Twitter Prefers Appeal Against Karnataka High Court Order Dismissing Its Challenge To Centre's Account Blocking Orders

X Corp (formerly Twitter) has preferred an appeal before the Karnataka High Court challenging the single bench order dismissing its plea challenging the blocking orders issued to it by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeiTY) under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act.

Vide its order dated June 30, the single judge had also imposed a cost of Rs. 50 lakh on the microblogging platform, citing its conduct.

The company contends that imposition of such exemplary costs is plainly unjust and excessive, and it effectively deters it as well as other intermediaries from challenging blocking orders that violate Section 69A or the Blocking Rules.

Thus, by way of interim relief, it has sought stay on payment of cost, which is due on August 14. “In case this court is unable to render a decision on Appellant's interim application prior to August 14, 2023, appellant requests that the daily levy of Rs.5,000, be kept in abeyance until this Hon'ble Court decides the interim application,” the appeal further prays.

The company in its appeal says that if the single bench decision is upheld, the Union Government will be "emboldened" to issue more blocking orders that "violate Section 69A, the Blocking Rules, and the procedures and safeguards mandated" by the Supreme Court in the Shreya Singhal case.

The matter is likely to be heard next week.

It is argued that the impugned order failed to follow the plain language of Section 69A(1) that reasons must be recorded in writing in a blocking order. It erroneously holds that Section 69A(1) does not require blocking orders to contain reasons in writing, the appeal says. Moreover, the impugned order's interpretation of Section 69A(1) leads to redundancy of words, which is impermissible in law, it is contended.

The appeal also questions the order inasmuch it permits blocking of accounts as a whole, including all future innocuous content posted by those accounts. It says, “The plain language of Section 69A(1) authorizes only the blocking of information that already exists, and therefore the Impugned Order should have applied a literal interpretation. It cannot justify adopting a purposive interpretation because the language of Section 69A(1) is unambiguous.”

Further it is said “The Impugned Order erroneously held that, although Appellant has locus-standi to bring a petition under Article 226, Appellant cannot claim the protection of Article 21 of the Constitution of India because it is not a natural person. This holding is wrong because it contradicts the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-J.) v. Union of India (2017).”

It is also said that the impugned order should be set aside because it ignored the respondent's failure to comply with Rule 14 of the Blocking Rules. The order failed to apply the doctrine of proportionality that is an inherent part of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, which apply to Appellant, it is averred.

Further it says, “The Impugned Order misstates material facts because it returns an erroneous finding that Appellant's "representatives who admittedly participated in several meetings of the Committee, never indicated to the authorities the grievances that are being now aired". This finding is erroneous because Appellant raised all of the relevant issues with the Rule 7 Committee and Respondents numerous times.”

Finally it says, “The order misstates the laws of the United States, and relies on inapplicable foreign law, in preference over Indian law, to justify a purposive interpretation.”

Case Title: X Corp And Union of India