Mere Breach Of Promise Not Equivalent To Giving False Promise To Marry: Madhya Pradesh High Court Quashes Rape Case

Justice Deepak Kumar Agarwal observed that only a false promise to marry made with the intention to deceive a woman would vitiate the woman's consent being obtained under the misconception of fact.

On going through the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court it is evident that there is a distinction between "mere breach of promise'' and ''giving a false promise to marry''. Only a false promise to marry made with an intention to deceive a woman would vitiate the woman's consent being obtained under misconception of fact, but mere breach of promise cannot be said to be a false promise.

The petition was filed under Section 482 of CrPC challenging the chargesheet and criminal proceeding initiated against the petitioner for an offence punishable under Section 376(2)(n) (Punishment for rape) of IPC.

The prosecution case is that the petitioner and the complainant-prosecutrix were in a live-in relationship and the petitioner had assured her that whenever he gets a job he will marry the complainant. However, in July 2021 the petitioner got married to another woman, subsequently, the complaint was filed.

The Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that the complainant lodged the FIR with mala fide intention to take undue benefit. The Counsel submitted that the prosecutrix was in a relationship with the petitioner over a significant period of time, therefore, consent of the prosecutrix is not obtained by misrepresentation.

The Court after referring to a number of Apex Court decisions in this regard summarised the legal position that the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to thewoman's decision to engage in the sexual act."

The Court pointed out that the Apex Court in Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. Naval Singh Rajput and others had held that there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The Court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, it was held in that case.

In this case, the Court pointed out that the complainant-prosecutrix was in a physical relationship with the petitioner for a period of 5 years and on the alleged day of the incident, the prosecutrix went along with the petitioner to a hotel. Thus the Court opined that it cannot be said that her consent was obtained by misconception of fact.

"At the most, it can be said to be a breach of promise to marry. Near about five years are more than sufficient time for a prudent woman to realize as to whether the promise of marriage made by the petitioner is false from its very inception or there is a possibility of breach of promise," the Court said.

The Court observed that it is clear that at the most, it can be said that it is a case of breach of promise and therefore it cannot be said that the promise made by the petitioner was obtained under fear or misconception of fact.

The Court further pointed out that the complainant stated that she had fallen in love with the appellant and was residing with him and when she came to know that the appellant had married another woman she lodged the complaint. 

"It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind", the Court said. 

The Court thus observed that even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, a case cannot be made out against the appellant. Further, the Court opined that since the complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained.

The Court thereby quashed the chargesheet and criminal proceeding against the petitioner citing that there is no case made out warranting prosecution of the petitioner.

Case Title: Mayank Tiwari v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr.

Case Citation: 2023 LiveLaw (MP) 44

Counsel appearing for the Petitioner: Advocate Rakesh Kumar Dubey

Counsel appearing for the Respondents: Public Prosecutor Advocate G.P. Chaurasiya  and Advocate Shyam Kishore Mishra 

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