Rent Control Court Has Power To Condone Delay Under Section 5 Of Limitation Act: Kerala High Court [FB]

The Kerala High Court has held that a Rent Control Court has the power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The appointment of a Munsiff as Rent Control Court is not as a persona designata or a quasi judicial authority, a Full Bench comprising Justices AM Shaffique, Sunil Thomas and Gopinath P. observed while overruling a division bench judgment in [Ratheesh v. A.M.Chacko and Another (2018 (5) KHC 35)] in which is it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is not applicable to proceedings before the Rent Control Court under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Full Bench was answering a reference by a division bench [Faisal v. Vikas Chacko (2019 (3) KLT 760)] which had doubted the dictum laid down in Ratheesh case.

Referring to the provisions of the Rent Control Act, the bench observed that being a special and a local law which does not expressly exclude the provisions of Limitation Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under the Rent Control Act, if the Rent Control Court is a 'Court'. Thus, the issue considered was whether the Rent Control Court is a "Court" in order to apply the provisions of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act.

The court noted that, a single bench, in Abdul Rehiman v. Hameed Hassan Peruvad and Others [1995 (2) KLT 794] had held that the Rent Control Court is a "court" and is not acting as persona designata. In Balakrishnan v. Mariyumma [1997 (1) KLT 205], a division bench had also held thus. Both these judgments relied on the Apex Court judgment in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [(1995) 5 SCC 5] , wherein it was held that the Limitation Act would apply to the appellate authority constituted under Section 13 of the Act. However, in M.P.Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise [(2015) 7 SCC 58], Mukri Gopalan was partly overruled. Taking note of this, the High Court in Ratheesh case, held that a Rent Control Court has no power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After referring to all these judgments, the bench observed:

In fact, in Ratheesh (supra), the Division Bench failed to notice that Mukri Gopalan (supra) was decided taking into account two specific issues. One is that the Appellate Authority under Section 18 of the Rent Control Act is a Court and therefore Limitation Act would apply, and secondly that Parsons Tools (supra) was decided on its own facts and statutory scheme, or else Section 29(2) would have applied to quasi judicial bodies or Tribunals. In M.P. Steel Corporation (supra), the Apex Court held that the second part of the finding in Mukri Gopalan (supra) was not good law. The first part was in fact approved in M.P.Steel Corporation (supra). Hence, we are of the view that the judgment in Ratheesh (supra) does not lay down the correct law and to that extent, stands overruled.

In Mukri Gopalan (supra), it was also held that when District Judges are appointed as Appellate Authorities under the Rent Control Act, it functions as a 'Court' and therefore Limitation Act would apply to applications filed before it. The said finding has not been held to be bad in law in M.P.Steel Corporation (supra)

As far as the law laid down in Mukri Goplan (supra) is concerned, the portion of the judgment which held that Limitation Act may apply to quasi-judicial authorities or Tribunals, alone has been found to be not good law in M.P.Steel Corporation (supra). The finding in Mukri Goplan (supra) that the appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Control Act is a Court and therefore Limitation Act would apply and the reasoning thereof still holds good.

Referring to Section 3(1) of the Rent Control Act and the Government notification issued thereunder, the bench further observed:

By usage of the words "a person" appearing in Section 3(1) and the words "a Munsiff" appearing in the said Section to be appointed as a Rent Control Court for such local areas as may be specified therein, the intention of the legislature in appointing a Munsiff as the Rent Control Court was to treat the said court to carry on with the functions of a Rent Control Court subject to the limitations specified under the Statute. Of course, the Rent Control Court cannot go beyond the statutory powers vested in it. For example, if there is a bonafide dispute regarding title, the Rent Control Court will have to direct the parties to move the Civil Court for adjudication of their civil rights in terms of 2nd proviso to S.11(1), in which event, the landlord will be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil Court. 18. Section 3(1) of the Rent Control Act, may at first blush give an impression that the intention of the legislature was to appoint a person as Rent Control Court. But, by virtue of the notification, SRO No. 390/1973, issued by the Government, the Principal Munsiff and Additional Munsiff of a jurisdictional area is appointed as the Rent Control Court. Even in the case of appellate authorities under Section 18 of the Rent Control Act, there is a conferment of power to the District Judge to function as appellate authorities.

The bench answered the reference as follows:

In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that the Rent Control Court is not a persona designata. It is a Court and in the absence of any express exclusion, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies. Consequently, the Rent Control Court has the power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Ratheesh (supra) does not lay down the correct law.

CASE: KK HAMSA vs. ATHIKOTTU SNEHALETHA RCRev..No.258 OF 2018
CORAM: Justices AM Shaffique, Sunil Thomas and Gopinath P. 

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