Krishna Janmabhumi Dispute: Allahabad HC To Deliver Verdict Tomorrow On Masjid Committee's Challenge To 18 Suits

Before the Court, the Committee of Management Trust Shahi Masjid Idgah (Mathura) primarily argued that the suits pending before the High Court are barred by the Places of Worship Act 1991, Limitation Act 1963, and Specific Relief Act 1963.

Appearing for the Mosque committee, Advocate Tasneem Ahmadi primarily contended that in the majority of the suits pending before the HC, the plaintiffs are seeking the right to the title of the land, which was the subject matter of a compromise arrived at in 1968 between Shree Krishna Janmasthan Seva Sangh and the management of the Shahi Masjid Idgah, dividing the disputed land and asking the 2 groups to stay away from each other's areas (within the 13.37-acre complex), however, the suits are specifically barred by law (the Places of Worship Act 1991, Limitation Act 1963 as well as the Specific Relief Act 1963).

On the other hand, the Hindu plaintiffs argued that no property in Shahi Idgah's name is in the government records, and the same is occupied illegally. They also argued that if the property is a Waqf property, the Waqf Board should tell who donated the disputed property. They also submitted that the Acts of Worship Act, Limitation Act, and Waqf Act are not applicable in this case.

Challenging the maintainability of the Original Suits no 6, 9, 16 and 18 (inter alia seeking removal of Shahi Idgah), Advocate Ahmadi had argued that the plaintiffs has, in the plaint, admitted the compromise of 1968 and the fact that the possession of the land (where Idagh is built) is under the control of the Mosque management and therefore, the suit, would be barred by the Limitation Act as well as the Places of Worship Act as the suits also admit the fact that the mosque in question was built in 1669-70.

For context, the limitation period for instituting civil suits is three years from the date the cause of action arose.

"The compromise was entered into in 1967, which is admitted even in the suit, hence, when they filed suit in 2020, the same would be barred by the Limitation Act (3 years)...Even if it is assumed that the Mosque was built in 1969 (after the compromise), even then, the suit can not now be filed as it would be barred by the Limitation Act. Over 50 years of delay...It is an old cause of action, as it can't be said that they were refused entry to the premises only in 2023 when they admitted that the disputed property had been under the control of the Mosque management since 1968-69" she had contended.

Advocate Ahmadi had further argued that if the complaint's assertion that the Mosque was constructed after the 1968 compromise is deemed accurate, then how can they claim in the suit that they learned about the compromise in 2020?

Importantly, she had also argued that a prayer of permanent injunction can be granted only to a person in actual possession of the property on the date of suit. Since the plaintiffs do not have the Mosque, they can't pray for a permanent injunction.

"The plaint admits the possession of the management of the Mosque, however, since the suit is for a declaration without seeking the consequential relief of possession, it would barred by proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act...An injunction can't be sought by them without the plaintiffs' being in the possession of the disputed property." she submitted

She had strongly contended that the Waqf Tribunal must decide who objects to the character of a Waqf Property (whether or not Shahi Idgah Mosque is so), and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be barred by law.

In its application filed under Order VII Rule 11 (d) [for rejection of plaint] r/w Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Shahi Masjid Idgah Committee argued that the suits pending before the High Court admit that a Mosque existed after 1968.

On the other hand, the plaintiffs argued that it is Waqf's nature to encroach on any property, change its nature, and convert it into Waqf property without ownership, and this kind of practice cannot be allowed. They also argued that the provisions of the Waqf Act will not apply in this case because the disputed property is not a Waqf property.

It was also argued that the Ancient Monuments Protection Act 1958 provisions apply to the entire portion of the disputed property. Its notification was issued on 26 February 1920, and now the provisions of Waqf will not apply to this property.

Hindu plaintiffs were represented by Advocates Hari Shankar Jain, Vishnu Shanker Jain, Reena N Singh, Mahendra Pratap Singh, Ajay Kumar Singh, Hare Ram Tripathi, Prabhash Pandey, Vinay Sharma, Gaurav Kumar, Radhey Shyam Yadav, Saurabh Tiwari, Siddharth Srivastava, Ashish Kumar Srivastava, Ashvinee Kumar Srivastava and Ashutosh Pandey (in person).

The dispute in brief

The entire controversy relates to Mughal emperor Aurangazeb-era Shahi Eidgah mosque at Mathura, which is alleged to have been built after demolishing a temple at the birthplace of Lord Krishna.

In 1968, a 'compromise agreement' was brokered between the Shri Krishna Janmasthan Seva Sansthan, the temple management authority, and the Trust Shahi Masjid Eidgah, allowing both places of worship to operate simultaneously. However, the validity of this agreement has now been doubted by parties seeking various forms of relief in courts with respect to Krishna Janmabhoomi.

The litigants contend that the compromise agreement was fraudulent and invalid in law. Many of them claim a right to worship at the disputed site and have sought the removal of the Shahi Eidgah mosque.

In May last year, the Allahabad High Court transferred to itself all the suits pending before the Mathura court, praying for various reliefs pertaining to the Krishna Janmabhoomi-Shahi Eidgah Mosque dispute, allowing the transfer application filed by Bhagwan Shrikrishna Virajman and seven others.