Courts Must Not Only Set Aside Arbitrary Administrative Actions But Also Restitute Affected Person : Supreme Court

The Bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta was hearing petitioner-Manoj Kumar's challenge to Delhi High Court orders (by Single & Division Bench) which dismissed his plea against denial of Pt. Deendayal Upadhyaya Institute for the Physically Handicapped (“Institute”) to award him 6 marks during the appointment process under the head of additional qualification.

As per the vacancy circular, final selection was subject to an interview of qualified candidates and the Institute, vide two clauses (14 and 19), had reserved its right to evaluate, review the process of selection, and shortlist candidates at any stage. Its decision was to be final and binding.

Eventually, the Institute deviated from the procedure initially prescribed. For certain posts, the interview requirement was done away with. Instead, additional marks were allocated for additional qualification, etc. For additional qualifications, a maximum of 10 marks were prescribed ('5' for PG Diploma, '6' for PG Degree, '7' for MPhil/Professional qualification in the field, and '10' for PhD).

When the results were declared, the appellant got lesser marks than the competing candidate (respondent No.3) and lost the post. On enquiry, it came forth that in the appellant's case, marks for additional qualification (PG Degree) were not included on the ground that his PG Degree was not “in the relevant subject”. However, respondent No.3 was given the benefit of 7 marks on account of her holding the professional qualification of M.Ed.

The appellant's case was that if he had been allocated 6 marks for the PG Degree that he possessed, he would have been at the top of the list. Denial of 6 marks on a new ground that the PG Degree held by him was not in the “relevant” subject, he claimed, was illegal and arbitrary.

Though he approached the concerned authorities and the High Court, no relief was forthcoming. The High Court's reluctance stemmed predominantly from the Supreme Court's decision in University Grants Commission v. Neha Anil Bobde (Gadekar), where it was held that in academic matters, the qualifying criteria must be left to the discretion of the concerned institution.

The High Court also relied on Clauses 14 and 19 of the vacancy circular to hold that the Institute in any event reserved the right to shortlist applications as it considered appropriate.

Against the High Court orders, the appellant moved the Supreme Court.

Regulation of arbitrary action – Primary duty of Constitutional Courts

Dismissing the High Court's reliance on Clauses 14 and 19, the Supreme Court Bench opined that the said clauses did nothing more than reserving flexibility in the selection process.

To quote, “They cannot be read to invest the Institute with unbridled discretion to pick and choose candidates by supplying new criteria”.

Calling it a “classic case of arbitrary action”, the Court further rejected the restriction of “PG Degree” to “PG Degree in Relevant Subject”. It noted that the revised evaluation criteria divided additional qualification into two categories: first, of general qualifications (ie PG Diploma, PG Degree or PhD), and second, of specialization (ie MPhil/Professional qualification in the field).

It was concluded that if specialization was added to “PG Degree”, the specialization category would become redundant.

“The whole purpose of providing PG Degree independently and allocating a lesser quantum of 6 marks will be completely lost if such an interpretation is adopted. This can never be the purpose of prescribing distinct categories.”

Dealing with the aspect, the Bench also deprecated the High Court's approach of limiting itself to restraint in judicial review. It said that when a citizen alleges arbitrariness in executive action, the High Court must examine the issue, albeit within the context of judicial restraint in academic matters.

“While respecting flexibility in executive functioning, courts must not let arbitrary action pass through.”

Restitution – Secondary duty of Constitutional Courts

Having found the Institute's action arbitrary, the Court explored ways in which the appellant could be restituted. At first, it asked the Institute to inform if there was any vacancy. In response, it was informed that the school for which vacancies were advertised was closed in April, 2023.

Noting that over 5 years had passed between the date of the impugned order and deciding of the matter by it, the Court lamented “this is an unfortunate situation where the Court finds that the action of the respondent was arbitrary, but the consequential remedy cannot be given due to subsequent developments.”

It was opined that identification and application of appropriate remedial measures may pose a significant challenge, largely due to dual variables ie time and limited resources. Yet, in public law proceedings, when it is realized that the prayer in the writ petition is unattainable due to passage of time, constitutional courts may not dismiss the writ proceedings on the ground of their perceived futility.

“…while the primary duty of constitutional courts remains the control of power, including setting aside of administrative actions that may be illegal or arbitrary, it must be acknowledged that such measures may not singularly address repercussions of abuse of power. It is equally incumbent upon the courts, as a secondary measure, to address the injurious consequences arising from arbitrary and illegal actions. This concomitant duty to take reasonable measures to restitute the injured is our overarching constitutional purpose. This is how we have read our constitutional text, and this is how we have built our precedents on the basis of our preambular objective to secure justice.”

Considering that long periods often pass between impugned actions and restitution, the Court said that it must address the systemic issues inherent in the judicial process.

“...we must formulate an appropriate system for preserving the rights of the parties till the final determination takes place. In the alternative, we may also formulate a reasonable equivalent for restitution of the wrongful action.”

On these lines, it considered the present case and the possibility of directing the Institute to appoint the appellant as primary teacher in any other school run by it. However, it was informed that the Institute only ran the one primary school for which vacancies were advertised and the same had been closed in 2023.

Accordingly, the Court directed the appellant to be compensated in monetary terms. The compensation payable was set at Rs.1,00,000. Costs @ Rs.25,000 were also imposed.

The Court also appreciated the spirit of the appellant, saying that he "has steadfastly contested his case like the legendary Vikram."

Case Title: Manoj Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal No.2679/2024

Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 143