Supreme Court Monthly Digest: October 2021 [Citation: LL 2021 SC 525 To LL 2021 SC 616]

1. Forcing Party To Undergo DNA Test Against Will Impinge On Personal Liberty & Right To Privacy

[Case: Ashok Kumar v. Raj Gupta and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 525]

The Supreme Court observed that forcing an unwilling party to undergo DNA test impinges on personal liberty and right to privacy. A bench comprising Justices R Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy. "observed, "In circumstances where other evidence is available to prove or dispute the relationship, the court should ordinarily refrain from ordering blood tests. This is because such tests impinge upon the right of privacy of an individual and could also have major societal repercussions." Holding so, the bench set aside the judgment of the High Court which had directed the plaintiff in a suit to undergo DNA test. 

2. Supreme Court Holds 9 Tamil Nadu Govt Officers Guilty Of Contempt Of Court For Not Implementing Orders

[Case: V. Senthur and another v. M. Vijayakumar IAS and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 526]

The Supreme Court held 9 officers of the Tamil Nadu Government guilty of contempt of court for not implementing a direction to revise the seniority list of officers in the Public Works Department. A bench comprising Justices L Nageswara Rao and BR Gavai held that the officers have committed civil contempt of court for not following the order passed by the Supreme Court on January 22, 2016. In the order dated January 16, 2016, the Supreme Court, while dismissing the Government's special leave petition against a judgment of the Madras High Court, held that seniority list should be drawn on the basis of merit list of selection and not on the basis of roster point. The contempt petitions were filed stating that the respondents published a revised seniority list breaching the principle laid down by the Supreme Court. The respondents argued that the judgment of the High Court had no general application and was confined to individual cases. It was also argued that the doctrine of merger is not applicable to an order dismissing Special Leave Petition, and hence contempt, if any, should be agitated before the High Court and not the Supreme Court. The Top Court that a principle of law declared in an order dismissing a special leave petition is binding on the parties, even though the doctrine of merger is not applicable to it.

3. Supreme Court Directs Centre To Issue Instructions To Implement Reservation In Promotions For Persons With Disabilities Within 4 Months

[Case: Siddaraju v. State of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 527]

The Supreme Court directed the Union of India to issue instructions "at the earliest and not later than four months", in accordance with the proviso to Section 34 of the Right of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 for giving reservation in promotions to persons with disabilities. The order was passed by Bench comprising Justices L Nageswara Rao, B.R.Gavai and Sanjiv Khanna in an application filed by the Central Government seeking clarification with respect to its judgment in Siddaraju v. State of Karnataka which declared that persons with disabilities have right to reservation in promotions. 

4. Section 92 Evidence Act - Oral Evidence Admissible Only To Show That The Document Is Sham

[Case: Placido Francisco Pinto (D) by LRs & Anr v Jose Francisco Pinto & Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 528]

The Supreme Court observed that Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act bars giving of oral evidence on a written document, except to prove that the document reflects a sham transaction. A bench comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and V Ramasubramanian observed that oral evidence is admissible under Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act to show that the document is a sham deed. "...it was open to the plaintiff to assert that the document was never intended to acted upon and the document is a sham. Such question arises when one party asserts that there has been a different transaction altogether than what is recorded in the document. It is for that purpose oral evidence is admissible", the Court further stated. 

5. Motor Accident Claim - Evidence Recorded Before Tribunal To Be Given Weightage Over Contents Of FIR In Case Of Contradiction

[Case: National Insurance Company v. Chamundeswari & Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 529]

While deciding the issue of negligence in a claim for motor accident, Supreme Court observed that if any evidence before the Tribunal runs contrary to the contents in the First Information Report, the evidence which is recorded before the Tribunal has to be given weightage over the contents of the First Information Report. A Bench comprising Justice Subhash Reddy and Justice Hrishikesh Roy made this observation while delivering its verdict in an appeal filed by National Insurance Company against Madras High Court's order partly allowing plea filed by wife and son of the deceased who lost his life in a motor vehicle accident, and enhancing compensation to Rs.1,85,08,832. 

6. Family Settlement Document Which Merely Records Past Transaction Does Not Require Compulsory Registration

[Case: Korukonda Chalapathi Rao & Ors v. Korukonda Annapurna Sampath Kumar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 530]

The Supreme Court held that a family settlement document which merely sets out the existing arrangement and past transaction will not be compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, if it doesn't by itself creates, declares, limits or extinguishes rights in the immovable properties. Therefore, such a document will not be hit by the bar under Section 49 of the Registration Act. "If we apply the test as to whether the Khararunama in this case by itself 'affects', i.e., by itself creates, declares, limits or extinguishes rights in the immovable properties in question or whether it merely refers to what the appellants alleged were past transactions which have been entered into by the parties, then, going by the words used in the document, they indicate that the words are intended to refer to the arrangements allegedly which the parties made in the past. The document does not purport to by itself create, declare, assign, extinguish or limit right in properties. Thus, the Khararunama may not attract Section 49(1)(a) of the Registration Act," a bench of Justices KM Joseph and SR Bhat observed. 

7. 'Voluntary Retirement' Can Be Sought Only If Officer Meets Eligibility Criteria; Resignation Can Be Anytime

[Case: Union of India v. Abhiram Verma; Citation: LL 2021 SC 531]

The Supreme Court observed that while a person can resign at any time during his service, he can ask for voluntary retirement only if he meets the eligibility criteria. A bench comprising Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna added, "When the legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particular date and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be included in it by implication. Therefore, having tendered the "resignation", the respondent has to suffer the consequences and now cannot be permitted to take 'U' turn and say that what the respondent wanted was "premature retirement" and not "resignation", the Court further observed. 

8. Motor Accidents Claim - Minimum Wage Notification Not An Absolute Yardstick To Fix Income Of Deceased In Absence Of Salary Certificate

[Case: Chandra @ Chanda v. Mukesh Kumar Yadav and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 532]

While deciding on compensation to be paid in a case of motor vehicle accident, Supreme Court observed that merely because claimants were unable to produce documentary evidence to show the monthly income of the deceased, the same does not justify adoption of lowest tier of minimum wage while computing the income. "In absence of salary certificate the minimum wage notification can be a yardstick but at the same time cannot be an absolute one to fix the income of the deceased. In absence of documentary evidence on record some amount of guesswork is required to be done. But at the same time the guesswork for assessing the income of the deceased should not be totally detached from reality", the Bench comprising Justice Subhash Reddy and Justice Hrishikesh Roy observed. 

9. Renewal Of Passport Cannot Be Refused Merely On The Ground Of Pendency Of Criminal Appeal

[Case: Vangala Kasturi Rangacharyulu v. CBI; Citation: LL 2021 SC 533]

The Supreme Court observed that renewal of passport cannot be refused merely on the ground of pendency of criminal appeal. The applicant was convicted for offences punishable under Sections 120-B,420, 468, 471, 477 A of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appeal filed by him was dismissed by the High Court. The bench of Justices L. Nageswara Rao and BR Gavai observed: "The refusal of a passport can be only in case where an applicant is convicted during the period of 5 years immediately proceeding the date of application for an offence involving moral turpitude and sentence for imprisonment for not less than two years. Section 6.2 (f) relates to a situation where the applicant is facing trial in a criminal court. Admittedly, at present, the conviction of the appellant stands still the disposal of the criminal appeal. The sentence which he has to undergo is for a period of one year. The passport authority cannot refuse the renewal of the passport on the ground of pendency of the criminal appeal." The Court therefore directed the passport authority to renew the passport of the applicant without raising the objection relating to the pendency of the criminal appeal.

10. First Appellate Court Should Deal With All Issues And Evidence And Follow Procedure Under CPC

[Case: K. Karuppuraj v. M. Ganesan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 534]

The Supreme Court observed that it is the duty of the First Appellate Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. First appeals are to be decided after following the procedure to be followed under the Code of Civil Procedure, the bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed. In this case, the Trial Court dismissed a specific performance suit filed by the plaintiff on the ground that he had not shown the willingness to purchase the property with the tenants and there are no such pleadings in the plaint and that the plaintiff has not elected to purchase the property as its nature. In first appeal, the High Court, the plaintiff filed an affidavit, in which for the first time he stated that he is ready and willing to purchase the property from the defendants. Taking note of this affidavit, the High Court decreed the suit for specific performance of the contract. In appeal before the Apex Court, the defendant contended that the High Court not at all re-appreciated the evidence on record and without even discussing the evidence on record and even without raising the points for determination on the basis of the issues which were framed by the Trial Court, allowed the appeal and has decreed the suit for specific performance, which otherwise is not permissible.

11. Arbitrator Cannot Grant Pendente Lite Interest If Contract Contains A Specific Clause Expressly Barring Payment Of Interest

[Case: Garg Builders v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited; Citation: LL 2021 SC 535]

The Supreme Court observed that an arbitrator cannot grant pendente lite interest if the contract contains a specific clause which expressly bars payment of interest. Such a contractual clause will not be a violation of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari has observed. The court said that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, categorically restricts the power of an arbitrator to award preference and pendente lite interest when the parties themselves have agreed to the contrary. Referring to Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act which deals with the payment of interest, the Court observed, "The law relating to award of pendente lite interest by Arbitrator under the 1996 Act is no longer res integra. The provisions of the 1996 Act give paramount importance to the contract entered into between the parties and categorically restricts the power of an arbitrator to award pre­reference and pendente lite interest when the parties themselves have agreed to the contrary."  

12. States Should Not Deny Ex-Gratia For COVID Deaths On Ground That Death Certificate Does Not Mention COVID As Cause Of Death

[Case: Gaurav Kuma Bansal v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 536]

The Supreme Court ordered that no state should deny the ex-gratia compensation of Rs 50,000 to the kin of persons who died of COVID on the sole ground that the death certificate does not mention COVID as the cause of death. A bench comprising Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna noted that as per the NDMA guidelines, the following cases are treated as COVID deaths : 1. Diagnosed as COVID positive through a positive RT-PCR/ Molecular Tests/ RAT or clinically determined through investigations in a hospital/in-patient facility by a treating physician, while admitted in the hospital/in-patient facility. 2. Deaths occurring within 30 days from the date of testing or from the date of being clinically determined as a Covid-19 case shall be treated as "Deaths due to Covid-19", even if the death takes place outside the hospital/in-patient facility. 3. Covid-19 case while admitted in the hospital/in-patient facility and who continued to be admitted beyond 30 days and died subsequently. 4. Covid-19 cases which are not resolved and have died either in the hospital settings or at home, and where a Medical Certificate of Cause of Death (MCCD) in Form 4 & 4A has been issued to the registering authority, as required under Section 10 of the Registration of Birth & Death (RBD) Act, 1969, shall also be treated as Covid-19 death.

13. Conduct Of Accused, Gravity Of Offence, Societal Impact Etc. Are Grounds To Revoke Bail

[Case: Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab; Citation: LL 2021 SC 537]

The Supreme Court observed that bail granted to an accused can be revoked by a superior court if the court has considered irrelevant factors or has ignored relevant material available on record which renders the order granting bail legally untenable. "The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and societal impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration of criminal justice system", the bench of CJI NV Ramana, Justices Surya Kant and Hima Kohli observed. The court observed thus while setting aside an anticipatory bail granted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana to a 'mother in law' in a dowry death case. The offence alleged in the instant case is heinous and protrudes our medieval social structure which still wails for reforms despite multiple efforts made by Legislation and Judiciary, the court remarked in this case. The court noted that the accused had remained absconding for more than two years after being declared a proclaimed offender.

14. 'Fit Case To Be Included In Law School Syllabus': Supreme Court On 5th Round Of Litigation Stalling Execution In 50 Yr Old Suit

[Case: Dipali Biswas and others v. Nirmalendu Mukherjee and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 538]

Astonished at the five rounds of litigation initiated by a litigant (and his successors) over five decades to stall the execution of a civil decree, the Supreme Court remarked that it was a fit case to be included in the law school syllabus as a study material for students to get equipped with various provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to execution. "...the case on hand is fit to be included in the syllabus of a law school as a study material for students to get equipped with the various provisions of the Code relating to execution", the judgment delivered by a bench comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and V Ramasubramanian observed. "..this appeal arises out of the fifth round of litigation at the stage of execution of a simple money decree and we wish that it is the knock out round", the Supreme Court judgment stated at the outset. 

Also Read: Judgment Debtor Can't Raise Objections In Instalments; Res Judicata Applicable To Execution Proceedings

15. Reprimanding A Student Would Not Tantamount To Provoking Him To Commit Suicide: Supreme Court Quashes FIR U/s 306 IPC Against A Teacher

[Case: Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 539]

The Supreme Court observed that reprimanding a student for his indiscipline would not tantamount to provoking a student to commit suicide. "If, a student is simply reprimanded by a teacher for an act of indiscipline and bringing the continued act of indiscipline to the notice of Principal of the institution who conveyed to the parents of the student for the purposes of school discipline and correcting a child, any student who is very emotional or sentimental commits suicide, can the said teacher be held liable for the same and charged and tried for the offence of abetment of suicide under section 306 IPC.. Our answer to the said question is 'No'.", the bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari observed while quashing a criminal case against a teacher.

16. Dependent Cannot Seek Compassionate Appointment On Higher Post Than Held By Deceased Employee

[Case: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Premlatha; Citation: LL 2021 SC 540]

The Supreme Court observed that a dependent/applicant cannot seek compassionate appointment on the higher post than what was held by the deceased employee. The Bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed that the appointment on compassionate ground is a concession and not a right. It is an exception to the general rule of appointment in the public services and is in favour of the dependents of a deceased dying in harness and leaving his family in penury and without any means of livelihood. "As per the law laid down by this court in catena of decisions on the appointment on compassionate ground, for all the government vacancies equal opportunity should be provided to all aspirants as mandated under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. However, appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependent of a deceased employee is an exception to the said norms. The compassionate ground is a concession and not a right."

17. Electricity Act - Additional Bill Raised By Distributor After Detecting Mistake Not Hit By 2 Years Limitation Under Section 56(2)

[Case: M/S Prem Cottex v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd & Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 541]

The Supreme Court held that an additional bill raised by an Electricity Distribution Company as a licensee under the Electricity Act, 2003, after detecting a mistake, will not be hit by the two years limitation under Section 56(2) of the Act. Section 56(2) says that "no sum due from any consumer, under this section shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due". The consumer had earlier approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission against the demand. The NCDRC however dismissed the complaint, holding that there was no 'deficiency of service' on the part of the power company and that the bill was for recovery of "escaped assessment". The consumer appealed to the Supreme Court against the NCDRC order. Relying on Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, the appellant argued that no amount due from a customer is recoverable after a period of two years from the date on which it became first due. The appellant also relied on the Supreme Court's verdict in the 2020 case Assistant Engineer (D1), Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited v. Rahamatullah Khan which held that electricity supply cannot be disconnected for additional demand raised after the two year limitation period.

A Bench comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and V Ramasubramanian observed, "The matter can be examined from another angle as well. Sub­section (1) of Section 56 as discussed above, deals with the disconnection of electric supply if any person "neglects to pay any charge for electricity". The question of neglect to pay would arise only after a demand is raised by the licensee. If the demand is not raised, there is no occasion for a consumer to neglect to pay any charge for electricity. Sub­section (2) of Section 56 has a non­-obstante clause with respect to what is contained in any other law, regarding the right to recover including the right to disconnect. Therefore, if the licensee has not raised any bill, there can be no negligence on the part of the consumer to pay the bill and consequently, the period of limitation prescribed under Sub­section (2) will not start running. So long as limitation has not started running, the bar for recovery and disconnection will not come into effect".

Also Read: Consumer Complaint Not Maintainable Against Power Distributor For Raising Additional Bill Due To Short Assessment

18. Section 69 Kerala Forest Act Does Not Place Reverse Burden Of Proof On Culpability Of Accused

[Case: Bharath Booshan Aggarwal v. State of Kerala; Citation: LL 2021 SC 542]

The Supreme Court observed that Section 69 of the Kerala Forest Act merely directs a presumption that the forest produce belongs to the government and it does not place reverse burden of proof on culpable mental state of the accused. The court said that seizure of the goods ipso facto does not mean that the accused had conscious knowledge about their illicit nature or origin or that they procured the goods illegally. "The presumption under Section 69 is with respect to not a conscious mental state, or a direction by the legislature that a certain state of affairs is deemed to exist, but with respect to ownership of the property", the bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and S. Ravindra Bhat observed. 

Also Read: Products Created From 'Forest Produce' By Human Labour Can Also Be 'Forest Produce': Supreme Court Disagrees With Earlier Judgment

19. Schools At Liberty To Take Appropriate Legal Action To Recover Outstanding Fee From Students

[Case: Progressive Schools Association v. State of Rajasthan & Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 543]

In a plea seeking clarification of top Court's order directing schools to not debar any student from attending classes on account of non­payment of fees, Supreme Court permitted the School Managements to initiate appropriate action in accordance with law for recovery of the outstanding fees from students who have defaulted. A Bench comprising Justice AM Khanwilkar and Justice CT Ravikumar left it open to the School Management to consider the requests, if any, made by parent or ward seeking some indulgence for just reasons, compassionately. The direction has been issued in a miscellaneous application filed seeking clarification that the Supreme Court's directions issued through its order dated 3rd May 2021 did not prohibit the schools from taking coercive action against the students who have failed to pay the instalments as per the arrangement predicated in that judgment.

Also Read: Products Created From 'Forest Produce' By Human Labour Can Also Be 'Forest Produce': Supreme Court Disagrees With Earlier Judgment

20. Consumer Protection Act - Onus To Prove Deficiency In Service Is On The Complainant : Supreme Court

[Case: SGS India v. Dolphin International Ltd; Citation: LL 2021 SC 544]

The Supreme Court observed that in a consumer case, the onus of proof that there was deficiency in service is on the complainant. Without any proof of deficiency, the opposite party cannot be held responsible for deficiency in service, Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian observed. It further clarified, "If the complainant is able to discharge its initial onus, the burden would then shift to the respondent in the complaint. The rule of evidence before the civil proceedings is that the onus would lie on the person who would fail if no evidence is led by the other side. Therefore, the initial burden of proof of deficiency in service was on the complainant, but having failed to prove that the result of the sample retained by the appellant at the time of consignment was materially different than what was certified by the appellant, the burden of proof would not shift on the appellant. Thus, the Commission has erred in law to draw adverse inference against the appellant."

21. Employer Cannot Be Compelled To Appoint A Candidate Merely Because He Made Truthful Declaration Regarding Criminal Cases

[Case: Union of India v. Mithu Meda; Citation: LL 2021 SC 545]

The Supreme Court observed that an employer cannot be compelled to appoint a candidate merely because truthful declaration regarding criminal cases has been made by the employee. The court said that the employer still has the right to consider criminal antecedents of such a candidates. If a person is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge of an offence involving moral turpitude or because the witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically entitle him for the employment, that too in disciplined force, the bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and JK Maheshwari observed while setting aside the High Court judgment which directed appointment of a candidate to the post of Constable in Central Industrial Security Force.

22. Interested Person Not Entitled To File PIL: Supreme Court Dismisses Plea Filed By Aspirant To Post Of State Information Commissioner

[Case: Wing Commander GB Athri v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 546]

An interested person is not entitled to file a public interest litigation, the Supreme Court has observed while it dismissed a petition filed by an aspirant to the post of the State Information Commissioner. A bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and JK Maheshwari observed: "Since the petitioner was also an aspirant to the post of the State Information Commissioner and has made an application seeking such employment as recorded in the judgment and order of the High Court impugned, we are of the view that the High Court has rightly declined to entertain the writ petition filed by him purportedly in public interest. It is well settled that an interested person is not entitled to file a public interest litigation."

23. Services Rendered By Adhoc Employees Prior To Regularization Cannot Be Counted For Purpose Of Seniority

[Case: Malook Singh v. State of Punjab; Citation: LL 2021 SC 547]

The Supreme Court reiterated that the services rendered by ad hoc employees prior to their regularization cannot be counted for the purpose of seniority. A bench of Justices DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and BV Nagarathna noted that the Constitution Bench in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra had held that ad hoc service cannot be counted for determining the seniority if the initial appointment has been made as a stop gap arrangement and not according to rules. "The judgment, therefore, would only bind those who are parties to the proceedings. The judgment would by no means operate to bind others whose interest did not coincide with the private respondents who are impleaded in the proceedings. This is precisely the reason why the Single Judge in the subsequent proceedings held that the seniority list which was prepared pursuant to the earlier judgment would not operate to bind those persons who were not parties to the earlier proceedings and were adversely affected", the Court said. 

24. Lok Adalat Has No Jurisdiction To Decide A Matter On Merits

[Case: Estate Officer v. Colonel H.V. Mankotia (Retired); Citation: LL 2021 SC 548]

The Supreme Court observed that Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction at all to decide the matter on merits once it is found that compromise or settlement could not be arrived at between the parties. The jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat would be to determine and to arrive at a compromise or a settlement between the parties to a dispute, the bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna said. The court added that once the settlement / compromise fails, the Lok Adalat has to return the case to the Court from which the reference was received. Taking note of the above and the judgment in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Ganpat Raj (2006) 8 SCC 364, the court observed: "Thus, a fair reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 makes it clear that the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat would be to determine and to arrive at a compromise or a settlement between the parties to a dispute and once the aforesaid settlement / compromise fails and no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the Lok Adalat has to return the case to the Court from which the reference has been received for disposal in accordance with law and in any case, the Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction at all to decide the matter on meris once it is found that compromise or settlement could not be arrived at between the parties." 

25. National Green Tribunal Is Vested With Suo Motu Jurisdiction, Declares Supreme Court

[Case: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha and Others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 549]

The Supreme Court declared that the National Green Tribunal is vested with suo motu powers to take cognizance on the basis of letters, representations and media reports. A bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar, Hrishikesh Roy and CT Ravikumar held, "NGT Act, when read as a whole, gives much leeway to the NGT to go beyond a mere adjudicatory role. The Parliament's intention is clearly discernible to create a multifunctional body, with the capacity to provide redressal for environmental exigencies. Accordingly, the principles of environmental justice and environmental equity must be explicitly acknowledged as pivotal threads of the NGT's fabric. The NGT must be seen as a sui generis institution and not unus multorum, and its special and exclusive role to foster public interest in the area of environmental domain delineated in the enactment of 2010 must necessarily receive legal recognition of this Court." The Court however cautioned that the NGT cannot divest from the principles of natural justice and fair play while exercising such a suo moto jurisdiction. It was directed that the party likely to be affected must be afforded with due opportunity to present its side before the issuance of any adverse orders.

26. Supreme Court Issues Guidelines On Grant Of Bail To Accused Not Arrested During Investigation On Filing Of Chargesheet

[Case: Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI; Citation: LL 2021 SC 550]

The Supreme Court issued guidelines on the aspect of grant of bail to accused who are not arrested during investigation on charge sheet being filed. The bench comprising  Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh accepted the suggestions made by Additional Solicitor General SV Raja and Senior Advocate Sidharth Luthra in this regard. The requisite conditions for this guideline to apply are (1) Not arrested during investigation. (2) Cooperated throughout in the investigation including appearing before Investigating Officer whenever called. The Court laid down guidelines for Category (A) offences, Category (B) and (D) offences and Category (C) offences. The court also agreed with the suggestion that, to consider bail, the trial Court is not precluded from granting interim bail taking into consideration the conduct of the accused during the investigation which has not warranted arrest. 

27. Preliminary Enquiry By CBI In Corruption Cases Not Mandatory; Accused Cannot Demand It As Of Right

[Case: Central Bureau of Investigation v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi; Citation: LL 2021 SC 551]

The Supreme Court held that preliminary enquiry by Central Bureau of Investigation in cases of corruption is not mandatory. "In case the information received by the CBI, through a complaint or a "source information" discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, it can directly register a Regular Case instead of conducting a Preliminary Enquiry, where the officer is satisfied that the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence", the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and BV Nagarathna observed. "An FIR will not stand vitiated because a Preliminary Enquiry has not been conducted", the Court stated in the judgment. The Court clarified that if the CBI chooses not to hold a preliminary enquiry, the accused cannot demand it as a matter of right.

28. Conviction Or Acquittal Cannot Be Set Aside Merely Because There Was A Possibility Of A Joint Or Separate Trial

[Case: Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab; Citation: LL 2021 SC 552]

The Supreme Court observed that a conviction or acquittal of the accused cannot be set aside on the mere ground that there was a possibility of a joint or a separate trial. To set aside the order of conviction or acquittal, it must be proved that the rights of the parties were prejudiced because of the joint or separate trial, the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and BV Nagarathna observed. The Bench elucidated that while applying the principles enunciated in Sections 218 - 223 on conducting joint and separate trials, the trial court should apply a two-pronged test, namely, (i) whether conducting a joint/separate trial will prejudice the defence of the accused; and/or (ii) whether conducting a joint/separate trial would cause judicial delay.

29. Section 138 NI Act: Complaint Cannot Be Proceeded With Once The Accused And Complainant Enter Into A Settlement Agreement

[Case: Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel; Citation: LL 2021 SC 553]

The Supreme Court observed that a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be proceeded with once the accused and the complainant enter into a settlement agreement. The bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and BV Nagarathna observed that non-compliance of the terms of the settlement agreement or dishonour of cheques issued subsequent to it, would then give rise to a fresh cause of action attracting liability under Section 138 of the NI Act and other remedies under civil law and criminal law.

30. Pre-Deposit Of 75% Of Awarded Amount U/s 19 MSMED Act Mandatory While Preferring Application To Set Aside Arbitration Award

[Case: Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority v. Aska Equipments Limited; Citation: LL 2021 SC 554]

The Supreme Court observed that the requirement under Section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act of deposit of 75% of the awarded amount as a pre deposit while preferring the application/appeal for setting aside the award, is mandatory. The bench comprising of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed, 'On a plain/fair reading of Section 19 of the MSME Act, 2006, reproduced hereinabove, at the time/before entertaining the application for setting aside the award made under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, the applicant/appellant has to deposit 75% of the amount in terms of the award as a pre-deposit. The requirement of deposit of 75% of the amount in terms of the award as a pre-deposit is mandatory. However, at the same time, considering the hardship which may be projected before the appellate court and if the appellate court is satisfied that there shall be undue hardship caused to the appellant/applicant to deposit 75% of the awarded amount as a predeposit at a time, the court may allow the pre-deposit to be made in installments."

31. Custody Of Child Obtained By Playing Fraud On Court Liable To Be Declared Void Ab Initio

[Case: Smriti Madan Kansangra v. Perry Kansangra; Citation: LL 2021 SC 555]

The Supreme Court recalled an order granting custody of a child to a Kenyan citizen of Indian origin after finding that he had played fraud on the court and had approached it with "unclean hands" by suppressing material facts. A bench comprising Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, Ajay Rastogi and Hemant Gupta declared its earlier order granting custody to the father who played fraud as "illegal" and "ab initio void". Observing that the party has defied the conditions imposed by the Court for taking the child to Kenya after securing his custody, the Court directed the CBI to initiate proceedings to secure and entrust the custody of the child to his mother. The Court also asked the Centre and the Indian mission in Kenya to help the mother and ordered registration of a suo motu contempt case against Perry Kansagra, the father of the child. The Court has directed Perry Kansagra's physical presence before it on November 16 and asked the registry to pay Rs 25 lakh as litigation cost, from the amount deposited earlier by him with it, to his wife.

32. Mere Exclusion Of Sibling From Will Not A Ground To Suspect Its Genuineness

[Case: V Prabhakara v. Basavaraj K (Dead) by LR and Another; Citation: LL 2021 SC 556]

While dealing with the validity of a Will, the Supreme Court observed that a mere exclusion of a sibling per se from the Will would not create a suspicion against it, unless it is surrounded by other suspicious circumstances. The Court stated that a testamentary court is not a "court of suspicion" but a "court of conscience" that has to consider relevant materials instead of adopting ethical reasoning. In this case, the Will was registered and its execution was admitted. The bench of Justices SK Kaul and MM Sundresh observed, "A testamentary court is not a court of suspicion but that of conscience. It has to consider the relevant materials instead of adopting ethical reasoning. A mere exclusion of either brother or sister per se would not create a suspicion unless it is surrounded by other circumstances creating an inference. In a case where a testatrix is accompanied by the sister of the beneficiary of the Will and the said document is attested by the brother, there is no room for any suspicion when both of them have not raised any issue." 

33. Civil Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Entertain A Suit Structured On Provisions Of Industrial Disputes Act

[Case: Milkhi Ram v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board; Citation: LL 2021 SC 557]

The Supreme Court observed that a civil court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit structured on the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this case, the plaintiff, who was a daily wage employee under the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, challenged his termination by filing a suit before a civil court. The suit was decreed ordering reinstatement of the plaintiff with back wages. This decree was upheld by the Appellate Courts. At the outset, the bench comprising Justices R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy observed, "The civil courts may have the limited jurisdiction in service matters, but jurisdiction may not be available to Court to adjudicate on orders passed by disciplinary authority. The authorities specified under the ID Act including the appropriate government and the industrial courts perform various functions and the ID Act provides for a wider definition of "termination of service", the condition precedent of termination of service. The consequence of infringing those, are also provided in the ID Act. When a litigant opts for common law remedy, he may choose either the civil court or the industrial forum."

34. Mere Delay In Recording Eye Witnesses' Statement By Itself Not A Ground To Reject Their Testimonies

[Case: Goutam Joardar v. State of West Bengal; Citation: LL 2021 SC 558]

The Supreme Court observed that a delay in recording the statements of eye-witnesses by itself cannot result in rejection of their testimonies. If the witnesses felt terrorised and frightened and did not come forward for some time, the delay in recording their statements stood adequately explained, the bench of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Bela M. Trivedi observed. "It is true that there was some delay in recording the statements of the concerned eye-witnesses but mere factum of delay by itself cannot result in rejection of their testimonies. The material on record definitely establishes the fear created by the accused. If the witnesses felt terrorised and frightened and did not come forward for some time, the delay in recording their statements stood adequately explained. Nothing has been brought on record to suggest that during the interregnum, the witnesses were carrying on their ordinary pursuits", the court observed after referring to the evidence on record.

35. 'ICAI Should Give Reasons For Its Decisions' : Supreme Court Sets Aside Recommendation To De-Register CA

[Case: DK Agrawal v. Council for Institute of Chartered Accountants of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 559]

Setting aside a recommendation made by the Council for Institute of Chartered Accountants of India to de-register a Chartered Account, the Supreme Court has observed that the powers of the Council are quasi judicial in nature. The court said that every judicial/quasi-­judicial order must be supported by reasons to be recorded in writing. "An unreasoned decision may be just, but it may not appear to be so to the person affected. A reasoned decision, on the other hand, will have the appearance of fairness and justice.", the bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari observed while holding that the Council should have given its own findings in the matter since he observations of the Disciplinary Committee cannot be treated as findings.

36. Section 138 NI Act - Summons To Directors Justified If Complaint Avers That They Were In Charge & Responsible For Conduct Of Business Of Company

[Case: Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya and another v. M/s Gharrkul Industries Pvt Ltd; Citation: LL 2021 SC 560]

The Supreme Court reiterated that the summons issued by a Magistrate on a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to the Directors of a Company is justified if the complaint contains the basic averment that they were in charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. A bench comprising Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S Oka was dealing with an appeal against a High Court judgment which refused to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the summons issued to the Directors of a Company, which was facing a complaint over dishonour of cheque. Approving the same, the Supreme Court noted that it is well settled by precedents that powers under Section 482 CrPC cannot be invoked to quash the summons against the Directors if the complaint has the basic averments against them. The Court noted that Section 141 of the NI Act imposes vicarious liability on the "every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company".

37. Part-Time Employees Can't Seek Regularization As Matter Of Right Contrary To Govt's Regularization Policy

[Case: Union of India and Ors v. Ilmo Devi and Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 561]

The Supreme Court observed that part-time temporary employees in a Government-run institution cannot claim parity in salary with regular employees of the Government on the principle of equal pay for equal work. The bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed, "part-time employees are not entitled to seek regularization as they are not working against any sanctioned post and there cannot be any permanent continuance of part-time temporary employees as held. The regularization can be only as per the regularization policy declared by the State/Government and nobody can claim the regularization as a matter of right dehors the regularization policy."

38. No Limitation Period In Case Of A Usufructuary Mortgage

[Case: Ram Dattan (Dead) by LRs v. Devi Ram and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 562]

The Supreme Court observed that there is no limitation period in case of a usufructuary mortgage. A bench comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and V Ramasubramanian was dealing with an appeal filed by a mortgagee, who claimed ownership of the mortgaged property on the ground that 45 years had elapsed after the mortgage. Relying on few precedents, it held, "special right of usufructuary mortgagor under S.62 of the TP Act to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein, i.e., when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not start for purposes of Art.61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for declaration that he had become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage." 

39. SLP Only Against A Review Order Not Maintainable, Reiterates Supreme Court

[Case: Bechai (Dead) v. Jag Ram; Citation: LL 2021 SC 563]

The Supreme Court reiterated that a special leave petition against only a review order passed by High Court is not maintainable. A bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh referred to an earlier judgment in Municipal Corp.Of Delhi v. Yashwant Singh Negi in which it was held thus: "Once the High Court has refused to entertain the review petition and the same was dismissed confirming the main order, there is no question of any merger and the aggrieved person has to challenge the main order and not the order dismissing the review petition because on the dismissal of the review petition the principle of merger does not apply."

40. "Reduces Litigation To Gambit": Supreme Court Deprecates 'Disturbing Trend' Of Filing Miscellaneous Applications Seeking Modification Of Its Judgments

[Case: Supertech Ltd v. Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Association; Citation: LL 2021 SC 564]

The Supreme Court observed that filing of miscellaneous application seeking modification/clarification of a judgment is not envisaged in law. The Court observed that there is a disturbing trend of filing such repeated applications after the pronouncement of a final judgment. "Such a practice has no legal foundation and must be firmly discouraged. It reduces litigation to a gambit.", the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna observed. The bench also noted that Miscellaneous Applications are becoming a preferred course to those with resources to pursue strategies to avoid compliance with judicial decisions. It observed, "The hallmark of a judicial pronouncement is its stability and finality. Judicial verdicts are not like sand dunes which are subject to the vagaries of wind and weather. A disturbing trend has emerged in this court of repeated applications, styled as Miscellaneous Applications, being filed after a final judgment has been pronounced. Such a practice has no legal foundation and must be firmly discouraged."

41. Convicts Represented By Legal Aid Advocates Shouldn't Suffer Due To Delay : Supreme Court Issues Directions For Early Disposal Of Criminal Appeals In HC's

[Case: Sonadhar v. State of Chhattisgarh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 565]

The Supreme Court issued directions for timely disposal of appeals filed against conviction pending before the High Courts which are being looked after by the High Court Legal Services Committee. A Bench comprising Justice SK Kaul and Justice MM Sundresh observed that a detailed exercise was undertaken by the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee whereby it prepared a chart with list of all criminal appeals pending in the Delhi High Court and being looked after by the High Court Legal Services Committee and shared with the National Legal Services Authority. The Bench has directed High Court Legal Services Committee of different High Courts to undertake a similar exercise so that convicts represented by legal aid Advocates do not suffer due to delay in hearing of the appeals. The Court has directed the NALSA to monitor the exercise to be carried on. The Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee has also been directed to take up the cases of those convicts who have undergone more than half the sentence in case of fixed-term sentences and examine the feasibility of filing bail applications before the High Court.

In the case of 'life sentence' cases, similar exercise has been directed to be undertaken where eight years of actual custody has been undergone. As a pilot project, in fixed-term sentence cases, the Bench has asked High Court of Delhi and Chhattisgarh to get in touch with the convicts and find out whether they are willing to accept their infractions and agree to the disposal of the appeals on the basis of sentence undergone. Further, according to the Bench, the same can be done even in respect of 'life sentence' cases where the sentenced persons are entitled to remission of the remaining sentence i.e., whether they would still like to contest the appeals or the remission of the sentence would be acceptable to such of the convicts.

42. Anticipatory Bail Granted Ignoring Material Aspects, Nature & Gravity Of Offence Liable To Be Cancelled

[Case: Prashant Singh Rajput v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 566]

The Supreme Court observed that anticipatory bail granted ignoring material aspects including the nature and gravity of the offence is liable to be canceled. The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna in the present matter was hearing a criminal appeal assailing High Court's order granting anticipatory bail to the accused(s) in connection with a crime registered for offences punishable u/s 302 and 323 r/w 34 of IPC, 1860. The Apex Court while setting aside the orders granting anticipatory bail observed, "The Court has to determine whether, on the basis of the material available at this stage, the High Court has applied the correct principles in allowing the applications for anticipatory bail. The offence is of a serious nature in which Vikas Singh was murdered. The FIR and the statements under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC indicate a specific role to Jogendra Singh and Suryabhan Singh in the crime. The order granting anticipatory bail has ignored material aspects, including the nature and gravity of the offence, and the specific allegations against Jogendra Singh and Suryabhan Singh. Hence, a sufficient case has been made out for cancelling the anticipatory bail granted by the High Court." 

43. Allowing 'Kashmiri Migrant' Retired Govt. Employees To Retain Govt. Accommodation For Indefinite Long Period Unconstitutional

[Case: Union of India v. Omkar Nath Dhar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 567]

The Supreme Court held that a government employee who is a Kashmiri Migrant cannot retain Government accommodation for a period exceeding three years. The Court held that the Office Memorandum allowing the retired Government employees who are Kashmiri Migrants to retain Government accommodation for indefinite long period is unconstitutional for being as being totally arbitrary and discriminatory. There cannot be any justification on the basis of social or economic criteria to allow the Kashmiri Migrants to stay in Government accommodation for an indefinite long period, the bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and AS Bopanna observed. 

44. Court Shall Not Help An Absconding Accused Who Is Not Cooperating With Investigation

[Case: Sanatan Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 568]

The Supreme Court observed that a Court shall not come to the rescue or help an absconding accused who is not cooperating with the investigation. The bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed thus while upholding an Allahabad High Court order refusing anticipatory bail. The accused, Sanatan Pandey, was charged for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 307, 308, 504 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code. "There is a prima facie case found against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences and even the charge-sheet has been filed and the petitioner is found to be absconding. Therefore, this is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner.", the court said taking note of the above facts. "The Court shall not come to the rescue or help the accused who is not cooperating the investigating agency and absconding and against whom not only nonbailable warrant has been issued but also the proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. has been issued.", the bench said.

45. Refund Of Stamp Duty Cannot Be Denied On Ground Of Delay If Application Got Belated Due To Judicial Proceedings

[Case: Mr.Rajeev Nowhar v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Maharastra Case, Pune; Citation: LL 2021 SC 569]

The Supreme Court exercised powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to order refund of stamp duty to a person, noting that the delay in making the application was due to the delay in deciding his consumer case before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The Court decided to exercise the powers under Article 142, after noting that there was no provision in the relevant statute, the Maharashtra Stamp Act, barring refund of stamp duty when the application for the same was belated due to judicial delay.  The Court expressed the view that when the application was delayed due to the prolonged judicial proceedings, the refund cannot be denied on the ground of delay.

"We are conscious of the fact that as a general rule of law, the right to refund is a statutory creation. A refund can be sought in terms envisaged by statute. As discussed above, the case of the appellant is not specifically barred by any substantive provision. It is an established principle that this Court while exercising its power under Article 142 of the Constitution must not ignore and override statutory provisions but must rather take note of the express statutory provisions and exercise its discretion with caution. Therefore, if a statute prescribes a limitation period, this Court must be slow to interfere with the delay under Article 142", a Bench comprising Justices D.Y.Chandrachud and B.V.Nagaratha observed. 

46. Relief Against Third-Party Can't Be Claimed In Proceedings Between Husband & Wife Under Hindu Marriage Act

[Case: Nitaben Dinesh Patel v. Dinesh Dahyabhai Patel; Citation: LL 2021 SC 570]

The Supreme Court held that in a proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act between a husband and a wife, a relief against a third party cannot be claimed. The Court held so while rejecting a wife's plea to seek a declaration that the alleged marriage between her husband and another woman was void. "Under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, the relief of divorce, judicial separation etc. can be between the husband and the wife only and cannot extend to the third party. Therefore, by virtue of Section 23A of the Hindu Marriage Act, it is not open for the appellant herein – original defendant to seek declaration to the effect that the marriage between the respondent – original plaintiff and the third party is void. No relief can be prayed by way of counter claim even against the son born out of the alleged wedlock between the respondent – original plaintiff and the third party", a Bench comprising Justices M.R.Shah and A.S.Bopanna stated. 

With respect to the permissibility of counter-claim under Order VIII Rule 6A of the CPC, the Bench observes that the core question which requires consideration is whether the appellant-wife could have claimed the relief sought qua para 37 by way of counter-claim in a marriage petition filed by the respondent-husband for dissolution of the marriage? Answering the question in negative, the Bench held that as per S.23A of the Hindu Marriage Act, by way of counter-claim the appellant-wife can pray for reliefs only those which can be prayed or granted under HMA namely- Restitution of Conjugal Rights (S.9); Judicial Separation (S.10); Declaration of marriage between petitioner and respondent void (S.12) and divorce (S.13). Crucially, the Bench holds that no relief can be prayed qua third party.

47. Mere Failure To Avoid Collision By Taking Some Extraordinary Precaution Does Not In Itself Constitute Contributory Negligence

[Case: K. Anusha v. Regional Manager, Shriram General Insurance Co.Ltd; Citation: LL 2021 SC 571]

The Supreme Court observed that mere failure to avoid the collision by taking some extraordinary precaution, does not in itself constitute negligence. To establish contributory negligence, some act or omission, which materially contributed to the accident or the damage, should be attributed to the person against whom it is alleged, the bench comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian observed. "To establish contributory negligence, some act or omission, which materially contributed to the accident or the damage, should be attributed to the person against whom it is alleged. In Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri vs. 8 Karmasey Kunvargi Tak and Others this Court quoted a decision of the High Court of Australia in Astley v. Austrust Ltd. , to hold that "…where, by his negligence, one party places another in a situation of danger, which compels that other to act quickly in order to extricate himself, it does not amount to contributory negligence, if that other acts in a way which, with the benefit of hindsight is shown not to have been the best way out of the difficulty". In fact, the statement of law in Swadling v. Cooper , that "…the mere failure to avoid the collision by taking some extraordinary precaution, does not in itself constitute negligence…", was also quoted with approval by this Court." 

48. Income Tax Act - Date Of Receipt Of Order Irrelevant For Computing Limitation Under Section 263(2)

[Case: Commissioner of Income Tax, Chennai v. Mohammed Meeran Shahul Hameed; Citation: LL 2021 SC 572]

The Supreme Court held that the date of the receipt of the assessment order has no relevance in computing the limitation period for the Revision by the Principal Commissioner under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act. A Bench of Justices M.R.Shah and A.S.Bopanna observed, "the word used is "made" and not the order "received" by the assessee. Even the word "dispatch" is not mentioned in Section 263 (2). Therefore, once it is established that the order under Section 263 was made/passed within the period of two years from the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be revised was passed, such an order cannot be said to be beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 263 (2) of the Act. Receipt of the order passed under Section 263 by the assessee has no relevance for the purpose of counting the period of limitation provided under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act".

49. Order VIII Rule 1 CPC - Period For Filing Of Written Statement Is Directory In Civil Suits; But Mandatory In Commercial Suits

[Case: Shoraj Singh v. Charan Singh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 573]

The Supreme Court observed that the period of 90 days for filing of written statement under Order VIII Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure in civil suits is directory. The bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian held the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 CPC are mandatory in the Commercial Courts under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. "It may be stated herein that the provisions of Order 8 Rule of CPC are mandatory in the Commercial Courts under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015", the Supreme Court observed.

50. Civil Dispute Given Colour Of Criminal Offence: Supreme Court Says Criminal Proceedings Should Not Become Weapons Of Harassment

[Case: Randheer Singh v. State of UP; Citation: LL 2021 SC 574]

Dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence, the Supreme Court has observed in a judgment delivered last month while it quashed criminal proceedings initiated against a property purchaser. The bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and JK Maheshwari observed that while considering a petition seeking quashing of criminal proceedings, the High Court should examine whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not. Section 482 is designed to achieve the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to generate into weapons of harassment, the court reiterated. In this case, an FIR was lodged against the power of attorney of the complainant and the purchaser of the property. Examining the FIR, the court observed that the criminal proceedings are being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment against the purchaser.

51. Supreme Court Again Deprecates Practice Of Summoning Public Officers Unnecessarily To Court

[Case: Prathama U.P Gramin Bank v. Suneel Kumar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 575]

The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of summoning public officers unnecessarily to the court. In this case, the Allahabad High Court had summoned the Chairman of the Gramin Bank while considering a writ petition filed by a workman challenging his termination. The Court also directed the Regional Manager of the Bank to appear in person and to file an affidavit stating the number of staff working in the Bank as Daily Wager. The Bank challenged these orders before the Apex Court. "We find that there is no reason for the High Court to summon the Chairman and Regional Manager of the Bank. If the High Court was so sure of the order of termination is contrary to law, the High Court would be well within its jurisdiction to pass such an order but summoning of the officers, discharging public duties, is clearly unwarranted", the bench comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian said. 

52. UAPA- State Police Has Duty To Continue Investigation Of Schedule Offence Till NIA Actually Takes It Over

[Case: Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai v. State of Maharashtra; Citation: LL 2021 SC 576]

The Supreme Court observed that the State police has a duty to continue with the investigation of a schedule offence till the National Investigating Agency actually takes it over. Between the issuance of a direction and the actual taking up of the investigation by the NIA, there should be no hiatus in the investigation to the detriment of the interests of national security involved in the enactment of the legislation, the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and BV Nagarathna observed. The court added that mere renumbering of the case filed by the NIA did not take away the power of the State police (ATS) to continue the investigation.

53. Difference Between 'Parole' and 'Furlough' : Supreme Court Explains

[Case: State of Gujarat v. Narayan Sai; Citation: LL 2021 SC 577]

The Supreme Court discussed the differences between 'furlough' and 'parole' and the principles relating to grant of them. A bench comprising Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice BV Nagarathna stated the broad principles as : (i) Furlough and parole envisage a short-term temporary release from custody; (ii) While parole is granted for the prisoner to meet a specific exigency, furlough may be granted after a stipulated number of years have been served without any reason; (iii) The grant of furlough is to break the monotony of imprisonment and to enable the convict to maintain continuity with family life and integration with society; (iv) Although furlough can be claimed without a reason, the prisoner does not have an absolute legal right to claim furlough; (v) The grant of furlough must be balanced against the public interest and can be refused to certain categories of prisoners. Referring to various precedents, the bench also observed that balance needs to be maintained between two competing interests while granting parole or furlough- that of reforming the convict on one hand and the public purpose and interests of society on the other: 

54. Specific Role Of Accused Not Required To Be Stated In Order Granting Prior Approval U/s 24(1)(a) KCOCA

[Case: Kavitha Lankesh v. State of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 578]

The Supreme Court observed that the specific role of the accused is not required to be stated in the order granting prior approval under Section 24(1)(a of the Karnataka Control of Organised Crimes Act, 2000. The prior approval is qua offence and not the offender as such, the bench of Justices AM Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari and CT Ravikumar said while setting aside the Karnataka High Court judgment that had quashed charges under Karnataka Control of Organised Crimes Act (KCOCA) against accused Mohan Nayak in the Gauri Lankesh murder case. The court said that, at this stage, the competent authority has to focus essentially on the factum whether the information/material reveals the commission of a crime which is an organized crime committed by the organized crime syndicate.

55. Absconder/Proclaimed Offender Not Entitled To Anticipatory Bail

[Case: Prem Shankar Prasad v. State Of Bihar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 579]

The Supreme Court observed that an absconder/proclaimed offender is not entitled to relief of anticipatory bail. In this case, the Trial Court dismissed the anticipatory bail application on the ground that as the accused is absconding and even the proceedings under section 82/83 Cr.PC has been issued, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail. Thereafter, the accused approached the High Court which granted the anticipatory bail. In appeal, the Top court noted that the High Court ignored the factum of initiation of proceedings under sections 82-­83 of Cr.PC by simply observing that "be that as it may". "In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradeep Sharma (Supra), it is observed and held by this court that if anyone is declared as an absconder/proclaimed offender in terms of section 82 of Cr.PC, he is not entitled to relief of anticipatory bail", the bench comprising Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed.

56. Order XXI Rule 16 CPC - Transferee Of Rights In Subject Matter Of Suit Can Apply For Execution Without Separate Assignment Of Decree

[Case: Vaishno Devi Construction v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 580]

The Supreme Court observed that the Explanation to Order XXI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, removed the distinction between an assignment pre-the decree and an assignment post the decree. Thus, the court observed that there is no bar under Order XXI Rule 16 against assignee who acquired rights prior to decree from making an application to execute the decree. The bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and BR Gavai observed that the objective of the said amendment is to avoid multifarious proceedings to determine the issue of assignment and to determine the issue of assignment in the execution proceedings itself. The bench was hearing an appeal arising out of a claim based of an assignee of the decree holder in terms of Order XXI Rule 16 CPC ( application for execution by transferee of decree). During the pendency of the execution proceedings, the decree holder died. The appellants (now before SC) filed application before the executing court under Section 47 read with Order 22 Rules 1&2 of the CPC. This claim was based on the basis of an assignment made by the deceased decree holder (prior to decree). This application was dismissed by the Trial Court, and later by the High Court.

57. Limitation Period For Appeal Under Section 61 IBC Starts Running From Date Of Pronouncement; Delay In Uploading Won't Exclude Limitation

[Case: V Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Ltd; Citation: LL 2021 SC 581]

The Supreme Court held that the period of limitation for filing of appeal against an order as per Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code will start running as soon as the same is pronounced and that it is not dependent on the date when the order is uploaded. So, a party who failed to file an application for the certified copy of the order immediately cannot raise a plea to extend the period of limitation on the ground of delay in uploading the order. The Court held that period awaiting the receipt of a free certified copy does not extend the limitation period under Section 61(2) of the IBC for a party who has not applied for the same.

The Court observed that a diligent litigant is expected to apply for the certified copy immediately. The act of filing an application for a certified copy is not just a technical requirement for computation of limitation but also an indication of the diligence of the aggrieved party in pursuing the litigation in a timely fashion, the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and BV Nagarathna observed. The Supreme Court also held that the annexation of a certified copy for an appeal to the NCLAT against an order passed in proceedings the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, cannot be automatically dispensed with. If an application has been filed, the period between the date of application and the date of receipt of order can be excluded from limitation as per Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The litigant has to file the appeal within thirty days, which can be extended up to a period of fifteen days, upon showing sufficient cause and no more, the court added.

58. Testimony Of Witness Who Identified Accused In Court Cannot Be Discarded Merely Because TIP Was Not Conducted

[Case: Jayan v. State of Kerala; Citation: LL 2021 SC 582]

The Supreme Court observed that the testimony of a witness who has identified the accused in the Court cannot be discarded merely because Test Identification Parade was not conducted. In a given case, there may be otherwise sufficient corroboration to the testimony of the witness, the bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka said. The court observed thus in a judgment allowing the appeal filed by the accused who were convicted under Section 55(a) of Kerala Abkari Act. However, in this case, the court disbelieved a witness who identified the accused in court where he saw him for the first time after 11 years.  In this context, the court observed that T.I Parade is a part of the investigation and it is not substantive evidence.

59. Nomenclature Of Tax Does Not Determine Its Nature Of Levy Or True Character

[Case: Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam and Ors v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation & Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 583]

The Supreme Court held that the nomenclature ascribed to a tax does not determine the nature of the levy or its true and essential character. Holding so, the Court observed that the tax labelled as "water tax" or "sewerage tax" under the UP Water Supply and Sewerage Act is in substance a tax on land and buildings situated with the area of the Jal Sansthan authority. The Court also noted that as per the statutory provisions, the tax labelled as "water tax" was not dependent on the actual consumption of water and was based on the provision for water supply given by the authority. A bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and BV Nagarathna observed: "the legislature may choose a label having a relationship with the function of the authority which imposes the tax as in the present case. The tax has been labelled as the water tax or a sewerage tax simply because it is imposed by the Jal Sansthan constituted under the UP Water Supply and Sewerage Act. That does not alter the nature of the levy which in substance is a tax on lands and buildings within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule." 

60. Selected IAS Candidates Have No Right To Be Allocated To Cadre Of Their Choice Or To Home State

[Case: Union of India v. A. Shainamol; Citation: LL 2021 SC 584]

The Supreme Court observed that selected IAS candidates have no right to be allocated to a cadre of their choice or to home state. The allocation of cadre is not a matter of right and the State has no discretion of allocation of a cadre at its whims and fancies, the bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian observed. The court also observed that consultation under Rule 5(1) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 in respect of allocation of cadre is not required to be done with the State from which the candidate belongs. The mandate of Rule 5(1) of the Cadre Rules is satisfied when consultation is made with the State to which allocation is made. The court allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India against a direction issued by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam on 28.02.2017 whereby a successful IAS Candidate was directed to allocate a selected candidate to the Kerala cadre of the All-India Service.

61. High Court Under Article 226 Cannot Permit Party To Modify Its Offer Without Hearing Other Parties

[Case: Vaibhavi Enterprise v. Nobel Cera Coat Limited; Citation: LL 2021 SC 585]

The Supreme Court observed that High Court under Article 226 could not permit a party to modify its offer without hearing other parties. The bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna in the present matter was considering a special leave petition assailing Gujarat High Court's judgement in which the High Court had directed ONGC to finalize the contract with an applicant on the condition that it would lift the gas within 65 days from the date of allotment instead of 75 days as offered by it earlier. 

Allowing the SLP, the Court observed, "So the procedure adopted by the High Court while disposing of the writ petition by permitting / allowing the original writ applicant to modify its offer and that too in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as observed herein above, is unsustainable and unknown to law. We have our own doubt whether in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court could have permitted one of the bidders to revise / modify its offer. Even in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court felt that instead of inviting fresh bids, the same could be allowed, in that case also, similar opportunities ought to have been given to the other applicants also."

62. NDPS Charges Based On Section 67 Statements Of Accused Unsustainable : Supreme Court Applies 'Tofan Singh' Judgment

[Case: Sanjeev Chandra Agarwal & Anr. v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 586]

In a case under the NDPS Act, the Supreme Court set aside the charges framed against the accused after noting that the case was based on statements by other accused given to officers under Section 67, which are inadmissible in evidence. A bench comprising Justices Sanjeev Khanna and Bela Trivedi noted that the Supreme Court's verdict in last year's case Tofan Singh v State of Tamil Nadu had declared that confessions made to NDPS officers are inadmissible in evidence. In this case, it observed that the factual position was that no narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances were recovered from the premises of the two appellants.

Also Read: NDPS Act : Are 'Confessional' Statements Given Under Section 67 Admissible In Evidence?

63. Requirement To File Certificate Of A Senior Advocate Along With Curative Petition Mandatory

[Case: Rajesh Jha v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 587]

The Supreme Court observed that filing of certificate of a Senior Advocate along with curative petition is a mandatory requirement. In this case, instead of filing the requisite certificate from a Senior Advocate, the petitioner, a convict, filed an application for exemption from filing the said certificate. Taking note of the fact that it is a jail petition, the court referred the matter to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCLSC). The Committee forwarded a Senior Advocate letter stating inter alia that there is no ground available for filing a curative petition. "Order XLVIII Rule 2(2) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 makes it mandatory to file a certificate from a Senior Advocate, certifying inter alia that the case is covered in terms of the guidelines laid down in the case of "Rupa Ashok Hurra" (supra). Since the information received from the Senior Advocate states that no ground is available for entertaining a curative petition, the unregistered Curative Petition is dismissed along with all the pending applications.", Justice Hima Kohli observed while dismissing the petition.

64. 'Dependent' Mother In Law Of A Deceased Can Maintain Motor Accident Claim Petition

[Case: N. Jayasree v. Cholamandalam Ms General Insurance Company Ltd; Citation: LL 2021 SC 588]

The Supreme Court observed that a motor accident claim petition filed by mother in law who was dependent on her deceased son-in-law is maintainable. "It is not uncommon in Indian Society for the mother­-in­-law to live with her daughter and son-­in­-law during her old age and be dependent upon her son-­in-­law for her maintenance", the bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari observed while holding that she is a "legal representative" under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. "In our view, the term 'legal representative' should be given a wider interpretation for the purpose of Chapter XII of MV Act and it should not be confined only to mean the spouse, parents and children of the deceased. As noticed above, MV Act is a benevolent legislation enacted for the object of providing monetary relief to the victims or their families. Therefore, the MV Act calls for a liberal and wider interpretation to serve the real purpose underlying the enactment and fulfil its legislative intent."

65. Offences Under Special Statutes Including SC/ST Act Can Also Be Quashed By Exercising Powers U/S 482CrPC/ Article 142

[Case: Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 589]

The Supreme Court observed that criminal proceedings arising out of Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 can be quashed invoking powers under Article 142 of Constitution or Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. "The mere fact that the offence is covered under a 'special statute' would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC", a three judges bench comprising CJI NV Ramana, Justices Surya Kant and Hima Kohli observed. The Bench opined, "where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings."

66. Distinction Between "Preparation" & "Attempt To Rape": Supreme Court Explains

[Case: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahendra Alias Golu; Citation: LL 2021 SC 590]

While upholding conviction of a man accused of attempt to rape, the Supreme Court explained the distinction between 'Preparation' and 'Attempt' to commit rape. The issue before the Court was whether the offence proved to have been committed by the accused amounts to 'attempt' to commit rape within the meaning of Section 376(2)(f) read with Section 511 IPC or was it a mere 'preparation' which led to outraging the modesty of the victims? The court noticed that, it has come in evidence that the accused had taken the minor girls were taken inside the room, closing the doors and taking the victims to a room. That then he stripped the girls and himself, and rubbed his genitals against those of the victims. It also found that the statements of both the victim children inspire full confidence, establish their innocence and evince a natural version without any remote possibility of tutoring.

The court observed that these acts were committed with endeavour to commit sexual intercourse. "These acts were deliberately done with manifest intention to commit the offence aimed and were reasonably proximate to the consummation of the offence. The acts of the accused exceeded the stage beyond preparation and preceded the actual penetration". the bench comprising Justices Surya Kant and Hima Kohli observed holding that the Trial Court rightly convicted him for attempting to commit rape as punishable within the ambit and scope of Section 511 read with Section 375 IPC as it stood in force at the time of occurrence. 

67. Arbitrator Has Substantial Discretion In Awarding Interest U/Sec 31 (7) (a) Arbitration Act

[Case: Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited (Punsup) v. Ganpati Rice Mills; Citation: LL 2021 SC 591]

The Supreme Court observed that an Arbitrator has substantial discretion in awarding interest under Section 31(7)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In this case, the Arbitrator had granted interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 01.01.2003 till the date of realization. Disposing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), the rate of interest was reduced by the District Court to 12% per annum. In Arbitration appeal, the High Court further reduced the rate of interest to 9% per annum. In appeal, the the bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi noted "Per contra, Section 31 (7) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 grants substantial discretion to the arbitrator in awarding interest. No reason and grounds have been given to reduce the rate of interest."

68. Mere Breach Of Contract Not Cheating; Giving Criminal Colour To Civil Disputes Must Be Discouraged

[Case: Mitesh Kumar J. Shah v. State of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 592]

The Supreme Court observed that mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating. For criminal prosecution, the key ingredient of having a dishonest or fraudulent intent under sections 405, 419 and 420 has to be made out, the bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari observed. The bench said that a criminal color cannot be given to a civil dispute merely to take advantage of a relatively quick relief granted in a criminal case in contrast to a civil dispute. Such an exercise is nothing but an abuse of the process of law which must be discouraged in its entirety, the court added.

69. Vicarious Liability As A Principle Cannot Be Applied To A Contempt Case

[Case: Dr. U.N. Bora, Ex. Chief Executive Officer v. Assam Roller Flour Mills Association; Citation: LL 2021 SC 593]

The Supreme Court observed that vicarious liability as a principle cannot be applied to a case of contempt. Merely because a subordinate official acted in disregard of an order passed by the Court, a liability cannot be fastened on a higher official in the absence of knowledge, the bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice MM Sundresh observed. "Knowledge acquires substantial importance qua a contempt order. Merely because a subordinate official acted in disregard of an order passed by the Court, a liability cannot be fastened on a higher official in the absence of knowledge. When two views are possible, the element of willfulness vanishes as it involves a mental element. It is a deliberate, conscious and intentional act. What is required is a proof beyond reasonable doubt since the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature," it added.

70. Proceedings Under SC-ST Act Not Vitiated Merely Because Cognizance Was Taken By Magistrate

[Case: Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai Chaudhari; Citation: LL 2021 SC 594]

The Supreme Court observed that criminal proceedings under SC-ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, is not vitiated merely because the magistrate had taken cognizance and committed the case to Special Court. The bench of Justices MR Shah and Aniruddha Bose observed that the insertion of second proviso to Section 14 of the Act only gives additional powers to the Special Court to take cognizance of the offences under the Act. It cannot be said that it takes away jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance and thereafter to commit the case to the Special Court for trial, the court said. The court further noted that under Section 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if any Magistrate not empowered by the law to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190, takes cognizance, such irregularities do not vitiate proceedings. At the most, it can be said to be irregular proceedings for which, it does not vitiate the proceedings, the bench said.

71. 'Specific Performance No Longer A Discretionary Relief': Supreme Court Says 2018 Amendment May Not Have Retrospective Application But Can Be A 'Guide'

[Case: Sughar Singh v. Hari Singh (Dead); Citation: LL 2021 SC 595]

The specific performance is no longer a discretionary relief, the Supreme Court observed. The bench of Justice MR Shah and Aniruddha Bose observed that the 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief Act, 1963 by which section 10(a) has been inserted, though may not be applicable retrospectively but can be a guide on the discretionary relief. The court, however, did not decide the question whether the said provision would be applicable retrospectively or not and/or should be made applicable to all pending proceedings. "Not to grant the decree of specific performance despite the execution of the agreement to sell is proved; part sale consideration is proved and the plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract would encourage the dishonesty," the court added.

72. 'Equality' A Definite Concept And A Vested Right; Article 14 Is Violated When 'Equals Are Treated Unequally'

[Case: Modified Voluntary Retirement Scheme of 2002 of Azam Jahi Mill Workers Association v. National Textile Corporation Limited; Citation: LL 2021 SC 596]

The Supreme Court observed that the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution is a vested right and the same is violated when the equals are treated unequally. The bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna said that for a classification to be valid, it must necessarily satisfy two tests: Firstly, the distinguishing rationale has to be based on a just objective and secondly, the choice of differentiating one set of persons from another must have a reasonable nexus to the objects sought to be achieved.

73. Motor Accident Claims - Loss Of Earning Capacity To Be Fixed As 100% When Claimant Is Incapacitated For Life

[Case: Jithendran v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd; Citation: LL 2021 SC 597]

The Supreme Court held that the loss of earning capacity must be fixed as 100% when a claimant-motor accident victim is incapacitated for life and is confined to home. A person therefore is not only to be compensated for the injury suffered due to the accident but also for the loss suffered on account of the injury and his inability to lead the life he led, prior to the life-altering event the bench of Justices R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy observed. The court added that the extent of economic loss arising from a disability may not be measured in proportions to the extent of permanent disability. "While the money awarded by Courts can hardly redress the actual sufferings of the injured victim (who is deprived of the normal amenities of life and suffers the unease of being a burden on others), the courts can make a genuine attempt to help restore the self-dignity of such claimant, by awarding 'just compensation", the bench remarked. In the case, the Court noted that even though the physical disability is assessed at 69%, the functional disability is 100% in so far as claimant's loss of earning capacity is concerned.

74. Sections 91/92 Evidence Act: When Parties Put Their Agreement Into Writing, It is Conclusively Presumed To Be Full & Final Statement Of Intentions

[Case: V Anantha Raju & Anr v. T.M.Narasimhan & Or; Citation: LL 2021 SC 598]

"It has been held that when parties deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory", a Bench of Justices L Nageswara Rao, Sanjiv Khanna and B.R.Gavai observed while dealing with a case involving the validity of the term of a Partnership Deed.

"When persons express their agreements in writing, it is for the express purpose of getting rid of any indefinite-ness and to put their ideas in such shape that there can be no misunderstanding, which so often occurs when reliance is placed upon oral statements", the Bench observed further. The court held that if a document has been produced to prove its terms under Section 91, the provisions of Section 92 come into operation for the purpose of excluding evidence of any oral agreement or statement for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from its terms. "It has been held that when parties deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory", it was opined further. The Court thus held that in view of S.91 of the Evidence Act, the evidentiary value of the 1995 Deed would stand on a much higher pedestal, as against the oral testimony of the parties.

75. 'First Come First Serve' Policy Of Granting Licence Is Fundamentally Flawed'

[Case: Anant Raj Ltd. v. State of Haryana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 599]

The Supreme Court observed that there is a fundamental flaw in the policy of granting licence on the First Come First Serve basis. It is the solemn duty of the State to ensure that a non-­discriminatory method is adopted, whether it is for distribution or allotment of licence on his own land, or alienation of property, the bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka observed. "Any person who has an access to the power corridors will be made available with an information from the Government records and before there could be a public notice accessible to the people at large, the interested person may submit his application, as happened in the instant case, and become entitled to stand first included in queue to have a better claim, at the same time it is the solemn duty of the State to ensure that a non-­discriminatory method is adopted, whether it is for distribution or allotment of licence on his own land, or alienation of property and it is imperative and of paramount consideration that every action of the State should always be in public interest", the Court observed.

76. Supreme Court Constitutes Independent Expert Committee To Probe Pegasus Snooping Allegations

[Case: Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India and connected cases; Citation: LL 2021 SC 600]

The Supreme Court ordered the constitution of an independent expert committee to look into the allegations of widespread and targeted surveillance of politicians, journalists, activist etc using the Pegasus spyware. The functioning of the committee will be overseen by retired Supreme Court judge Justice RV Raveendran. The overseeing Judge will be assisted in this task by: i. Mr. Alok Joshi, former IPS officer (1976 batch) ii. Dr. Sundeep Oberoi, Chairman, Sub Committee in (International Organisation of Standardisation/ International Electro-Technical Commission/Joint Technical Committee). The three members Technical Committee shall comprise- i. Dr. Naveen Kumar Chaudhary, Professor (Cyber Security and Digital Forensics) and Dean, National Forensic Sciences University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat. ii. Dr. Prabaharan P., Professor (School of Engineering), Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham, Amritapuri, Kerala. iii. Dr. Ashwin Anil Gumaste, Institute Chair Associate Professor (Computer Science and Engineering), Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, Maharashtra. The judgment pronounced by the Chief Justice of India NV Ramana said that the Court was constituted to pass this order due to the following "compelling circumstances". 

Also Read: State Won't Get A Free Pass By Mere Mention Of "National Security" : Supreme Court In Pegasus Case

Also Read: Protection Of Journalistic Sources A Basic Condition For Freedom Of Press : Supreme Court In Pegasus Case

Also Read: Pegasus- All You Want To Know About Supreme Court Appointed Committee-Members, Terms Of Reference, Procedure

77. GST - 'Rectification Of Errors Permissible Only At Initial Stages': Supreme Court Dismisses Bharti Airtel's Plea For Refund Of Rs.923 Crore

[Case: Union of India v. Bharti Airtel; Citation: LL 2021 SC 601]

The Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court judgment that had allowed Bharti Airtel's plea for rectification and refund of excess GST worth Rupees 923 Crores paid by it during the period between July-September 2017. "The law permits rectification of errors and omissions only at the initial stages of Forms GSTR­1 and GSTR­3, but in the specified manner. It is a different dispensation provided than the one in pre­-GST period, which did not have the provision of auto­populated records and entries.", the bench of Justices AM Khanwilkar and Dinesh Maheshwari observed. The court said that assessee cannot be permitted to unilaterally carry out rectification of his returns submitted electronically in Form GSTR­3B, as this would affect the obligations and liabilities of other stakeholders, because of the cascading effect in their electronic records. The court also upheld the circular issued by the Commissioner (GST) which had restricted the rectification of Form GSTR­3B in respect of the period in which the error had occurred.

78. Appointment Of Special Teachers For Divyang Children: Supreme Court Issues Directives To Centre, States

[Case: Rajneesh Kumar Pandey v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 602]

The Supreme Court issued directives in the matter of appointing special teachers to teach Children/Child with Special Needs. The bench was considering a writ petition alleging illegality being committed by authorities in employing such teachers in recognised schools on contract basis without any certainty of tenure. A Bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari and CT Ravikumar said that its directives will operate across the country (all States and Union Territories). The State Commissioners appointed under Section 79 of the 2016 Act in the concerned States/Union Territories have been directed to forthwith initiate suo motu enquiries regarding compliance and then make recommendation to the appropriate authority (of the concerned State/Union Territory), as may be necessary, so that the authority will be obliged to submit compliance report to the State Commissioner within three months from the date of receipt of recommendation, as mandated under Section 81 of the 2016 Act.

Access full report to read directives

79. Supreme Court Temporarily Restores Senior Designation Of Yatin Oza For 2 Years

[Case: Yatin Narendra Oza v. High Court of Gujarat; Citation: LL 2021 SC 603]

With the caveat that it is the High Court which will watch and can best decide how he behaves and conducts himself as a senior counsel "without any further opportunity", the Supreme Court opined that the ends of justice would be served by temporarily restoring the designation of advocate Yatin Oza for a period of two years from January 1, 2022. "It will be for the High Court to take a final call whether his behaviour is acceptable in which case the High Court can decide to continue with his designation temporarily or restore it permanently. Needless to say that if there is any infraction in the conduct of the petitioner within this period of two years, the High Court would be well within its rights to withdraw the indulgence which we have given for two years which in turn is predicated on the assurances given by the petitioner and his counsel for the immaculate behaviour without giving any cause to the High Court to find fault with his conduct. In effect, the fate of the petitioner is dependent on his appropriate conduct as a senior counsel before his own High Court, which will have the final say", the bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and R. Subhash Reddy clarified.

80. Suit For Permanent Injunction In Respect Of Waqf Property Maintainable Before Wakf Tribunal And Not Civil Court

[Case: Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari; Citation: LL 2021 SC 604]

The Supreme Court held that a suit for permanent injunction in respect of a waqf property has to be filed before the Wakf Tribunal and not the Civil Court. "To say that the Tribunal will have jurisdiction only if the subject property is disputed to be a waqf property and not if it is admitted to be a waqf property, is indigestible in the teeth of Section 83(1)", the bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian observed. The court also added that the Waqf Tribunal will have power to issue temporary injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment refers to historical background of the Wakf Act and also the conflicting judgments of various benches on this issue. The bench noted that many courts were misled by the reference to two specific questions in Sections 6(1) and 7(1), to come to the conclusion that the bar of jurisdiction was confined only to disputes revolving around those two questions. The court observed that the Section 83(1) even as it stood before the amendment, provided for the determination by the Tribunal, of any dispute, question or other matter (i) relating to a waqf; and (ii) relating to a waqf property. "Therefore, to allow the plaintiff to ignore the Waqf Tribunal and to seek a decree of permanent injunction and mandatory injunction from a civil court, would be ignore the mandate of section 83 and 85 which speak of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf or a waqf property.", the Court observed. 

81. Mere Support To Terrorist Organization Without Intention To Further Its Activities Does Not Attract Section 38/39 UAPA

[Case: Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 605]

In its judgment restoring the bail granted to Thwaha Fasal and Allan Shuhaib, the Supreme Court observed that mere support given to a terrorist organization or mere association with it, is not sufficient to attract offences under Sections 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The association and the support have to be with intention of furthering the activities of a terrorist organisation, the bench comprising Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka observed. Such intention, according to the court, can be inferred from the overt acts or acts of active participation of the accused in the activities of a terrorist organization which are borne out from the materials forming a part of charge sheet. Further, the court reiterated that the restrictions imposed by sub-section (5) of Section 43D per se do not prevent a Constitutional Court from granting bail on the ground of violation of Part III of the Constitution. 

82. Dishonour Of Cheque Issued As A Security Can Also Attract Offences U/Sec 138 NI Act

[Case: Sripati Singh (D) v. State of Jharkhand; Citation: LL 2021 SC 606]

The Supreme Court observed that the dishonour of cheque issued as a security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. There cannot be a hard and fast rule that a cheque which is issued as security can never be presented by the drawee of the cheque, the bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed. The court added that such contention would arise only in a circumstance where the debt has not become recoverable and the cheque issued as security has not matured to be presented for recovery of the amount, if the due date agreed for payment of debt has not arrived. 

83. SC/ST Act - Notice To Victim Under Section 15A In Court Proceedings Against Accused Is Mandatory

[Case: Hariram Bhambhi v. Satyanarayan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 607]

The Supreme Court observed that the requirement under Section 15A of SC-ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act of issuing notice of a court proceeding to a victim or a dependent is mandatory. The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna observed that, as per this requirement, a reasonable and timely notice must be issued to the victim or their dependent. Under Section 15A(3), a victim or his dependent shall have the right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any Court proceeding including any bail proceeding and the Special Public Prosecutor or the State Government shall inform the victim about any proceedings under this Act. As per Section 15A(5), a victim or his dependent shall be entitled to be heard at any proceeding under this Act in respect of bail, discharge, release, parole, conviction or sentence of an accused or any connected proceedings or arguments and file written submission on conviction, acquittal or sentencing.

84. National Security Act: Failure To Communicate Rejection Of Detenu's Representation In Time Bound Manner Will Vitiate Detention Order

[Case: Sarabjeet Singh Mokha v. District Magistrate, Jabalpur; Citation: LL 2021 SC 608]

The Supreme Court observed that failure of Government to communicate rejection of a detenu's representation in a time-bound manner is sufficient to vitiate the order of detention passed under National Security Act. The Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and BV Nagarathna said that the detenu has right to have his representation considered expeditiously- failing which the detention order would be invalidated. This right would ring hollow without a corollary right of the detenu to receive a timely communication from the appropriate government on the status of its representation- be it an acceptance or a rejection, the Bench opined. It noted that Article 22(5) of the Constitution mandates that (i) the authority making the order shall "as soon as may be" communicate the grounds on which the order has been made to the person detained; and (ii) the detaining authority shall afford to the person detained "the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order".

85. If Banned Firecrackers Found To Be Made Or Used, Authorities Will Be Held Personally Liable

[Case: Arjun Gopal v Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 609]

The Supreme Court issued a series of directions to ensure the strict implementation of its earlier orders banning the use of barium-based chemicals in fire crackers and allowing only the use of "green crackers". A bench comprising Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna held that that if it was found that any banned firecrackers are manufactured, sold and used in any particular area, the Chief Secretary of the concerned State(s), the Secretary (Homes) of the concerned State(s) and the Commissioner of Police of the concerned area, District Superintendent of Police of the concerned area and the SHO/Police Officer in-charge of the concerned police station shall be held personally liable. The Court also made clear that there was no total ban on use of firecrackers and said that only those firecrackers were banned that contained barium salts.

86. Evidence In A Trial Against An Accused Does Not Have Any Bearing Upon A Co-Accused In A Separate Trial For The Commission Of Same Offence

[Case: AT Mydeen v. Assistant Commissioner, Customs Department; Citation: LL 2021 SC 610]

The evidence recorded in a criminal trial against any accused is confined to the culpability of that accused only and it does not have any bearing upon a co-accused, who has been tried on the basis of evidence recorded in a separate trial, though for the commission of the same offence, the Supreme Court observed. In other words, the culpability of any accused cannot be decided on the basis of any evidence, which was not recorded in his presence or his pleader's presence and for which he did not get an opportunity of cross-examination, unless the case falls under exceptions of law. The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and BV Nagarathna observed that the scope of the appellate court's power does not go beyond the evidence available before it in the form of a trial court record of a particular case, unless section 367 or section 391 of Cr.P.C. comes into play in a given case, which are meant for further inquiry or additional evidence while dealing with any criminal appeal. In this case, the Trial Court vide separate judgments acquitted all the six accused in a crime registered under Customs Act. However, the High Court allowed the appeal and convicted them all.

87. 'Mental Health Of A Person Can't Be Compressed Into A One Size Fits All Approach' : Supreme Court In Abetment To Suicide Case

[Case: Mahendra KC v. State of Karnataka and Others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 611]

Stressing that the "mental health of a person cannot be compressed into a one-size fits all approach", the Supreme Court has criticized a High Court judgment for terming a person who died by suicide a "weakling". The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna in the present matter was considering an appeal against the order passed by the High Court of Karnataka in which the Court had quashed an FIR registered against Special Land Acquisition Officer u/s 306 r/w 34 of IPC, 1860 on the ground that continuation of the prosecution "would [be] a travesty of justice and be a sheer waste of time", besides requiring the accused-respondent "to undergo the rigors of a lengthy trial".

While allowing the appeal and setting aside the High Court's judgement the bench in (Mahendra KC v State of Karnataka and Others) observed that, "The Single Judge has termed a person who decided to commit suicide a 'weakling' and has also made observations on how the behavior of the deceased before he committed suicide was not that of a person who is depressed and suffering from mental health issues. Behavioural scientists have initiated the discourse on the heterogeneity of every individual and have challenged the traditional notion of 'all humans behave alike'. Individual personality differences ​​manifest as a variation in the behavior of people. Therefore, how an individual copes up with a threat- both physical and emotional, expressing (or refraining to express) love, loss, sorrow and happiness, varies greatly in view of the multi-faceted nature of the human mind and emotions. Thus, the observations describing the manner in which a depressed person ought to have behaved deeply diminishes the gravity of mental health issues." The bench also said that the High Court has made observations diminishing the importance of mental health. The Apex Court in this regard observed that, "The mental health of a person cannot be compressed into a one size fits all approach."

88. Employee Can't Claim Change Of Date Of Birth As A Matter Of Right

[Case: Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited v. T.P. Nataraja & Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 612]

The Supreme Court observed that application for change of date of birth by an employee can only be as per the relevant provisions/regulations applicable. The Court reiterated change of date of birth cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna summarised the law on the change of date of birth as under: (i) application for change of date of birth can only be as per the relevant provisions/regulations applicable; (ii) even if there is cogent evidence, the same cannot be claimed as a matter of right; (iii) application can be rejected on the ground of delay and latches also more particularly when it is made at the fag end of service and/or when the employee is about to retire on attaining the age of superannuation.

89. NIA Act- Division Bench Of High Court Should Hear Revision Petition Against Special Court Order

[Case: State of Kerala v. Roopesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 613]

Holding that a revision petition against an order passed by a Special Court under the National Investigation Agency can lie only before a division bench of a High Court, the Supreme Court set aside an order passed by the Kerala High Court in the case relating to alleged Maoist leader Roopesh. A bench comprising Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna set aside the order passed by the single bench and remanded the matter back to the High Court for being heard by a division bench. The matter should be decided expeditiously, preferably within a period of 6 months, the Supreme Court added. "It goes without saying that all the contentions/defences, which may be available to the respective parties are kept open to be considered by the Division Bench of the High Court in accordance with law and on its own merits", the bench noted in the order.

90. Offender Who Had Not Used Deadly Weapon During Robbery Cannot Be Convicted Under Section 397 IPC

[Case: Ganesan v. State; Citation: LL 2021 SC 614]

The Supreme Court observed that an offender who had not used any deadly weapon at the time of committing robbery/dacoity cannot be convicted under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code. The use of deadly weapon by one offender at the time of committing robbery/dacoity cannot attract Section 397 IPC for the imposition of minimum punishment on another offender who has not used any deadly weapon. A Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed, "The term 'offender' under Section 397 IPC is confined to the 'offender' who uses any deadly weapon and use of deadly weapon by one offender at the time of committing robbery cannot attract Section 397 IPC for the imposition of minimum punishment on another offender who has not used any deadly weapon. Even there is distinction and difference between Section 397 and Section 398 IPC. The word used in Section 397 IPC is 'uses' any deadly weapon and the word used in Section 398 IPC is 'offender is armed with any deadly weapon'. Therefore, for the purpose of attracting Section 397 IPC the 'offender' who 'uses' any deadly weapon Section 397 IPC shall be attracted"

91. Seriousness & Gravity Of Crime Relevant Considerations For Grant Of Bail

[Case: Bhoopendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 615]

The Supreme Court aside an order of the Rajasthan High Court by which it granted bail to an accused for murder of the village sarpanch, after noting that the High Court did not consider the relevant considerations of seriousness and gravity of the crime and the specific role attributed to the accused. While directing the accused to surrender on or before 7 November 2021, a Bench comprising Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice BV Nagarathna has clarified that observations made in its judgment are only for the purpose of considering the application for bail and will have no bearing on the merits of the case or the pending trial. Calling the High Court's order unsustainable, the Bench opined that the High Court has failed to notice relevant circumstances bearing on the seriousness and gravity of the crime and the role attributed to the accused. The direction has been passed in an appeal arises from a judgment dated 11 August 2021 of a Single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan whereby the High Court allowed the fifth bail application of the accused (second respondent in present case).

The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court on the following grounds: 1. The High Court has failed to consider the seriousness and gravity of the crime and the specific role which is attributed to the second respondent. 2. The deceased was due to testify in the trial in the prior case under Section 307 of the IPC and the murder was committed barely a fortnight prior to the date on which he was to depose. 3. The High Court had rejected four previous bail applications and there was no change in circumstances. 4. The High Court having failed to notice material circumstances bearing upon the grant of bail to the second respondent proceeded on a palpable erroneous basis. 

92. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act- Mere Dispatch Of Public Analyst's Report To Accused Not A Sufficient Compliance Of Mandatory Requirement To Serve It On Him

[Case: Narayana Prasad Sahu v. State of MP; Citation: LL 2021 SC 616]

The Supreme Court observed that mere dispatch of the report of public analyst to the accused is not a sufficient compliance with the requirement of subsection (2) of Section 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, to serve the report on him/her. Apart from the right of the accused to contend that the report is not correct, he has the right to exercise an option of sending the sample to Central Food Laboratory for analysis by making an application to the Court within ten days from the date of receipt of the report, the bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka observed. The court observed thus while allowing the appeal filed by a person convicted for the offence punishable under Section (16)(1)(a)(i)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.