Para 13) Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 371 : AIR 2024 SC 2984

Section 102(1) & 102(3) – 'Seizure orders' – Substantive power on the police to seize property linked to a crime – Whether non-compliance with the procedural formality of reporting such seizure forthwith to the Magistrate would vitiate the seizure? – Held, the validity of the power exercised under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. is not dependent on the compliance with the duty prescribed on the police officer under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C. The obligation to report the seizure to the Magistrate is neither a jurisdictional pre-requisite for exercising the power to seize nor is the exercise of such power made subject to compliance with the reporting obligation. Hence, the act of seizure (seizure order) would not get vitiated by virtue of such delay in reporting to the magistrate. (Para 13, 14 & 24) Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 371 : AIR 2024 SC 2984

Section 102 (3) – Interpretation of the expression 'shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate' – The expression means 'as soon as may be', 'with reasonable speed and expedition', 'with a sense of urgency', and 'without any unnecessary delay'. In other words, it would mean as soon as possible, judged in the context of the object sought to be achieved or accomplished. Hence, the interpretation of the word 'forthwith' would depend upon the terrain in which it travels and would take its colour depending upon the prevailing circumstances which can be variable. (Para 22 & 23) Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 371 : AIR 2024 SC 2984

Section 125 - The approach of the State of taking the side of the husband in a maintenance case, to say the least, is very strange. In fact, the counsel, who appeared for the State, was under a duty and obligation to act as an officer of the Court and to assist the Court in arriving at a correct conclusion. (Para 7 & 8) Asiya Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 140

Section 156(3) – To direct for registration of FIR – Held, no offence was made out in the complaint. Hence, the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate in dismissing the application filed under Section 156(3) is correct and unassailable. (Para 17) State of GNCT of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar @ Prashant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 422

Section 156 (3) - An affidavit is necessary with the application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. - Directions in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 are mandatory. Ramesh Kumar Bung v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 213

Section 156 (3) - Whether prior sanction is mandatory for a Magistrate to forward a complaint against a public servant for investigation as per Section 156(3) CrPC. This issue was referred to a larger bench in 2018 in the case Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora. The issue was of wide relevance and was arising in several matters frequently, an earlier decision on the question referred is solicited. Shamim Khan v. Debashish Chakraborty, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Section 156(3) – Magistrate empowered to order investigation – Held, the Trial Court after having been prima facie satisfied, had exercised its judicial discretion directing investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC Further held, such order being just, legal and proper, the High Court should not have interfered with the same, more particularly while exercising limited powers under Section 482 of CrPC. (Para 10) Sas Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 412

Section 156(3) & 190 – Magistrate power to take cognizance – When the Magistrate in exercise of his judicial discretion directs investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. It is only when the Magistrate after applying his mind prefers to follow the procedure under Chapter XV of CrPC by resorting to Section 200, he can be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. (Para 8) Sas Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 412

Section 161 - If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. (Para 26) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164 : 2024 CriLJ 1601

Section 161(1) & 162(1) – The statement made by a witness before the police under Section 161(1) Cr.P.C. can be used only for the purpose of contradicting such witness on what he has stated at the trial. The statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded during the investigation are not substantive pieces of evidence but can be used primarily for the limited purpose: (i) of contradicting such witness by an accused under Section 145 of the Evidence Act; (ii) the contradiction of such witness also by the prosecution but with the leave of the Court; and (iii) the re-examination of the witness if necessary. (Para 63) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 CriLJ 2377

Section 167 and 173 - Once from the material produced along with the chargesheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the chargesheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet or that the chargesheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. (Para 23) Central Bureau of Investigation v. Kapil Wadhawan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : AIR 2024 SC 905 : 2024 Cri LJ 1082

Section 172 – Diary of proceedings – Every police officer making an investigation under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. is required to enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary day by day. Sub-section (IA) of Section 172 requires that the statements of the witnesses recorded during the course of investigation under section 161 have to be inserted in the case diary; and sub-section (1B) of Section 172 requires that such diary shall be a volume and duly paginated. (Para 11) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

A case diary is maintained by an Investigating Officer during his investigation for the purpose of entering the day-to-day proceedings of the investigation. While doing so, the Investigating Officer should mandatorily record the necessary particulars gathered in the course of investigation with the relevant date, time and place. Under sub-section (1-A) and (1-B) of Section 172 of CrPC, the Investigating Officer has to mention, in his case diary, the statement of witnesses recorded during investigation with due pagination. Sub-section (1-A) and (1-B) were inserted by Act 5 of 2009 with effect from 31/12/2009. The object of these sub-sections is to facilitate a fair investigation since a statement made under Section 161 of CrPC is not expected to be signed as mandated by Section 162 of CrPC. (Para 20) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Section 172 (3) - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 and 161 - Whenever a case is made out either under Section 145 or under Section 161 of the Evidence Act, the benefit conferred thereunder along with the benefit of Section 172(3) of CrPC has to be extended to an accused. Thus, the accused has a right to cross-examine a police officer as to the recording made in the case diary whenever the police officer uses it to refresh his memory. Though Section 161 of the Evidence Act does not restrict itself to a case of refreshing memory by perusing a case diary alone, there is no exclusion for doing so. Similarly, in a case where the court uses a case diary for the purpose of contradicting a police officer, then an accused is entitled to peruse the said statement so recorded which is relevant, and cross-examine the police officer on that count. What is relevant in such a case is the process of using it for the purpose of contradiction and not the conclusion. To make the position clear, though Section 145 read with Section 161 of the Evidence Act deals with the right of a party including an accused, such a right is limited and restrictive when it is applied to Section 172 of CrPC. Suffice it is to state that the said right cannot be declined when the author of a case diary uses it to refresh his memory or the court uses it for the purpose of contradiction. Therefore, held that Section 145 and Section 161 of the Evidence Act on the one hand and Section 172(3) of CrPC on the other are to be read in consonance with each other, subject to the limited right conferred under sub-section (3) of Section 172 of CrPC. (Para 27) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Section 173 – Power of Magistrate to act on Police report – When such a Police Report concludes that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons, the Magistrate has three options: (i) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, (ii) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report, or (iii) he may disagree with the report and discharge the accused or drop the proceedings. If such Police Report concludes that no offence appears to have been committed, the Magistrate again has three options: (i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings, or (ii) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (iii) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156. (Para 14) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173 – Police report – It is an opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the concerned court that on the material collected during the course of investigation, an offence appears to have been committed by the particular person or persons, or that no offence appears to have been committed. (Para 13) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Mandatory requirements of police report – It is found that the investigating officers while submitting the chargesheet/Police Report do not comply with the requirements of the Section 173(2). Though the form of the report to be submitted under Section 173(2) has to be prescribed by the State Government and each State Government has its own Police Manual, the mandatory requirements required to be complied with by such officers in the Police Report/Chargesheet are laid down in Section 173. It is incumbent on the part of the Investigating Officer to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 173(2). Only the report forwarded by the police officer to the Magistrate under Section 173(2). can form the basis for the competent court for taking cognizance thereupon. A chargesheet is nothing but a final report of the police officer under Section 173(2) of. (Para 12 & 13) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Directions issued and particulars listed for compliance in a police report on completion of investigation – Report of police officer on the completion of investigation shall contain (i) A report in the form prescribed by the State Government stating- (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170 Cr.PC. (h) Whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under [sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB] or section 376E of the IPC. (ii) If upon the completion of investigation, there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the Police officer in charge shall clearly state in the Report about the compliance of Section 169 Cr.PC. (iii) When the report in respect of a case to which Section 170 Cr.PC. applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report, all the documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; and the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC. of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. (iv) In case of further investigation, the Police officer in charge shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and shall also comply with the details mentioned in the above sub para (i) to (iii). (Para 17) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Right to default bail on grounds of incomplete police report – Once from the material produced along with the chargesheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the chargesheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet or that the chargesheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. (Para 15) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Contents of chargesheet – The need to provide lead details of the offence in the chargesheet is mandatory as it is in accord with paragraph 122 of the police regulations. The investigating officer must make clear and complete entries of all columns in the chargesheet so that the court can clearly understand which crime has been committed by which accused and what the material evidence available. Statements under Section 161 of the Code and related documents have to be enclosed with the list of witnesses. Substantiated reasons and grounds for an offence being made in the chargesheet are a key resource for a Magistrate to evaluate whether there are sufficient grounds for taking cognisance, initiating proceedings, and then issuing notice, framing charges etc. (Para 20, 31 & 31) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322

Section 173(2), 190 & 204 – There is an inherent connect between the chargesheet submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code, cognisance which is taken under Section 190 of the Code, issue of process and summoning of the accused under Section 204 of the Code, and thereupon issue of notice under Section 251 of the Code, or the charge in terms of Chapter XVII of the Code. The details set out in the chargesheet have a substantial impact on the efficacy of procedure at the subsequent stages. The chargesheet is integral to the process of taking cognisance, the issue of notice and framing of charge, being the only investigative document and evidence available to the court till that stage. (Para 20) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322

Section 173(8) – The requirement of “further evidence” or a “supplementary chargesheet” as referred to under Section 173(8) of the Code, is to make additions to a complete chargesheet, and not to make up or reparate for a chargesheet which does not fulfil requirements of Section 173(2) of the Code. (Para 13) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322

Section 173(8) - Protest Petition - An application seeking further investigation can be treated as a protest petition if the application prima facie establishes the commission of the offences, and such an application can't be technically rejected because procedural recourse of filing a protest petition is not followed. Although the proper course for the complainant would have been to file a protest petition instead of filing it under Section 173(8) for further investigation, a petition should not be rejected merely because it is filed under the wrong caption. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Section 178 (8) - It would be impermissible under the law for a Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance of a supplementary charge-sheet submitted after further investigation if it doesn't contain any fresh oral or documentary evidence, would be impermissible under the law. While submitting the supplementary charge-sheet as a result of an order of further investigation under Section 178 (8) Cr.P.C., the Investigating Officer shall mention new evidence found to substantiate the conclusions drawn by him. Otherwise, such supplementary charge-sheet lacks investigative rigour and fails to satisfy the requisites of Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The provision for submitting a supplementary report infers that fresh oral or documentary evidence should be obtained rather than reevaluating or reassessing the material already collected and considered by the investigating agency while submitting the initial police report, known as the chargesheet under Section 173(2) CrPC. (Para 26 & 27) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 190(1)(a) – To treat Protest Petition as complaint – Once additional evidence was being relied upon which had been filed along with the Protest Petition then the only option open was to treat it as a private complaint proceeded to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC after following the due procedure in Chapter XV of the CrPC. Held, CJM took into consideration not only the Protest Petition but also the affidavit filed in support of the Protest Petition for taking cognizance and summoning the accused. Magistrate ought to have treated the Protest Petition as a complaint and followed the provisions and the procedure prescribed under Chapter XV of the CrPC. (Para 5, 7 & 11) Mukhtar Zaidi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 315

Section 197 - Fabrication of records cannot be a part of the official duty of a public servant. (Para 25) Shadakshari v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 42 : AIR 2024 SC 590

Section 197 Cr.P.C. does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission of a public servant while in service. It is restricted to only those acts or omissions which are done by public servants in the discharge of official duties. (Para 23) Shadakshari v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 42 : AIR 2024 SC 590

Section 202 – Issue of summon – The Magistrate cannot issue the summons until there is satisfaction that the material was sufficient to pass the summoning order. The learned Magistrate being not satisfied that the material on the record of the complaint, was sufficient to pass the summoning order, had called for the police report under Section 202 of the Cr.PC. Once the Magistrate has called for the police report under Section 202 of the Cr.PC, then the magistrate couldn't issue summon unless the report is submitted by the police. The order issuing process has drastic consequences and requires application of mind. The learned Magistrate was not justified in passing the order to issue a summons. Shiv Jatia v. Gian Chand Malick, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : AIR 2024 SC 1186 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1360

Section 202 – Summons - A Magistrate, while issuing the summoning order, shall not act in a casual manner; rather they should be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused. The recording of the satisfaction of the Magistrate while issuing the summons should not be in a cryptic manner but only when a prima facie case is made out from the allegations. Detailed reasoning is not required from the Magistrate while issuing summons, but the Magistrate also needs to record satisfaction that there exists a sufficient ground for proceedings. (Para 18) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 202(1) – Postponement of issue of process – Section 202(1) was amended with effect from 23rd June 2006. The requirement of postponing the issue of the process is applicable only when one of the accused stays outside the jurisdiction of the court. The mandate of postponing the issue of the process introduced with effect from 23rd June 2006 was not applicable on the date of filing of the complaint in 2004. Shiv Jatia v. Gian Chand Malick, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : AIR 2024 SC 1186 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1360

Section 204 – Issue of summons – Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issue of summons and this is not a prerequisite for deciding the validity of the summons. Nevertheless, the summons should be issued when it appears to the Magistrate that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Magistrate in terms of Section 204 of the Code is required to exercise his judicial discretion with a degree of caution, even when he is not required to record reasons, on whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding. (Para 17) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322

Section 205 – Dispense with personal appearance of accused – Section 205 states that the Magistrate, exercising his discretion, may dispense with the personal attendance of the accused while issuing summons, and allow them to appear through their pleader. Held, there is no provision for granting exemption from personal appearance prior to obtaining bail, is not correct, as the power to grant exemption from personal appearance under the Code should not be read in a restrictive manner as applicable only after the accused has been granted bail. (Para 47) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322

Section 242(3) - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 138 – The general rule is that witnesses shall be examined in the order laid down in Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. An exception to this rule is Section 242(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 under which, in a warrant case, the learned Magistrate, by recording reasons, can permit cross-examination of a witness to be postponed till a particular witness or witnesses are examined. Held, recording only the examination-in-chief of 12 prosecution witnesses without recording cross-examination is contrary to the law. (Para 6 & 7) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261

Section 294 – No formal proof of certain documents – The essential ingredient of Section 294(1) of the Cr.PC is that when any document is produced by the prosecution or the accused, the parties shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document. In this case, it is nobody's case that the appellant-accused was called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of the WhatsApp chats. (Para 21) Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Section 299 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 33 – Record of evidence in absence of accused – Deposition of any witness taken in the absence of an accused may be used against him if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving evidence or cannot be found or his presence cannot be procured without any amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable. Held, despite ample efforts made, the witness cannot be traced and produced in the witness box for deposition during trial after the accused had been arrested. Hence, the statement earlier recorded was fit to be read as a piece of substantive evidence against the accused. (Para 31, 38 & 39) Sukhpal Singh v. NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : AIR 2024 SC 2724

Section 313 – It is only after the prosecution discharges its duty of proving the case beyond all reasonable doubt that the false explanation or non-explanation of the accused could be taken into consideration. (Para 21) Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 60 : AIR 2024 SC 695 : (2024) 3 SCC 481

Section 313 - Statement recorded u/s. 313 CrPC cannot form the sole basis of conviction. Mere omission to take a specific plea by accused when examined u/s 313 CrPC, is not enough to denude him of his right if the same can be made out otherwise. (Para 33) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164

Section 313 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872– Admissibility of statement of accused under Section 313(1) as evidence – Section 313(4) of the Cr.PC provides that the answers given by the accused in his examination under Section 313(1) of the Cr.PC may be taken into consideration in the trial. But the conviction cannot be based solely on the statements made by an accused under Section 313(1) but in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution. (Para 6) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : AIR 2024 SC 2395

Section 313 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Cross-examination of the prosecutrix – The case of accused made out in statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC was that they was in a physical relationship with the victim and were paying money to the victim for maintaining a sexual relationship was not put to the prosecutrix in cross-examination. Held, while appreciating the evidence adduced by the prosecution, answers given by the accused in the examination under Section 313(1), that they maintained a physical relationship with the prosecutrix by paying her money can be considered. In the cross-examination, the case put to the prosecutrix was that she had voluntarily accompanied the accused and there was no suggestion given by the accused that the sexual intercourse with the consent of the prosecutrix. Further held, the evidence of the prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief that the accused committed sexual intercourse with her has not been shaken. Conviction granted by the High Court is upheld. (Para 10 & 12) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : AIR 2024 SC 2395

Section 319 – Discretionary powers of High Court –The materials on record could not be said to have satisfied the threshold envisaged under Hardeep Singh v State of Punjab & Ors., i.e., more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. The High Court failed to appreciate that the discretionary powers under Section 319 of the CrPC ought to have been used sparingly where circumstances of the case so warrant. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence laid before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. (Para 7 & 10) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 319 - High Court overturned the Trial Court Order; and accordingly impleaded the Appellants' as accused person(s) in the Underlying Proceedings on the satisfaction of a prima-facie finding that the materials on record i.e., (i) vague allegations emanating from the underlying complaint; (ii) the Complainant's statement under Section 161 of the CrPC; and (iii) the Complainant's examination-in-chief, are sufficient to proceed against the Appellant(s). Held, the High Court failed to appreciate that the discretionary powers under Section 319 of the CrPC ought to have been used sparingly where circumstances of the case so warrant. The Trial Court Order was well reasoned and did not suffer from any perversity. Moreover, the materials on record could not be said to have satisfied the threshold i.e., more than a prima facie case, as exercised at the time of framing of charge but short of evidence that if left unrebutted would lead to conviction. (Para 9 & 10) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 319 – Legality of summon order – Power under Section 319 can only be excercised if evidence against the accused is strong and reliable i.e. much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The evidence before the trial court should be such that if it goes unrebutted, then it should result in the conviction of the person who is sought to be summoned. Held, deposition of PW-1, not being an eye-witness, is not sufficient enough to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Section 319 to summon the appellants. There are no other witnesses or documentary evidence against the appellants. The higher degree of satisfaction that is required for exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is not met. Hence, the trial Court committed a serious error in allowing the application under Section 319 and issuing summons to the appellants. Summon order is set aside. (Para 16, 23, 24 & 25) Shankar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 345

Section 357 – Victimology – Impugned order to pay compensation in lieu of Punishment – Held, the High Court having once affirmed the conviction and awarded sentence of four years could not have further diluted the order of sentence by asking the accused persons to pay compensation. Further held, Payment of victim compensation cannot be a consideration or a ground for reducing the sentence imposed upon the accused as victim compensation is not a punitive measure and only restitutory in nature and thus, has no bearing with the sentence that has been passed which is punitive in nature. Hence, the High Court fell into error. Sentences such as imprisonment and / or fine are imposed independently of any victim compensation and thus, the two stand on a completely different footing, either of them cannot vary the other. If payment of compensation becomes a consideration for reducing sentence, itt will result in criminals with a purse full of money to buy their way out of justice, defeating the very purpose of criminal proceedings. (Para 21, 23, 25, 26) Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 378

Section 357 – Victimology – Object – The idea of victim compensation – Theory of Victimology seeks to take into consideration the effect of the offence on the victim's family even though human life cannot be restored but then monetary compensation will at least provide some solace. The object of victim compensation is to rehabilitate those who have suffered any loss or injury by the offence which has been committed. The sole factor for deciding the compensation to be paid is the victim's loss or injury as a result of the offence and the convict's capacity to pay, and has nothing to do with the sentence that has been passed. (Para 22, 24) Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 378

Section 357(1) - A victim of a crime cannot be treated merely as a prosecution witness. Section 357(1) of Cr.P.C. empowers the court to order that the fine amount recovered be given to any person as compensation who has suffered any loss or injury caused due to that offence. There may be times when the situation may demand that a substantive amount of compensation be paid to the victim and the convict may not be financially that strong to bear that burden. For such situations, Section 357A was therefore introduced in Criminal Procedure Code for this reason, where compensation to the victims may be paid out of State funds, as the State had the responsibility to protect the victim against the offence that had been committed against the victim of the crime. (Para 19) Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : AIR 2024 SC 271 : (2024) 3 SCC 125

Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal – Scope of interference by an appellate Court – Grounds for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court: (i) That judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (ii) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (iii) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. Held, none of these essential mandates governing an appeal against acquittal were adverted to by the High Court. Hence, impugned judgment reversing acquittal into conviction, as recorded by the trial Court is contrary to the principles established by law. (Para 39, 41 & 42) Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : AIR 2024 SC 2252 : 2024 CriLJ 2021

Section 378 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 r/w. 2 & 3 - Delay that occurred in preferring an appeal against acquittal can be condoned under limitation act. Mohd Abaad Ali v. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 141 : AIR 2024 SC 1271 : 2024 CriLJ 1335

Section 389 – Suspension of sentence pending an appeal by convicted person – Section 389 deals with the suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal against conviction and release of appellant(s) on bail. In the case of short-term imprisonment for conviction of an offence, suspension of sentence is the normal rule and its rejection is the exception. The provision mandates for recording of reasons in writing leading to the conclusion that the convicts are entitled to get suspension of sentence and consequential release on bail. (Para 3 & 4) Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 333

Section 389 – Suspension of sentence pending an appeal by convicted person – Grounds of suspension of sentence in heinous crimes – Likelihood of delay and sufferance of incarceration for a particular period, cannot be grounds for invoking power under Section 389 Cr.PC. It is because disposal of appeals against conviction within a short span of time may not be possible in a number of pending cases. However, in cases of inordinate delay in consideration of appeal and long incarceration undergone, the power under Section 389 can be invoked. (Para 9 & 11) Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 333

Section 389 – Compensation to victim for grant of suspension of sentence – “Blood Money” – The convicts have offered to pay compensation to the victim for grant of suspension of sentence, which when she refused to accept, was directed to be deposited in the court. Held, the compensation was in a way kind of “Blood Money” offered by the convicts to the victim for which there is no acceptability in our criminal justice system. (Para 13) Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 333

Section 389 – Suspension of sentence in heinous crimes – Principle of proportionality – Held, if the appropriate punishment is not awarded or if, after conviction for a heinous crime, the court directs the suspension of the sentence without valid reasons, the purpose of criminal justice system fails. (Para 6) Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 333

Section 389 - When there is a fixed term sentence and especially when the appeal is not likely to be heard before completing the entire period of sentence, normally suspension of sentence and bail should be granted. Atul @ Ashutosh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : (2024) 3 SCC 663

Section 391 – A party who was not diligent in producing evidence at the trial stage of a criminal case cannot seek to produce the same in appeal. The power to record additional evidence at the appellate stage should not be exercised in a routine and casual manner. Such a power shall only be exercised when non-recording of the evidence may lead to failure to justice. Power to record additional evidence under Section 391 CrPC should only be exercised when the party making such request was prevented from presenting the evidence in the trial despite due diligence being exercised or that the facts giving rise to such prayer came to light at a later stage during pendency of the appeal. (Para 9) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Section 432 - A consideration for remission must be by way of an application under Section 432 of the CrPC which has to be made by the convict or on his behalf. In the first instance whether there is compliance of Section 433A of the CrPC must be noted inasmuch as a person serving a life sentence cannot seek remission unless fourteen years of imprisonment has been completed. (Para 55 (b) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 432 - The application for remission under Section 432 of the CrPC could be only before the Government of the State within whose territorial jurisdiction the applicant was convicted (appropriate Government) and not before any other Government within whose territorial jurisdiction the applicant may have been transferred on conviction or where the offence has occurred. (Para 55 (a) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 432 - The guidelines under Section 432(2) with regard to the opinion to be sought from the Presiding Judge of the Court which had convicted the applicant must be complied with mandatorily. While doing so it is necessary to follow the requirements of the said Section which are highlighted, namely, (i) the opinion must state as to whether the application for remission should be granted or refused and for either of the said opinions, the reasons must be stated; (ii) the reasons must have a bearing on the facts and circumstances of the case; (iii) the opinion must have a nexus to the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists; (iv) the Presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, must also forward along with the statement of such opinion granting or refusing remission, a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists. (Para 55 (c) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 432 (2) - The Jail Advisory Committee which has to consider the application for remission may not have the District Judge as a Member inasmuch as the District Judge, being a Judicial Officer may coincidently be the very judge who may have to render an opinion independently in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 432 of the CrPC. (Para 55 (g) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 435 - State Government to act after consultation with Central Government in certain cases - Held, there has also to be consultation in accordance with Section 435 of the CrPC wherever the same is necessitated. (Para 55 (f) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 438 – Anticipatory bail granted on the condition is totally alien to the principles governing bail jurisprudence and is nothing short of perversity. State v. B. Ramu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 128

Section 438 – Pre-arrest/Anticipatory Bail – Grant of pre-arrest bail to a police officer facing allegations of manipulating the investigation so as to favour an accused would send out a wrong signal in society and would be against public interest. Presumptions and other considerations applicable to a layperson facing criminal charges may not carry the same weight while dealing with a police officer who is alleged to have abused his office. Considering the position held by the respondent, even if he was suspended from service, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and the evidence was sufficiently high. Bail order is liable to be set aside. (Para 9 & 10) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Section 438 – Pre-arrest/Anticipatory Bail – Court must record reasons for grant of Bail – An order of bail, bereft of any cogent reason, could not be sustained. Though grant of bail is discretionary, it calls for exercise of such discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. The High Court did not deem it necessary to record as to what weighed with it while granting pre-arrest bail to the respondent, hence, bail order is set aside. (Para 5, 6 & 7) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Section 438 – Bail / Anticipatory Bail – Considerations by Court while dealing with a bail petition – Similar considerations would apply even for grant of anticipatory bail – The nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case. (Para 7) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Sections 438 and 439 - Bail Applications - Applicants must include : details and copies of previous bail orders. Information on pending bail applications in any court, with a clear statement if none are pending. Bail applications in the same FIR should be heard by the same Judge, unless there are specific circumstances. The application indicates whether it is the first, second, or subsequent one for clarity. The court registry should attach a system-generated report on decided or pending bail applications for the specified crime case. This procedure applies to private complaints as well, with cases assigned specific numbers. The Investigating Officer or State Counsel should inform the court of relevant orders, and counsels must conduct themselves as officers of the Court. These suggestions aim to streamline proceedings and prevent anomalies in bail applications during ongoing trials or sentence suspension. (Para 20 & 21) Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : AIR 2024 SC 790

Section 439 – Considerations for setting aside Bail order – Considerations include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. (Para 28) Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 392 : AIR 2024 SC 2885

Section 439 – Parameters for granting Bail – The parameters are: nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. Further, at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused, ought to be avoided. Suffice it is to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused. (Para 26 & 28) Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 392 : AIR 2024 SC 2885

Section 439 (1) – Power of cancellation of Bail – It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. Held, the respondents do not deserve the concession of bail. Hence, the bail orders are quashed and set aside. (Para 27 & 35) Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 392 : AIR 2024 SC 2885

Section 439 and National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; Section 21(2) – Jurisdiction of High Court to entertain Bail application – The jurisdiction of the High Court to consider the question of bail is coordinate with that of the Sessions Court and it has evolved as a matter of practice that an accused seeking bail ought to approach the Sessions Court before approaching the High Court. Further, the High Court adopted proper course while exercising jurisdiction under Section 439 of the 1973 Code to refer the matter to a Division Bench to decide the bail plea in accordance with Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act. (Para 12) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 439 (2) – Cancellation of Bail order - The exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge in cancelling the bail granted by another Single Judge of the same High Court, by examining the merits of the allegations, tantamounts to judicial impropriety/indiscipline. The application for cancellation of bail filed on merits as opposed to violation of the conditions of the bail order should have been placed before the same learned Single Judge who had granted bail to the accused. The act of reviewing the orders granting bail to the accused by another Single Judge is uncalled for and amounts to gross impropriety. (Para 10) Himanshu Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2024 Cri LJ 1482 : (2024) 4 SCC 222

Section 439 – Grounds for cancellation of bail - Bail granted to an accused can only be cancelled if the Court is satisfied that after being released on bail, (a) the accused has misused the liberty granted to him; (b) flouted the conditions of bail order; (c) that the bail was granted in ignorance of statutory provisions restricting the powers of the Court to grant bail; (d) or that the bail was procured by misrepresentation or fraud. None of these grounds existed while cancellation of bail granted by another bench. (Para 12) Himanshu Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2024 Cri LJ 1482 : (2024) 4 SCC 222

Section 451 – Custody and disposal of the property pending an inquiry or trial – When any property is produced before any criminal court during the course of inquiry or trial, it is the criminal court which would have the jurisdiction and the power to pass appropriate orders for the proper custody of such property or for selling or disposing of such property. The appellant without approaching the concerned court under Section 451 of CrPC, directly approached the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Held, when there is a specific statutory provision contained in the CrPC. empowering the criminal court to pass appropriate order for the proper custody and disposal of the property pending the inquiry or trial, the appellant could not have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking release of his vehicle. (Para 5 & 6) Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : AIR 2024 SC 2139 : 2024 CriLJ 2092

Section 482 – Power to quash chargesheet – The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution, only where such exercise is justified by the tests laid down in the Section itself. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. does not confer any new power on the High Court but only saves the inherent power, which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Code. There are three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. If the Court is convinced by the fact that the involvement by the complainant of her husband and his close relatives is with an oblique motive then even if the FIR and the chargesheet disclose the commission of a cognizable offence the Court with a view to doing substantial justice should read in between the lines the oblique motive of the complainant and take a pragmatic view of the matter. Held, if the criminal proceedings are allowed to continue against the Appellant, the same will be nothing short of abuse of process of law & travesty of justice. The High Court should have exercised its inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for the purpose of quashing the criminal proceedings. (Para 20, 21, 31 & 36) Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 343 : 2024 CriLJ 2307 : AIR 2024 SC 2548

Section 482 – Quashing of chargesheet – Object – The court owes a duty to subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to a thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with the sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute. (Para 25) Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 343 : 2024 CriLJ 2307 : AIR 2024 SC 2548

Section 482 – Quashing of chargesheet – Stages at which the power to quash can be used – There is nothing in the words of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. which restricts the exercise of the power of the court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It would be a travesty of justice to hold that the proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has materialized into a chargesheet. (Para 22) Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 343 : 2024 CriLJ 2307 : AIR 2024 SC 2548

Section 482 and Constitution of India; Article 226 – Exercise of extraordinary power to quash proceedings – Such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Some instances where such power can be exercised is: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Held, present case would squarely fall under categories (1), (3) and (5) and even if the allegations made in the FIR and the material on which the prosecution relies, are taken at its face value, there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. (Para 17 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2024 CriLJ 1894

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – The entire case of prosecution is based on unauthorizedly and illegally collected sample of meat. Hence, the High Court was right when it interfered by quashing the First Information Report. (Para 9) Joshine Antony v. Asifa Sultana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 195

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – Law with regard to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings - Discussed. (Para 9, 10 & 21) A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 197

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – Offence of Rape - A relationship may be consensual at the beginning but the same state may not remain so for all time to come. Whenever one of the partners show their unwillingness to continue with such relationship, the character of such relationship at it was when started will not continue to prevail. In the instant case, we do not think the relationship had remained consensual to justify quashing of the criminal complaint at the threshold. Rajkumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 214

Section 482 – Inherent power of court – High Court should have exercised power under Section 482 to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice. Although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature but are given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. (Para 5 & 6) Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Section 482 - High Court could not have stayed the investigations and restrained the investigating agencies from investigating cognizable offences as alleged in the FIRs and the Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR), particularly when the investigations were at a very nascent stage. The inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.PC do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whims or caprice. The statutory power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. In a way, by passing such orders of staying the investigations and restraining the investigating agencies from taking any coercive measure against the accused pending the petitions under Section 482 Cr.PC, the High Court has granted blanket orders restraining the arrest without the accused applying for the anticipatory bail under Section 438 of Cr.PC. (Para 20) Directorate of Enforcement v. Niraj Tyagi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : AIR 2024 SC 1161 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1306

Section 482 - Iudicial comity and judicial discipline demands that higher courts should follow the law. The extraordinary and inherent powers of the court do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whims and caprice. (Para 24) Directorate of Enforcement v. Niraj Tyagi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : AIR 2024 SC 1161 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1306

Section 482 - If the charge sheet is filed against the accused during the pendency of the petition for quashing of the FIR, the High Court is not restrained from exercising its inherent jurisdiction and could still examine if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on the basis of the F.I.R., charge sheet and other documents. Mamta Shailesh Chandra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 86

Section 482 - Allegations made by the complainant do not give rise to the offences for which the accused has been summoned for trial. A commercial dispute, which ought to have been resolved through the forum of Civil Court has been given criminal colour by lifting from the penal code certain words or phrases and implanting them in a criminal complaint. No case at all has been made out that would justify invoking the machinery of the Criminal Courts. The dispute, per se, is commercial in nature having no element of criminality. The Magistrate here failed to apply his mind in issuing summons and the High Court also failed to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the 1973 Code to prevent abuse of the power of the Criminal Court. (Para 18) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 482 - When the High Court was called upon to invoke power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a criminal case, it was incumbent upon the High Court to consider the question whether the allegations would constitute the offence(s) alleged against the person-accused. (Para 6) Rajaram Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 40

Commercial Courts Act, 2015

Commercial Courts Act, 2015; Section 2(1)(c)(vii) - Merely because the dispute is related to an immovable property wouldn't per se make it a commercial dispute unless the immovable property is 'actually used' exclusively in trade or commerce. S.P. Velayutham v. Emaar Mgf Land Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 179

Companies Act, 2013

Section 31(2) - Section 31(2) was thus introduced with the intention to confer validity on any alterations to the articles as if they were originally contained therein. Therefore, any increase in the share capital of the company also shall be valid as if it were originally there when the Articles of Association were first stamped. Legislature has specifically mentioned Articles of Association in Article 10 of Schedule-I of the Stamp Act, where stamp duty is to be charged inter alia on increase in the share capital of a company. Thus, in spite of Section 31(2) of the Companies Act, stamp duty will be payable on increased share capital. (Para 12 & 13) State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : AIR 2024 SC 2037

Section 94 & 97 – A company is empowered to increase its share capital, by such amount as it thinks expedient, by passing a resolution in a general meeting. Once a resolution for authorising increase in share capital has been passed in terms of Section 94 of the Companies Act, a notice is required to be sent by the company in Form No.5 to the Registrar, pursuant to Section 97 of the Companies Act. (Para 7) State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : AIR 2024 SC 2037

Section 182 and Finance Act 2017; Section 154 – Constitution of India; Article 19(1)(a) – Constitutionality of Section 182(3) of Companies Act as amended by Section 154 of Finance Act – Non-disclosure of particulars of political contribution is violative of Right to Information – After amendment, Section 182(3) only requires the disclosure of the total amount contributed to political parties in a financial year. The deletion of the mandate of disclosing the particulars of contributions violates the right to information of the voter since they would not possess information about the political party to which the contribution was made which, is necessary to identify corruption and quid pro quo transactions in governance. Such information is also necessary for exercising an informed vote. The only purpose of amending Section 182(3) was to bring the provision in tune with the amendment under Section 29C of the RPA exempting disclosure requirements for contributions through electoral bonds. The amendment to Section 182(3) of the Companies Act serves no practical purpose as the Electoral Bond Scheme and relevant amendments to the RPA and the IT Act mandating non-disclosure of particulars on political contributions through electoral bonds is held unconstitutional. Hence, Section 182(3) as amended by the Finance Act 2017 is unconstitutional. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Companies Act, 2013; Section 182 – Finance Act 2017; Section 154 – Constitution of India; Article 14 – Unlimited corporate funding – Arbitrariness of Section 182 - Removal of restrictions on political contributions is arbitrary and violates Article 14 of the Constitution – Unlimited contribution by companies to political parties is antithetical to free and fair elections because it allows certain persons/companies (including shell companies) to influence the electoral process and policy making. This is violative of the principle of free and fair elections and political equality captured in the value of “one person one vote”. The ability of a company to influence the electoral process through political contributions is much higher when compared to that of an individual. Companies and individuals cannot be equated for the purpose of political contributions. Companies before the amendment to Section 182 could only contribute a certain percentage of the net aggregate profits and could be classified between loss-making companies and profit-making companies for the purpose of political contributions. The underlying principle of this distinction was that it is more plausible that loss-making companies will contribute to political parties with a quid pro quo and not for the purpose of income tax benefits. The amended provision does not recognize that the harm of contributions by lossmaking companies in the form of quid pro quo is much higher. Thus, the amendment to Section 182 is manifestly arbitrary for (a) treating political contributions by companies and individuals alike; (b) permitting the unregulated influence of companies in the governance and political process violating the principle of free and fair elections; and (c) treating contributions made by profit-making and loss-making companies to political parties alike. The observations means that the law must not treat companies and individual contributors alike because of the variance in the degree of harm on free and fair elections. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Compensatory Jurisprudence

Compensatory jurisprudence – Case of wrong medical diagnosis causing premature discharge from service –In case of premature discharge from service of armed forces, extreme caution and care in ensuring correct diagnoses was required. The Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) failed to observe that there is no medical literature to show that the appellant was suffering from AIDS defining illness. In spite of being aware of the adverse and pernicious impact on the appellant, respondents acted grossly careless and negligent. The appellant had submitted four diagnostic reports, showing that his CD4 cell count was above 300 cells/mm3, as opposed to the respondents' 2003 Guidelines defining an AIDS illness to be one where the CD4 cell count is below 200 cells/mm3. The Medical Board, arbitrarily, wrongly and rejected the appellant's prayer on flimsy and wrong grounds by applying the 1992 Guidelines. Held, the appellant's reinstatement in service is not an available option now and also that direction for grant of pension, cannot be considered an equitable restitution of what the appellant has suffered by reason of psychological, financial and physical trauma, hence monetary compensation on account of wrongful termination of services is awarded to the appellant. (Para 6, 7, 8, 9 & 23) Satyanand Singh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : AIR 2024 SC 1659

Conflict of Law

Conflict between laws – It is a settled position of law that in case of conflict between two laws, the general law must give way to the special law. A conjoined reading of the Stamp Act and the Companies Act would show that while the former governs the payment of stamp duty for all manner of instruments, the latter deals with all aspects relating to companies and other similar associations. In the case at hand, we are concerned with an instrument which is chargeable to Stamp Duty and finds its origin in the Companies Act. The various provisions of the Companies Act provide the purpose and scope of the instrument. Thus, it has to be said that the Companies Act is the special law and the Stamp Act is the general law with regards to Articles of Association, and the special will override the general. (Para 11) State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : AIR 2024 SC 2037

Constitution of India

Article 12 & 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition – 'State' or 'Other Authority' – The respondent employer, Air India Limited (AIL) after its disinvestment ceased to be a State or its instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India – The writ petitions were maintainable on the date of institution but whether they continued to be maintainable as on the date the same were finally heard? – Held, the issue about exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would arise only on the date when the writ petitions were taken up for consideration and decision. The subsequent event of disinvestment of the Government Company and its devolution into a private company would make the company immune from being subjected to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, even if the litigant had entered the portals of the Court while the employer was the Government. (Para 5, 32 & 38) R.S. Madireddy v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 384

Article 12 & 226 – Writ Jurisdiction of High Court – The High Court has the power to issue the directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Certiorari, Quo Warranto and Prohibition to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government within its territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution of India and for any other purpose. Held, since, respondent employer (AIL) had been disinvested and had assumed the character of a private entity not performing any public function, the High Court could not have exercised the extraordinary writ jurisdiction to issue a writ to such private entity. (Para 34 & 38) R.S. Madireddy v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 384

Article 13 – Scope of Judicial Review in matters of economic policy – Courts must adopt a less stringent form of judicial review while adjudicating challenges to legislation and executive action which relate to economic policy as compared to laws relating to civil rights such as the freedom of speech or the freedom of religion. The amendment to Section 31 of the RBI Act can be classified as a financial provision to the extent that it seeks to introduce a new form of a bearer banking instrument. However, any resemblance to an economic policy ends there. The amendments in question can be clubbed into two heads: first, provisions mandating non-disclosure of information on electoral financing; and second, provisions permitting unlimited corporate funding to political parties. Both these amendments relate to the electoral process. The Bonds were introduced only to curb black money in the electoral process, and protect informational privacy of financial contributors to political parties. The Union of India has itself classified the amendments as an “electoral reform”. Thus, the submission of the Union of India that the amendments deal with economic policy cannot be accepted. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Article 14 – Exemption of certain projects or activities from mandatory obtaining environment clearance – Unguided and blanket exemption, is, per se, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Item 6 grants exemption from the requirement of obtaining EC for “extraction or sourcing or borrowing of ordinary earth for linear projects, such as roads, pipelines, etc. Held, when an exception is sought to the requirement of obtaining EC, the exception must be specific. There is no specification about the quantum of ordinary earth, which can be extracted or the area which can be used to extract ordinary earth. “Linear projects” have not been defined making the term “linear projects” very vague. Even the amended item 6 continues to suffer from the same vice of arbitrariness, which Article 14 of the Constitution of India prohibits. The exemption granted without incorporating any safeguards is completely unguided and arbitrary and such blanket exemption completely defeats the very object of the EP Act. Hence, on account of the violation of Article 14, item 6 in the impugned notification, as well as the amended impugned notification, is struck down. (Para 25, 26 & 27) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : AIR 2024 SC 1871

Article 14 – Right to equality of the underprivileged – Held, forests play a pivotal role in controlling pollution, which significantly affects the underprivileged, violating their right to equality. It is the vulnerable sections of the society who would be most affected by the depletion of forests, considering the fact that the more affluent sections of society have better access to resources as compared to the underprivileged. The concept of sustainable development is to be understood from an eco-centric approach. First and foremost, it is the environment that needs to be sustained, while the anthropogenic development must follow later. (Para 30 & 32) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466

Article 14 & 16 and Gujarat Rules, 2005; Rule 8 – Constitutionality of the Rules stipulating minimum qualifying marks in the viva voce test, as a part of the selection criteria, is challenged – Held, the Prescription of minimum qualifying marks for interview is permissible and this is not in violation of All India Judges Association and Others vs. Union of India and Others which accepted certain recommendations of the Shetty Commission. Further held, the minimum cut-off of 20% for the Bihar recruitment and 40% for the Gujarat recruitment cannot be considered to provide a high threshold if one keeps in mind that the recruitment is for selection of judicial officers. The object of viva voce set out in Rule 8(5) of Gujarat Rules, 2005 has a reasonable and direct nexus with the object sought to be achieved i.e. the appointment of well-rounded judicial officers. For recruitment of judicial officers, ideally the effort should be to not only test the candidate's intellect but also their personality. The prescription of minimum cut off is also not perceived to be of such a nature that it reeks of irrationality, or was capricious and/or without any adequate determining principle. It does not appear to be disproportionate so as to adversely affect “meritorious” candidates and certainly not manifestly arbitrary, or irrational or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The concerned recruitment Rules cannot be said to be unconstitutional. The impugned selection process in the State of Bihar and Gujarat are found to be legally valid and are upheld. (Para 66, 67 & 102) Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Judicature at Patna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : AIR 2024 SC 2596

Article 14 and Income Tax Rules, 1962; Rule 3(7) (i) – Fixing single benchmark for interest rates charged by different banks – Rule 3(7) (i) is challenged to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 insofar as it treats the PLR of SBI as the benchmark to determine the value of benefit to the assessee in comparison to the rate of interest charged by other individual banks – Held, it is neither arbitrary nor unequal exercise of power. By fixing a single clear benchmark for computation of the perquisite or fringe benefit, the rule prevents ascertainment of the interest rates being charged by different banks from the customers and, thus, checks unnecessary litigation. Rule 3(7) (i) ensures consistency in application, provides clarity for both the assessee and the revenue department, and provides certainty as to the amount to be taxed. Rule 3(7) (i) is based on a uniform approach and fair determining principle which aligns with constitutional values. Hence, Rule 3(7) is held to be intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (Para 32 & 33) All India Bank Officers' Confederation v. Central Bank of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 352

Article 14, 19, 21, 48A & 51A(g) – Fundamental rights and Directive principle of state policy are complimentary to each other – Article 48A and 51A(g) ought to be understood in light of Articles 14, 19 and 21, as they represent the collective conscience of the Constitution. If the continued existence and protection of forests is in the interest of humanity and nature, then there can be no other interpretation than to read the constitutional ethos into these provisions. Part III and Part IV of the Constitution are like two wheels of a chariot, complementing each other in their commitment to a social change and development. There is a constitutional duty enjoined upon every court to protect and preserve the environment. Courts will have to apply the principle of parens patriae in light of the constitutional mandate enshrined in Articles 48A, 51A, 21, 14 and 19 of the constitution. Therefore, the burden of proof lies on a developer or industrialist and also on the State in a given case to prove that there is no degradation. (Para 25, 26 & 38) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466

Article 14 & 21 – The right to a healthy environment and the right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change – The right to a healthy environment encapsulates the principle that every individual has the entitlement to live in an environment that is clean, safe, and conducive to their well-being. Even if there is no umbrella legislation in India which relates to climate change and the attendant concerns this does not mean that the people of India do not have a right against the adverse effects of climate change. As the havoc caused by climate change increases year by year, it becomes necessary to articulate this as a distinct right. It is recognised by Articles 14 and 21. Without a clean environment which is stable and unimpacted by the vagaries of climate change, the right to life is not fully realised. States are compelled to prioritize environmental protection and sustainable development, thereby addressing the root causes of climate change and safeguarding the wellbeing of present and future generations. It is a fundamental right of all individuals to live in a healthy and sustainable environment. (Para 19, 24, 25 & 35) M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 286

Articles 14 and 51A - Appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers in the States - Submission that no such office is stipulated in the Constitution – Held, Appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers not unconstitutional. A Deputy Chief Minister is, first and foremost, a Minister in the Government of the State. The appellation of a Deputy Chief Minister does not breach the constitutional position. (Para 1) Public Political Party v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Article 19(1) (a) – Commercial speech includes advertisements and is protected under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution, subject to the reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2). Commercial speech that is deceptive, unfair, misleading, and untruthful is excluded from such constitutional protection and can be regulated and prohibited by the State. Subject to constitutional restrictions, the producer/ advertiser has the freedom to creatively and artistically promote his goods and services. (Para 5) Yash Raj Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Afreen Fatima Zaidi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : AIR 2024 SC 2333

Article 19(1) (a) & 21– Right to dissent – The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) and every individual must respect the right of others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against the decisions of the Government is an essential part of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner must be treated as a part of the right to lead a dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21, but the protest or dissent must be subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance with Article 19(2). Further, the police machinery must be enlightened on the concept of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and the extent of reasonable restraint on this freedom. The police machinery must be sensitised about the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. (Para 10 & 13) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : (2024) 4 SCC 156

Article 19(1)(a) – Infringement of the Right to information of the voter – The non-disclosure of information about electoral contributions under amendments introduced by the Finance Act 2017 and the Electoral Bond Scheme is violative of the right to information of the voter traceable to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The voters have a right to the disclosure of information which is “essential” for choosing the candidate for whom a vote should be cast. The information about funding to a political party is such an 'essential' information for a voter to exercise their freedom to vote in an effective manner. The right to information of the voter includes the right to information of financial contributions to a political party because of the influence of money in electoral politics (through electoral outcomes) and governmental decisions. Information about political funding would enable a voter to assess if there is a correlation between policy making and financial contributions. Anonymizing contributions through electoral bonds are violative of Article 19(1)(a). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Article 19(1)(a) and Indian Evidence act, 1872; Section 124 – Scope of right to information in the context of deciding the disclosure of evidence relating to affairs of the State – Conflict between public interest and private interest – Article 19(1)(a) has been held to guarantee the right to information to citizens. It is the role of citizens to hold the State accountable for its actions and inactions and they must possess information about State action for them to accomplish this role effectively. Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act stipulate that evidence which is relevant and material to proceedings need not be disclosed to the party if the disclosure would violate public interest. When such disclosure is denied on the ground that it would violate public interest, there is a conflict between private interest and public interest. There is a public interest in the impartial administration of justice which can only be secured by the disclosure of relevant and material documents. There is a close relationship between the right to information and open governance. Citizens have a duty to hold the government of the day accountable for their actions and inactions, and they can effectively fulfil this duty only if the government is open and not clothed in secrecy. The right to information has an instrumental exegesis, which recognizes the value of the right in facilitating the realization of democratic goals. But beyond that, the right to information has an intrinsic constitutional value; one that recognizes that it is not just a means to an end but an end in itself. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) and Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 - Infringement of the right to information of the voters for the purposes of curbing black money – Proportionality standard applied – Least restrictive means stage –The Electoral Bond Scheme is not the only means for curbing black money in Electoral Finance. There are other alternatives which substantially fulfill the purpose and impact the right to information minimally when compared to the impact of electoral bonds on the right to information. The legal regime itself provides other alternatives to curb black money such as contributions through cheques, bank draft, electronic clearing system or electoral trusts. Hence, the Electoral Bond Scheme does not fulfill the least restrictive means test. Further, the right to information under Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted based on the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2). The purpose of curbing black money is not traceable to any of the grounds in Article 19(2). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Article 20(1) – Article 20(1) does not prohibit this Court, to award a lesser punishment in a befitting case, when this Court is of the opinion that a lesser punishment may be awarded since the new law on the penal provision provides a lesser punishment i.e. lesser than what was actually applicable at the relevant time. The prohibition contained in Article 20 of the Constitution of India is on subjecting a person to a higher punishment than which was applicable for that crime at the time of the commission of the crime. There is no prohibition for this Court to impose a lesser punishment which is now applicable for the same crime. (Para 8) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Article 20(3) and Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 42(1) – Power of search and seizure under Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985, is inherently limited by the recognition of fundamental rights by the Constitution as well as statutory limitations. Article 20(3) of the Constitution would not be affected by the provisions of search and seizure. The statutory provisions conferring authorities with the power to search and seize are a mere temporary interference with the right of the accused as they stand well regulated by reasonable restrictions emanating from the statutory provisions itself. (Para 41) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778

Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the soul of the Constitution as the liberty of a citizen is of paramount importance. Not deciding the matter pertaining to liberty of a citizen expeditiously and shunting away the matter on one or the other ground would deprive the party of their precious right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 3) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159

Article 21 and 47 – Right to food – Although the Constitution of India does not explicitly provide for Right to food, the fundamental Right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution does include Right to live with human dignity and right to food and other basic necessities. Article 47 of the Constitution also provides that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties. (Para 5) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

Article 21 – Right to just and fair trial – Actions of the authorities concerned within the meaning of the NDPS Act 1985 must be towards ensuring of upholding the rights of the accused in order to allow the accused to have a fair trial. (Para 24) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778

Article 21 – Pre-conviction detention – Liberty of a pre-trial detenue – Detention before conclusion of trial at the investigation and post-chargesheet stage has the sanction of law but any form of deprival of liberty results in breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of being reasonable, following a just and fair procedure. Pre-conviction detention must be proportionate in the facts of a given case depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed. (Para 38) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 Cri LJ 2001

Article 21 – Primacy of consent of pregnant person in abortion – The right to choose and reproductive freedom is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The consent of a pregnant person in decisions of reproductive autonomy and termination of pregnancy is paramount and the MTP Act does not allow any interference with the personal choice of a pregnant person in terms of proceeding with the termination. The Act or indeed the jurisprudence around abortion developed by the courts leave no scope for interference by the family or the partner of a pregnant person in matters of reproductive choice. In case there is a divergence in the opinion of a pregnant person and her guardian, the opinion of the minor or mentally ill pregnant person must be taken into consideration as an important aspect in enabling the court to arrive at a just conclusion. (Para 32, 35 & 37) A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : AIR 2024 SC 2499

Article 21 – Right to abortion – The right to abortion is a concomitant right of dignity, autonomy and reproductive choice guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The fundamental right of a pregnant person is not compromised for reasons other than to protect the physical and mental health of the pregnant person. (Para 21) A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : AIR 2024 SC 2499

Article 21 – The expression 'life' unequivocally includes the right to live a life worthy of human honour and dignity. Self-regard, social image and an honest space for oneself in one's surrounding society, are just as significant to a dignified life as are adequate food, clothing and shelter. Held, pre-conceived notions of prevailing stereotypes associated with a particular community, often render them 'invisible victims' and impede their right to live a life with self-respect. (Para 14 & 15) Amanatullah Khan v. Commissioner of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : AIR 2024 SC 2340

Article 21 – Right to health – The fundamental right to health encompasses the right of a consumer to be made aware of the quality of products being offered for sale by manufacturers, service providers, advertisers and advertising agencies. (Para 23) Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 381

Article 21 & 22(1) & 22 (5) – Mandatory to inform' grounds of arrest' – The requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Noncompliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be. (Para 30) Prabir Purkayastha v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : AIR 2024 SC 2967

Article 21 and 32 - Writ petition aggrieved by non-consideration and non-disposal of criminal appeal is not maintainable. If priority has not been given to the criminal appeal by the High Court for early hearing, for whatever reason, the same is also part of the judicial process and cannot be made amenable to a challenge in a writ petition under Article 32 citing breach of Article 21. A judicial decision rendered by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him does not infringe a Fundamental Right. If the petitioner wishes to be released on bail pending the criminal appeal, cannot invoke the writ remedy but has to take recourse to an application under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Para 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147

Article 22(1) and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA); Section 43B (1) – The proceedings of arrest and the police custody remand of appellant is questioned – On grounds that mandator requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested is not provided – The arrest memo nowhere conveys the grounds on which the accused was being arrested. Keeping the accused in police custody without informing him the grounds on which he has been arrested; deprives the accused of the opportunity to avail services of the legal practitioner of his choice to oppose the prayer for police custody remand and seek bail. Held, the copy of the remand application in the purported exercise of communication of the grounds of arrest in writing was not provided to the accused appellant or his counsel before passing of the order of remand which vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand of the appellant. Further held, the mere fact that a charge sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody remand to the accused. The arrest of the appellant followed by remand order are hereby declared to be invalid in the eyes of law and are quashed and set aside. Hence, the appellant is entitled to a direction for release from custody. (Para 48, 50 & 51) Prabir Purkayastha v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : AIR 2024 SC 2967

Article 22(4) and Act, 1986; Section 9, 10, 11 & 12 - Advisory Board - Article 22(4) mandates that, any law pertaining to preventive detention must provide for constitution of an Advisory Board consisting of persons who have been or qualified to be appointed as judges of the High Court. It further vests the Advisory Board with the pivotal role of reviewing an order of detention within three-months by forming an opinion as to whether there is a sufficient cause for such detention or not, after consideration of all the material on record including representation if any, of the detenu. Under preventive detention legislations, Advisory Boards(s) are constitutional safeguards available to the detenu against an order of detention. Under the Act, 1986, Section 9 gives expression to this constitutional requirement, and provides for the constitution and composition of an Advisory Board for the purposes of the Act. Under section 10, any order of detention that has been made under the Act shall be placed before an Advisory Board thereunder within three-weeks from the date of its passing. As per Section 11, the Advisory Board must form an opinion and specify as to whether there is sufficient cause warranting the detention of the detenu. (Para 50, 52 & 53) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Article 32 – Quashing the order of detention – The Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction but may ascertain whether the subjective satisfaction is based on objective facts or influenced by any caprice, malice or irrelevant considerations or non-application of mind. (Para 43) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Article 32 – Writ of Habeas Corpus – 'Habeas Corpus' literally means 'have his body'. This is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective relief of immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention, whether in prison or in private custody. It is the duty of the Court to issue this writ to safeguard the freedom of the citizen against arbitrary and illegal detention. By the writ of habeas corpus, the Court can cause any person who is imprisoned to be brought before the Court and obtain knowledge of the reason why he is imprisoned and then either set him free then and there if there is no legal justification for the imprisonment, or see that he is brought speedily to trial. The writ may be addressed to any person whatsoever an official or a private individual who has another in his custody. (Para 29 & 30) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Article 32 - Writ or direction for expeditious disposal of Criminal Appeal - Held, the Supreme Court has no power of superintendence over the High Courts. There is no provision in Chapter-IV (titled The Union Judiciary) under Part-V (The Union) of the Constitution of India which, in terms similar to Article 227 of the Constitution (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court) under Chapter-V thereof, confers power of superintendence on the Supreme Court over the High Courts. In our constitutional scheme there is a clear division of jurisdiction between the two institutions and both the institutions need to have mutual respect for each other. Accepting the prayer of the petitioner and issuing any direction, as prayed, would amount to inappropriate exercise of discretionary jurisdiction showing disrespect to another constitutional court; hence, no such direction, as prayed by the petitioner, can be issued. That apart, assuming that an extraordinary case requires a nudge from Supreme Court for early hearing of a long pending criminal appeal, it is only a request that ought to be made to the High Court to such effect in appropriate proceedings, care being taken to ensure that the proceeding before Supreme Court is otherwise maintainable. (Para 1 - 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147

Article 136 – Interference not warranted – The Technical Assistants are not claiming against the 75% posts available for direct recruits. Their claim is only towards 25% posts which are required to be filled in from Junior Draughting Officers, Overseers and Technical Assistants who have put five year service and have acquired B.E./A.M.I.E. qualification. Held, the Technical Assistants are not encroaching upon the quota apportioned for directly recruited Assistant Engineers. The continuation of the appellants as Assistant Engineers would not amount to encroaching upon the 75% posts apportioned for the members of the appellants' association. Hence, any interference at this stage is likely to undo the settled position which has been prevalent almost for a period of last 18 years. (Para 21, 25 & 26) Association of Engineers v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : AIR 2024 SC 2061

Article 136 – Interference under Article 136 is not warranted – The Supreme Court may exercise its power under Article 136 sparingly and only when exceptional circumstances exist which justify the exercise of its discretion. The court is not inclined under Article 136 of the Constitution to re-appreciate the findings of facts which have been arrived at by the High Court. The order of the High Court does not suffer from any error that would warrant the invocation of jurisdiction under Article 136. (Para 18 & 23) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 136 – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court – Discretion to interfere – In cases where there is no substantial question of law this court would not exercise its discretion. (Para 18) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230

Article 136 – Power to interfere in acquittal passed by High Court – Once the appellate court acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence as it existed before conviction by the Trial Court, stands restored. Court, while scrutinizing the evidence, will proceed with great circumspect and will not routinely interfere with an order of acquittal, save when the impeccable prosecution evidence nails the accused beyond any doubt. An intervention is warranted when the High Court's approach or reasoning is deemed perverse or when based on suspicion and surmises court rejects evidence or when the acquittal is primarily rooted in an exaggerated adherence to the rule of giving the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. Further circumstance for intervention arises when the acquittal would lead to a significant miscarriage of justice. An erroneous or perverse approach to the proven facts of a case and/or ignorance of some of the vital circumstances would amount to a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice. Supreme Court will be justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction to undo the injustice mete out to the victims of a crime. (Para 15, 17 & 18) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : (2024) 4 SCC 469

Article 136 – Scope of interference in arbitral award – While adjudicating the merits of a Special Leave Petition and exercising its power under Article 136, the Supreme Court must interfere sparingly and only when exceptional circumstances exist, justifying the exercise of the Court's discretion. The Supreme Court must be slow in interfering with a judgement delivered in exercise of powers under Section 37 unless there is an error in exercising of the jurisdiction. Held, the judgment of the Division Bench provided more than adequate reasons to come to the conclusion that the arbitral award suffered from perversity and patent illegality. There was no valid basis for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. (Para 43 & 71) Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : AIR 2024 SC 2070

Article 136 – Special leave petition – Interference not required – Findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court are based on evidence and is not perverse. (Para 11) Rajco Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 306 : AIR 2024 SC 2105

Article 136 – Wrongful denial of employment and regularization – Distinction between the two sets of workers – Artificial distinction asserted by appellant between two set of workers is unjustified. The appellant has failed to establish any distinction between the 19 workers who were regularized and the 13 workers who were left out. The tribunal came to the conclusion that the nature of the duties performed by the 13 workmen are perennial in nature and they hold the same status as the 19 regularized employees but were wrongly not made part of the settlement. There is no merit in the appeals filed by the appellant. (Para 20, 21 & 22) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230

Article 141 – Held, directions of the court shall be treated as the law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. (Para 24) Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 381

Article 142 doesn't empower Courts to ignore substantive rights of litigants - Issued guidelines on exercise of inherent powers. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Article 142 – Direction of Supreme Court for automatic vacation of interim stay due to lapse of time – The jurisdiction of Supreme Court under article 142 cannot be exercised to make judicial legislation. By a blanket direction in the exercise of power under Article 142, the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court of granting interim relief by limiting its jurisdiction to pass interim orders valid only for six months at a time. Putting such constraints on the power of the High Court will amount to making a dent on the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. Elementary principles of natural justice, mandate that an order vacating or modifying interim relief is to be passed only after hearing all the affected parties and order passed without hearing the beneficiary is against the basic tenets of justice. If an interim order is automatically vacated only because the High Court cannot hear the main case within the time limit, the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” will apply, i.e. no litigant should be allowed to suffer due to the fault of the Court. Further, automatic vacation on lapse of time gives an unfair advantage to the respondent in the case and adversely affects a litigant's right to the remedies under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Such orders virtually defeat the right of a litigant to seek and avail of statutory remedies such as revisions, appeals, and applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as well as the remedies under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Constitutional Courts may issue directions for the time-bound disposal of cases only in exceptional circumstances. (Para 16, 17, 24, 28 & 32) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Article 142 – Direction of Supreme court to dispose stay cases on a day-to-day basis – Such directions of the Supreme Court virtually amounts to judicial legislation. The High Courts cannot be expected to decide, on a priority basis or a day-to-day basis, only those cases in which a stay of proceedings has been granted while ignoring several other categories of cases that may require more priority to be given. Therefore, the issue of giving out-ofturn priority to certain cases should be best left to the concerned Courts. (Para 28, 30 & 32) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Article 142 – Scope of powers of Supreme Court under Article 142 – The jurisdiction under Article 142 cannot be invoked to pass blanket orders setting at naught a very large number of interim orders lawfully passed by all the High Courts, and that too, without hearing the contesting parties. The jurisdiction under Article 142 can be invoked only to deal with extraordinary situations for doing complete justice between the parties before the Court. Although the Supreme Court under Article 142 can always issue procedural directions to other Courts, the right to be heard before an adverse order is passed is not a matter of procedure but a substantive right. Hence, Article 142 does not empower this Court to ignore the substantive rights of the litigants. Power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to defeat the principles of natural justice, which are an integral part of our jurisprudence. (Para 19 & 22) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Article 142 – Power to ensure electoral democracy – The Court is duty-bound, to do complete justice to ensure that the process of electoral democracy is not allowed to be thwarted by subterfuges. The Court must step in exceptional situations to ensure that the basic mandate of electoral democracy at the local participatory level is preserved. The extraordinary situation of electoral misconduct by the presiding officer himself, justifies the invocation of the power of this Court under Article 142. (Para 37) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

Article 142 – Setting aside the Election Process – It would be inappropriate to set aside the election process in its entirety when the only infirmity which has been found is at the stage when the counting of votes was recorded by the Presiding Officer. Allowing the entire election process to be set aside would further compound the destruction of fundamental democratic principles which has taken place as a consequence of the conduct of the Presiding Officer. (Para 35) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

Article 142 and Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 354D & 506 – Power of court exercised to quash conviction of accused – Held, the offences under Section 354D IPC and Section 506 IPC are personal to the complainant and the accused, and the fact that the appellant and the complainant have married each other during the pendency of the appeal gives rise to a reasonable belief that both were involved in some kind of relationship even when the offences alleged were said to have been committed. Hence, on grounds that the accused and the complainant married each other and the affirmation of the conviction of accused would have the disastrous consequence on the matrimonial relationship of the accused with the complainant, the appellant is acquitted of the charges. (Para 7, 9 & 11) Dasari Srikanth v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 391

Article 142 – Maintainability of the Curative Petition – Test of 'manifest injustice' – The exercise of the curative jurisdiction of this Court should not be adopted as a matter of ordinary course and create a fourth or fifth stage of court intervention in an arbitral award. The Court may entertain a curative petition to (i) prevent abuse of its process; and (ii) to cure a gross miscarriage of justice. The concern of the Court for rendering justice in a cause cannot be considered less important than the principle of finality. There are certain situations, which would require reconsideration of a final judgement even after the review has been dismissed to set right a miscarriage of justice. The interference by Supreme Court by setting aside the judgement of the Division Bench, has resulted in restoring a patently illegal award and has caused a grave miscarriage of justice. Hence, curative petition is allowed applying the standard of a 'grave miscarriage of justice'. (Para 32, 33 & 70) Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : AIR 2024 SC 2070

Article 142 – Joint application to declare the marriage void – Held, marriage between the parties is not a 'Hindu marriage' having regard to the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. Hence, the registration certificate is null and void. Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 334

Article 142 – Quashing of criminal proceedings – There is nothing on record to show that the appellant had any ill intention of cheating or defrauding the complainant. The transaction between the parties was purely civil in nature which does not attract criminal law in any way. Held, all pending criminal appeals is liable to be quashed. (Para 13) Raj Reddy Kallem v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 336

Article 142 – Applicability/non-applicability of the doctrine of merger – The extraordinary constitutional powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which is to be exercised with a view to do complete justice between the parties, remains unaffected and being an unfettered power, shall always be deemed to be preserved as an exception to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis." Held, the doctrine of merger is not of universal application and powers under Article 142 of the Constitution shall be deemed as an exception to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis. (Para 33) Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 420

Article 226(3) – Clause (3) will not apply when an interim order in a writ petition under Article 226 is passed after the service of a copy of the writ petition on all concerned parties and after giving them an opportunity of being heard. It applies only to ex-parte ad interim orders. It provides for an automatic vacation of interim relief only if the aggrieved party makes an application for vacating the interim relief and when the application for vacating stay is not heard within the time specified. (Para 26) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Article 226 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 – Categories of cases wherein quashing power could be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice are: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are absurd and inherently improbable to reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is provision providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is mala fide. (Para 32) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Article 226 – Error of jurisdiction of High Court – The petitioner had expressly consented to the High Court to evaluate the entirety of the matter in its full perspective. As the petitioner has agreed to the evaluative action by the High Court, it cannot be concluded that the High Court has committed an error of jurisdiction. (Para 16 & 17) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 226 – Jurisdiction to interfere in administrative decisions – The judiciary must exercise restraint and avoid unnecessary intervention qua administrative decision(s) of the executive involving specialised expertise in the absence of any mala-fide and / or prejudice. The process of evaluation of an IAS officer, ought to have been left to the executive on account of it possessing the requisite expertise and mandate for the said task. The High Court entered into a specialised domain i.e., evaluating the competency of an IAS officer without the requisite domain expertise and administrative experience to conduct such an evaluation. The High Court ought not to have ventured into the said domain particularly when the Accepting Authority is yet to pronounce its decision qua the Underlying Representation. (Para 25, 27 & 28) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : AIR 2024 SC 1397

Article 226 – Delay defeats equity – Writ petition dismissed on grounds of Delay or Laches – An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. The High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. The High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is not gainsaid that in all cases of delay the petition is to be dismissed and in certain circumstances depending on the facts of each case, if the court thinks fit can on its discretion condone the delay. For filing a writ petition, there is no fixed period of limitation prescribed but the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches of the applicant in approaching a writ court. (Para 9, 10 & 11) Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 318 : AIR 2024 SC 2717

Article 226 – Entertaining petition under Article 226 in case of availability of alternative remedy – The High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an alternate effective remedy is available. This rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. (Para 15) PHR Invent Educational Society v. Uco Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : AIR 2024 SC 1893

Article 226 – Exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy – (i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question; (ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; (iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and (iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice. (Para 29) PHR Invent Educational Society v. Uco Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : AIR 2024 SC 1893

Article 226 – Power of High court to interfere – Reopening the issue is not allowed under Article 226 – Held, the High Court could have interfered in the confirmed auction sale only in cases of fraud or collusion. As the case is not of fraud or collusion, the effect of the order of the High Court would be again reopening the issues which have achieved finality. (Para 26) PHR Invent Educational Society v. Uco Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : AIR 2024 SC 1893

Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Jurisdiction of High Court to overturn finding of scrutiny committee – The High Court ought not to have interfered, especially when Scrutiny Committee had followed the due procedure under Rule 12, 17 and 18 of the 2012 Rules and that there was nothing perverse about a finding of fact. The order of validation of caste claim by Scrutiny Committee is based on subjective satisfaction. The Scrutiny Committee is an expert forum armed with fact finding authority. Held, order passed by Scrutiny Committee reflects due appreciation of evidence and application of mind and in absence of any allegation of bias/malice or lack of jurisdiction, disturbing the findings of Scrutiny Committee cannot be sustained. The High Court has clearly overstepped by reappreciating the evidence in absence of any allegation of malafide or perversity. (Para 15, 17 & 19, 22) Navneet Kaur Harbhajansing Kundles v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Article 226 – Writ of certiorari – Object – The writ jurisdiction is supervisory and the Court exercising it, ought to refrain to act as an appellate court unless the facts so warrant. The writ of certiorari is expended as a remedy and is intended to cure jurisdictional error, and should not be used by superior Court to substitute its own views by getting into fact-finding exercise unless warranted. High Courts as well as Supreme Court should refrain themselves from deeper probe into factual issues like an appellate body unless the inferences made by the concerned authority suffers from perversity on the face of it or are impermissible in the eyes of law. (Para 17 & 19) Navneet Kaur Harbhajansing Kundles v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Article 226 – Civil Suit filed to declare clause 8 of Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) arbitrary – Clause 8 of the NIT mandated deposit of five post-dated cheques and bank guarantee to secure the payment of balance auction amount – Held, once the respondent-writ petitioner had participated in the tender process being fully conscious of the terms and conditions of the auction notice, he was estopped from taking a U-turn so as to question the legality or validity of the terms and conditions of the auction notice. By dragging the matter to litigation, the respondent himself was responsible for the delay occasioned in issuance of the work order which deprived him of the opportunity to work for the entire period of 365 days. The impugned order granting payment of pro-rata auction amount for the 33 days, that he has worked less than the contract period, is ex-facie illegal and without jurisdiction. Hence, the same is quashed and set aside. (Para 21 & 24) Municipal Committee Katra v. Ashwani Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : AIR 2024 SC 2855

Article 226 – Claim of damages in Writ Petition – Held, such relief is not subject matter of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Law is well settled that disputes arising out of purely contractual obligations cannot be entertained by the High Court in exercise of the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction. Hence, the High Court ought to have relegated the writ petitioner (respondent herein) to the competent Court for claiming damages. (Para 22 & 23) Municipal Committee Katra v. Ashwani Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : AIR 2024 SC 2855

Article 226 – Writ petition – Petition rejected by High Court on grounds of delay – Held, delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the court. The condition of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of the case. It would depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. Hence, impugned order of High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration. (Para 25) Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 380

Article 226 - the High Court by way of the interim order could not have passed an order which had the effect of encroaching upon the areas reserved for the Legislature and the Executive. Our Constitution recognizes the independence of the three wings of the State, i.e. the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. No doubt that if the High Court found that the legislature concerned was not valid on account of any of the grounds available within the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it could set aside such a legislation. But by way of an interim order it could not have in effect stayed the operation of the said Statute. (Para 8 - 10) State of Uttar Pradesh v. In Re Constitution of Education Tribunals, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 71

Article 227 – Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere with order of trial court – Held, the High court could not have interfered with the order of the trial Court, unless found the view taken by the learned trial Judge was perverse or impossible. (Para 19) P. Seshareddy v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 379

Article 229 - Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts - Article 229 (2) pertains only to the service conditions of 'officers and servants' of the High Courts and does not include Judges of the High Court (both sitting and retired judges). The Chief Justice does not have the power, under Article 229, to make rules pertaining to the post-retiral benefits payable to former Chief Justices and judges of the High Court. Therefore, the Rules proposed by the Chief Justice, in the present case, do not fall within the competence of the Chief Justice under Article 229. (Para 25) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

Article 229 (2) - The High Court did not have the power to direct the State Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High Court. The Chief Justice did not have the competence to frame the rules under Article 229 of the Constitution. Further, the High Court, acting on the judicial side, does not have the power to direct the Government to frame rules proposed by it on the administrative side. (Para 24 – 30) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

Article 234 and Gujarat Rules, 2005; Rule 8 – Consultation with public service commission required under Article 234 of the Constitution for amending the rules –The prescription of minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce under Rule 8(3) of Gujarat Rules, 2005 as amended in 2011 was only in consultation with the High Court of Gujarat but not with the Gujarat Public Service Commission. Held, the Governor is under no compulsion to consult the Public Service Commission in case the Commission does not wish to be consulted. The concerned Gujarat Rules cannot, therefore, be declared to be void particularly when the Rules were framed with due consultation with the High Court. (Para 93, 97 & 102) Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Judicature at Patna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : AIR 2024 SC 2596

Article 285 - 'Enemy property' vested in the possession of the Union Government-appointed 'custodian', as per the Enemy Property Act, 1968, cannot be considered a property of the Union Government to claim the exemption from the municipal taxes under Article 285 (1) of the Constitution of India. (Para 22) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156

Article 293 – Borrowing by states – Plaintiff -State seeks interim injunction against Union of India to restore the position that existed before the Defendant union imposed ceiling on all the borrowings of the Plaintiff state – The Triple-Test, are followed by the Courts as the pre-requisites before a party can be mandatorily injuncted to do or to refrain from doing a particular thing. These three cardinal factors, are: (a) A 'Prima facie case', which necessitates that as per the material placed on record, the plaintiff is likely to succeed in the final determination of the case; (b) 'Balance of convenience', such that the prejudice likely to be caused to the plaintiff due to rejection of the interim relief will be higher than the inconvenience that the defendant may face if the relief is so granted; and (c)'Irreparable injury', which means that if the relief is not granted, the plaintiff will face an irreversible injury that cannot be compensated in monetary terms. Held, the Plaintiff – State has failed to establish a prima facie case that even after adjusting the over-borrowings of the previous year, there is fiscal space to borrow. The balance of convenience, thus, clearly lies in favour of the Defendant – Union of India as the mischief that is likely to ensue in the event of granting the interim relief, will be far greater than rejecting the same. Further Plaintiff – State has sought to equate 'financial hardship' with 'irreparable injury'. Held, it appears prima facie that 'monetary damage' is not an irreparable loss. If the State has essentially created financial hardship because of its own financial mismanagement, such hardship cannot be held to be an irreparable injury that would necessitate an interim relief against Union. Since the Plaintiff – State has failed to establish the three prongs of proving prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, State of Kerala is not entitled to the interim injunction, as prayed for. (Para 3, 12, 25, 33, 35 & 37) State of Kerala v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 269

Article 300A - The expression person in Article 300-A covers not only a legal or juristic person but also a person who is not a citizen of India. The expression property is also of a wide scope and includes not only tangible or intangible property but also all rights, title and interest in a property. (Para 18) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156

Article 300A – Right to property – The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that the State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. (Para 18) Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 380

Article 300A – Sub-rights to Right to property – The seven sub-rights or strands constituting the right to property. These are: i) duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property – the right to notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition – the right to be heard, iii) the duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire – the right to a reasoned decision, iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose – the duty to acquire only for public purpose, v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate – the right of restitution or fair compensation, vi) the duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings – the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting – the right of conclusion. Held, the larger right to property is seen as comprising intersecting sub-rights, each with a distinct character but interconnected to constitute the whole. The sub-rights weave themselves into each other, and as a consequence, State action or the legislation that results in the deprivation of private property must be measured against this constitutional net as a whole, and not just one or many of its strands. Further held, noncompliance of these will amount to violation of the right, being without the authority of law. These sub-rights of procedure have been synchronously incorporated in laws concerning compulsory acquisition and are also recognised by our constitutional courts while reviewing administrative actions for compulsory acquisition of private property. (Para 26, 28 & 29) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Article 300A – The Right to notice – A prior notice informing the bearer of the right that the State intends to deprive them of the right to property is a right in itself; a linear extension of the right to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does not contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice to acquire must be clear, cogent and meaningful. (Para 30.1) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Article 300A – The Right to be heard – It is the right of the property-bearer to communicate his objections and concerns to the authority acquiring the property. This right to be heard against the proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not a sham. (Para 30.2) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Article 300A – The Right to a reasoned decision – It is incumbent upon the authority to take an informed decision and communicate the same to the objector. The declaration is mandatory, failing which, the acquisition proceedings will cease to have effect. (Para 30.3) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Article 300A – The Duty to acquire only for public purpose – The acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire. Further, the decision of compulsory acquisition of land is subject to judicial review and the Court will examine and determine whether the acquisition is related to public purpose. If the court arrives at a conclusion that that there is no public purpose involved in the acquisition, the entire process can be set-aside. (Para 30.4) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Article 300A – The Right of restitution or fair compensation – A person's right to hold and enjoy property is an integral part to the constitutional right under Article 300A. Deprivation or extinguishment of that right is permissible only upon restitution, be it in the form of monetary compensation, rehabilitation or other similar means. Compensation has always been considered to be an integral part of the process of acquisition. Fair and reasonable compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition process. (Para 30.5) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Article 300A – The Right to an efficient and expeditious process – It is necessary for the administration to be efficient in concluding the process and within a reasonable time. This obligation must necessarily form part of Article 300A. (Para 30.6) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Article 300A – The Right of conclusion – The culmination of an acquisition process is not in the payment of compensation, but also in taking over the actual physical possession of the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition is not complete. With the taking over of actual possession after the normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is divested and the right, title and interest in the property, along-with possession is vested in the State. The obligation to conclude and complete the process of acquisition is also part of Article 300A. (Para 30.7) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Articles 341 and 342 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Public notification of 'tribes or tribal communities' by the President of India, upon consultation with the Governor, is a sine qua non for deeming such tribes or tribal communities to be 'Scheduled Tribes' in relation to that State or Union Territory for the purposes of the Constitution. (Para 15) Chandigarh Housing Board v. Tarsem Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Articles 341 and 342 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Insofar as a person claiming benefit having regard to his status as a Scheduled Tribe in a State, when he migrates to a Union Territory where a Presidential Order has not been issued at all insofar Scheduled Tribe is concerned, or even if such a Notification is issued, such an identical Scheduled Tribe does not find a place in such a Notification, the person cannot claim his status on the basis of his being noted as a Scheduled Tribe in the State of his origin. (Para 29) Chandigarh Housing Board v. Tarsem Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Ad-interim order of stay – When a High Court grants a stay of the proceedings while issuing notice without giving an opportunity of being heard to the contesting parties, it is not an interim order, but it is an ad-interim order of stay. It can be converted into an interim order of stay only after an opportunity of being heard is granted on the prayer for interim relief to all the parties to the proceedings. Ad-interim orders, by their very nature, should be of a limited duration. (Para 14) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Bar association's resolution to not represent a party - Such a Resolution could not have been passed. Right to defend oneself is a Fundamental Right under Part III of the Constitution of India and further right to appear for a client is also a Fundamental Right being a part of carrying on one's profession as a lawyer. (Para 3) Rupashree H.R. v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Grounds on which interim order comes to an end – Can come to an end by disposal of the main case either on merits or for default or other reasons, by the High Court, in which the interim order has been passed or by a judicial order vacating interim relief, passed after hearing the contesting parties on the above stated grounds. (Para 16) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Guidelines issued to secure the fundamental rights and dignity of intimate partners, and members of the LGBTQ+ communities in illegal detention – Mandatory in nature – Habeas corpus petitions and petitions for protection must be given a priority in hearing and courts must avoid adjournments or delays in the disposal of the case; In evaluating the locus standi of a partner or friend, the court must not make a roving enquiry into the precise nature of the relationship between the appellant and the person; Effort must be to create an environment conducive for a free and un-coerced dialogue to ascertain the wishes of the corpus; The court must ensure that the corpus is produced before the court and given the opportunity to interact with the judges in-person in chambers to ensure the privacy and safety of the detained or missing person; The court must ensure that the wishes of the detained person is not unduly influenced by the Court, or the police, or the natal family during the course of the proceedings; Upon securing the environment and inviting the detained or missing person in chambers, the court must make active efforts to put the detained or missing person at ease; If a detained or missing person expresses their wish to not go back to the alleged detainer or the natal family, then the person must be released immediately without any further delay; Courts must grant an ad-interim protection while dealing with a petition for police protection by intimate partners on the grounds that they are a same sex, transgender, inter-faith or inter-caste couple to maintain their privacy and dignity; The Court must not adopt counselling or parental care as a means of changing the mind of the appellant, or the detained/missing person; The Judge during the interaction with the corpus to ascertain their views must not attempt to change or influence the admission of the sexual orientation or gender identity of the appellant or the corpus and Sexual orientation and gender identity fall in a core zone of privacy of an individual and no stigma or moral judgment must be imposed when dealing with cases involving parties from the LGBTQ+ community. (Para 16 & 17) Devu G. Nair v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 249

Hierarchy in judiciary – Any orders passed by the Supreme Court, ought to be respected and fully complied with, in view of the fact that the hierarchy in the judiciary needs to be respected by one in all. In that hierarchy, the orders passed by the Supreme Court would bind not just the parties, but the judicial officers as well. (Para 8) Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Sanjay Gopinath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 428

High Court's power to vacate or modify interim relief – The High Courts are always empowered to vacate or modify an order of interim relief passed after hearing the parties if (a) A litigant, after getting an order of stay, deliberately prolongs the proceedings either by seeking adjournments on unwarranted grounds or by remaining absent when the main case in which interim relief is granted is called out for hearing before the High Court with the object of taking undue advantage of the order of stay; (b) The High Court finds that the order of interim relief is granted as a result of either suppression or misrepresentation of material facts by the party in whose favour the interim order of stay has been made; and (c) The High Court finds that there is a material change in circumstances requiring interference with the interim order passed earlier. A long passage of time may bring about a material change in circumstances. These grounds are not exhaustive and there can be other valid grounds for vacating an order of stay. (Para 15) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Object of passing interim orders – An order of interim relief is usually granted in the aid of the final relief sought in the case. An occasion for passing an order of stay of proceeding arises as it is not possible for the High Court to take up the case for final hearing immediately. Further, to avoid the possibility of passing an order of remand, the grant of stay of proceedings is called for in many cases. (Para 13) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Parliamentary processes not taking place on the floor of the house are also covered by parliamentary privilege. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629

Position of the High Courts and its power of superintendence – Both the Supreme Court and the High Court are constitutional Courts. A High Court is constitutionally independent of the Supreme Court of India and is not judicially subordinate to the Supreme Court. (Para 23) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Quashing of proceedings – Held, tested on the touchstone of the principles stated in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., allowing continuance of the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR is gross abuse of process of law because the allegations as set out in the FIR do not disclose necessary ingredients of any cognizable offence. Hence, the impugned FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant are quashed and set aside. (Para 33) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Quashing of proceedings – The object of dispute, manifestly rife with mala fide intentions of only recovering the tainted money by coercion and threat of criminal proceedings. Such proceedings cannot be allowed to proceed further and exploit the time and resources of the law enforcement agency. The valuable time of the police is consumed in investigating disputes that seem more suited for civil resolution. The need for vigilance on the part of the police is paramount, and a discerning eye should be cast upon cases where unscrupulous conduct appears to eclipse the pursuit of justice. There is a need for a circumspect approach in discerning the genuine from the spurious and thus ensuring that the resources of the state are utilised for matters of true societal import. (Para 14 & 15) Deepak Kumar Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2024 Cri LJ 1388 : (2024) 3 SCC 601

Rajya Sabha's role is part of basic structure - Rajya Sabha elections protected by legislative privileges under Article 194. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629

Right to free and fair elections – It is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Elections at the local participatory level act as a microcosm of the larger democratic structure in the country. Local governments, such as municipal corporations, engage with issues that affect citizens' daily lives and act as a primary point of contact with representative democracy. The process of citizens electing councillors, who in turn, elect the Mayor, serves as a channel for ordinary citizens to ventilate their grievances through their representatives – both directly and indirectly elected. Ensuring a free and fair electoral process throughout this process, therefore, is imperative to maintain the legitimacy of and trust in representative democracy. (Para 36) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

Right to legal aid – When the examination-in-chief of a prosecution witness is being recorded, the presence of the Advocate for the accused is required, as the advocate has a right to object to a leading or irrelevant question being asked to the witness. The report of trial court records that the evidence of prosecution witnesses was recorded in the presence of the appellants, but their Advocate was not present as they had not engaged any Advocate. Held, after finding that the appellants-accused had not engaged any Advocate, the Trial Court ought to have provided a legal aid Advocate to the appellants accused so that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses could have been recorded in the presence of the Advocate representing the appellants-accused. Recording of evidence in this fashion is not justified even if the High Court had fixed a time-bound schedule for disposal of the case. The trial court could have always sought an extension of time from the High Court. (Para 5 & 6) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261

Remission – Appellant granted liberty to prefer an appropriate representation addressed to the State Government praying for remission of sentence. Considering the fact that the appellant has undergone almost 11 years of imprisonment so far i.e. almost half of his life lived so far has been spent undergoing the ordeal of the criminal prosecution. Held, when a crime is committed, a variety of factors are responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations. (Para 85 & 86) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 Cri LJ 2377

Scope of judicial review in matters of transfer – The scope of judicial review is only available when there is a clear violation of statutory provision or the transfer is persuaded by malafide. In absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegation are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. The impugned transfer order is not alleged to be malafide or violative of any prescribed statutory provision, hence, the interference made by the Division Bench setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the Single Judge is not justified. The Division Bench has committed an error in setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. (Para 12 & 13) Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 231

Scope of judicial review in policy matters – The Courts do not and cannot examine the correctness, suitability or appropriateness of a policy, nor are the courts advisors to the executive on the matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The Courts cannot direct the States to implement a particular policy or scheme on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, would be the subject of judicial review. The scope of judicial review in examining the policy matters is very limited. (Para 8) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

Supreme Court asks Yamuna River Board to decide Delhi Govt's plea for additional water; HP Govt withdraws statement on surplus water. Government of NCT of Delhi v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 429

The decision of the Supreme Court enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all cases irrespective of the stage of pendency thereof because it is assumed that what is enunciated by the Supreme Court is, in fact, the law from inception. (Para 16) Bhumikaben N. Modi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : AIR 2024 SC 2444

The proportionality standard - To determine if the violation of the fundamental right is justified – The proportionality standard is by nature curated to give prominence to the fundamental right and minimize the restriction on it. The measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage); The measure must be a suitable means for furthering the goal (suitability or rational connection stage); The measure must be least restrictive and equally effective (necessity stage); and The measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the right holder (balancing stage). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Writ Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction of the Writ Court in entering into fact-finding exercise while testing legality of an award of tribunal – For revision of wages and other facilities, the standard criteria followed by the industrial adjudicator is the 'industry-cum-region test', which implies that the prevailing pay and other allowances should be compared with equally placed or similarly situated industrial units in the same region. To determine comparability of units applying the industry-cum-region test, the financial capacity of the employer would be a strong factor. Held, where the employer contested comparability of the concerned units, on grounds of its financial position, the proper course would have been to remit the matter to the Industrial Tribunal rather than entering into these factual question independently in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The High Court ought not to re-appreciate evidence and substitute its own finding for that of the Tribunal, it would not be beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court in its power of judicial review to altogether eschew such a process. (Para 12 & 15) VVF Ltd. Employees Union v. VVF India Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Writ petition – Lack of proper procedure – The writ petition filed claiming title on the disputed plot of land was taken up by the High Court in hot haste and was allowed without issuing formal notice to all the respondents. Further, the State authorities were not given proper opportunity of filing a counter and the standing counsel was instructed to appear without any formal notice being issued and was given a single day's opportunity to present the factual report. Impugned order passed by the High Court suffers from patent illegality, perversity and in sheer violation of principles of natural justice. (Para 16 & 18) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226

Writ petition – Writ petition was manifestly tainted on account of concealment of material facts. Factum of filing of two earlier writ petitions with similar prayers was concealed by respondent while filing the present writ petition. (Para 14 & 16) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226