'Sufficient Cause' Paramount Consideration For Delay Condonation, Can't Be Imbibed With Laxity & Mala Fides: Gujarat High Court
The Gujarat High Court has reiterated that sufficient cause is the paramount consideration while dealing with application for delay condonation and if sufficient cause is shown, the Court should generally condone the delay.The Bench comprising Justice AC Joshi however added,"If the sufficient cause is imbibed with the laxity and mala fides on the part of the delayer despite due knowledge,...
The Gujarat High Court has reiterated that sufficient cause is the paramount consideration while dealing with application for delay condonation and if sufficient cause is shown, the Court should generally condone the delay.
The Bench comprising Justice AC Joshi however added,
"If the sufficient cause is imbibed with the laxity and mala fides on the part of the delayer despite due knowledge, then Court should restrain itself from encouraging such practice and condone the delay."
Holding thus, it set aside an order passed by a Court in Ahmedabad wherein the restoration applications filed by the State beyond prescribed time limit of 30 days was allowed, and it directed the Court below to consider the matter afresh.
The Petitioner was seeking to recover its dues pursuant to a work contract. It was primarily contented that the impugned judgement was illegal, perverse and arbitration insofar as the restoration applications were filed beyond the time limit and basis false allegations. It was also alleged that the Respondent authority as a Government undertaking had taken leverage of its position even for inordinate delays.
The Petitioner further stated that the parties had undergone the arbitration process and received an award in 2003 and faced multiple litigation and yet, the Petitioner is not being able to benefit from such litigation due to the impugned order. Post dismissal, the Petitioner had filed execution proceedings and Respondent No. 1 was duly served, hence it could not be said that the Respondent was not aware of the order of the court.
Per contra, the Respondent submitted that the City Civil Judge was correct in passing the impugned judgement. The Respondent was not informed about the dismissal of the applications challenging the award in 2013 and the Petitioner had not informed the same. Consequently, the City Civil Judge allowed the restoration applications and as a condition precedent, full decretal amount was deposited by Respondent No. 1.
The Bench primarily noted that the prescribed period of limitation for filing of restoration application was 30 days from the date of dismissal. It was also not in dispute that the Respondent No. 1 was served with the notice of the execution petitions of 2015. Further, in 2016, Respondent No. 1 also assured to settle the payment upon the service of the distress warrant in 2016. The Bench concluded, "thus, from the above, it is abundantly clear that there was delay in filing the restoration applications, however, record reveals neither any delay condonation application is filed nor is there any prayer to condone the delay appear to have been made in the said restoration applications."
The Bench also displayed displeasure with the fact that the Respondent, a government undertaking, had not filed any prayer for condonation of delay in the restoration applications and yet the delay of 1074 days was condoned. Owing to these facts and circumstances, the Bench opined that the matter ought to be remanded back for de novo consideration of the restoration applications.
The High Court ventured forth to explain that if sufficient cause is shown, delay can be condoned. However, in cases of laxity with mala fides on the part of the delayer despite knowledge, no condonation of delay can be encouraged by the courts.
Accordingly, the Bench allowed the petition in part and set aside the order of the City Civil Court and remanded the matter back to the court for fresh consideration.
Case Title: INDIAN HUME PIPE COMPANY LTD Versus GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION & 1 other(s)
Case No.: C/SCA/10173/2018