1. Default bail not an order on merits and can be cancelled

“When an accused is released on default bail under proviso to subsection (2) of Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure, he is released on furnishing the bail bond by him on the failure of the investigating agency to complete the investigation and file the chargesheet within the stipulated time mentioned therein. The proviso fixes the outer limit within which the investigation must be completed and if the same is not completed within the period prescribed therein, the accused has a right to be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. The object and purpose is to impress upon the need for expeditious investigation within the prescribed time limit and to prevent laxity in that behalf. The object is to inculcate a sense of its urgency and on default the Magistrate shall release the accused if he is ready and does furnish bail. Thus, it cannot be said that order of release on bail under the proviso is an order on merits. An accused is released on bail under the proviso on the failure of the prosecuting agency. Therefore, the deeming fiction cannot be interpreted to the length of converting the order of bail not on merits as if passed on merits. when special reasons/grounds are being made out from the chargesheet and the chargesheet reveals the commission of a nonbailable crime, the bail in favour of a person, who has been released on default bail under the section can be cancelled…Mere filing of the chargesheet subsequent to a person is released on default bail under Section 167(2) cannot be a ground to cancel the bail of a person, who is released on default bail. However, on filing of the chargesheet on conclusion of the investigation, if a strong case is made out and on merits, it is found that he has committed a non-bailable offence/crime, on the special reasons/grounds and considering Section 437(5) and Section 439(2), over and above other grounds on which the bail to a person, who is released on bail can be cancelled on merits. Therefore, there is no absolute bar that once a person is released on default bail under Section 167(2), his bail cannot be cancelled on merits and his bail can be cancelled on other general grounds like tampering with the evidence/witnesses; not cooperating with the investigating agency and/or not cooperating with the concerned Trial Court etc. ” [Justice M.R. Shah in State through CBI v. T. Gangi Reddy @ Yerra Gnagi Reddy, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 37]

2. Inability to cancel default bail rewards lethargic investigation and negligence

“The submission that once an accused is released on default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, his bail cannot be cancelled on merits is accepted, in that case, it will be giving a premium to the lethargic and/or negligence, may be in a given case of deliberate attempt on the part of the investigating agency not to file the chargesheet within the prescribed time period. In a given case, even if the accused has committed a very serious offence, may be under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 or even committed murder(s), still however, he manages through a convenient investigating officer and he manages not to file the chargesheet within the prescribed time limit mentioned under the section and got released on default bail, it may lead to giving a premium to illegality and/or dishonesty. Such release of the accused on default bail is not on merits at all and is on the eventuality occurring in proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167. However, subsequently on curing the defects and filing the chargesheet, though a strong case is made out that an accused has committed the very serious offence and non-bailable crime, the Court cannot cancel the bail and commit the person into custody and not to consider the gravity of the offence committed by the accused, the Courts will be loathe for such an interpretation, as that would frustrate the justice. The Courts have the power to cancel the bail and to examine the merits of the case in a case where the accused is released on default bail and released not on merits earlier. Such an interpretation would be in furtherance to the administration of justice.” [Justice M.R. Shah in State through CBI v. T. Gangi Reddy @ Yerra Gnagi Reddy, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 37]

3. Adopted son’s rights under Hindu law & right to draw family pension different

“On adoption by a widow, the adopted son or daughter is deemed to be a member of the family of the deceased husband of the widow. The said provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956 determine the rights of a son adopted by a Hindu widow only vis-à-vis his adoptive family. Rights and entitlements of an adopted son of a Hindu widow, as available in Hindu Law, as against his adoptive family, cannot axiomatically be held to be available to such adopted son, as against the government, in a case specifically governed by extant pension rules. The provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956 relate generally to the capacity of the female Hindu to take a son or daughter in adoption and the effects that follow such an adoption. The said provisions do not lend much assistance in the instant case which does not pertain to the rights of the adoptee under Hindu Law, but to his rights and entitlements under the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules. There exists a vital difference between the rights of an adopted son under Hindu Law and his rights to draw family pension, which creates a burden on the public exchequer.” [Justice B.V. Nagarathna in Shri Ram Shridhar Chimurkar v. Union of India, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 40]

4. Child adopted by Hindu widow not ‘family’ for the purpose of family pension

“Family pension was devised as a means to help the dependents of the deceased government servant tide over the crisis and to extend to them some succour. Therefore, the definition of the term ‘family’ cannot be extended to include those persons who were not even dependents of the government servant, at the time of his death…This is because the object of the provision is to lend succour to a son till he attains the age of twenty-five years and unmarried or widowed or divorced daughter; similarly to the adopted son or unmarried adopted daughter when such an adoption had been made by the government servant during his/her lifetime. A case where a child is born to the deceased government servant after his death has to be contrasted with a case where a child is adopted by the widow of a government servant after his death. The former category of heirs is covered under the definition of family since such a child would be a posthumous child of the deceased government servant. The entitlement of such a posthumous child is wholly distinct from a child being adopted subsequent to the demise of the government servant by the surviving spouse. The reason for the same is not far to see. This is because the deceased government servant would have had no relationship with the adopted child which would have been adopted subsequent to his demise, as opposed to a posthumous child. Therefore, the definition of the word ‘family’ in relation to a government servant means various categories of persons coming within the nomenclature of the word ‘family’ and all persons who would have had a familial relationship with the government servant during his lifetime. Any other interpretation would lead to abuse of the provision in the matter of grant of family pension. The present case is concerned only with the definition of ‘family’ under the CCS (Pension) Rules. The said definition is a restrictive and specific one and cannot be expanded to take within its sweep, all heirs, as provided under Hindu law, or other personal laws. It is trite that in construing a word in a statute, caution has to be exercised in adopting a meaning ascribed to that word or concept in another statute.” [Justice B.V. Nagarathna in Shri Ram Shridhar Chimurkar v. Union of India, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 40]

5. ‘Last seen’ doctrine cannot be sole basis for conviction

“The concurrent conviction of the appellants rests entirely on the ‘last seen’ theory, upheld by the courts below…A basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that in circumstantial evidence cases, the prosecution is obliged to prove each circumstance, beyond reasonable doubt, as well the as the links between all circumstances; such circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else; further, the facts so proved should unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused. The circumstantial evidence, in order to sustain conviction, must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused, and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence…[In this case], apart from serious infirmities, there is no evidence, oral or any material object, which connects the accused-appellant with the crime. It has been repeatedly emphasized by this court, that the ‘last seen’ doctrine has limited application, where the time lag between the time the deceased was seen last with the accused, and the time of murder, is narrow; furthermore, the court should not convict an accused only on the basis of the ‘last seen’ circumstance. In the present case, save the ‘last seen’ theory, there is no other circumstance or evidence. Importantly, the time gap between when the deceased was seen in the company of the accused on 09-10-1999 and the probable time of his death, based on the post mortem report, which was conducted two days later, but was silent about the probable time of death, though it stated that death occurred approximately two days before the post mortem, is not narrow. Given this fact, and the serious inconsistencies in the depositions of the witnesses, as well as the fact that the FIR was lodged almost 6 weeks after the incident, the sole reliance on the ‘last seen’ circumstance (even if it were to be assumed to have been proved) to convict the accused-appellants is not justified.” [Justice S. Ravindra Bhat in Jabir v. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 41]

6. Crowd sources online sources such as Wikipedia not completely dependable

“The adjudicating authorities while coming to their respective conclusions, especially the Commissioner of Customs (Appeal) have extensively referred to online sources such as Wikipedia to support their conclusion. While we expressly acknowledge the utility of these platforms which provide free access to knowledge across the globe, but we must also sound a note of caution against using such sources for legal dispute resolution. We say so for the reason that these sources, despite being a treasure trove of knowledge, are based on a crowd­sourced and user generated editing model that is not completely dependable in terms of academic veracity and can promote misleading information as has been noted by this court on previous occasions also. The courts and adjudicating authorities should rather make an endeavour to persuade the counsels to place reliance on more reliable and authentic sources.” [Justice Surya Kant in Hewlett Packard India Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (Import), Nhava Sheva, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 43]

7. Failure to disclose pending criminal cases amounts to gross misconduct

“The petitioner was involved in a criminal case when he was hardly aged about 19 years and the said case had resulted into a compromise between the parties. According to [the counsel], on the basis of the said compromise, the Trial Court had closed the case on 21.11.2007, and the petitioner was appointed as constable in CISF on 03.11.2007…She submitted that considering the nature of offence in which the petitioner was allegedly involved, the removal from service on the ground of non-disclosure of pendency of the said case could not be said to be a grave misconduct attracting the harsh punishment of removal from service…This Court has no hesitation in holding that the Single Bench of the High Court had committed an error in interfering with the order passed by the respondents-authorities. Such a well-reasoned and well considered decision of the respondent-authorities should not have been interfered by the Single Bench in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when there were no allegations of mala fides or of non-observance of rules of natural justice or of breach of statutory rules were attributed against the respondent authorities…Therefore, we are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court had rightly set aside the order passed by the Single Bench, which had wrongly interfered with the order of removal passed by the respondent authorities against the petitioner. The petitioner having been found to have committed gross misconduct right at the threshold of entering into disciplined force like CISF, and the respondent authorities having passed the order of his removal from service after following due process of law and without actuated by mala fides, the court is not inclined to exercise its limited jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.” [Justice Bela M. Trivedi in Ex-Const/Dvr Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India & Ors., 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 44]

8. Grant of bail not meant for arm-twisting for recovery of money

“We have indicated on more than one occasion that the process of criminal law, particularly in matters of grant of bail, is not akin to money recovery proceedings but what has been noticed in the present case carries the peculiarities of its own. We would reiterate that the process of criminal law cannot be utilised for arm-twisting and money recovery, particularly while opposing the prayer for bail. The question as to whether pre-arrest bail, or for that matter regular bail, in a given case is to be granted or not is required to be examined and the discretion is required to be exercised by the Court with reference to the material on record and the parameters governing bail considerations. Putting it in other words, in a given case, the concession of pre-arrest bail or regular bail could be declined even if the accused has made payment of the money involved or offers to make any payment; conversely, in a given case, the concession of pre-arrest bail or regular bail could be granted irrespective of any payment or any offer of payment. We would further emphasize that, ordinarily, there is no justification in adopting such a course that for the purpose of being given the concession of pre-arrest bail, the person apprehending arrest ought to make payment. Recovery of money is essentially within the realm of civil proceedings.” [Order by bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Hrishikesh Roy in Bimla Tiwari v. State of Bihar, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 47]

9. Rajasthan government permitted estate of erstwhile Raja to be destroyed

“We are shocked and amazed at the manner in which the State of Rajasthan has permitted its heritage to be destroyed and continues to permit it to be destroyed while claiming its rights under the Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956! An updated booklet titled ‘Lost Treasures reflects a horrifying picture [with respect to the maintenance of the estate of erstwhile Maharaja of Khetri, Shri Raja Sardar Singh, which includes several heritage properties]. The issue of restoration of heritage undoubtedly cannot be left to the State Government who have shown no consideration for the same. Whether ultimately the Trust is entitled to it under the Will or not or whether the agnates and cognates are so entitled too, that is a different subject matter for which civil proceedings are on but in these proceedings we are concerned with how the heritage can be saved and restored. The appellants have placed before us an Assessment Report of January 2023 putting forth how the restoration work has to be carried out. We are inclined to entrust the restoration work to a group of architects who have prepared the report. The next question arises as to what can be the check and balance on the work sought to be done by the architects. We consider it appropriate that Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage should nominate two heritage architects and so will the Archaeological Survey of India. The Committee consisting of five members will be chaired by a retired Judge who will be free to obtain assistance as deemed proper from any other source/person. The only positive aspect placed before us today is that a budget of five crores has been sanctioned by the State Government for carrying out the renovation work. The said amount will be made available for the renovation work as and when cleared by the five members of the supervising Committee. This five-crore amount may not be enough, by any stretch of imagination, to carry out the renovation and [the State Government] will have to make necessary funds available, having been party to watching as it got destroyed.” [Order by bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Abhay S. Oka, and J.B. Pardiwala in State of Rajasthan v. Lord Nothbook, Civil Appeal No. 6677/2019]

10. Public access to FIRs not to be equated with public access to charge-sheets

“[In support of the prayer for free public access to chargesheets and final reports on police websites], heavy reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Youth Bar Association of India v. Union of India, (2016) 9 SCC 473. This reliance is thoroughly misconceived and misplaced. In the aforesaid decision this Court directed that the copies of the FIRs should be published within 24 hours of their registrations on the police websites or on the websites of the State Government. From the entire judgment it appears that this Court directed the copies of the FIRs to be published within 24 hours on the police websites or on the websites of the State Government. Looking to the interest of the accused and so that the innocent accused are not harassed and they are able to get the relief from the competent court and they are not taken by surprise. Therefore, the directions issued by this Court are in favour of the accused, which cannot be stretch to the public at large so far as the chargesheets are concerned…On a conjoint reading of Sections 173 and 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Investigating Agency is required to furnish the copies of the report along with the relevant documents to be relied upon by the prosecution to the accused and to none others. Therefore, if the relief as prayed in the present petition is allowed and all the chargesheets and relevant documents produced along with the chargesheets are put on the public domain or on the websites of the State Governments it will be contrary to the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code and it may as such violate the rights of the accused as well as the victim and/or even the investigating agency. Putting the FIR on the website cannot be equated with putting the chargesheets along with the relevant documents on the public domain and on the websites of the State Governments. 5. Now so far as the reliance placed upon on Sections 74 & 76 of the Evidence Act is concerned, the reliance placed upon the said provisions are also absolutely misconceived and misplaced. Documents mentioned in Section 74 of the Evidence Act only can be said to be public documents, the certified copies of which are to be given by the concerned police officer having the custody of such a public document. Copy of the chargesheet along with the necessary documents cannot be said to be public documents within the definition of Public Documents as per Section 74 of the Evidence Act. As per Section 75 of the Evidence Act all other documents other than the documents mentioned in Section 74 of the Evidence Act are all private documents. 4 Therefore, the chargesheet/documents along with the chargesheet cannot be said to be public documents under Section 74 of the Evidence Act, reliance placed upon Sections 74 & 76 of the Evidence Act is absolutely misplaced. 6. Now so far as the reliance placed upon Section 4 of the RTI Act is concerned, under Section 4(2) of the RTI Act a duty is cast upon the public authority to take steps in accordance with the requirements of clause (b) of subSection 1 of Section 4 of the RTI Act to provide as much information suo moto to the public at regular intervals through various means of communications. Copies of the chargesheet and the relevant documents along with the charge-sheet do not fall within Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act. Under the circumstances also the reliance placed upon Section 4(1)(2) of the RTI Act is also misconceived and misplaced.” [Order by bench of Justices M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar in Saurav Das v. Union of India, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 52]

11. Charge-sheets not public document for the purposes of Evidence Act

“Now so far as the reliance placed upon on Sections 74 and 76 of the Evidence Act is concerned, the reliance placed upon the said provisions are also absolutely misconceived and misplaced. Documents mentioned in Section 74 of the Evidence Act only can be said to be public documents, the certified copies of which are to be given by the concerned police officer having the custody of such a public document. Copy of the chargesheet along with the necessary documents cannot be said to be public documents within the definition of public documents as per Section 74 of the Evidence Act. As per Section 75 of the Evidence Act all other documents other than the documents mentioned in Section 74 of the Evidence Act are all private documents. Therefore, the chargesheet/documents along with the chargesheet cannot be said to be public documents under Section 74 of the Evidence Act, reliance placed upon Sections 74 and 76 of the Evidence Act is absolutely misplaced. Now so far as the reliance placed upon Section 4 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 is concerned, under Section 4(2) of the RTI Act a duty is cast upon the public authority to take steps in accordance with the requirements of clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 4 of the RTI Act to provide as much information suo moto to the public at regular intervals through various means of communications. Copies of the chargesheet and the relevant documents along with the charge-sheet do not fall within Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act. Under the circumstances also the reliance placed upon Section 4(1)(2) of the RTI Act is also misconceived and misplaced.” [Order by bench of Justices M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar in Saurav Das v. Union of India, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 52]

12. Police under no obligation under RTI Act to give public access to charge-sheets

“So far as the reliance placed upon Section 4 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 is concerned, under Section 4(2) of the RTI Act a duty is cast upon the public authority to take steps in accordance with the requirements of clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 4 of the RTI Act to provide as much information suo moto to the public at regular intervals through various means of communications. Copies of the chargesheet and the relevant documents along with the charge-sheet do not fall within Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act. Under the circumstances also the reliance placed upon Section 4(1)(2) of the RTI Act is also misconceived and misplaced.” [Order by bench of Justices M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar in Saurav Das v. Union of India, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 52]

13. Employees’ State Insurance Act applicable irrespective of employee strength

“The short question is whether a factory or an establishment, established prior to 20.10.1989 shall be governed by the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 notwithstanding that the number of persons employed therein at any time falls below the limit specified by or under the ESI Act…Prior to insertion of Sub-section (6) of Section 1 of the Act, only those establishments/factories engaging more than 20 employees were governed by it. However, thereafter, Sub-section (6) of Section 1 of the ESI Act has been inserted on 20.10.1989, and after 20.10.1989 there is a radical change and under the amended provision a factory or establishment to which ESI Act applies would be governed by the ESI Act notwithstanding that the number of persons employed therein at any time falls below the limit specified by or under the ESI Act. Therefore, on and after 20.10.1989, irrespective of number of persons employed a factory or an establishment shall be governed by the ESI Act. Therefore, for the demand notices for the period after 20.10.1989, there shall be liability of every factory or establishment irrespective of the number of persons employed therein…The High Court has committed a very serious error in observing and holding that even for the demand notices for the period subsequent, the said provision is applied retrospectively and the High Court has erred in allowing the appeal and setting aside the demand notices even for the period subsequent to 20.10.1989. [The provision], therefore, shall be applicable even with respect to those establishments, established prior to 31.03.1989/20.10.1989 and the ESI Act shall be applicable irrespective of the number of persons employed or notwithstanding that the number of persons employed at any time falls below the limit specified by or under the ESI Act.” [Justice M.R. Shah in ESI Corporation v. Radhika Theatre, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 53]

14. Employees’ State Insurance Act to be given liberal interpretation

“The Preamble of the ESI Act is: “An Act to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provisions for certain other matters in relation thereto.” The ESI Act being a social welfare legislation, any interpretation which would lean in favour of the beneficiary should be given. After considering catena of earlier decisions under the ESI Act, it is observed and held that ESI Act should be given liberal interpretation and should be interpreted in such a manner so that social security can be given to the employees.” [Justice M.R. Shah in ESI Corporation v. Radhika Theatre, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 53]

15. State govt entitled to receive compensation for acquisition of coal bearing areas

“The State Government being the original owner can be said to be deemed lessor and ‘person interested’. As per Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, the Government company in whose favour the order is issued under Section 11 can be said to be the deemed lessee of the State Government. Therefore, the State Government can be said to be the ‘person interested’ in getting the compensation. Therefore, the High Court is absolutely right in observing and taking the view that being ‘person interested’ the State Government is entitled to the compensation/rental, etc.” [Justice M.R. Shah in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd v. State of Odisha, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 51]