When A Person Has Relinquished Rights In Father's Self Acquired Property, His Sons Are Estopped From Claiming Share : Supreme Court

A Bench comprising Justices K.M. Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy observed that when a son relinquishes their right to the self-acquired property of the father; and the conduct is accompanied by receipt of a consideration the principle of estoppel will apply qua the son and his successors.

Factual Background

The matter pertains to a suit for partition of a property filed by two children from a man’s second marriage. It was a self-acquired property of one Sengalani Chettiar. He had a son from his first marriage and from his second marriage he had 5 daughters and a son. Chandran, the son from the first marriage had executed a Release Deed in 1975 before he passed away in 1978. Chettair died in 1988 and his wife from the second marriage in 2005. Thereafter, the suit for partition was filed by children of Chettiar from his second marriage. The successors of Chettair’s son from first marriage were defendants in the suit. The plaintiffs pleaded to exclude them on the basis of the Release Deed. However, the Trial Court held that the Release Deed was void as the son had executed it while his father was alive. Therefore, the plaintiffs were allotted 2/7 share. Challenging the order of the trial court, appeal was filed before the High Court, which were eventually allowed. The sons of Chandran, successors of Chettair’s son from first marriage approached the Apex Court by way of a Special Leave Petition.

Analysis by the Supreme Court

At the outset, the Court noted that the suit property is a separate property of Chettiar. While considering the effect of the Release Deed, the Court looked at Section 6 and 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, and observed that the person who would be entitled to succeed upon the death of their relative would not have a right until the death. It stated that unlike a coparcener who acquires right in joint family property by birth, for separate property of Hindus there exists no such right. In this backdrop, the Court stated that the Release Deed would not affect the transfer of rights.

Thereafter, it delved into a deeper scrutiny of the conduct of the son who had executed the Release Deed, and whether receiving consideration for the relinquishment would result in creation of estoppel. On perusal of the Release Deed, wherein it was stated that ‘he did not have any other connection except blood relation’, it inferred that the intention of the father was to deny any right of the son in regard to the property. It noted that the conduct of the son accompanied by the receipt of consideration would have estopped the son from acquiring rights in the property. The Court also looked into the impact of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority And Guardianship Act. In law, the natural guardian of a Hindu minor cannot bind the minor by a personal covenant. The argument of the appellants was that they were minors when the Release Deed, in the nature of a covenant, was executed by their father and they are not bound by it. The Court refused to discard the Release Deed on the basis of this Section 8 argument on the ground that Chandran himself had no right in the property at the time of execution of the release deed.

With respect to estoppel the Court noted -

“What estoppel brings about, however, is preventing a party from setting up the right, which, but for the estoppel, he would have in the property.”

The Bench further noted that the rights under Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act would not devolve on the appellants whose father was estopped to inherit the property in view of the conduct in his relinquishment. It held

“…that appellants would also not be in a position to claim immunity from the operation of the Principle of Estoppel on the basis of Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act…

[...]

…a clear estoppel sprang into existence following the receipt of consideration by Shri Chandran. Estoppel would shut out in equity any claim otherwise either by Shri Chandran or his children, viz., the appellants.”

Case Details

Elumalai @Venkatesan And Anr. v. M. Kamala And Ors. And Etc. | 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 65 | CA 521-522 OF 2023 | 25 January 2023 | Justice K.M. Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy

For Appellant(s) Mr. Siddharth Iyer, Adv. Mr. Rakesh R. Sharma, Adv. Mr. P. V. Yogeswaran, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, Sr. Adv. Mrs. Malavika Jayanth, AOR Miss. Miranda Solaman, Adv. Mr. S. Gowthaman, AOR

Transfer of Property Act 1882- Section 6(a) - spes successonis- A living man has no heir- Release deed executed by son relinquishing his share in the self-acquired property of father has no effect- A person who may become the heir and entitled to succeed under the law upon the death of his relative would not have any right until succession to the estate is opened up.  Unlike a co-parcener who acquires right to joint family property by his mere birth, in regard to the separate property of the Hindu, no such right exists -Para 10

Transfer of Property Act 1882- Section 6(a) -Transfer by an heir apparent being mere spes successonis is ineffective to convey any right. By the mere execution of Release Deed, in other words, in the facts of this case, no transfer took place-This is for the simple reason that the transferor, namely, the father of the appellants did not have any right at all which he could transfer or relinquish- Para 14.

Principle of Estoppel- Transfer of Property Act- Though the release deed executed by the son was with respect to only a spes successonis right, his conduct of relinquishment will bind his sons through estoppel-despite the fact that what was purported to be released by Shri Chandran, was a mere spec successonis or expectation his conduct in transferring/releasing his rights for valuable consideration, would give rise to an estoppel. The effect of the estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct has generated the estoppel -Para 23.