Conviction Under Section 498-A IPC Can Be Upheld Despite Acquittal Under Section 304-B IPC : Supreme Court

In a heartwrenching case, where a girl committed suicide by setting herself on fire due to physical and mental torture committed by her in-laws demanding dowry, the Supreme Court convicted the appellants under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide) and Section 498A(cruelty against a married woman)read with Section 34 IPC based on the dying declaration made by her.

Her dying declaration even while suffering burn injuries(70-80%) proved critical in the end, even as her own father and all other witnesses had turned hostile in this case.

The Court observed that “dying declaration made while suffering burn injuries upto 70-80% would be acceptable if made consciously.” It also summed up the principles related to dying declaration in Vikas v. State of Maharashtra.

In this case, the conviction under Section 304B(dowry death) could not be sustained, due to lack of a direct connection between the dowry demand and the death. But at the same time, the Court held that “a conviction under Section 498-A can be upheld despite acquittal under section 304-B IPC since the former has a broader scope.”

The Court observed that “Omission to frame charge doesn’t disable court from convicting accused for an offence proved by evidence on record.” Therefore, it held that “accused persons are liable to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC though charge was not framed.”

The Supreme Court bench comprising Justices S Ravindra Bhat and Justice Aravind Kumar was hearing an appeal against the Karnataka HC judgment which affirmed the sentence given by the trial court for offences punishable under Section 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

The case revolved around the death of Akkamahadevi, the third daughter of the complainant, Shri Chandappa Gooli. Akkamahadevi was married to the second respondent, accused No.1, in May 2010. The complaint filed by her father alleged that a dowry of Rs. 31,000 and 1.5 tolas of gold was given at the time of the marriage. Subsequently, an additional dowry of Rs. 50,000 and gold was demanded two months after the marriage. It was further alleged that the accused No.1 and his parents subjected Akkamahadevi to physical and mental torture. Unable to bear the suffering, she committed suicide by self-immolation, pouring kerosene and setting herself on fire.

A dying declaration, recorded on December 20, 2010, detailed the circumstances of the tragedy. Akkamahadevi succumbed to her burn injuries on December 24, 2010. The prosecution initially registered the case under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Dowry Prohibition Act. The charge was later amended to include Section 304B of the IPC.

The High Court, in its judgment, found in favor of the prosecution. The court concluded that the dying declaration had been properly recorded and was consistent with other evidence, including the case sheet issued by the treating doctor.

The prosecution's case was that the deceased was continuously harassed for dowry and was subjected to physical and mental torture by the appellants. She couldn’t take it any longer and committed suicide by pouring kerosene and setting herself on fire.

Dying declaration made while suffering burn injuries upto 70-80% acceptable if made consciously

The Court recognized that the deceased had self-immolated due to the relentless torture and abuse inflicted upon her by the appellant. Her dying declaration, marked as Ex.P-45 and recorded by PW-25, highlighted this fact.

The Court noted that the physical disability suffered by the deceased, primarily caused by burn injuries ranging from 70% to 80%, would not disqualify her statement if it had been made consciously with an understanding of its consequences.

The judgment cited Kamlavva And Anr v. State of Karnataka (2009) 13 SCC 614, which established that even in cases with burn injuries to this extent, dying declarations can be deemed admissible.

The Court referred to a constitution bench judgment in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra which emphasized that the Court must decide that the declarant was in a fit state of mind to make the declaration, but where the eyewitnesses' evidence including the evidence of a Magistrate who had recorded the dying declaration to that effect was available, mere absence of doctor's certification as to the fitness of the declarant's state of mind, would not ipso facto render the dying declaration unacceptable

It observed “The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement."

SC reiterates and sums up key principles related to dying declaration

The Court, in its detailed judgment, summarized the key principles related to dying declarations, as laid out in Vikas v. State of Maharashtra:

• Corroboration not necessary if its true and voluntary:There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration.
• Scrutinise and ensure that its not tutored or imagined:This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.
• Corroboration required in cases of suspicious Dying Declarations
• Reject declarations made while being unconscious or suffering from infirmity: Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction.
• On Details and Length of Declarations: Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth.
• Eyewitness prevails over Medical opinion: where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.

The Court in this case had further held that when a dying declaration is recorded by a competent Magistrate, it holds a higher level of reliability. It observed “where a dying declaration is recorded by a competent Magistrate, it would stand on a much higher footing inasmuch as a competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person named in the dying declaration of the victim and in absence of circumstances showing anything to the contrary, he should not be disbelieved by the court.”

In the present case, the Court scrutinized the dying declaration and found it to be genuine, true, and untainted by doubt. The evidence presented, along with the statements of the individuals involved in recording the declaration, confirmed its credibility.

The Court observed “the dying declaration in the instant case which came to be accepted by the courts below cannot be found fault with, particularly, in the backdrop of the evidence tendered by the person who recorded the same and he having stood to his ground in the cross-examination and having spoken about her mental capability to make such statement and that too consciously.There is no prescribed format for recording the dying declaration. The perusal of the dying declaration in the instant case clearly suggests the same to be genuine and the maker has stated the true story.”

Need to establish proximate link between dowry demand and death for conviction under Section 304-B

The Court then considered whether the conviction of the accused under Section 304B could be upheld. The Court cited various cases to clarify the interpretation of "soon before her death" and its role in dowry death cases. Notably, the case of Bansilal v. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 held that one of the primary elements of Section 304B is the requirement to establish that the victim, "soon before her death," was subjected to cruelty and harassment linked to dowry demands

The Court referred to Sher Singh v. State of Haryana (2015) 1 SCR 29, where it emphasized that the term "soon" should not be construed in terms of specific timeframes like days, months, or years. Instead, it should indicate that the demand for dowry was not a past event but a continuing cause for the death or suicide under Section 304-B

The court had opined “We are aware that the word “soon” finds place in Section 304-B; but we would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or months or years, but as necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be the continuing cause for the death under Section 304-B or the suicide under Section 306 IPC. Once the presence of these concomitants is established or shown or proved by the prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt of the accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his guilt, beyond reasonable doubt.”

The Court upon reviewing the declaration, found that there was no proximate nexus between the act of suicide and the preceding demand for dowry. The demand for dowry did not appear to have triggered the deceased to commit suicide or force her to self-immolate.

As a result, the Court held that the conviction of the accused under Section 304B could not be sustained, emphasizing the necessity of establishing a direct connection between the dowry demand and the death.

Conviction under Section 498-A can be upheld despite acquittal under section 304-B IPC since the former has a broader scope

The Court referred to the judgment in Dinesh Seth v State of NCT of Delhi (2008) 14 SCC 94, which examined the width and scope of Sections 304B and 498A. It was held that “Section 304B deals with cases of death as a result of cruelty or harassment within 7 years of marriage. Whereas Section 498A has a wider spectrum and it covers all cases in which the wife is subjected to cruelty by her husband or relative of the husband which may result in death by way of suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) or even harassment caused with a view to coerce the woman or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand of property.”

The Court held that Section 498A has a broader scope and that the conviction of the accused under this section should be upheld, irrespective of the acquittal under Section 304B.

The Court based this decision on the acceptance of the dying declaration made by the deceased, which disclosed her inability to endure the torture she had endured, leading to her act of suicide. The Court found this sufficient to convict the accused under Section 498A.

Omission to frame charge doesn’t disable court from convicting accused for an offence proved by evidence on record

The court then considered whether the accused can be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC though not charged for said offence?

The Court referred to Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P. (2004) 5 SCC 334 which held that according to Section 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), an appellate or revisional court may convict an accused for an offense for which no charge was originally framed, provided that doing so does not result in a failure of justice.

It added “In order to judge whether a failure of justice has been occasioned, it will be relevant to examine whether the accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the offence for which he is being convicted and whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to defend himself.”

In Dalbir Singh’s case, the Court further relied on Sections 221(1) and (2) of the CrPC and held that if the evidence presented by the prosecution proves that an offense has, in fact, been committed, the accused can be convicted of that offense, even if it was not the specific charge

The Court noted that the fundamental elements of an offense under Section 306 IPC include suicidal death and the abetment. To establish abetment, it is essential to prove the intention of the accused to aid, instigate, or abet the deceased in committing suicide.In this case, the Court observed that the evidence supported the torture endured by the victim, as revealed in her statement and her accepted dying declaration, which ultimately led to her taking her own life.

The Court maintained that the omission to frame a charge under Section 306 would not preclude the court from convicting the accused for the offense if it is proven based on the evidence on record.

The Court held that “Omission to frame charge does not disable the court from convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have been proved on the evidence on record. The code has ample provisions to meet a situation like the one before us. From the statement of charge framed under Section 304B and in the alternative Section 306, it is clear that all the facts and ingredients for framing the charge for offence under Section 306 existed. The mere omission on the part of the trial judge to mention Section 306 IPC with 498A would not preclude this Court from convicting the accused for the said offence when found proved. In the charge framed under Section 304B of IPC, it has been clearly mentioned that the accused has subjected the deceased to such cruelty and harassment as to drive her to commit suicide by self-immolation and as such non-framing of the specific charge would not be fatal in the instant case as no injustice is being caused to the accused.”

The Court also relied on K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217 which held that mere omission or defect in framing of charge would not be fatal if from the statement of charge under Section 304B and in the alternative Section 498A, it is clear that all facts and ingredients for framing of charge under Section 306 existed in the case, same would suffice.

As a result, the appellants were acquitted of the charges punishable under Section 304B IPC (relating to dowry death) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, while being convicted for the offenses punishable under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide) and Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC (cruelty against a married woman).

The Court took a lenient view while imposing sentence noting that the appellants were aged 66 and 61 having no prior criminal record and had already spent one year in jail.

It ordered “sentenced to imprisonment for the period already undergone with fine of Rs.5000/- each and in default to pay the fine to undergo one month simple imprisonment for each of the offence.”

Case title: Paranagouda v. State of Karnataka

Citation: 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 915

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