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Section 18 Of Limitation Act Applies To Public Premises Act : Supreme Court
Debby Jain
6 April 2025 6:37 AM
In a case involving liability for demand raised under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, the Supreme Court recently applied Section 18 of the Limitation Act and granted benefit of extension of limitation to the lessor noting that there was acknowledgement of liability by the licensee within the limitation period of 3 years."The respondents cannot argue that...
In a case involving liability for demand raised under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, the Supreme Court recently applied Section 18 of the Limitation Act and granted benefit of extension of limitation to the lessor noting that there was acknowledgement of liability by the licensee within the limitation period of 3 years.
"The respondents cannot argue that only section 3 of the Limitation Act along with the limitation provided under Article 52 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act will apply and not section 18 of the same Act. Once the Limitation Act applies, all its provisions will be applicable to the proceedings under the PP Act", observed a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and PB Varale.
The Court was dealing with the case of New Mangalore Port Trust, which allotted land to the respondents in 2003 subject to payment of license fee. The fee was revisable every 5 years. In 2010, when license fee was revised with effect from 2007, an issue arose between the parties as to whether there could be retrospective revision of license fee. In 2011-12, the licensee moved the High Court, but were unsuccessful, insofar as a Single Judge upheld the 2010 notification in 2013 and held that fee could be revised retrospectively. Aggrieved, the licensee appealed before a Division Bench.
While the intra-court appeal remained pending, demand notices were issued to the licensee, but were objected to on the ground that the matter was pending before the High Court. It was requested that NMPT not demand the difference in the license fee (for the period between 2007 and 2010) till the time the appeal (on the question of retrospective revision of license fee) was decided. Subsequently, notice to the licensee was also issued under PP Act, but the licensee's stance remained the same. As no interim order had been passed in the intra-court appeal, an order was passed under Section 7(1) of PP Act granting one month's time to the licensee for payment, failing which the amount was to be recovered as land revenue.
When the licensee preferred a miscellaneous appeal, the District Court set aside the demand noting that the proceedings under Section 7(1) were barred by time. NMPT appealed against the said decision, but the High Court decided against it. Challenging the High Court order, NMPT approached the Supreme Court.
Going through the contentions, the top Court set aside the impugned order, holding that the High Court should not have decided the writ petition while the intra-court appeals were pending, as the outcome of the intra-court appeals would have a direct bearing on the writ petition.
"Once the issue relating to retrospective applicability of revised tariff has been upheld by the learned Single Judge and the writ petitions filed by the respondents were dismissed, against which intra-court appeals at the instance of the respondents were pending, the High Court ought not to have proceeded with the hearing of the writ petition. Rather, it should have awaited the outcome of the pending intra-Court appeals relating to retrospective application of the notification dated 23.07.2010. Subject to the final outcome of the said intra-court appeals, the writ petition should have been decided."
Further, it opined that the respondents, despite failing before the Single Bench of the High Court, had been resisting the demand on account of pendency of the intra-court appeals. The objection was taken only to delay payment, and as such, they should not have benefitted on said basis.
"The respondents therefore ought not to have benefitted out of the technical objection raised by them regarding the limitations when they were themselves bound by the decision of the learned Single Judge and had no other objection or denial to the demand except that of the pending appeals before the Division Bench."
Insofar as the respondents contended that they had not admitted the liability, but rather denied it (relying on the challenge to the 2010 notification), the Court observed that the challenge was not to the revised tariff but to retrospective applicability thereof.
"...there was no denial to pay nor the amount was disputed. The respondents were bound by the notification dated 23.07.2010 till such time it was set aside by any Court of law. Having failed before the Single Judge, the respondents, were liable to comply with the notification dated 23.07.2010."
With regard to the findings of the District Court and the High Court that the limitation period of 3 years for raising demand was to expire on 11.05.2015, and as such, the proceedings initiated under PP Act by issuance of notice on 12.08.2015 were barred by limitation, the Court applied explanation (a) of Section 18(1) of Limitation Act and granted NMPT the benefit of extension of limitation.
For context, Section 18 provides that where liability is acknowledged in respect of any property or right, a fresh limitation may be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. Clause (a) of the explanation to Section 18 declares that an acknowledgment would be sufficient for various reasons to be stated therein, which includes the time for payment has not yet come as one of the reasons.
In the instant case, as the respondents alleged throughout that the time had not come for payment as appeals were pending before the Division Bench, it was held that Clause (a) was squarely applicable. "This acknowledgement was given in response to the demand by the lessor (appellant) made well within the limitation of 3 years. The lessor as such would be entitled to the benefit of extension of limitation taking benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act."
Ultimately, the Court restored the writ petition of NMPT to be heard after the decision in the intra-court appeals. It observed that if the appeals are allowed by the Division Bench, there would no question of any retrospective recovery; the demands would be liable to be withdrawn. However, if the respondents fail, they would be liable to pay the demand in accordance with law alongwith admissible interest.
Case Title: NEW MANGALORE PORT TRUST & ANR. VERSUS CLIFFORD D SOUZA ETC.ETC., CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1796-1828 OF 2024
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 397
Click here to read the judgment