Compromise Deed Must State Reasons For Settlement For Quashing Of FIR & Criminal Proceedings: Punjab & Haryana High Court
High Courts are empowered under Section 482 of CrPC to quash FIR and further criminal proceedings, even for non-compoundable offences, if a compromise has been reached and the matter is personal. However, to seek such quashing, the compromise deed must not have inconsistencies and must state clear and specific reasons for the compromise, Punjab and Haryana High Court has held. In a...
High Courts are empowered under Section 482 of CrPC to quash FIR and further criminal proceedings, even for non-compoundable offences, if a compromise has been reached and the matter is personal. However, to seek such quashing, the compromise deed must not have inconsistencies and must state clear and specific reasons for the compromise, Punjab and Haryana High Court has held.
In a case where quashing of FIR and further proceedings had been sought, and the accused was charged with common object pertaining to attempt to murder and other provisions of Arms Act, 1959, on grounds that a compromise had been arrived at, Justice Anoop Chitkara while referring to several apex court judgments, noted that the compromise deed was devoid of any reasons regarding why the compromise had been made and that it was also inconsistent with the FIR filed, and thus, rejected the petition.
The gist of the matter is that an FIR was filed in April 2021 by the respondents under S. 452, 307, 336, 148, 149 of IPC and S.25 and 27 of the Arms Act, stating that the respondents were sitting in their haveli and three vehicles containing 10-12 unknown persons stopped by and one Narinder Singh and son alighted the vehicles and fired shots in the air. Narinder Singh was carrying a 12 bore double barrel gun and his son, Nawab Singh was holding a revolver.
During the pendency of the petition, the accused and the injured arrived at a compromise and thus, the petitioners (Narinder Singh and his son) came up before this court to quash the FIR and further proceedings. Respondents were also asked to record their statements with the concerned court on oath.
The High Court, on a perusal of compromise deed, noted that the respondents had claimed that the petitioners had tied masks and handkerchiefs on their faces, however, in the FIR, it was clearly stated by present respondents that it was Narinder Singh and his son who had fired the air shots. Further noting that the compromise deed was devoid of any reasons for the compromise, the High Court stated that "although the said affidavit might be a factor for consideration for the grant of bail it cannot be a factor in terminating the criminal proceedings altogether."
Perusing judicial precedents regarding quashing of proceedings under S.307, IPC, using powers under S.482 of CrPC, the Court stated that primarily, S.307 of IPC is not compoundable under law and compromise deeds are generally only allowed in cases where continuation of criminal proceedings would not tantamount to abusing the process of law. If the offences are not personal, then compromise deeds should not be allowed.
This was also iterated by the apex court in State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, that whenever the High Courts decide to exercise their extraordinary powers under S.482 of CrPC, they must give due regard to the gravity of the crimes and their potential impact on the society at large. The judgment had further held that "taking a lenient view on serious offences will leave a wrong impression about the criminal justice system and will encourage further criminal acts."
This perception of the apex court was reasserted in Yogendra Yadav v. the State of Jharkhand where it was held that the powers under S.482 and S.320 are different and although Court can exercise the powers under S.482 to quash proceedings for non-compoundable offences, however, it depends on the specific circumstances of each case and must be exercised cautiously and only when the High Court is entirely convinced that the offence committed would not affect public peace and tranquility or when the quashing of proceedings will aid the process of peace and harmony between the two parties.
Thus, noting the inconsistencies in the present case between the compromise deed and the FIR and the lack of reasoning for reaching the compromise deed, in addition to the fact that the offence alleged is non-compoundable, the High Court rejected the present petition regarding quashing of FIR, but it still allowed the parties the liberty to enter into a fresh compromise which must mention the reasons to justify such compromise.
Case: Narinder Singh & another v. State of Punjab and another
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (PH) 18
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anoop Chitkara
Counsel for Petitioners: Mr. P.S. Ahluwalia
Counsel for respondents: Mr. Sidakmeet Singh Sandhu, AAG, Punjab ad Mr. Shaurya Puri, Advocate for Respondent no. 2