[LARR Act, 2013] Court Cannot Condone Delay Beyond 120-Day Period In Appeal Against Award Of Compensation: Bombay High Court

A division bench of Justice B. P. Colabawalla and Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan noted that as the proviso to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act specifically states that High Court cannot condone delay for a further period of exceeding 60 days, after the initial period of 60 days, this amounts to express exclusion of the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Court was seized with Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai's (MCGM) challenge to two orders/awards passed by the Reference Authority under the 2013 Act. In its orders, Reference the authority partly allowed the references filed by the Original Claimants and enhanced compensation payable to them by the appellant/MCGM.

As both the appeals were not filed within stipulated time under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, MCGM filed interim applications seeking condonation of delay in filing the two appeals.

Subject Of Limitation In 2013 Act Is Special Law

The appellant/MCGM based its arguments on the line that the 2013 Act is a 'general law'. It argued that the argued that as the 2013 Act is a general law, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act pertaining to special/local law would not apply.

For context, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Limitation Act, then the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

MCGM argued that, under Section 105 of the 2013 Act, read with the Fourth Schedule (Section 105 explicitly exempts the application of the Act to the legislations listed in the Fourth Schedule), there are specific enactments related to land acquisition. Therefore, the 2013 Act should be considered a general law.

The High Court noted that whether a legislation is a special law or general law must be determined based on the context in which it is evaluated. It stated that there can never be a general classification on the nature of the act.

It observed that whether a legislation special law or general law is relative to the some other legislation or provision. It stated that while determining of whether an act is special or general one, focus must the principal subject-matter and the particular perspective.

On limitation, it noted that though a law might be a general law, it may contain special provisions relating to limitation, different from the general law of limitation. In such cases, the Court said that the law would be a special law for the purpose of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

The Court stated that as Section 74 of Land Acquisition Act prescribes a different period of limitation for filing appeals, it can be considered as a special law in relation to the subject of limitation.

It observed that even though it may be a general law on matter of land acquisition, since it contains different limitation period than that prescribed under the Limitation Act, the limitation provision would be a special law a general law.

“Though one may be able to say that the 2013 Act is a general law in relation to the subject of acquisition of land for public purposes, Section 74 which prescribes a different period of limitation for filing appeals from what is set out in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, would be a special law in relation to the subject of limitation. In other words, though the 2013 Act may be classified as a general law regulating the procedure of acquisition of land generally, if it lays down any bar of time in respect of special cases in special circumstances, like those contemplated under Section 74(1) read with its proviso, it would be a “special law” contained within the general law.”

Limitation Act Not Applicable To 2013 Act

The appellant/MCGM further contended that even assuming the 2013 Act is a special law, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would still be applicable as the same has not been expressly excluded by the language of Section 74 of the 2013 Act.

Section 5 of Limitation Act permits the court to condone delay if the applicant/appellant shows sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the stipulated period.

However, the Court rejected this argument and stated that Section 74 excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

“We, after perusing the provisions of Section 74, are clearly of the view that when the said section is read as a whole, the inescapable conclusion is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked for condoning the delay beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) read with its proviso.”

It remarked that if the legislature intended the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it would not have inserted the proviso to Section 74(1) which empowers the High Court to condone the delay for a period not exceeding 60 days.

It observed,“However, the proviso to Section 74(1) specifically stipulates that the High Court shall have the power to condone the delay, after the initial period of sixty days, for a further period not exceeding sixty days. This would most definitely amount to an express exclusion to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to an appeal to be filed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act.”

The Court thus held that it does not have the power to condone delay beyond the 120 day period.

It therefore dismissed the applications seeking a condonation of delay and as a result, also dismissed the two appeals.

Case title: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai vs. Anusaya Sitaram Devrukhkar & Ors. (Interim Application No. 13254 Of 2024 In First Appeal (ST.) No. 24058 Of 2024 In Reference No. 827/KOK/MUM(SOB)/2021 & Connected Matter)

Counsels for Applicant/Appellant: Mr. Girish Godbole, Senior Counsel a/w Rahul Soman, Aditya Joshi, Vidya Vyavahare, Pallavi Khale for the Applicant/Appellant (MCGM)

Counsels for Respondent: Adv. Anoshak Daver i/b. Nikhil Mengde a/w Rahul Lathi, Siddhikesh Ghosalkar, Sahil Salunkhe a/w Burjis Doctor for the Respondent Nos. 1, 7 to 11; Mr. Anuj Desai a/w Rajendra B. Singhavi, Dhrumil Shah, Divya Dave i/b. Lex Service for Respondent No.12.

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