Spotlight On Recent Appointments To The Supreme Court - Justice Manoj Misra

A general criticism of the Indian Courts has been that very little is known to the public about the judges being recommended by respective Collegium before their appointment, on merit and suitability. A designated Secretariat ideally should do the job, unfortunately we don’t have such a mechanism. Livelaw has taken an initiative to share relevant information about the appointees and we are starting with the appointments to the Apex Court. The focus is to shed light on some of their significant high court judgments.

We traced the judicial career of Justice Pankaj Mithal in Part 1 and of Justice Dipankar Datta in Part II. In Part III, we offered a glimpse into the judicial philosophy of Justice Sanjay Karol. In Part IV, we offered some of the highlights of Justice P.V. Sanjay Kumar’s judicial pronouncements during his tenures as a High Court Judge and as the Chief Justice of the Manipur High Court. In Part V, we surveyed some of the key judgments delivered by Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, during his career as a Judge of the Patna and Andhra Pradesh High Courts.

In Part VI, we offer a peek into the judicial philosophy of Justice Manoj Misra.

Background

Justice Manoj Misra was born on June 2, 1965. Misra, who belongs to a family of lawyers, graduated in Law from University of Allahabad in 1988 and was enrolled as an Advocate on December 12, 1988. He practised at Allahabad High Court for about 23 years in Civil,Revenue, Criminal and Constitutional matters. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on November 21, 2011 and as a Permanent Judge on August 06, 2013. Elevated as a Judge of the Supreme Court on February 6, 2023, he is due to retire on June 1, 2030, after completing a tenure of more than seven years.

Justice Manoj Misra’s elevation to the Supreme Court directly from the position of being a Judge of the High Court - while most others made it to the Supreme Court after a stint as the Chief Justice of a High Court - is likely to raise eyebrows. At the farewell ceremony held in Allahabad High Court, Justice Misra did share his surprise over his direct elevation, but attributed it to his childhood trait, when he was asked to write his school final examination, even while studying ninth standard.

Observers, however, point out that Justice Manoj Misra’s direct elevation to the Supreme Court was under the merit as well as the regional quota, as he was not only a bright judge, but was the senior-most Judge from Uttar Pradesh. With Justice Krishna Murari, another Judge from Uttar Pradesh retiring on July 8 this year, there was a prospect of Uttar Pradesh being underrepresented in the Apex Court, with only one Judge from Uttar Pradesh, Justice Vikram Nath among the sitting Judges. The elevation of Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court, Pankaj Mithal - also with Allahabad High Court as his parent High Court - along with Justice Manoj Misra is seen in that perspective.

The following are some of his judgments delivered by Justice Manoj Misra during his long career as a Judge of the Allahabad High Court.

Rule of Law

In In Re: Withdrawal of Criminal Cases by State Government, Justice Manoj Misra was part of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court - also comprising Justice V.K.Shukla and Justice Bharat Bhushan - which held that the state government is not at all free to exercise its authority under Section 321 CrPC in a whimsical or arbitrary manner or for extraneous considerations, apart from just and valid reasons, while withdrawing criminal cases. The bench held that when the Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor proceeds to move an application for withdrawal, he has to act objectively being an Officer of the Court and has to see and ensure that the move that is being mooted by him is in the interest of advancing cause of justice. ‘The Public Prosecutor will have to rise to the occasion and will have to act independently, courageously and not simply surrender his discretion’, the bench put it. The bench added that the authority conferred on Public Prosecutor to take independent decision is not negotiable and cannot be bartered away in favour of those who may be above him on the administrative side as the Public Prosecutor is obligated to be guided by law and spirit of CrPC only and ensure that his opinion is not used otherwise. A duty has also been fastened on Court to check the abuse or misuse by the executive of the provisions of Section 321 of the CrPC, the bench emphasised in this case.

In Javed Aftab & Ors v State of UP & Ors, the bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Deepak Verma stayed an order passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Bijnor directing four accused persons to pay compensation for damaging public properties during anti-CAA protests in Lucknow on December 19, 2019.

The Uttar Pradesh government had issued show cause notices under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and under Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, to those allegedly involved in the protests. As these notices were challenged before the Supreme Court in a writ petition titled Parwaiz Arif Titu v State of Uttar Pradesh, as being contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in In Re: Destruction of Public and Private Properties v Government of Appellant, Justice Manoj Misra’s bench considered it appropriate to stay the ADM’s order, pending its adjudication by the Supreme Court.

In In Re: Destruction of Public and Private Properties v Govt. of Appellant (2009), the Supreme Court had put the onus of assessment of damages and recovery from the accused on High Courts of every State. The Justice Manoj Misra bench rejected the state government’s view that in the absence of the Supreme Court’s passing any interim order in Parwaiz Arif Titu case, and till such time the validity of the Rules were not doubted by the Court, the proceedings initiated thereunder ought to be brought to its logical conclusion.

Acquittal of accused on the ground of unfair trial

In Ishaque v State of Uttar Pradesh, the appellant argued that the Trial Court had failed to put to him (the accused) the incriminating circumstances emanating from the prosecution evidence, as is required by law for the recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It was argued that since the appellant/accused is a citizen of Bangladesh, he signed all papers in Bangla; therefore, even if the prosecution evidence was recorded in his presence, the same should have been put and explained to him in Bangla language so that he could have offered a plausible explanation to that evidence. Thus the accused challenged his conviction on the ground that the failure to put to him the evidence in the language understood by him had caused serious prejudice to his defence thereby vitiating the trial and the order of conviction.

The Allahabad High Court bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Sameer Jain, held that the examination of the appellant under Section 313 CrPC was not in respect of the circumstances that appeared against him in the prosecution evidence. Noting that the appellant had already served more than 30 years in prison, Justice Misra held that any fresh exercise to cure the defect, after such a long gap, would be a travesty of justice, and allowed his appeal by setting aside his conviction.

Against Death Sentence

In Upendra v State of Uttar Pradesh, the Allahabad High Court bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Sameer Jain, rejected the reference made to it to confirm the death penalty awarded to a man accused of raping and murdering a 75-year-old woman, by observing that the investigation in the case had not been up to the mark. Acquitting the accused, the bench noted that in the instant case, blood and other biological material were not collected from the accused of DNA profiling as per the requirement of section 53-A CrPC.

In Monu Thakur v State of Uttar Pradesh, the bench rejected the reference made to it to confirm the death penalty awarded to a rape-and-murder accused, saying there was no worth-while evidence on record to prove the charges against the accused-appellant. The bench found that the prosecution witnesses had claimed that the victim got accidentally burnt while cooking food as a kerosene oil bottle slipped and fell on the gas burner. Noting that the prosecution witnesses also did not depose about the presence of the accused-appellant in the house at the time of the incident, the Court concluded that the prosecution had not been able to prove that the accused-appellant entered the house of the victim, misbehaved with her, or sexually assaulted her in any manner, and thereafter, set her on fire.

Regarding the applicability of Section 29 of the POCSO Act in this case, the Court noted that to take the benefit of the presumptive provisions (requiring the accused to discharge the burden of proving his innocence), the prosecution, by leading legally admissible evidence, would have to prove the foundational or basic facts, in respect of commission of the offence specified therein by the accused. Section 29 of the POCSO Act raises a presumption of commission of offences under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the Act against a person who is prosecuted against the same, unless the contrary is proved. The bench also noted that the prosecution chose not to prove the victim’s dying declaration. The bench acquitted the appellant, as a result.

In Najeeruddin v State of Uttar Pradesh, the bench rejected the reference made to it to confirm the death penalty awarded to an accused in connection with a rape and murder case, and directed the Sessions Court to conduct a retrial in the matter. The bench noted that the trial court, while holding the appellant guilty, did not give sufficient time to the prosecution and the defence before pronouncing the verdict and that it had failed to put to the accused the forensic report.

Master of the Roster

In June 2021, the bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Anil Kumar Ojha dismissed a plea with Rs.20000 cost as the petitioner had prayed that no case filed by him be listed before a court comprising a particular Judge. Describing the petition as totally misconceived, the Bench reiterated that the master of the roster is the Chief Justice, and it is the prerogative of the Chief Justice as to before which Judge or Judges the matter is to be listed. The Bench added that the causelist is prepared by the Registry, under the authority of the Chief Justice. Therefore, the Bench expressed its inability to issue any direction to the High Court not to list cases of a particular counsel before a particular Judge.

Justice Manoj Misra’s order came close on the heels of dismissal of another petition filed before the court of the High Court Chief Justice in April 2021 which sought non- delegation of the power of Chief Justice as the Master of the Roster to Senior Judges in his absence. The Bench of the Chief Justice Govind Mathur and Justice Mrs Saroj Yadav had dismissed it as misconceived, as the object of the Rule facilitating such delegation is to make the High Court functional in the absence of the Chief Justice.

In Defence of Daughter’s Right

In Chandra Gopal Shukla v Additional District and Sessions Judge/F.T.C. and Others, the Allahabad High Court had to decide a defendant-tenant’s petition against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority in a Rent Case and the Order passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC) in Rent Appeal.

The landlord-respondent had filed a release application under the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 against the petitioner for release of a shop for his only child (daughter) to set up a beauty parlour. The shop in dispute was required for setting up the parlour to ensure her own income. Under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, a building could only be released when it is bona fide required by the landlord himself or any member of his family, whereas, under Section 3(g) of the Act, family does not include a married daughter. It was contended by the petitioner that after marriage the daughter goes out of the family of the landlord and her requirement cannot be made basis of an eviction decree.

Justice Manoj Misra noted that the need set up by the landlord in the release application was not merely to get employment for his daughter, but to ensure better financial condition for the family. Considering that the landlord's only child was his daughter, he had no option but to look up to his daughter for amelioration of his financial condition. Therefore, once it was brought on record that even after marriage she was staying with her father/landlord, Justice Manoj Misra observed that mere marriage of daughter did not extinguish the need set up in the release application. Justice Manoj Misra, therefore, directed the petitioner to vacate and hand over possession of the disputed accommodation to the landlord.

In Defence of Special Investigation Team

In Re Missing of an LLM Student at Swami Shukdevanand Law College v State of Uttar Pradesh was decided by the Division Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice D.Verma on April 30, 2020. In this case, the former Union Minister, and BJP leader, Swami Chinmayanand was an accused in a rape case. The allegation was that he held a law student in his captivity in Shahjahanpur, while the victim had levelled rape charges against him. Chinmayanand was arrested in the case on September 20, 2019 and sent to jail.

Meanwhile, the law student moved an application before the Allahabad High Court alleging bias on the part of the SIT, set up to investigate her rape allegations against him, and also the extortion case filed against her. The Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Deepak Verma expressed its satisfaction on the way the state-appointed SIT had investigated the cases and dismissed the allegations of bias. The same Bench was appointed at the direction of the Supreme Court, to monitor the investigation being conducted by the SIT. The law student who had accused Swami Chinmayanand was later booked on the charges of extortion in a cross FIR filed by him. The Bench clarified that since FIR had been registered against her, the SIT was under an obligation to investigate the matter keeping both sets of allegations in mind. Thus, it could not be said that the SIT proceeded with a view to find her faults, it said.

The victim had alleged that the SIT focused on the extortion case to malign her image in the public. She had pointed out that the press conference held by the SIT to demonstrate that she was involved in extortion not only infringed upon her right to privacy, but also maligned her image in public so as to “break her spirit”.

In response to this argument, the Bench said that merely because a press conference was held, it would not mean that the investigation was tainted or was biased. It remarked that in sensitive matters it might become inevitable to apprise the media about developments. While it cautioned that investigating agencies must exercise restraint and restrict the press conference just to disclose the status of the investigation, the same would not affect the legality of the investigation. A detailed press conference disclosing material and opinion might result in prejudging the issue, and might also have serious repercussions on the safety of the victim, accused and the witnesses, the Bench cautioned.