- Home
- /
- Top Stories
- /
- 1987 Road Rage Case :"No Intention...
1987 Road Rage Case :"No Intention To Kill", Navjot Singh Sidhu Opposes Plea To Enhance Sentence; Supreme Court Reserves Judgment
Mehal Jain
25 March 2022 4:54 PM IST
The Supreme Court on Friday reserved its judgment on the review petition preferred by the family of victim Gurnam Singh against its 2018 verdict that had reduced the sentence of Navjot Singh Sidhu to Rs 1000 from 3 years imprisonment in a 1987 road rage accident in which Gurnam Singh had died.The review petitions were listed before the bench of Justices A. M. Khanwilkar and Sanjay Kishan Kaul....
The Supreme Court on Friday reserved its judgment on the review petition preferred by the family of victim Gurnam Singh against its 2018 verdict that had reduced the sentence of Navjot Singh Sidhu to Rs 1000 from 3 years imprisonment in a 1987 road rage accident in which Gurnam Singh had died.
The review petitions were listed before the bench of Justices A. M. Khanwilkar and Sanjay Kishan Kaul. On February 25, the Top Court had asked asked Navjot Singh Sidhu to file reply on the miscellaneous application seeking punishing Sidhu for the offence of murder instead of causing hurt under section 323 IPC for which he was convicted. Senior Advocate Siddharth Luthra for the petitioners had earlier submitted that the petitioners had filed an application seeking enlargement of the scope of notice (which limited on the aspect of quantum of sentence).
Senior Advocate Siddharth Luthra, for the petitioners: "The application is predicated on 2 decisions having not been considered. The first is Virsa Singh 1958 SCR 1495. This has been followed in a judgment called Richhpal Singh Meena 2014 8 SCC 918. I had quoted from the latter to point out that it relies on the former to come to the conclusion that if death is caused by injury or hurt, it will not be considered under 304. I am not for a moment getting into the details of the evidence as this court has said that evidence is only to be looked at for the purpose of arriving at the findings already arrived at. Virsa Singh test ignored in this case. Virsa says, 'To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. 300, 3rdly " ; First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, 3rdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was Do intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional'"
Continuing, Mr. Luthra submitted, "This is the locus classicus. Please look at section 300, IPC- 'Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or--...Thirdly.--If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or--...'. Please look at Exception 4 which says that culpable homicide is not murder if it is without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel and unusual manner"
"In the present case, the fact that there is an injury is part of the post-mortem report. There is no dispute to that. The fact that this injury is antemortem is not a matter of dispute, Your Lordships have held that. The fact that it was intentionally caused is also noted in the judgment. We have three elements- the fact of the injury, the fact that it is an ante-mortem injury and the fact that it was caused intentionally by the respondent. The question really is about the principles in Virsa and Richhpal. Having considered that- why this matter merits consideration- When we had argued this matter, we had placed on record detailed written submissions and along with that we had placed on record this contention regarding Virsa Singh and Richhpal Singh that a single blow on the head is sufficient to constitute an offence under 302. Our submission is that the parameters applied in the judgment need reconsideration because that is the issue where the only fact that had to be shown was the injury, the nature of the injury and the part of the body, and that is sufficient. I have pointed out the Virsa Singh judgment to submit that the head injury itself is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and hence, section 300 'thirdly' clause will apply", advanced Mr. Luthra.
"Now, the third point I wanted to make is that this is the short case I am making out on the admitted facts and the findings and I am saying that the conclusion was not correct. The only issue is whether it is 302 or the exception to the 'thirdly' clause and hence, whether 304 part one or part two. The objection they have sought to raise against me are two fold -the locus of the petitioners. Avtar Singh is a person who is PW4 and on 22 March 2018 at the time of hearing the appeals, your lordships allowed his substitution. There can be no objection to locus. Even when your Lordships issued notice on the current review, you granted us permission to file the review petition on 11 September 2018. Locus cannot be in objection at all. Thirdly, they say we did not move for three years and therefore the matter lacks bonafides and is belated. But there is no delay. Fourthly, my learned friend's entire objection to Virsa and Richhpal is that the decisions are inapplicable to the peculiar facts of the case and therefore this court has rightly not adverted to these decisions. That cannot be an answer to law, they cannot distinguish the two principles of law merely by saying they are distinguishable in fact because those are Locus Classicus on 'thirdly' clause of 300 and because of the fact that hurt and death are two different categories. Therefore my submission is that I am not asking for a re-appreciation of evidence, I am going on the admitted facts in your lordships' judgment to say that had Richhpal and Virsa Singh been considered, the conclusion would have been different", he concluded.
Submissions for Sidhu
Next, Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi, for Siddhu, advanced, "It is an extraordinary case in the negative sense which does not merit your lordships' entertainment because it has potential to be subversive of the basic foundations of criminal justice and therefore, an abuse of process. One, it is a 34-year-old incident of 1988; two, your lordships have many cases of suspension of sentence at the High Court stage after a trial court conviction and sometimes suspension of sentence in the Supreme Court after High Court affirmation. But this is a case where a detailed reasoned judgment of the Supreme Court has suspended conviction. That is not very common."
Justice Khanwilkar: "That is only interlocutory order"
Justice Kaul: "All this is not relevant at all today. The issue is only whether despite our having issued limited notice on sentence, the provision under which sentence has been imposed needs to be looked at and whether the sentence which was restricted to fine needs to be enhanced with actual sentence also"
Dr. Singhvi: "The considerations (in the order of suspension) are very relevant even though your lordships are not bound by it"
Dr. Singhvi: "When an expansion of sentence is asked, it is a mix of several factors to be kept in mind. The factors are- no personal enmity, no motive, no case of violation of bail in the long past, I resigned and sought suspension of conviction, highly doubtful that injury could have caused death, from this long journey from 1988 to today there has been no allegation of lack of cooperation...there cannot be said to be the intention to kill in the case"
Dr. Singhvi: "This enlargement petition is a review of a review. Your Lordships had expressly limited notice. This is an extraordinary review! Matters of life arranged for 34 + 4 years are now sought to be disturbed! In cases of long delay, in criminal jurisdiction, Your Lordships even commute death sentences"
Justice Khanwilkar: "You never entered appearance for 4 years. You only did that when registry listed the matter on its own"
Dr. Singhvi: "They also could have mentioned the matter for early listing"
Dr. Singhvi: "Sentence is a discretion of court and no interference is done by your lordships except in that death penalty phrase of 'rarest of the rare'. Your Lordships never do it on different views possible. Even fine is fully adequate without any incarceration...appeal on adequacy of sentence is not entertained- as per your lordships' decisions- The state is not in appeal against the sentence and the victim cannot challenge the adequacy"
Dr. Singhvi: "Virsa, even if applied to our case, would make no difference to the result. One involves 1 spear and the other 1 fist- it is like chalk and cheese"
Dr. Singhvi: "This matter was listed before the elections. Now that the elections are over, it has come to be activated..." Bench: "Please don't say that. This has nothing to do with the elections"
Senior Advocate R. Basant made a brief submission to back Dr. Singhvi.
Case Title: Jaswinder Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representative v. Navjot Singh Sidhu And Ors.
Next Story
