Supreme Court Monthly Digest- January 2025

Refund court fees - The petitioner sought a refund of court fees paid in the trial court, first appellate court, and second appellate court after the High Court decided the second appeal based on an amicable settlement between the parties. The High Court rejected the petitioner's prayer for a refund, holding that no grounds for refund were made out. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that refund of court fees is permissible only if the case is resolved through arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement (including Lok Adalat or mediation), and not in cases of out-of-court settlements. Since the settlement in this case was not reached through any of the aforementioned mechanisms, the petitioner was not entitled to a refund of court fees. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's refusal to refund court fees, as the settlement was not reached through a formal dispute resolution mechanism. Jage Ram v. Ved Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Aircraft Act, 1934

Section 12B - Investigation by Local Police - The appeals challenged the High Court's judgment quashing an FIR registered against the respondents, including a Member of Parliament, for alleged offences under Sections 336, 447, and 448 IPC and Sections 10 and 11A of the Aircraft Act, 1934. The FIR alleged that the respondents forcibly entered the Air Traffic Control (ATC) room at Deoghar Airport and pressured officials to grant take-off clearance for their chartered flight after sunset, violating airport security protocols. The High Court quashed the FIR, holding that it was vitiated by mala fides and that allowing the proceedings to continue would amount to an abuse of the legal process. The court noted that the Aircraft Act, 1934, is a complete code, and the IPC provisions were not applicable. It also observed that the respondents, including a sitting MP and members of aviation committees, had no role in influencing the ATC clearance, which was granted by the Kolkata ATC. Held, the allegations did not make out offences under Sections 336, 447, or 448 IPC. The respondents' actions did not amount to rash or negligent behavior endangering human life (Section 336 IPC), nor did they involve criminal trespass or unlawful entry (Sections 447 and 448 IPC). The Aircraft Act, 1934, and its rules constitute a complete code for aviation safety and security. Section 12B of the Act mandates that cognizance of offences can only be taken on a complaint by authorized aviation authorities, not by the local police. The local police could only forward the material collected during the investigation to the authorized officer under the Aircraft Act, who would then decide whether to file a complaint. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision to quash the FIR. However, it granted liberty to the State to forward the investigation material to the authorized officer under the Aircraft Act within four weeks for further action, if deemed necessary. The FIR was quashed, and the respondents were cleared of the charges under IPC and the Aircraft Act. The Court reinforced the primacy of the Aircraft Act, 1934, in matters of aviation security and the limited role of local police in such cases. State of Jharkhand v. Nishikant Dubey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 101

Archaeology

Issue of the unauthorized occupation and poor maintenance of the Gumti of Shaikh Ali, a heritage structure from the late 15th century Lodhi Era, located in Delhi - The Court had previously ordered an inspection of the site, which was conducted by Dr. Swapna Liddle, who prepared a detailed report highlighting the structure's unique architectural design and its status as a Grade I Heritage Building. The report criticized the encroachment and poor maintenance by Respondent No. 4, the Defence Colony Resident Welfare Association, and warned of the imminent decay of the heritage site if urgent measures were not taken. The Court directed the Department of Archaeology (NCT of Delhi) to prepare a restoration plan within three weeks and ordered Respondent No. 4 to hand over peaceful possession of the site to the Land and Development Office, Ministry of Urban Affairs, Government of India. Additionally, the Court appointed Shri Gopal Shankar Narayan, Senior Advocate, as the Court Commissioner to supervise the handover process and ensure minimal harm to the structure during the removal of encroachments. Rajeev Suri v. Archaeological Survey of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Limitation - The Court expressed concerns about the stringent application of limitation laws, which may curtail the remedy to challenge arbitral awards. The current legal position may lead to injustice in cases where parties are unable to file applications within the prescribed period due to genuine reasons. The Court suggested that the legislature reconsider the limitation framework to ensure uniformity and fairness, particularly in arbitration matters. My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 49

Section 14 (2), 17 and 30 - The 30-day limitation period for filing objections under Section 30 of the Act, 1940, begins when the party becomes aware of the award's existence, not necessarily from the date of formal notice. A formal notice is not required for the limitation period to commence; mere awareness of the award's filing is sufficient. The purpose of Section 14(2) is to ensure parties are aware of the award's existence, not to impose procedural formalities. Krishna Devi v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 16

Section 16 (2) and 34 - Jurisdictional Challenge and Conduct of Parties - The contract provided for arbitration by a three-member tribunal. However, due to procedural issues, a sole arbitrator (a retired Chief Justice of the High Court) was appointed by the Chief Justice of the High Court. The respondent initially accepted the sole arbitrator's jurisdiction but later challenged it. The respondent filed a statement of defense before the sole arbitrator without raising any jurisdictional objections. However, the respondent filed an application challenging the sole arbitrator's jurisdiction, contending that the arbitration clause mandated a three-member tribunal. The sole arbitrator rejected this challenge, holding that the respondent had already submitted to the jurisdiction and that the objection was barred under Section 16(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which prohibits raising jurisdictional objections after submitting the statement of defense. The sole arbitrator passed an award which was challenged by the respondent under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The District Judge set aside the award, holding that the appointment of the sole arbitrator was illegal. The High Court upheld this decision. Held, the respondent had unequivocally accepted the sole arbitrator's jurisdiction and had filed its statement of defense without raising any jurisdictional objections. The Court emphasized that under Section 16(2) of the Arbitration Act, a jurisdictional challenge cannot be raised after the submission of the statement of defense. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments of the District Judge and the High Court, restoring the arbitration case for consideration on other grounds, while conclusively holding that the issue of the sole arbitrator's jurisdiction could not be re-agitated. Vidyawati Construction Company v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 105

Section 18 - Constitution of India; Article 227 - Judicial restraint in arbitration matters - Whether the High Court was justified in granting an additional opportunity to cross-examine the witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal's refusal to do so. During the arbitration, the respondent sought multiple extensions to cross-examine the witness, which the Arbitral Tribunal eventually denied, citing lack of preparedness and excessive delay. The respondent challenged the Tribunal's decision before the High Court which granted an additional opportunity for cross-examination, citing "exceptional circumstances." Held, the Arbitral Tribunal had provided sufficient opportunity for cross-examination, with the respondent having already cross-examined RW-1 for over 12 hours across multiple sessions. The High Court's interference was unjustified, as it failed to demonstrate any perversity in the Tribunal's order, which is a prerequisite for judicial intervention under Article 227. The Tribunal's decision to deny further cross-examination was upheld, and the arbitration process was directed to proceed without further delay. Serosoft Solutions v. Dexter Capital Advisors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 14

Section 34 and 37 - Courts cannot modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act. S. Jayalakshmi v. Special District Revenue Officer, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 98

Section 34 (3) - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 4 - General Clauses Act, 1897; Section 10 - Applicability of - The appellants received the arbitral award on February 14, 2022. The 3-month limitation period for filing a Section 34 application expired on May 29, 2022 (extended due to COVID-19). The 30-day condonable period expired on June 28, 2022, during the court's summer vacation. The application was filed on July 4, 2022, the day the court reopened. The High Court dismissed the application as time-barred, and the Division Bench upheld the decision. Held, the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under the ACA, except where expressly excluded. Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies only when the 3-month limitation period expires on a court holiday, not when the 30-day condonable period expires during a vacation. The 30-day condonable period cannot be extended by invoking Section 4 of the Limitation Act. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to proceedings under the ACA, as the Limitation Act governs such proceedings. The proviso to Section 10 explicitly excludes its application where the Limitation Act applies. The Section 34 application was filed beyond the condonable period of 30 days and was thus barred by limitation. The High Court's decision to dismiss the application was upheld. My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 49

Section 34 and 37 - Scope of judicial interference is limited. Courts cannot reappraise evidence or substitute their view for that of the arbitrator. An arbitral award can only be set aside if it is contrary to the public policy of India, shocks the conscience of the court, or suffers from patent illegality. Technical findings by expert bodies like the DRB and Arbitral Tribunal should be given due weight, especially in complex contractual disputes. Somdatt Builders –Ncc – Nec (Jv) v. National Highways Authority of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 115

Section 34 and 37 - Whether the Engineer, under the contract, had the authority to revise rates for additional quantities of geogrid beyond the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) in the absence of a change in design or instructed variation. Whether the Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the arbitral award and the Single Judge's decision. The appellant, a joint venture, was awarded a contract by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) for four-laning and strengthening of a section of NH-2 near Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. A dispute arose regarding the payment for geogrid material, which exceeded the BOQ quantities. The appellant contended that the Engineer could not revise the rates for the additional quantities, as there was no change in design or instructed variation. The Dispute Review Board (DRB) and the Arbitral Tribunal ruled in favor of the appellant, holding that the Engineer lacked the authority to revise rates for the additional quantities. The Single Judge of the High Court upheld the arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, set aside the arbitral award, holding that the increase in quantity, even if uninstructed, constituted a variation under Clause 51.1, allowing for rate renegotiation. Held, the increase in geogrid quantity did not constitute a variation under Clause 51.1, as there was no change in design or instructed variation. The Engineer did not have the authority to revise the rates for the additional quantities, and the BOQ rates were applicable. The DRB and Arbitral Tribunal's findings, based on technical expertise, were correct and plausible. The Division Bench erred in setting aside the arbitral award under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. The interpretation of contractual terms by the Arbitral Tribunal was reasonable, and the Single Judge had rightly declined to interfere under Section 34. The Division Bench's decision to overturn the award was unjustified, as it exceeded the limited scope of interference under Section 37. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench's judgment and restored the arbitral award, holding that the Engineer could not revise the rates for additional quantities of geogrid in the absence of a change in design or instructed variation. The appeal was allowed. Somdatt Builders –Ncc – Nec (Jv) v. National Highways Authority of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 115

Section 34 - Respondent No. 1 was employed as a Lab Assistant/Technician at Dina Nath Parbati Bangla Infectious Disease (DNPBID) Hospital, Kanpur, which was taken over by the State of Uttar Pradesh in 1956. Respondent No. 1 challenged his retirement age (58 years) in a writ petition, claiming entitlement to retire at 60 years under Municipal Board rules. The writ petition was withdrawn in 2009. In 2008, Respondent No. 1 initiated arbitration proceedings based on an alleged arbitration agreement dated April 1, 1957, between the Municipal Board and the State of Uttar Pradesh. Two ex parte awards were passed in favor of Respondent No. 1 by arbitrators unilaterally appointed by him, awarding significant sums with interest. The State challenged the awards alleging fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Held, the purported arbitration agreement was not found in official records, and its authenticity was denied by both the Municipal Corporation and the State. Respondent No. 1 was not a signatory to the agreement, and the unilateral appointment of arbitrators was contrary to the alleged arbitration clause. The arbitration proceedings were deemed a sham, and the awards were declared null and void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and fraud. The Court emphasized that arbitration agreements must be genuine and enforceable, and unilateral appointments undermine the integrity of arbitration. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the ex parte awards and dismissed the execution proceedings. Fraudulent arbitration proceedings and unilateral appointments of arbitrators without a valid arbitration agreement render the awards null and void. The existence of a genuine arbitration agreement is a prerequisite for enforceability under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. State of Uttar Pradesh v. R.K. Pandey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 45

Bail

Anticipatory Bail – Investigation was completed and the charge sheet was filed - Investigating Officer did not arrest the petitioner during the investigation phase, and the Court had issued summons for the petitioner's appearance. The Court expressed disapproval of the practice in Uttar Pradesh where arrests are made post-charge sheet filing and cognizance by the Court, deeming it illogical. The Court held that once the investigation is complete and the charge sheet is filed, the accused should appear before the trial court and furnish bail. Musheer Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 83

The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition challenging the dismissal of second anticipatory bail application by the High Court. The High Court had dismissed the bail petition as withdrawn after lengthy arguments. Subsequently, the petitioner filed another application in the disposed-of matter, prompting the High Court to issue directions to the police for a status report and personal appearance of the Deputy Commissioner of Police citing inaction in arresting the accused despite the rejection of anticipatory bail. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner was attempting to circumvent procedural law, as he had not surrendered despite two rejections of anticipatory bail. The Court imposed costs of Rs. 2,00,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority, and directed the Commissioner of Police to arrest the petitioner within three days and file an affidavit of compliance. Parteek Arora @ Parteek Juneja v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Interim Bail for Elections - Right to Campaign - Whether interim bail can be granted to an undertrial prisoner for the purpose of contesting elections and campaigning. Whether the right to campaign or canvass for elections is a fundamental, constitutional, or statutory right. The balance between an individual's right to participate in elections and the seriousness of criminal charges against them. The petitioner was in custody in connection with multiple cases, including rioting and murder during the Delhi riots of February 2020, and a PMLA case. He sought interim bail to contest the Delhi Assembly Elections 2025 from the Mustafabad Constituency. The High Court denied interim bail but granted conditional custody parole to file his nomination papers. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court, arguing that without the ability to campaign, his participation in the election would be meaningless. Pankaj Mithal, J.: Interim bail is not a statutory right but has been granted in exceptional circumstances. However, contesting elections or campaigning is not a recognized ground for interim bail. The right to campaign is neither a fundamental nor a constitutional right. It is not essential for the statutory right to contest elections. The petitioner is involved in serious crimes, including murder and rioting, with allegations of using his property as a base for criminal activities. Granting interim bail could lead to witness tampering. In Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2024) 9 SCC 577 interim bail was granted due to the petitioner's role as Chief Minister and national party president, which is not applicable here. Allowing interim bail for elections could open a floodgate of similar requests, undermining the judicial process and the integrity of elections. The High Court did not err in denying interim bail. The petition was dismissed, with liberty to pursue regular bail. Dissenting Opinion Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. The petitioner, having been in custody for nearly five years and granted bail in most cases, should be allowed interim bail for a limited period to campaign, subject to strict conditions. Right to participate in elections, while not a fundamental right, the petitioner's statutory right to contest elections should be meaningfully exercised, including the ability to campaign. The petitioner's long incarceration and the delay in trial proceedings justify temporary release for campaigning, without prejudicing the ongoing criminal cases. The petitioner was granted interim bail with restrictions on movement, prohibition from discussing pending cases, and surrender of his passport. The decision in Arvind Kejriwal was distinguished, but the principles of temporary release in exceptional circumstances were upheld. The petition was allowed in part, granting interim bail for campaigning with stringent conditions. Held, the Supreme Court delivered a split verdict. The matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for further consideration due to the differing opinions. This case highlights the tension between an individual's right to participate in democratic processes and the judiciary's duty to ensure that serious criminal charges are not undermined by temporary releases. It also underscores the evolving jurisprudence on interim bail and its application in exceptional circumstances. Mohd Tahir Hussain v. State of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 106

Bail is a matter of judicial discretion and must be exercised in accordance with established principles rather than subjective considerations. The courts must avoid unnecessary incarceration, particularly when the alleged offense does not involve extreme violence or grave societal impact. The denial of bail in non-heinous offenses contributes to the overburdening of higher courts with bail applications. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi @ Mohd. Shad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 114

Grant of bail in an alleged case of unlawful religious conversion under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. Judicial discretion in bail matters and the role of trial courts in exercising it. The petitioner, a Maulvi, was denied bail by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in connection with a case under Sections 504 and 506 IPC and Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner forcibly converted a mentally challenged minor while keeping him in a Madarasa. The petitioner contended that the minor was abandoned and that he had only provided him shelter on humanitarian grounds. The trial had commenced, with seven witnesses examined. Held, the High Court erred in denying bail, as the allegations did not constitute a grave offence like murder or dacoity. The Court criticized the reluctance of trial courts to grant bail and emphasized that the High Court should have exercised its discretion judiciously. The Court observed that bail should not be denied based on personal perceptions about the seriousness of conversion but should be granted unless the offense is of an exceptionally grave nature. The petitioner was granted bail, subject to conditions imposed by the trial court, with a direction that the trial proceed expeditiously. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi @ Mohd. Shad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 114

Bank

Unauthorized Transactions - The fraudulent transactions were deemed unauthorized, and no negligence was attributed to the account holder. The bank is responsible for preventing and detecting fraudulent transactions using available technology. Account holders must exercise caution and avoid sharing OTPs to prevent potential liability. The RBI Circular dated 06.07.2017 (Clauses 8 and 9) was held applicable. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the SLP. State Bank of India v. Pallabh Bhowmick, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 22

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

The Supreme Court has directed that police should not serve notice for appearance to the accused/suspect as per Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita) through WhatsApp or other electronic modes. The Court made it amply clear that the service of notice through WhatsApp or other electronic modes cannot be considered or recognised as an alternative or substitute to the mode of service recognised and prescribed under the CrPC, 1973/BNSS, 2023. The Court also directed that notices under Section 160 of CrPC/Section 179 of BNSS, 2023 and Section 175 of CrPC/Section 195 of BNSS to the accused persons or otherwise can be issued only through the mode of service as prescribed under the CrPC/BNSS. Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 112

Section 175 (3) - The Court discussed the changes introduced by the BNSS, which codify judicial safeguards to prevent misuse of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. BNSS mandates Magistrate to hear police officer on refusal to register FIR, ensures reasoned order.Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Central Excise Act, 1944

Section 4(1)(a), 11A(1) and 11AC - Whether the price fixed under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) was the sole consideration for the sale of petroleum products, as required under Section 4(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944? Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, could be invoked by the Revenue? Whether the penalty imposed under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944, was justified? The appellant, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL), along with other OMCs (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL)), entered into an MOU on March 31, 2002, to ensure the smooth supply and distribution of petroleum products across India. The MOU stipulated that petroleum products would be sold among OMCs at the Import Parity Price (IPP), which was lower than the price at which OMCs sold products to their own dealers. The Revenue issued show-cause notices to BPCL and other OMCs, alleging that the transaction value for excise duty should be based on the price at which OMCs sold products to their own dealers, rather than the IPP. The Revenue invoked the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) and imposed penalties under Section 11AC, alleging suppression of facts. Held, the price under the MOU was not the sole consideration for the sale. The MOU was primarily aimed at ensuring uninterrupted supply and distribution of petroleum products across India, and the arrangement was not a commercial sale but a mutual agreement for product sharing. Therefore, the transaction value for excise duty could not be based on the IPP, and Section 4(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, was not applicable. The extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) could not be invoked. The Revenue was aware of the MOU, and there was no suppression of facts by BPCL. The MOU was executed at the behest of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, and the Revenue had knowledge of its existence through various circulars and tribunal decisions. The penalty under Section 11AC was not justified as there was no evidence of fraud, collusion, or wilful mis-statement by BPCL. The invocation of the extended period of limitation was itself found to be invalid, and thus, the penalty could not be sustained. BPCL's appeal was allowed, and the demand for excise duty, along with the penalty, was set aside. Other appeals involving IOCL and HPCL were remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication in light of the findings in this judgment. The Supreme Court clarified that the MOU between OMCs was not a commercial transaction but a mutual arrangement to ensure the smooth supply of petroleum products. The price under the MOU was not the sole consideration for the sale, and the Revenue could not invoke the extended period of limitation or impose penalties under Section 11AC. The judgment emphasizes the importance of examining the true nature of transactions and the conditions under which the extended period of limitation can be invoked. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Nashik Commissionerate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 86

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Amendment of Plaint - Continuous Cause of Action - Debarment orders - Limitation Period - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision allowing the respondent to amend its plaint in a civil suit challenging debarment orders. The Court held that the subsequent debarment orders and related events constituted a continuous cause of action, arising from the original memo dated 08.03.2016, and did not change the nature or character of the suit. Thus, a fresh suit was not required. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the amendment application was time-barred. It held that the cause of action was continuous, and the limitation period did not expire, especially considering the COVID-19 exclusion and the High Court's order dated 24.01.2020, which kept the issue of the debarment's legality open. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellants' challenge to the High Court's order allowing the amendment of the plaint. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52

Injunction Suit – Requirement for Declaration of Title - The appellants (original plaintiffs) filed a Title Suit seeking a permanent injunction against the defendants to restrain them from entering or interfering with the suit land. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, which was affirmed by the First Appellate Court. However, the High Court allowed the Second Appeal filed by the defendants on the ground that the suit for injunction simpliciter was not maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title. Whether a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter is maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title when the defendants do not dispute the plaintiffs' title. Held, A suit for permanent injunction simpliciter is maintainable without a declaration of title when the defendants do not dispute the title of the plaintiffs. The High Court failed to properly consider relevant issues, including the fact that the defendants did not dispute the plaintiffs' title. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Second Appeal in accordance with the law. Krushna Chandra Behera v. Narayan Nayak, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 69

Section 21 - Principles of - Objections regarding the place of suing must be raised at the earliest opportunity in the court of first instance. Punjab National Bank v. Atin Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 27

Section 80 - When an application seeking an amendment to plaint is filed due to subsequent developments intrinsically linked to the main cause of action, it constitutes a continuous cause of action, and no notice to the government is required under Section 80 CPC. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52

Section 80 - Amendments to a plaint are permissible when they pertain to a continuous cause of action, and such amendments do not necessitate a fresh suit or a Section 80 CPC notice to the government. The requirement of issuing a notice under Section 80 of the CPC was irrelevant in this case, as the amendment sought was part of a continuous cause of action and did not alter the suit's nature. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52

Sections 96 and 100 - Law governing the grant of leave to appeal - Only an aggrieved person, whose rights are prejudicially affected by a judgment or decree, can file an appeal, even if they are not a party to the proceedings, provided they obtain leave from the appellate court. The expression "person aggrieved" was clarified to exclude those suffering from psychological or imaginary injuries, and it was held that leave to appeal should not be granted to those remotely or indirectly affected by a decree. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Sections 96 and 100 - Whether the High Court erred in condoning a delay of 586 days in filing a regular first appeal and granting leave to appeal. The High Court had allowed the condonation of delay, considering factors such as the appellants' advanced age (75 and 66 years), their residence abroad, and their purchase of 4 acres of land from the suit property, while noting that their vendor had failed to protect their interests. Held, the High Court committed an egregious error in condoning the delay, as the appellants failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay and were not vigilant in pursuing their rights. The Court also addressed the issue of granting leave to appeal, noting that the rejection of the appellants' impleadment application by the Trial Court, which had attained finality, precluded them from seeking leave to appeal against the final decree of specific performance. The findings of the Trial Court in rejecting the impleadment application would operate as res judicata in any appeal filed by the transferee pendente lite. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Section 100 - Legal Principles - Interim Orders - Whether the High Court can grant an interim order (status quo) in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without first formulating a substantial question of law. The appellants challenged an interim order passed by the High Court in a second appeal which directed the parties to maintain status quo without framing any substantial question of law. The dispute involved a suit for permanent injunction over a property, where the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but the first appellate court reversed the decision, holding that the plaintiff could not maintain a suit for injunction without seeking a declaration of title. The High Court granted interim relief (status quo) without formulating a substantial question of law, which was challenged before the Supreme Court. Held, A second appeal lies to the High Court only if a substantial question of law is involved. The High Court must formulate such a question before proceeding with the appeal. The High Court cannot grant interim relief in a second appeal without first framing a substantial question of law, as this violates the mandate of Section 100 CPC. The High Court erred in granting interim relief without formulating a substantial question of law, as required under Section 100 CPC. The interim order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. U. Sudheera v. C. Yashoda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 79

Order II Rule 2 - A subsequent suit filed on a different cause of action would not be subject to the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC. The Court justified the filing of a subsequent suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, following the institution of an earlier suit seeking a permanent injunction, noting that both suits were based on distinct causes of action. Order II Rule 2 CPC mandates that a plaintiff include the whole claim he is entitled to, arising from the same cause of action, in a single suit. The rule seeks to prevent the splitting of claims and multiplicity of suits based on the same cause of action. However, the Court said that the Rule would not be applicable when the subsequent suit was filed on a different cause of action than that of the cause of action for the first suit. Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73

Order II Rule 2 of the CPC mandates including the entire claim arising from the same cause of action in one suit, it should not be misconstrued to require combining all different causes of action stemming from the same transaction into a single suit. The mandate of Order II Rule 2 is the inclusion of the whole claim arising in respect of one and the same cause of action, in one suit. It must not be misunderstood to mean that all the different causes of action arising from the same transaction must be included in a single suit. In other words, a number of causes of action may arise out of the same transaction and it is not the mandate of Order II Rule 2 that they should all be included in one suit. On the other hand, what is required is that every suit shall include the “whole of the claim” arising out of “one and the same cause of action”. A defendant objecting to a subsequent suit must demonstrate that it was based on the same cause of action and that the plaintiff could have sought the reliefs in the first suit without any impossibility. Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73

Order VII Rule 11 - Partial Rejection of Plaint - Whether a plaint can be partially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC if some reliefs are barred by law while others are not. Held, a plaint cannot be partially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. If even one relief sought in the plaint is maintainable, the entire plaint must proceed to trial. The Court emphasized that civil courts should not make observations on the maintainability of specific reliefs in an Order VII Rule 11 application. Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96

Order VII Rule 11(d) - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 113 - Whether the plaint in the subsequent suit for specific performance is liable to be rejected on the ground that the suit is barred by the law of limitation. The dispute pertains to a 5.05-acre portion of a 6.48-acre property in Kodaikanal, originally purchased by American missionaries in 1912 and later transferred to the appellant (Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association) in 1975. In 1991, the appellant entered into an agreement to sell the property to the respondent (Sri Bala & Co.) for ₹3.02 crores, with an advance payment of ₹10 lakhs. The respondent filed an unnumbered suit in 1993 for specific performance, which was rejected in 1998 due to non-payment of court fees. A second suit was filed in 2007 for the same relief, which the appellant sought to reject under Order VII Rule 11(d), arguing it was barred by limitation and res judicata. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the appellant's application, holding that the issue of limitation was a mixed question of fact and law to be decided after evidence. Held, the second suit was filed beyond the limitation period prescribed under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The cause of action for the second suit arose on the rejection of the plaint in the first suit (12.01.1998), and the limitation period expired on 12.01.2001. The suit filed in 2007 was thus barred by limitation. The reliance on a letter dated 15.07.1991 to extend the limitation period was untenable, as it was not referenced in the first suit and contradicted the respondent's earlier stance. The plaint in 2007 was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) as the suit was barred by law. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court, and rejected the plaint in 2007 as barred by limitation. Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 37

Order VII Rule 11(d) and 13 - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 113 - Second suit on same cause of action must be filed within 3 years of rejection of earlier plaint. Plaint can be rejected if the suit appears to be barred by any law, including limitation. Article 113 of the Limitation Act provides a three-year limitation period for suits not covered by specific articles, starting from the date the right to sue accrues. Rejection of a plaint does not preclude filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action, provided it is within the limitation period. Once limitation begins to run, it continues unless expressly suspended or interrupted by law. Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 37

Order XXIII Rule 1 - Abandonment of Claim - Res Judicata - The dismissal of the respondent's first amendment application as "not pressed" did not amount to an abandonment of the claim under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC. The subsequent amendment application was filed at a different stage and was based on new facts, making it legally sustainable. The dismissal of an earlier amendment application as "not pressed" does not bar subsequent amendment applications based on new facts. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Section 2(d) - Definition of Complaint - Judicial vs. Executive Magistrate - As per Section 2(d) of CrPC, a complaint refers to an allegation submitted orally or in writing to a Magistrate with the intent to invoke legal action under the Code. The Magistrate must be a Judicial Magistrate capable of taking cognizance of the case. Judicial Magistrates are entrusted with judicial functions, including the power to try cases and punish offenders, while Executive Magistrates primarily perform administrative and executive functions, such as maintaining public order. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Section 82 Cr.P.C. is aimed at securing the presence of an accused in court. Once the purpose is achieved or the accused is acquitted, the proclamation can be quashed. Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 12

Section 82 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 174A - Proclaimed Offender Status - Whether the status of a "proclaimed offender" under Section 82 Cr.P.C. subsists if the accused is subsequently acquitted of the offence for which the proclamation was issued. Whether the subsistence of a proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is necessary for authorities to proceed against an accused under Section 174A IPC. A complaint was filed in 2010, and the appellant was declared a proclaimed offender in 2016 for non-appearance in court. The appellant was later acquitted of the main offence but faced charges under Section 174A IPC for failing to comply with the proclamation. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition to quash the proceedings, leading to the present appeal. Held, the status of a proclaimed offender under Section 82 Cr.P.C. does not automatically cease upon acquittal in the main offence. However, if the accused is acquitted, the necessity for securing their presence in court is nullified, and the proclamation can be quashed. Section 174A IPC is an independent, substantive offence. Prosecution under this section can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is no longer in effect. However, if the accused is acquitted in the main offence, the court may consider this as a ground to close proceedings under Section 174A IPC, depending on the circumstances. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the High Court's judgment and all criminal proceedings, including the FIR under Section 174A IPC. The appellant's status as a proclaimed offender was also quashed. Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 12

Section 125 (4) - Interpretation of - Whether a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, is absolved of paying maintenance to his wife under Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if the wife refuses to comply with the decree and return to the matrimonial home? Held, a wife's refusal to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically disqualify her from claiming maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The refusal must be assessed in light of the facts and circumstances of each case, including whether the wife had justifiable reasons for not returning to the matrimonial home. The Supreme Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to provide social justice and prevent destitution. A decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically bar a wife from claiming maintenance if she has valid reasons for refusing to return to her husband. This judgment clarifies that the mere existence of a restitution decree does not override a wife's right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Court must examine the facts of each case to determine whether the wife's refusal to comply with the decree is justified. The ruling reinforces the protective intent of maintenance laws in ensuring the financial security of women. Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 47

Section 156 (3) - The appellant, a police officer, challenged the order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class directing the registration of an FIR against him under Sections 323, 294, 500, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) based on a complaint filed by a practicing advocate. The High Court rejected the appellant's application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. affirming the Magistrate's order. Whether the Magistrate mechanically ordered police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. without proper application of mind. The scope and prerequisites for invoking Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and the judicial discretion of the Magistrate. Held, Magistrates must apply their minds before directing police investigation. The order should not be mechanical, and the Magistrate must ensure that the complaint discloses cognizable offences. The Court highlighted the need for affidavits and prior applications to the police before invoking Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate. The Court held that no cognizable offence was made out, and the continuation of the investigation would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The appeal was allowed, and the investigation was quashed. Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Section 195 (1) - A complaint under Section 195 (1) Cr.P.C. must be filed before a Judicial Magistrate and not an Executive Magistrate. A complaint addressed to an Executive Magistrate, such as a City Magistrate, does not fulfill the statutory requirement for cognizance under Section 195(1) CrPC. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Section 319 - The petitioners, initially named in the FIR but exonerated by the Investigating Officer in a closure report, were summoned based on the testimony of the original informant during the trial. The Court reiterated that under Section 319 CrPC, a Trial Court can summon individuals not initially charge-sheeted if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial. The Court emphasized that the power under Section 319 is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly, based on evidence stronger than a prima facie case but not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The closure report, though not considered by the Trial Court, was deemed irrelevant once the Court invoked Section 319. The Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition, allowing the petitioners to raise all legal defenses, including reliance on the closure report, before the Trial Court. Omi @ Omkar Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 24

Section 401 r/w. 397 & 372 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121

Section 438 – Anticipatory Bail – Ad Interim Relief – Legal Implications - The High Court granted interim protection with a condition that the accused join the investigation. Whether the nature of ad interim relief granted by the High Court amounted to the grant of final relief in anticipatory bail. The legality of directing the accused to join the investigation with an assurance of no arrest. Held, an ad interim order in anticipatory bail matters should not result in granting final relief, as it may hamper the investigation process and affect the prosecution's case. Courts must exercise caution and judicious discretion while granting such relief. Appeals Disposed of. Deepak Aggarwal v. Balwan Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 68

Section 438 – Anticipatory Bail – Matrimonial Dispute - Imposition of Maintenance Condition – The appellant challenged the High Court's order granting him anticipatory bail with a condition to pay maintenance of ₹4,000 per month to his wife. Held, conditions imposed while granting anticipatory bail should be relevant to ensuring the accused's presence at trial and not extend to issues unrelated to bail considerations, such as maintenance obligations. The Court quashed the condition of maintenance imposed by the High Court, emphasizing that irrelevant conditions should not be attached to bail orders. Appeal allowed. Condition of maintenance quashed. Srikant Kumar @ Shrikant Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 67

Section 482 - Whether the summoning order issued by the trial court, without assigning reasons, is valid in light of the legal requirement for magistrates to apply their mind before issuing process in criminal cases. The appellants were accused of manufacturing and distributing drugs not of standard quality under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. A complaint was filed by the Drugs Inspector alleging that a drug sample failed the dissolution test. The trial court issued a summoning order without providing reasons. The appellants filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the proceedings, which was dismissed by the High Court. Held, the issuance of process in criminal cases is a serious matter, and magistrates must apply their mind to the facts and law before summoning accused persons. The summoning order in this case was a non-speaking order, lacking any reasons, and thus violated the principles laid down in precedents such as Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 and Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2015) 4 SCC 609. The Court reiterated that the magistrate must scrutinize the evidence and allegations before issuing process, and failure to do so renders the order unsustainable. The impugned judgment of the High Court and the summoning order of the trial court are quashed. All proceedings arising from the summoning order are set aside. The judgment reaffirms the necessity for magistrates to provide reasoned orders when issuing process in criminal cases, ensuring that the accused are not subjected to unwarranted legal proceedings without proper judicial scrutiny. The appeal is allowed. JM Laboratories v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 128

Section 482 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 354 and 506 - Quashing of criminal proceedings - The allegations did not meet the essential ingredients of the offense, as there was no evidence of criminal force or intent to outrage the complainant's modesty. The record contained only vague assertions without any concrete evidence of physical or mental harassment. The charge of criminal intimidation was not established, as there was no evidence of any threat with the intent to cause alarm or compel to act against will. The High Court should not conduct a mini-trial at this stage but should ensure that the allegations, if taken at face value, constitute an offense. In this case, the allegations were found to be insufficient to proceed against the appellant. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the criminal proceedings holding that no prima facie case was made out against him under Sections 354 and 506 IPC. The Court reiterated that vague allegations without supporting evidence cannot form the basis for criminal charges. The inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC should be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of the legal process. The judgment emphasized the importance of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not used as tools for harassment, especially in cases arising from business disputes. Appeal Allowed. Naresh Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 17

Section 482 and 197 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B) - Madhya Pradesh Griha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972; Section 83 - The appellant, an official of the Madhya Pradesh State Housing Board, was implicated in a criminal case involving allegations of forgery and cheating related to the transfer of property. The appellant sought quashing of the FIR and subsequent proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which was refused by the High Court. Whether the appellant, as a public servant, was protected under Section 83 of the Madhya Pradesh Griha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972, akin to Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., which requires prior sanction for prosecution of public servants for acts done in their official capacity. Whether the allegations against the appellant, including conspiracy and forgery, were substantiated by evidence. Whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed in light of the civil nature of the dispute and the absence of mens rea on the part of the appellant. Held, offences in the chargesheet cannot be based on bald assertions of connivance. There must be some substance to it. The appellant's actions were in furtherance of his official duties, and there was no evidence to suggest that he acted with any dishonest intent or knowledge of the alleged forgery. The allegations of conspiracy and forgery were not substantiated by the chargesheet or witness statements, and no prima facie case was made out against the appellant. The case was essentially civil in nature, and the criminal proceedings were an abuse of the process of law. The High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR, as the ingredients of the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120-B IPC were not met. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside. All proceedings arising from the FIR and subsequent chargesheet were quashed. Dinesh Kumar Mathur v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 20

Constitution

Article 12 and 226 - Writ Jurisdiction and Private Entities - Public vs. Private Law - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that Muthoot Finance Ltd., a private company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, does not qualify as a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. Consequently, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it does not perform any public or sovereign functions. The Court reiterated the distinction between public and private law, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction is generally limited to actions involving public duties or functions. Private entities, unless performing public functions or discharging statutory obligations, are not subject to writ jurisdiction. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Article 12 and 226 - Regulatory Compliance and Writ Jurisdiction - The petitioner argued that Muthoot Finance Ltd., being a non-banking financial institution regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), could be subject to writ jurisdiction if it breached statutory regulations. The Court rejected this argument, stating that regulatory compliance does not transform a private entity into a "State" or imbue it with public functions. The Court clarified that the petitioner's appropriate remedy lies in civil litigation or arbitration, as per the arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The High Court had also protected the petitioner's interests by directing the deposit of Rs. 24,39,085/- (from the sale of pledged gold) in a fixed deposit, with interest accruing to the petitioner. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Article 12 and 226 - Function Test for Writ Jurisdiction - The Court emphasized the "function test" for determining whether a body is subject to writ jurisdiction. A private entity may be subject to writ jurisdiction only if it discharges a public duty or function, which Muthoot Finance Ltd. does not. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that no case was made out for interference. The petitioner was left free to pursue civil remedies or arbitration. The judgment reinforces the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not available against private entities unless they perform public functions or are statutorily obligated to do so. Private disputes, even involving regulated entities, must be resolved through civil or arbitration proceedings. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Article 14 and 16 - Fair and open recruitment processes - Negative Equality - The petitioner's claim of discrimination based on the promotion of two other employees to the post of Tracer was rejected. Held, Article 14 does not permit negative equality, and illegal actions by the State cannot be perpetuated. Past illegalities cannot justify future violations of statutory rules. The Court expressed concern over the State's casual approach in handling the litigation, noting that the relevant 1979 Rules were not properly presented before the Tribunal or the High Court. The Court criticized the State for creating false hopes among employees by granting promotions contrary to the Rules, leading to unnecessary litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the post of Tracer is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the 1979 Rules, and the petitioner was not eligible for promotion. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid unnecessary litigation and ensure justice. A copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Chief Secretary of Odisha for corrective action. Petition dismissed. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91

Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - The Court recognized the appellant's right to dignity in death and freedom of religion but balanced it against the State's duty to maintain public order and provide designated burial grounds. The Court criticized the Gram Panchayat for failing to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the dispute. The Court underscored the importance of secularism and fraternity, as enshrined in the Constitution, and called for harmony among different religious communities. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, directing the appellant to bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with State support. The Court also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months to avoid similar controversies in the future. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113

Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - Whether the appellant, a Christian, has the right to bury his deceased father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors were buried, despite objections from the local Hindu and tribal communities. Whether the State's refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard and insistence on using a Christian burial ground 20-25 km away violates the appellant's fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. Whether the Gram Panchayat's failure to formally designate a burial ground for Christians in the village constitutes a violation of the appellant's rights. The appellant, a third-generation Christian, sought to bury his father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors had been buried for decades. However, the local villagers, predominantly Hindu and tribal, objected to the burial, leading to threats and police intervention. The appellant approached the High Court seeking permission to bury his father in the village graveyard and police protection. The High Court denied relief, citing potential public unrest and the availability of a Christian burial ground in a nearby village, Karkapal, 20-25 km away. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard violated his fundamental rights, including the right to dignity in death and freedom of religion. Justice B.V. Nagarathna held that the appellant should be allowed to bury his father in his private agricultural land in Chhindwada, with police protection. She emphasized that the Gram Panchayat had failed to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the controversy. She also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma dissented, holding that the appellant should bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground in Karkapal, as per the State's rules. He emphasized the importance of maintaining public order and the State's duty to provide designated burial grounds for all communities. The Supreme Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed that the appellant bury his father in the Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with logistical support and police protection from the State. The Court emphasized the need for an expeditious and dignified burial, given the prolonged delay. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113

Article 21, 47 and 48A - Whether the lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India violates the fundamental right to life and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Whether the State and Union Territories are obligated to provide separate, accessible, and well-maintained toilet facilities for men, women, persons with disabilities (PwD), and transgender persons in all court complexes. Held, access to clean, functional, and hygienic toilet facilities is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The right to life includes the right to live with dignity, and the absence of proper sanitation facilities in court premises undermines this right. The State's duty under Articles 47 and 48A of the Constitution to improve public health and protect the environment, which includes providing adequate sanitation facilities. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72

Article 21, 47 and 48A - Lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India - Directions Issued - Construction and Maintenance of Toilets - Formation of Committees - Maintenance and Hygiene - Special Facilities - Funding and Transparency - Compliance Reporting - All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must ensure the construction and availability of separate toilet facilities for males, females, PwD, and transgender persons in all court premises and tribunals across the country. Toilets must be clearly identifiable, accessible, and equipped with functional amenities such as water, electricity, hand soap, napkins, and toilet paper. Each High Court shall constitute a committee chaired by a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice, with members including the Registrar General, Chief Secretary, PWD Secretary, Finance Secretary, and a representative of the Bar Association. The committee will conduct a survey, assess infrastructure gaps, and ensure the implementation of adequate toilet facilities. Regular maintenance of toilets must be ensured, preferably through outsourcing to professional agencies. A mandatory cleaning schedule and periodic inspections must be implemented. A grievance redressal mechanism must be established for reporting and resolving issues related to toilet facilities. Separate washrooms must be provided for judges, advocates, litigants, and staff. Child-friendly washrooms must be constructed in family courts. Nursing rooms with breastfeeding facilities and changing stations must be provided for mothers. Sanitary pad dispensers must be installed in women's, PwD, and transgender washrooms. State Governments/UTs must allocate sufficient funds for the construction and maintenance of toilet facilities. A transparent and separate monetary fund must be established for this purpose. All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must file a status report within four months. The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition with the above directions, emphasizing that access to proper sanitation is not merely a matter of convenience but a fundamental right essential for human dignity and the fair administration of justice. This judgment reinforces the constitutional obligation of the State to provide basic sanitation facilities as part of the right to life and dignity under Article 21. It also highlights the need for inclusive and accessible infrastructure in public spaces, particularly in judicial premises, to ensure equality and justice for all. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72

Article 21 - Right to Appeal against Conviction - Appeal challenging the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the High Court due to a delay of 1637 days in filing - The appellant, convicted under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, sought condonation of delay, citing lack of monetary resources and his absence from the station to earn a livelihood. The High Court had dismissed the delay condonation application, construing the appellant's absence as absconding, and consequently dismissed the appeal. Held, right to appeal, particularly in cases affecting personal liberty, is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Dismissing an appeal solely on the grounds of delay without examining the reasons for the delay is erroneous. Consequently, the Supreme Court condoned the delay, restored the criminal appeal, and directed the High Court to decide the appeal on merits. Mahesh Singh Banzara v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 28

Article 32 - The petitioners sought several reliefs, including a declaration that a judgment of the High Court was illegal for being passed without hearing necessary parties, a direction to survey properties to ascertain encroachment on government land, regularization of their apartments, and an injunction against interference by the State and its agents. Held, the High Court's judgment could not be declared illegal under Article 32. The petitioners were advised to pursue alternative remedies, such as filing for recall of the judgment or challenging it under Article 136. The writ petition was dismissed, leaving the petitioners free to explore other legal remedies. Vimal Babu Dhumadiya v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 140

Article 142 - Scope of Appeal - Special leave petition was granted on a limited question regarding the applicability of the PC Act and the quantum of sentence for other offenses. Whether the scope of appeal could be expanded beyond the limited notice issued by the Supreme Court. Held, even when a limited notice is issued, the Court has the discretion to expand the scope of the appeal under Article 142 of the Constitution if substantial justice so requires. This discretionary power remains with the Court even after granting special leave. Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 89

Article 224A - Appointment of ad-hoc Judges - Rising backlog of cases in High Courts - Implementation of continuing mandamus for judicial appointments - The Supreme Court, while considering the issue of pendency of cases in High Courts, observed that as of 25.01.2025, over 62 lakh cases were pending, with more than 18.2 lakh criminal cases and over 44 lakh civil cases. Referring to its earlier judgment dated 20.04.2021, the Court reiterated that the Constitution should be dynamic to address existing judicial challenges. In light of the situation, the Court temporarily set aside the condition that appointments under Article 224A should only be made if 80% of the sanctioned judicial strength was either working or recommended. The Court allowed High Courts to appoint ad-hoc Judges (ranging from 2 to 5, not exceeding 10% of the sanctioned strength) to expedite the disposal of criminal appeals. These ad-hoc Judges would function under a Bench presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court. The Court directed that the existing Memorandum of Procedure be followed for such appointments and granted liberty to the parties to file further applications if necessary. The matter remains open for further directions. Lok Prahari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Article 226 - Whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower authorities regarding the classification of disputed land as "Johad (Pond)" in revenue records. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge which prohibited the respondent from interfering with the villagers' use of the disputed land as a water reservoir. The appellant contended that the land was a water reservoir used by villagers, while the respondent claimed ownership based on a 1981-82 patta, asserting the land was "Oosar" (barren). The Additional District Magistrate and Additional Commissioner found the patta to be fictitious and upheld the land's classification as a pond. The High Court, however, reversed these findings, holding that the land was mistakenly recorded as a pond and should be treated as "Oosar." Held, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 by reappreciating evidence and overturning the concurrent factual findings of the lower authorities, which had determined the land was a pond. The High Court erred in disregarding the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge, which was based on independent consideration and not solely reliant on the Collector's order. The findings of the lower authorities, declaring the land as "Johad (Pond)," were restored, and the High Court's interference was deemed unjustified in the absence of perversity or illegality in the lower authorities' decisions. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court, in writ jurisdiction, cannot re-examine factual findings unless there is a clear perversity or jurisdictional error. The concurrent findings of the lower authorities were reinstated, and the land was declared to be a pond, upholding the villagers' rights to its use as a water reservoir. Ajay Singh v. Khacheru, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 29

Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (Maharashtra)

Section 21(4) - Whether the High Court, while considering a bail application, transgressed into impermissible areas by making findings on the merits of the case, especially in light of the stringent conditions for bail under Section 21(4) of MCOCA. Whether the High Court failed to consider the rigors of MCOCA while granting bail to the accused. Held, the High Court had made observations akin to findings on the merits of the case, such as concluding that the accused had no direct or indirect contact with the gang leader (accused No. 4) and that they played no role in the shooting. Such findings are impermissible at the bail stage, as they could prejudice the trial. The High Court failed to adequately consider the stringent conditions for bail under MCOCA, particularly Section 21(4), which imposes specific requirements for granting bail in cases involving organized crime. Jayshree Kanabar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 10

Conveyance

A lessee seeking conveyance of property must fulfill all statutory and contractual obligations, including payment of costs, to enforce such a claim. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Obligation to Convey - Whether the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) was obligated to convey the leasehold property (Block-A) to Century Textiles and Industries Limited (Respondent No. 1) upon the expiration of the 28-year lease under the Bombay Improvement Trust Transfer Act, 1925. Century Textiles applied in 1918 under the City of Bombay Improvement Act, 1898, for a scheme to construct dwellings for poorer classes. The scheme was approved, and Century Textiles constructed 476 dwellings and 10 shops by 1925, less than the originally planned 980 dwellings and 20 shops. In 1927, Century Textiles requested an alteration to the scheme, which was approved by the Board, and a 28-year lease for Block-A was granted in 1928, expiring in 1955. After the lease expired, Century Textiles continued in possession of Block-A without any demand for conveyance until 2006, when it issued a legal notice. No suit was filed, and in 2016, Century Textiles filed a writ petition seeking conveyance of Block-A. The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing MCGM to execute the conveyance. MCGM appealed to the Supreme Court. Held, neither the lease deed nor the Board Resolution of 1927 obligated MCGM to convey Block-A to Century Textiles upon the expiration of the lease. The lease deed did not contain any clause mandating conveyance, and the Board Resolution did not approve the conveyance of Block-A. Section 51(2) of the 1925 Act, which provides for conveyance upon the expiration of the lease, must be read harmoniously with Section 48(a), which requires the lessee to leave the premises in good condition. The conveyance under Section 51(2) is contingent upon the lessee fulfilling its obligations, including payment of costs, which Century Textiles failed to do. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Criminal Trial

Afterthought Allegations - Allegations introduced at a later stage, inconsistent with the FIR, are treated as afterthoughts, especially when such allegations pertain to facts that should have been known and mentioned at the time of filing the FIR. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Delay in trial and lack of identification parade - Incident occurred in 1997, but the trial took place in 2005, approximately eight years later. The delay raised concerns about the identification of the accused, as no identification parade was conducted. Identification of the accused for the first time in court after such a long gap cast serious doubt on the prosecution's case. Venkatesha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 116

Invalid Initial Process and Its Consequences - If the initiation of a criminal process is not in consonance with legal requirements, all subsequent proceedings are vitiated. The maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus applies, wherein the removal of the foundation invalidates the structure built upon it. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Significance of FIR - An FIR must disclose the commission of a cognizable offense. While it need not be exhaustive, it must contain sufficient information to justify suspicion of such an offense. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Custodial Violence

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the State challenging the acquittal of the respondents by the High Court for offences under Sections 302, 364, and 261 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The case was based on circumstantial evidence, with the key circumstance being the "last seen together" theory. However, the sole witness (PW1) failed to identify the accused in court or confirm their presence with the deceased, leading to the breakdown of the chain of circumstances. Held, the High Court's view was plausible and that no other conclusion was possible on the evidence presented. Additionally, the Court expressed concern over the custodial violence inflicted on the first respondent who suffered a leg fracture due to police assault, as confirmed by a jail doctor (DW1). The Court directed the District Magistrate to conduct an inquiry into the incident, initiate legal action against responsible officials, and submit a report. Acquittal upheld based on insufficient circumstantial evidence. Witnesses failed to establish the "last seen together" theory. Custodial violence confirmed; inquiry ordered against erring officials. Appeals dismissed. State of Uttarakhand v. Nanku @ Pappu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 109

Delay and laches

Whether the High Court erred in condoning a delay of approximately 2200 days in filing an application for recall, thereby reviving a suit pending for 48 years? Whether the High Court overlooked the principles of limitation, judicial restraint, and the doctrine of res judicata while condoning the delay? The dispute pertains to a property initially purchased in 1916. Multiple suits were filed over the years where the deceased respondent was found not to be a bona fide purchaser. The respondent filed O.S. No. 1833/1980, which was dismissed for default in 1983, restored in 1984, and later abated in 2000 due to the respondent's failure to bring the legal heirs of a deceased defendant on record. In 2006, the respondent filed an application for recall, which was dismissed by the Trial Court in 2014, citing inordinate delay, lack of bona fides, and the suit being barred by res judicata. The High Court, in 2020, condoned the delay of 2200 days, allowing the revival of the suit. Held, the High Court ignored the inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the recall application and the respondent's repeated negligence in prosecuting the suit. The High Court failed to consider the principles of limitation, which are based on sound public policy and equity, and should not be overridden by a "liberal approach" to condone delay. The suit, pending for 48 years, was barred by res judicata and lacked bona fides, as the respondent's rights had already been adjudicated in prior suits. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the Trial Court's dismissal of the recall application. The Court emphasized that rules of limitation are not merely technical but serve to prevent dilatory tactics and ensure prompt resolution of disputes. H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 53

If a court is inclined to condone the delay, it should not delve into the merits of the case before the appeal is properly heard. The High Court's scope in a challenge to the rejection of a delay condonation application is limited to assessing whether sufficient cause was shown. Observations on the merits of the case at the delay condonation stage are unwarranted and prejudicial. Surendra G. Shankar v. Esque Finamark Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Whether the High Court erred in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeals before the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal. Whether the High Court was justified in commenting on the merits of the orders passed by the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) and the Appellate Tribunal while considering the delay condonation issue. Held, the High Court should have limited its examination to the issue of condonation of delay and should not have commented on the merits of the case, especially when the Appellate Tribunal had not adjudicated on them. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and the Appellate Tribunal's order rejecting the delay condonation application. The delay in filing the appeals was condoned, and the appeals were restored for consideration on merits before the Appellate Tribunal. Surendra G. Shankar v. Esque Finamark Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Delay and laches are valid grounds for dismissing a writ petition, especially when the petitioner has an alternative remedy and fails to act within a reasonable time. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Lease - Conveyance - Whether the writ petition filed by Century Textiles in 2016, 61 years after the lease expired in 1955, was barred by delay and laches. Held, Century Textiles' writ petition, filed 61 years after the lease expired, was barred by delay and laches. Century Textiles had not taken any legal steps to enforce its claim for conveyance until 2016, despite the lease expiring in 1955 and a legal notice being issued in 2006. The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition, especially when Century Textiles had an alternative remedy of filing a suit for specific performance or mandatory injunction, which it failed to pursue within the limitation period. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed Century Textiles' writ petition. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) was not obligated to convey Block-A to Century Textiles, and the writ petition was barred by delay and laches. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Domestic Workers

Need for better legal safeguards for domestic workers, particularly concerning exploitation - Vulnerability of domestic workers and the need for stronger legal protections against exploitation - Whether the existing legal framework sufficiently protects domestic workers' rights -. The Supreme Court, recognizing the vulnerability of domestic workers and the lack of comprehensive legal protection, directed the Ministry of Labour and Employment, in conjunction with other relevant ministries, to form an expert committee. This committee is tasked with exploring the feasibility of recommending a legal framework to protect and regulate the rights of domestic workers, with a report due within six months. The government is then expected to consider enacting such a framework. Directions issued to the government regarding the formation of an expert committee to examine legal protections for domestic workers. Ajay Mallik v State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 120

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

Section 4 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 306, 498-A and 304B - Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 113A and 113B - The deceased allegedly faced harassment from her husband, in-laws, and the appellant (her brother-in-law) due to dowry demands, leading her to commit suicide by self-immolation. The trial court acquitted all accused of dowry death under Section 304B IPC but convicted them for abetment of suicide. The High Court upheld the conviction. Held, Dowry death cannot be presumed without clear evidence of incessant harassment. There was no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant, as the brother-in-law of the deceased, abetted her suicide. Presumptions under Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked without evidence of cruelty or harassment. Mere familial relation to the deceased does not justify the presumption of abetment in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside. Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 66

Education

Issue of eligibility criteria for the JEE (Advanced) examination. The petitioners challenged the abrupt change in eligibility criteria from three academic years (2023, 2024, and 2025) to two years (2024 and 2025) through subsequent press releases dated 05.11.2024 and 18.11.2024, respectively. The petitioners, acting on the initial promise, had dropped out of their colleges to prepare for JEE (Advanced), claiming detriment due to the change. The Court, applying the principle of estoppel, held that the respondents could not withdraw the promise made in the 05.11.2024 press release to the detriment of the petitioners. Consequently, the Court permitted students who withdrew from their courses between 05.11.2024 and 18.11.2024 to register for JEE (Advanced), without commenting on the merits of the decision to restrict eligibility. Mithin Mondal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 55

Election

The Supreme Court of India disposed of a public interest litigation (PIL) filed under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the use of public funds for constructing statues, parks, and memorials glorifying the Chief Minister and the election symbol of a political party. The petitioners alleged that the expenditure of crores of rupees from the state exchequer for such purposes was a misuse of public funds, violated the principles of free and fair elections, and was contrary to the constitutional duty of protecting public resources. The respondents defended the actions, stating that the memorials honored Dalit leaders and social reformers, and the expenditure was approved through proper budgetary processes. The Election Commission of India (ECI) had earlier declined to grant relief, citing the difficulty in assessing the impact of such constructions on elections. The Court, while disposing of the petition, emphasized the need for compliance with ECI guidelines issued in 2016, which prohibit the use of public funds or places for political propaganda. The Court refrained from adjudicating on the specific prayers but underscored the importance of adhering to the ECI's directives to ensure free and fair elections. Ravi Kant v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 107

Electricity Act, 2003

Section 63 - Determination of tariff by bidding process - Importance of harmonizing the provisions of the Electricity Act with environmental laws - Whether the application under Section 63 of the Act could have been made by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) which is a “local authority” within the meaning of Section 2(41) of the Act ? Held: Section 63 of the Act allows local authorities like the MCD to file applications for tariff adoption. Section 63 does not restrict the filing of tariff adoption applications only to distribution licensees or generating companies. The MCD, as a local authority, was entitled to file an application under Section 63 for the adoption of tariffs determined through a competitive bidding process for a Waste-to-Energy (WTE) project. The MCD was fulfilling its statutory obligations under the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016, and the project was in the public interest to address Delhi's waste management crisis. The Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC) had the authority to approve the tariff of Rs. 7.38/KWh for the WTE project, as the bidding process was transparent and complied with the guidelines. The WTE project aligned with the National Tariff Policy, 2016, and the Renewable Purchase Obligation (RPO). The judgment reaffirmed the DERC's orders which had approved the tariff and dismissed challenges to the MCD's authority to issue tariff-based bids. The Supreme Court criticized APTEL for adopting a hyper-technical approach and failing to consider the larger public interest served by the WTE project. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of harmonizing electricity and environmental laws to promote renewable energy projects. The judgment underscores the role of local authorities in addressing urban waste management challenges through sustainable solutions. The appeals were allowed, and set aside APTEL's judgment. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gagan Narang, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 5

Environmental Law

Liability of tanneries for environmental pollution under the "Polluter Pays Principle" and "Precautionary Principle." Continuation of liability for compensation beyond 1998 until ecological damage is reversed - Implementation of schemes for ecological restoration and compensation to affected individuals/families - Role of the State and Central Governments in enforcing environmental laws and ensuring compliance - Explained. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Compensation - The appeals arose from the pollution caused by tanneries in Vellore District, Tamil Nadu, particularly the discharge of untreated effluents into the River Palar, leading to severe environmental degradation, health hazards, and loss of livelihood for local communities. The Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee and the All India Skin and Hide Tanners and Merchants Association (AISHTMA) challenged the orders of the High Court regarding compensation and the liability of tanneries for ongoing pollution. The State Government is directed to disburse the compensation to all affected individuals/families as per the awards dated 07.03.2001 and 24.08.2009. The State shall recover the compensation amount from the polluters under the Revenue Recovery Act or other legal means. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Polluter Pays Principle - The tanneries are absolutely liable for the environmental damage caused by their operations. The liability extends not only to compensating affected individuals/families but also to restoring the damaged ecology. The liability continues until the pollution is curbed and the ecological damage is reversed. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Ecological Restoration - A committee, chaired by a retired High Court Judge, shall be constituted to oversee the implementation of a comprehensive scheme for ecological restoration, including the establishment of Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) and Individual Effluent Treatment Plants (IETPs), and ensure Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD). Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Government Responsibility - The State and Central Governments are responsible for enforcing environmental laws, ensuring compliance, and taking preventive measures to protect the environment. The "Government Pay Principle" is invoked, holding the government accountable for regulatory lapses. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Monitoring and Compliance - The State Pollution Control Board (TNPCB) and Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) shall monitor industries, enforce emission standards, and ensure real-time water quality monitoring. Industries failing to comply with environmental norms shall face strict action, including closure. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Health and Safety of Workers - The State shall ensure that tannery workers are provided with protective gear, health check-ups, and insurance coverage. The Factories Act and other labor laws shall be strictly enforced. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Public Participation - The State shall establish platforms for citizens to report pollution incidents and ensure transparency in environmental data. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Directions Issued - The State Government shall pay compensation to affected individuals/families within six weeks and recover the amount from polluters. A committee shall be constituted to oversee ecological restoration and ensure ZLD compliance. The State shall implement a comprehensive rejuvenation plan for the River Palar, including desilting and pollution removal. Quarterly inspections of tanneries shall be conducted, and non-compliant industries shall face strict action. The State shall promote sustainable practices, including waste recycling and reuse, and ensure the health and safety of workers. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a balanced approach between economic development and environmental protection. The tanneries' liability for pollution is absolute and continuing until the ecological damage is reversed. The State and Central Governments have a crucial role in enforcing environmental laws and ensuring compliance to protect public health and the environment. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Environmental Compensation – Validity of Calculation Method – Jurisdiction of NGT under PMLA - The Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (PCB) determined environmental compensation against Waris Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. for polluting groundwater by storing hazardous chromium waste. The National Green Tribunal (NGT) disapproved of the PCB's method for calculating the compensation, which was based on the total waste found at the site (62225 MT) without properly considering the appellant's actual contribution. The NGT imposed compensation of Rs. 25,39,68,750/- and also held the appellant liable under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Held; the Supreme Court set aside the NGT's decision, noting that the PCB's method of calculating compensation was flawed as it did not accurately attribute the waste to the appellant. The Court remanded the matter to the PCB for redetermination of the environmental compensation in accordance with law. The NGT exceeded its jurisdiction by holding the appellant liable under the PMLA, especially since no criminal complaint or FIR was filed for any scheduled offence under the PMLA. Citing Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 Live law (SC) 633 the Court emphasized that proceedings under PMLA require a registered scheduled offence. The Court expressed doubt on the jurisdiction of the NGT to direct prosecution under PMLA but did not decide on it, as the impugned order was set aside on other grounds. The appeal was partly allowed. The PCB was directed to re-evaluate the environmental compensation. The NGT's findings on liability under the PMLA were set aside. Waris Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Evidence Act, 1872

Section 27 - A disclosure statement under Section 27 unaccompanied by the supporting evidence is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction cannot be solely based on the disclosure statement because it is considered a weak piece of evidence. Vinobhai v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 127

Section 65B - Electronic Evidence - Electronic evidence, such as CCTV footage, must be accompanied by a Section 65-B certificate to be admissible in court. Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 119

Section 112 - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Whether the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, determines paternity unless rebutted by proof of non-access. Held, legitimacy and paternity are not independent concepts. Under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, a child born during a valid marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband unless non-access is proven. The presumption of legitimacy is conclusive and cannot be displaced by mere allegations of adultery or requests for DNA tests without strong evidence of non-access. The presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is conclusive and can only be rebutted by proving non-access. DNA tests should be ordered sparingly, considering the rights to privacy and dignity of the parties involved. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118

Section 112 - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Res Judicata - The dispute arose from a maintenance petition filed by the respondent claiming that the appellant was his biological father. The respondent and his mother sought to establish paternity through a DNA test, but the courts consistently upheld the presumption of legitimacy, as the respondent's mother failed to prove non-access during the relevant period. The Family Court initially closed the maintenance petition but allowed its revival if the respondent succeeded in challenging the legitimacy presumption in civil proceedings. When the civil courts upheld the presumption, the Family Court nonetheless revived the maintenance petition, leading to the present appeal. Whether the Family Court was entitled to reopen the maintenance petition. Whether the second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata. Held, the principle of res judicata bars the re-agitation of issues that have already been conclusively decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. The second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata, as the issue of legitimacy had already been conclusively decided by the High Court in 2011, and the Family Court erred in reviving the maintenance petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Family Court's order reviving the maintenance petition. The proceedings in the maintenance petition were quashed, and the Court reiterated the importance of finality in litigation under the principle of res judicata. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118

DNA Test and Balancing of Interests - The Court emphasized that DNA tests should not be ordered as a matter of course. The right to privacy and dignity of the parties must be balanced against the child's interest in knowing their biological father. In this case, there was no “eminent need” for a DNA test, as the presumption of legitimacy had not been rebutted, and the respondent's claim was based on unsubstantiated allegations. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118

Unreliable Witness Testimony - Lack of Corroborative Evidence - Eyewitness testimony must be free from material omissions and contradictions to be relied upon for conviction. The prosecution must examine all material witnesses and provide corroborative evidence to support its case. Vinobhai v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 127

Family Courts Act, 1984

Legitimacy - Jurisdiction of Civil and Family Courts - Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit regarding legitimacy. The Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit regarding legitimacy, as the Family Court's exclusive jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act, 1984, applies only to matters involving marital relationships. Since the case involved an alleged extra-marital relationship, the Civil Court was the appropriate forum. The Family Court's jurisdiction is limited to matters involving marital relationships, and it cannot entertain claims based on alleged extra-marital relationships. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118

Foreigners Act, 1946

Whether a Foreign Registration Officer or Civil Authority must be impleaded in bail applications filed by foreigners under the Foreigners Act, 1946. The Court held that it is not necessary to implead such authorities in bail applications, as they have no locus to oppose bail unless the offence falls under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. However, the Court directed that upon granting bail to a foreign national, the prosecuting agency or State must immediately inform the concerned Registration Officer, who will then notify the Civil Authority. This ensures compliance with the Foreigners Order, 1948, and allows authorities to take appropriate legal steps. The Court emphasized that this process avoids unnecessary delays in bail proceedings while safeguarding the interests of the State. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 23

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956

Section 12(c) - Adoption and Property Rights - Doctrine of Relation Back - The appellant was adopted by defendant No.1, on 16.07.1994, after the death of her husband. The appellant claimed a half share in the suit schedule properties, arguing that he became the legal heir upon adoption. Held, under Section 12(c) of the Act an adopted child cannot divest any person of any estate that vested before the adoption. The court applied the "Doctrine of Relation Back," which states that adoption by a widow relates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property. However, lawful alienations made by the widow before the adoption are binding on the adopted child. The court upheld the validity of the sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.2 and 3, as the alienation was made after defendant No.1 had become the absolute owner of the property. The appellant's challenge to the sale deed was dismissed. The court declared the gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.4 and 5 as null and void. The court found that the gift deed lacked the necessary prerequisites for a valid gift, such as delivery and acceptance of the property. The trial court's decision to grant the appellant the entire 'B' and 'C' schedule properties as the sole legal heir of defendant No.1 was restored. Sri Mahesh v. Sangram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 6

Income Tax Act, 1961

Section 2(47) - Whether the reduction in share capital of a subsidiary company, resulting in a proportionate reduction in the number of shares held by the assessee, constitutes a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, thereby allowing the assessee to claim a capital loss. The respondent-assessee, M/s. Jupiter Capital Pvt. Ltd., held 99.88% shares in Asianet News Network Pvt. Ltd. (ANNPL). Due to financial losses, ANNPL filed for a reduction in share capital, which was approved by the High Court. The share capital was reduced from 15,35,05,750 shares to 10,000 shares, and the assessee's shareholding was proportionately reduced from 15,33,40,900 shares to 9,988 shares. The face value of the shares remained unchanged at Rs. 10. The assessee claimed a long-term capital loss of Rs. 164,48,55,840/- due to the reduction in share capital. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim, stating that the reduction did not amount to a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, as there was no extinguishment of rights or sale of shares. The CIT(A) upheld the Assessing Officer's decision, but the ITAT allowed the assessee's claim, holding that the reduction in share capital amounted to a transfer under Section 2(47). The High Court affirmed the ITAT's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that the reduction in share capital amounted to a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Kartikeya v. Sarabhai v. CIT (1997) 7 SCC 524, which held that the extinguishment of rights in a capital asset, even without a sale, constitutes a transfer. The Court emphasized that the reduction in the number of shares held by the assessee resulted in the extinguishment of rights in the capital asset, and the assessee was entitled to claim a capital loss. The Court also noted that the face value of the shares remaining unchanged did not negate the fact that the assessee's rights in the shares had been extinguished. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 v. Jupiter Capital, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 41

Section 2(47) - "transfer" - Reduction of Share Capital - Capital Loss - Legal Principles - The definition of "transfer" includes the extinguishment of any rights in a capital asset, even if there is no sale or exchange. A reduction in share capital, resulting in the extinguishment of a shareholder's rights, constitutes a transfer under Section 2(47). The assessee is entitled to claim a capital loss when there is a reduction in share capital that results in the extinguishment of rights in the capital asset. The Supreme Court held that the reduction in share capital of the subsidiary company and the consequent reduction in the assessee's shareholding amounted to a transfer under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee was entitled to claim a capital loss, and the petition filed by the Revenue was dismissed. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 v. Jupiter Capital, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 41

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Section 31(4) proviso - Approval of the resolution plan - A resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, containing a proposed combination (a merger or amalgamation of entities), should only be placed before the Committee of Creditors (CoC), after it has been approved by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Section 31(4) proviso - The appeal arose from the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of Hindustan National Glass and Industries Ltd. (HNGIL), a major player in the glass packaging industry. AGI Greenpac Ltd., the successful resolution applicant, proposed a combination with HNGIL, which would result in a significant market share in the glass packaging industry, raising concerns of an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC). The appellant, Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. (INSCO), challenged the approval of AGI Greenpac's resolution plan, arguing that the CCI's approval was not obtained prior to the CoC's approval, as required under the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) held that while CCI approval is mandatory, the requirement to obtain it prior to CoC approval is directory, not mandatory. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is mandatory, and CCI approval must be obtained before the CoC approves a resolution plan containing a combination. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory timelines and procedural requirements to ensure the integrity of the insolvency resolution process and competition law. The Court underscored the importance of maintaining a balance between the objectives of the IBC and the Competition Act, ensuring that the resolution process does not distort market dynamics. The Court highlighted that conditional approvals, such as the divestment of assets, must be rigorously monitored to prevent anti-competitive practices. The Court reiterated that procedural safeguards are non-negotiable and must be strictly followed to ensure fairness and transparency in the regulatory process. Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Section 31(4) proviso - Mandatory Nature of CCI Approval - Literal Interpretation - Whether the approval of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) for a proposed combination must be obtained prior to the approval of a resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under Section 31(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016. Whether the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC, which mandates CCI approval before CoC approval, is mandatory or directory. Held, the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is mandatory, requiring CCI approval for combinations before the CoC approves the resolution plan. The legislative intent was to ensure that combinations do not adversely affect competition, and thus, prior CCI approval is essential. The Court rejected the purposive interpretation argued by AGI Greenpac and upheld a literal interpretation of the proviso, stating that the language is clear and unambiguous. The Court noted that the proviso creates an exception for combinations, requiring stricter compliance. Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Section 31(4) proviso - Procedural Lapses - Consequences of Non-Compliance - Whether procedural lapses in the CCI's approval process, including the failure to issue a show cause notice to the target company, vitiate the approval of the combination. The Court found that the CCI's failure to issue a show cause notice to the target company (HNGIL) was a procedural lapse. However, it did not vitiate the CCI's approval, as the Resolution Professional (RP) did not object to the process. The Court set aside the approval of AGI Greenpac's resolution plan, as it was approved by the CoC without the requisite CCI approval. The Court directed the CoC to reconsider INSCO's resolution plan and any other plans that had obtained CCI approval as of the date of the CoC's original approval. Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 in Insolvency Matters - Held, the High Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, especially when statutory remedies are available. The IBC is a complete code with its own checks, balances, and appellate mechanisms. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19

Article 226 - Delay and Laches - Natural Justice in CIRP - The Court emphasized that the respondent's delay of nearly three years in approaching the High Court, despite being aware of the proceedings, was fatal to their case. The initiation of parallel proceedings under the IBC further undermined the justification for invoking writ jurisdiction. The High Court had set aside the resolution plan on the ground of violation of natural justice due to inadequate notice (less than 24 hours) for a Committee of Creditors (CoC) meeting. The Supreme Court, however, found that the delay in approaching the High Court and the availability of alternative remedies under the IBC rendered the writ petition untenable. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19

Finality of CIRP Proceedings - The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of timely conclusion of CIRP proceedings, as delays undermine the objectives of the IBC. The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Adjudicating Authority to resume the proceedings from the stage they were interdicted and conclude them expeditiously. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the resolution plan approved by the CoC. The Adjudicating Authority was directed to expedite the completion of the CIRP proceedings. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19

Interpretation of Statues

A statutory provision must be interpreted harmoniously to avoid rendering any part of the statute nugatory. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Judicial Service

Promotion to the post of District Judge – Merit-cum-Seniority – Suitability Test – Seniority - Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the denial of promotion to the appellants, who were judicial officers in Jharkhand, despite qualifying the suitability test for promotion to the post of District Judge in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. The appellants were denied promotion on the basis of a merit list, although they had secured more than the requisite minimum marks for suitability. The Court relied on the judgment in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta v. High Court of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 387, holding that under the 65% quota for promotion based on merit-cum-seniority, once a candidate qualifies the suitability test, promotions cannot be denied solely on the basis of a comparative merit list. The suitability of each candidate should be assessed individually, and a comparative assessment is not warranted unless explicitly provided by the applicable rules. Under the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment, Appointment, and Condition of Service) Rules, 2001, promotions under the 65% merit-cum-seniority quota should be based on suitability, not comparative merit. Once candidates qualify the suitability test, they are entitled to promotion without a comparative merit list ranking. The appellants were granted notional promotion from the date on which other officers from the same selection list were promoted (i.e., as per the notification dated 30.05.2019). They were also entitled to all consequential service benefits, including seniority, increments, and notional pay fixation, but without any back wages. Appeal Allowed. Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. Honble High Court of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 71

Judicial Officers' Pay - Implementation of Second National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC) Recommendations - The Court addressed the non-implementation of the SNJPC recommendations, particularly regarding the payment of super-time scale and selection grade scales for judicial officers, which were approved by the Court in its order dated 19.05.2023. The Court emphasized the need for timely payment of arrears and directed the constitution of Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary (CSCDJ) in each High Court to oversee the implementation of these recommendations. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Remuneration for Special Judicial Magistrates - The Court clarified that Special Judicial Magistrates are entitled to a minimum remuneration of Rs. 45,000/- per month, along with a conveyance allowance of Rs. 5,000/- per month, effective from 01.04.2019. The Court directed the State of Andhra Pradesh to pay arrears to these magistrates within three months. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Risk Allowance and Higher Qualification Allowance - The Court addressed issues related to the admissibility of risk allowance for judicial officers and clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every Assured Career Progression (ACP) stage, rejecting the argument that such allowances would lead to unjust enrichment. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Individual Grievances - Miscellaneous Applications - The Court disposed of several intervention applications and clarified that individual grievances should be addressed by the respective High Courts through the newly constituted Committees. The Court directed the Committee for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary in the High Court of Telangana to address the grievance of a petitioner regarding inadequate pension, in line with the Court's earlier orders. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Directions - Increase of posts of District Judges - Constitution of Committees - Payment of Arrears - Regular Meetings - Clarification on Allowances - The Supreme Court directed the High Courts and State Governments to frame rules regarding the increase of posts of District Judges in the Selection Grade and Super Time Scale categories. All High Courts were directed to constitute Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary within four weeks, with a Nodal Officer appointed to address day-to-day grievances of judicial officers. States were directed to pay arrears to judicial officers, including Special Judicial Magistrates, within three months. The Committees were directed to meet at regular intervals (not exceeding three months) to ensure timely resolution of grievances. The Court clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every ACP stage, irrespective of promotions or ACP benefits. The Court emphasized the importance of timely implementation of its orders and the need for institutional mechanisms to address the service conditions of judicial officers. The directions were issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, binding all State Governments and High Courts to comply. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Juvenile

Issue of juvenility and the failure of the judicial machinery to recognize and act upon the constitutional mandate regarding juvenile justice. The appellant was convicted of culpable homicide amounting to murder in 1994 and sentenced to death. Throughout the legal proceedings, he consistently claimed to be a juvenile at the time of the offense, but his plea was ignored by the trial court, High Court, and even the Supreme Court in earlier rounds of litigation. Held, a plea of juvenility, which was not properly considered by Courts as per due procedure, cannot be treated as final. Therefore, a fresh plea of juvenility can be raised when the plea of juvenility was improperly adjudicated upon in the previous rounds. The Court emphasized the paramount duty of the judiciary to unearth the truth and ensure justice, particularly in cases involving juveniles. Procedural and substantive laws should not obstruct the discovery of truth, especially in social welfare legislations like the Juvenile Justice Act. The Court reiterated that the plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after the final disposal of a case, and must be adjudicated upon in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court found that the appellant was indeed 14 years old at the time of the offense, as evidenced by school certificates and medical reports. The Court criticized the lower courts for ignoring crucial documents and failing to follow the procedural mandates of the Juvenile Justice Act. The appellant's incarceration for over 25 years was a grave injustice, and directed his immediate release, while maintaining his conviction. The Court also ordered the State Legal Services Authority to assist in his rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This judgment underscores the importance of the judiciary's role in ensuring justice for juveniles and the need for courts to actively seek the truth, particularly in cases involving vulnerable individuals. The Court's decision to allow the plea of juvenility even after final disposal of the case sets a significant precedent for future cases involving juvenile offenders. Om Prakash @ Israel @ Raju @ Raju Das v State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 35

Land

Issue of non-payment of compensation to land owners whose land was acquired for the construction of a water tank. The Court expressed strong disapproval of the conduct of the State authorities, who had failed to pay the compensation despite a final award in favor of the land owners. The Court directed to ensure the release of the compensation amount, along with interest and punitive costs. The Court also mandated an explanation from the Collector and warned of contempt proceedings if the payment was not made by the stipulated date. The Special Leave Petition was disposed of with these directions, and the Court clarified that its observations were not against any individual officer. Kondiram Manikrao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 54

Lease and Allotment - Difference Between - Explained - Lease is a temporary grant whereas allotment though is a temporary right of use and occupation of evacuee but does not include a grant by way of a lease. Dalip Ram v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 13

Although the land acquisition compensation is to be determined at the market rate prevailing on the date of issuance of the notification regarding the acquisition of land, the compensation can be determined based on a later date in exceptional circumstances when the delay in the disbursal of the compensation has been inordinate. Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 2

Constitution of India - Articles 142 and 300-A – Compensation – Delay in Determination and Disbursal – Held, the appellants were deprived of their legitimate compensation for over 22 years due to the inaction and lethargy of the State and Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB). The delay violated the appellants' constitutional right under Article 300-A, which guarantees the right to property, mandating adequate and timely compensation for deprivation of property. The Court found that despite the statutory framework requiring prompt disbursal, the compensation was determined only in 2019 after contempt proceedings were initiated, using the market value from 2011 as the base. It was held that awarding compensation at the 2003 market value would result in gross injustice and render Article 300-A meaningless. In exercise of its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court directed the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) to determine compensation based on the market value as of April 22, 2019, along with statutory benefits under the 1894 Land Acquisition Act. Additionally, the judgment and orders of the High Court's Division Bench were set aside, and the appellants' writ petition was allowed. The Court clarified that the inter se dispute between the State, KIADB, and Respondents 6 and 7 regarding the delay in compensation payment must be resolved as per the agreements between them, without affecting the appellants' entitlement. Respondents 6 and 7 were granted liberty to pursue remedies in law if aggrieved. Appeals allowed; fresh award to be determined within two months based on the 2019 market value; statutory benefits to be provided. Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 2

Limitation Act, 1963

Need for legislative reform to ensure uniformity in limitation periods across statutes. Suggested that courts should have broader discretion to condone delays beyond the fixed condonable periods, especially in cases of genuine hardship. My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 49

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007

Section 23 - Requirements - Scope and interpretation of - Beneficial Legislation - Breakdown of Relations - Senior Citizens' Rights - Conditions in property transfers involving senior citizens - Tribunal's Power - Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the Tribunal's order granting relief under Section 23 - Held, the Act is a welfare-oriented statute aimed at protecting the rights of senior citizens. It must be interpreted liberally to further its objectives. For a property transfer to be void under Section 23, it must be shown that the transfer was conditional upon the transferee maintaining the transferor and that the transferee failed to fulfill these conditions. The Court noted the appellant's allegations of neglect and abuse by the respondent, holding that such behavior violated the conditions implied in the Gift Deed and related promissory note. The Court reaffirmed the Tribunal's authority under the Act to cancel property transfers and order possession transfer if necessary to protect senior citizens. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Division Bench judgment of the High Court, and the respondent was directed to restore possession of the property to the appellant. It restored the orders of the Single Judge and the Tribunal, quashing the Gift Deed executed by the appellant in favor of the respondent. The judgment reinforced the Act's purpose of providing senior citizens with simple, expedient remedies against neglect or abuse. Tribunal Powers. Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 3

Medical Education

Residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses is constitutionally impermissible. Such reservations violate Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The concept of regional or provincial domicile is alien to the Indian legal system. All citizens of the country carry a single domicile, which is the "domicile of India". Institutional preference is permissible to a reasonable extent. The Court upheld the reservation of 32 seats for students who completed their MBBS from the same institution, as it creates a reasonable classification with a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. State Quota seats must be filled strictly based on merit in the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET). The Court clarified that its decision would not affect students already admitted under the residence-based reservation, as they had completed their courses or were in the process of doing so. Higher education, especially in specialized fields like medicine, must prioritize merit to maintain national standards and development. Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 122

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006

Section 18 and 19 - Maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). The Court examined conflicting judgments, including Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 LiveLaw SC 753 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited v. Mahakali Foods Private Limited, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893 regarding whether the MSEFC, after acting as a conciliator, could also act as an arbitrator, and whether a writ petition could be entertained against its orders. The Court also considered the mandatory pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, which mandates a 75% deposit of the awarded amount for challenging an award. The Court expressed reservations about the absolute bar on writ jurisdiction and referred the following questions to a larger Bench of five Judges: (i) Whether the judgment in M/s India Glycols Limited, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 992 completely bars writ petitions against MSEFC orders. (ii) If not absolute, under what circumstances the principle of alternative remedy would not apply. (iii) Whether MSEFC members, after conciliation, can act as arbitrators under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, despite Section 80 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is a constitutional right and part of the basic structure, and its exercise is not precluded by statutory remedies, especially in cases involving violations of natural justice, jurisdictional errors, or challenges to the vires of a statute. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for further consideration. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 95

Section 8 - Filing of a memorandum under Section 8 is discretionary. Section 8 of the MSMED Act grants discretion to micro and small enterprises to file a memorandum. The Act does not mandate registration as a precondition for availing the benefits or remedies under the Act. The Court also referred to the Expert Committee Report on MSMEs, which highlighted that many MSMEs operate in the informal sector and that registration is not mandatory for availing benefits under the Act. NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 46

Section 8 and 18 - Whether an MSME (Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise) can refer a dispute to the Facilitation Council under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act) if it was not registered under Section 8 of the Act before the execution of the contract with the buyer. Interpretation of the term "any party to a dispute" under Section 18 of the MSMED Act and whether it is restricted to a "supplier" registered under Section 8. Held, registration under Section 8 is not a precondition for referring a dispute under Section 18. The phrase "any party to a dispute" in Section 18 is not restricted to a "supplier" registered under Section 8. The text, context, and purpose of Section 18 indicate that it is an open-ended remedy for dispute resolution, available to any party involved in a dispute regarding delayed payments under the MSMED Act. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the term "any party" must be interpreted as a "supplier" registered under Section 8, emphasizing that such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of the Act, which is to provide an effective remedy for MSMEs. NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 46

Section 8 and 18 - Distinction from previous judgments - Reference to a larger Bench - The applicability of previous judgments, including Silpi Industries v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, (2021) 18 SCC 790 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893, to the present case. The Court distinguished the present case from Silpi Industries and Mahakali Foods, noting that the issue of whether registration under Section 8 is a precondition for invoking Section 18 was not directly addressed in those cases. The observations in those cases were made in different contexts and did not involve a detailed analysis of the statutory provisions. The Court emphasized that the decisions in Silpi Industries and Mahakali Foods were not binding precedents on the issue at hand, as the issue was neither raised nor fully considered in those cases. While the Court expressed a clear opinion on the interpretation of Section 18, it deemed it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench of three Judges for an authoritative pronouncement, given the need for clarity and legal certainty on the issue. NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 46

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

Whether the State Government is entitled to levy royalty on the excavation of brick earth from private lands leased by brick kiln owners, even if the ownership of the land is not vested in the State. Whether the declaration of brick earth as a minor mineral under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, empowers the State to levy royalty irrespective of land ownership. The respondents, brick kiln owners, leased private lands and excavated brick earth for brick manufacturing. They challenged the State's imposition of royalty, contending that brick earth did not vest in the State under the Wajib-ul-arz (village land records) and that no provision in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, or the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964, authorized such levies. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the suits, holding that brick earth, declared a minor mineral, vested in the State under Section 42 of the Land Revenue Act. The High Court, however, ruled in favor of the respondents, holding that mere declaration of brick earth as a minor mineral did not confer ownership or royalty rights on the State. Held, the State's right to levy royalty on brick earth is independent of land ownership. Once brick earth is declared a minor mineral under the 1957 Act, the State is empowered to levy royalty under the Mineral Rules. The ownership of the land is irrelevant for royalty purposes, as the Mineral Rules require a certificate of approval (Form “B”) for mining operations, and royalty is payable on the production and disposal of minor minerals. The High Court erred in focusing on land ownership rather than the State's statutory right to levy royalty under the Mineral Rules. The appeals were allowed, and the Trial Court's dismissal of the suits was restored. The Court clarified that it made no adjudication on the ownership of the lands in question. The State Government is entitled to levy royalty on the excavation of brick earth, irrespective of land ownership, once brick earth is declared a minor mineral under the 1957 Act. The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the Trial Court's decision was reinstated. State of Punjab v. Om Prakash Brick Kiln Owner, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 93

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Motor Accidents Claim - The insurance company contended that the vehicle involved was not the one insured and challenged the liability. The MACT found the insurance company, driver, and owner jointly and severally liable. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the MACT and the High Court that the insured vehicle was involved in the accident, rejecting the insurance company's claim of ambiguity regarding the vehicle's registration number. Insurance coverage is effective from the date of premium payment, irrespective of policy issuance timing. The insurance policy was deemed effective from the date of premium payment, even if the issuance was delayed, thus covering the accident. An insurance company bears the burden of proving a breach of policy conditions to avoid liability. The allegation of fraud by the insurance company was dismissed as unproven, reiterating that fraud must be specifically pleaded and proven with evidence. Allegations of fraud require specific pleading and proof. The appeals were dismissed, affirming the compensation awarded by the MACT and upheld by the High Court. The insurance company was held liable to indemnify the owner and compensate the claimants. National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Maya Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 58

Disability Assessment - Compensation for Pain and Suffering - The appellant, a diamond cutter by profession, suffered grievous injuries, including complete loss of vision in one eye, due to a collision caused by the negligence of an auto-rickshaw driver. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, had awarded Rs. 8,70,000/- as compensation, which was later enhanced to Rs. 10,57,500/- by the High Court. The Supreme Court, however, found the High Court's computation of disability at 65% insufficient, given the nature of the appellant's profession, which requires precise vision. The Court held that the functional disability should be assessed at 100%, considering the appellant's inability to continue his vocation as a diamond cutter. Additionally, the Court enhanced the compensation for "pain and suffering" from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 1,50,000/-, recognizing the profound impact of the accident on the appellant's life and career. The total compensation awarded by the Supreme Court was Rs. 15,98,000/-, with an interest rate of 8% from the date of the claim petition. Appeal was allowed modifying the compensation awarded by the High Court. Jayanandan v. Varkey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 44

The appellants, daughters of the deceased, filed claims for compensation after their parents died in a road accident involving a bus owned by Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation and a Tempo Traveler insured by Oriental Insurance Company. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 58,24,000/- for the father and Rs. 93,61,000/- for the mother. The High Court reduced the compensation to Rs. 26,68,600/- for the father and Rs. 19,22,680/- for the mother. Whether the High Court erred in reducing the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, particularly in light of the appellants' contention that the business run by their deceased parents suffered a significant loss due to their inexperience. Held, the takeover of the deceased persons' business by dependents does not justify reducing motor accident compensation. The deceased persons' contribution to the business must be considered in assessing compensation claims. The Tribunal's award was well-considered and based on reliable evidence, including Income Tax Returns. The High Court's reduction of compensation was unjustified, as it failed to consider the appellants' lack of experience and the consequent decline in business profitability. The Court emphasized that the transfer of business ownership to the appellants did not automatically mean they could run the business as effectively as their parents. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Tribunal's award, holding that the compensation was just and reasonable. S. Vishnu Ganga v. Oriental Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 132

Section 162 - Implementation of - Scheme for cashless treatment of road accident victims during the "golden hour" (the critical one-hour period following a traumatic injury) - Motor Vehicle Accident Fund - Directions Issued - Despite the provision being in force since April 1, 2022, no such scheme has been formulated. The Court emphasized the importance of the golden hour in saving lives and noted that delays in treatment due to financial or procedural reasons often lead to fatalities. The Court referred to Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286 which underscored the duty of hospitals to provide immediate medical aid to accident victims. The Court expressed concern over the lack of a scheme under Section 162(2) despite the creation of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund under Section 164-B and the framing of related rules in 2022. The draft concept note submitted by the Central Government proposed a maximum treatment limit of ₹1,50,000 and coverage for only seven days, which the Court found inadequate to achieve the objective of saving lives during the golden hour. The Court noted that 1,026 claims under the hit-and-run compensation scheme were pending as of August 31, 2024, due to documentation deficiencies. The Central Government was directed to frame and implement the scheme under Section 162(2) by March 14, 2025, and submit an affidavit detailing the implementation plan by March 21, 2025. The General Insurance Council (GIC) was directed to process pending claims based on seven essential documents and to develop a portal for streamlined claim processing by March 14, 2025. The judgment reinforces the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution and highlights the statutory obligation of the Central Government to ensure timely medical treatment for road accident victims during the golden hour. The Court's directions aim to address systemic delays and ensure the effective utilization of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund. The Central Government is mandated to expedite the formulation of a scheme for cashless treatment during the golden hour, with strict compliance deadlines set by the Court. S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 36

Section 162 - Implementation of - Scheme for cashless treatment of road accident victims during the "golden hour" (the critical one-hour period following a traumatic injury) - Statutory Provisions - Section 162 (1) requires insurance companies to provide cashless treatment for road accident victims, including during the golden hour. Section 162 (2) obligates the Central Government to create a scheme for cashless treatment during the golden hour, which may include provisions for a dedicated fund. Section 164B establishes the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund to provide compulsory insurance cover and compensation for road accident victims, including those involved in hit-and-run cases. S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 36

The appellant suffered severe injuries in a motor accident resulting in 60% permanent disability. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) awarded compensation of Rs. 19,43,800/- with 7% interest. The High Court partially allowed the appellant's appeal, enhancing the compensation for loss of income from Rs. 11,23,200/- to Rs. 27,21,600/- but did not address other heads of compensation adequately. The appellant argued that the MACT and High Court failed to consider the doctor's recommendations and the long-term impact of his disabilities. The Respondent contended that the High Court correctly assessed the notional income and future prospects, and that the compensation under other heads was adequate based on the evidence. The Court reiterated the principles laid down in Sarla Verma, Pranay Sethi, and other precedents regarding the assessment of compensation in motor accident cases, emphasizing the multiplier method and the need for uniformity. The Court found that the High Court correctly enhanced the compensation for loss of income but failed to adequately address other heads of compensation, such as future medical expenses, speech therapy, physiotherapy, and attendant charges, which were not in line with medical recommendations. The Court also noted that the compensation under non-pecuniary heads was insufficient and needed enhancement. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a comprehensive and just assessment of compensation in motor accident cases, ensuring that all heads of compensation, including future medical needs and non-pecuniary damages, are adequately addressed. The Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 48,00,000/- to reflect the appellant's long-term needs and the impact of his disabilities. Atul Tiwari v. Oriental Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 26

Motor Accident Compensation – Deduction for Personal Expenses - The High Court erred in not deducting one-third of the deceased's income towards personal expenses. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 18

Motor Accident Compensation – Income Assessment - Xerox copies of Income Tax Returns - Whether the High Court erred in assessing the deceased's income without proper proof - The Tribunal rightly disregarded xerox copies of Income Tax Returns and made a reasonable estimation of income based on surrounding circumstances. The High Court's assessment of the deceased's income, though based on assumptions, was reasonable given the circumstances and the age of the deceased. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 18

Motor Accident Compensation – Conventional Heads - The appeals arose from a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of the appellant's parents and younger brother. The appellant, the legal heir of the deceased, sought enhancement of compensation awarded by the Motor Vehicles Accident Tribunal, while the insurer (respondent) sought reduction of the compensation. The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 14,78,000/- for the father's death, Rs. 13,33,936/- for the mother's death, and Rs. 2,45,000/- for the brother's death. The High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 30,58,000/-, Rs. 16,34,000/-, and Rs. 5,00,000/- respectively. Whether the High Court erred in awarding compensation exceeding the limits set under conventional heads. The Court upheld the High Court's award under conventional heads, noting that the judgment was delivered prior to the Pranay Sethi decision, which capped such awards at Rs. 70,000/-. However, the Court declined to reduce the compensation, as the difference was not excessive and the appellant had suffered significant loss. The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals, upholding the High Court's enhanced compensation, finding it just and reasonable in light of the appellant's tragic loss and the principles of just compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 18

Negligence in Motor Accident Cases - Reliability of Police Records - Fraud Allegations Unsubstantiated - Negligence is to be determined on the basis of preponderance of probabilities, not beyond a reasonable doubt. Police records, including FIRs and charge sheets, are admissible evidence for determining negligence. The Tribunal and High Court were justified in relying on such documents to conclude that the driver of the offending vehicle was rash and negligent. The appellant's contention that the respondents connived with the police to prepare a fraudulent charge sheet was rejected due to lack of evidence. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court. ICIC Lombard General Insurance Co Ltd v. Rajni Sahoo, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 9

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Section 8 r/w. 15 and 54 – Conscious Possession – Presumption under Section 54 – Burden of Proof - The appellant was convicted under Section 8 read with Section 15 of the NDPS Act for possession of 50 kg of poppy husk. The prosecution's case rested on the recovery of the contraband from the appellant's possession while he was traveling on a train. The appellant argued that he was not in conscious possession of the contraband, claiming the cartons could have belonged to any passenger. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the prosecution had established conscious possession. The Court emphasized that "possession" under the NDPS Act implies not just physical possession but also awareness of the nature of the substance possessed. Once physical possession is established, the burden shifts to the accused to explain how they came into possession and prove lack of awareness of the contraband's nature. The Court noted that the appellant's explanation for being found with the cartons was unconvincing. The Court further relied on Section 54 of the NDPS Act, stating that when the accused is found in possession of a prohibited article and fails to provide a satisfactory explanation, a presumption arises that the accused has committed an offense under the Act. The Court rejected the appellant's arguments and dismissed the appeal. Rakesh Kumar Raghuvanshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 100

Section 52A - Whether non-compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act vitiates the trial and conviction, especially when the seized contraband was allegedly mixed before sampling. Held; Section 52A of the NDPS Act is primarily for the safe disposal of seized contraband but also introduces procedural safeguards, including inventorying, photographing, and sampling in the presence of a magistrate. The procedure under Section 52A and related rules requires substantial, not strict, compliance. Non-compliance alone does not vitiate the trial unless it renders the prosecution's case doubtful. Inventory, photographs, and samples certified by a magistrate under Section 52A(4) are treated as primary evidence, even if the bulk contraband is not produced. The initial burden lies on the accused to show non-compliance with Section 52A. Once foundational facts are established, the prosecution must prove substantial compliance or that non-compliance does not affect the case. Procedural lapses under Section 52A do not automatically lead to acquittal. Courts must consider the overall evidence, including discrepancies, and ensure that the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt. Non-compliance may lead to an adverse inference, but it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court found no procedural lapse in the sampling process and upheld the conviction, emphasizing that the prosecution had established the recovery and possession of the contraband beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was dismissed. Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 84

Section 20 – Absence of evidence linking accused to contraband - Acquittal – The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted under the NDPS Act for the recovery of 20 kilograms of ganja from his vehicle after two passengers fled upon interception by the police. The appellant argued that he was unaware of the contraband as it belonged to the fleeing passengers. No incriminating material was found on his person, and he did not attempt to flee. Held, merely failing to provide details of the passengers, did not establish the appellant's connection to the contraband, especially since no effort was made to trace the passengers. It was unreasonable to expect a taxi driver to know the details of his passengers. The conviction was set aside as the prosecution failed to establish any direct link between the appellant and the contraband. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges under the NDPS Act. Sri Shankar Dongarisaheb Bhosale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 64

Section 52A - Principles - Burden of Proof - Chain of Custody - Substantial Compliance - Procedural safeguards for inventorying, photographing, and sampling seized narcotics must be substantially complied with. Non-compliance alone is not fatal unless it casts doubt on the prosecution's case. The accused must first establish non-compliance with Section 52A on a preponderance of probabilities. The prosecution must then prove substantial compliance or show that non-compliance does not affect the case. Proper sealing and handling of samples are critical. Any discrepancy in the chain of custody can lead to an adverse inference against the prosecution. Minor procedural lapses do not automatically vitiate the trial if the prosecution's case is otherwise credible. Rajwant Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Section 52A - The appellant was convicted under Section 15 of the NDPS Act for possessing poppy straw. The Special Court sentenced him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 1 lakh. The High Court upheld the conviction. The prosecution's case was based on the recovery of poppy straw from a car driven by the appellant, following a tip-off about his involvement in drug peddling. The co-accused was acquitted by the High Court. Whether the conviction was vitiated due to non-compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act, which mandates procedural safeguards for the disposal, inventorying, and sampling of seized narcotics. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to establish non-compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act. The Court emphasized that the initial burden lies on the accused to show non-compliance on a preponderance of probabilities. In this case, no questions were raised during cross-examination regarding Section 52A, and no evidence was presented to prove procedural lapses. The Court also distinguished the case from Mohammed Khalid vs. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183 where the conviction was set aside due to multiple loopholes in the prosecution's case, including tampering concerns. Here, the samples were properly sealed, and the chain of custody was intact. The appellant was directed to surrender to serve the remaining sentence. Appeal dismissed. Rajwant Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Sections 451 and 457 of Cr.P.C. - Interpretation of - Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - No Specific Bar under NDPS Act - Whether a vehicle seized under the NDPS Act can be released to its owner during the pendency of the trial. The appellant owned a truck purchased on an EMI basis, which was his sole source of income. The truck was stopped at a police checkpoint, and 24.8 grams of heroin were found concealed in the vehicle. The main accused was arrested, but the appellant and his driver were not implicated in the crime. The appellant sought the release of the truck, which had been lying unused at the police station, citing natural wear and tear. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. Appellant relied on Sections 451 and 457 of Cr.P.C. and precedents to argue for the interim release of the vehicle, emphasizing that the appellant was not involved in the crime and that the vehicle was deteriorating in police custody. The State contended that the NDPS Act is a special law that does not permit interim release of vehicles used in drug trafficking, as they are critical evidence and may be reused for illegal activities. Held, the Court found no explicit prohibition in the NDPS Act against the interim release of seized vehicles. Section 51 of the NDPS Act allows the application of Cr.P.C. provisions, including Sections 451 and 457, for the custody and disposal of property. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30

Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - Four Scenarios of Seizure - The Court identified four scenarios where contraband is seized from a vehicle: (i) Owner or agent is the accused. (ii) Vehicle is stolen by the accused. (iii) Contraband is found with a third-party occupant without the owner's knowledge. The Court held that in the third and fourth scenarios, where the owner is not implicated, the vehicle should normally be released on interim custody with appropriate conditions. The Court rejected the State's argument that vehicles should not be released due to the risk of reuse, noting that such a stance would lead to absurd outcomes, such as seizing private planes or ships used unknowingly in drug trafficking. Keeping the vehicle in police custody would serve no purpose and only lead to its deterioration. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30

Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the trial court to release the vehicle to the appellant on interim custody under the following conditions: (i) The vehicle must be videographed and photographed, with the inventory authenticated by the Investigating Officer, owner, and accused. (ii) The appellant must furnish an undertaking not to sell or transfer the vehicle until the trial concludes. (iii) The appellant must surrender the vehicle or pay its value if directed by the court after the trial. The Court emphasized that the release of the vehicle would benefit the owner, the financier, and society at large, while ensuring that the vehicle remains available for trial purposes if needed. This judgment clarifies that vehicles seized under the NDPS Act can be released to their owners during the pendency of the trial, provided the owner is not implicated in the crime and appropriate conditions are imposed to safeguard the interests of justice. The decision balances the stringent provisions of the NDPS Act with the practical need to prevent unnecessary hardship to innocent vehicle owners. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 138 – Dishonour of cheque – Liability of Director – Resignation before issuance of cheque – Quashing of complaint – Held, where the appellant had resigned from the post of Director prior to the issuance of post-dated cheques by the company, and the cheques were signed by another competent person, the appellant could not be held liable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was undisputed that the appellant resigned on 21.06.2019 and the resignation was acknowledged by the Registrar of Companies on 26.06.2019, whereas the cheques were issued on 12.07.2019. Therefore, the appellant was not in charge of or responsible for the affairs of the company at the relevant time. The judgment of Malva Cotton and Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Virsa Singh Sidhu (2008) 17 SCC 147 was distinguished on facts, as in that case, the resignation was submitted after the issuance of the cheques. The appeals were allowed, and the impugned order of the High Court dismissing the petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was set aside. The complaints under Section 138 NI Act against the appellant were quashed. Appeals Allowed. Adhiraj Singh v. Yograj Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 142 - Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the complaint under Section 138 NI Act on the ground of lack of specific averments regarding the personal knowledge of the power of attorney holder in the complaint and supporting documents. The High Court relied on the decision in A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790 to hold that the power of attorney holder lacked personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to the proceedings, as there were no specific pleadings to that effect in the Letter of Authority or affidavits. However, a conjoint reading of the Letter of Authority, the verifying affidavit, and the affidavit of evidence under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. demonstrated that the manager and power of attorney holder of the appellant-firm, had personal knowledge of the transactions and was duly authorized to file the complaint. The complaint satisfied the requirements of Section 142 of the NI Act as it was filed by the payee through its authorized representative. The High Court's reliance on inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the complaint was unwarranted and contrary to the settled principle that such powers should be exercised sparingly and not interfere with a fair trial. The High Court erred in quashing the complaint based on incorrect reasoning and lack of due consideration. The appeal was allowed, and the complaint was restored to the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate for adjudication on merits. Appeal allowed. Judgment and order of the High Court quashed and set aside. Complaint restored for fresh adjudication. Naresh Potteries v. Aarti Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1

Partnership Act, 1932

Section 69 - Effect of Non-Registration - A partner of an unregistered firm cannot institute a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract against another partner. The prohibition under Section 69(1) is mandatory and applies even if the partnership business has not commenced, as the partnership deed itself constitutes a contractual agreement. The appropriate legal remedy would have been to file a suit for dissolution of the partnership firm and rendition of accounts, which is permitted under the exception in Section 69(3). Section 69 is mandatory, and suits by partners of unregistered firms are void if enforcing contractual rights. The suit for recovery of money by the petitioners, being partners of an unregistered partnership firm, is not maintainable under Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Sunkari Tirumala Rao v. Penki Aruna Kumari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 99

Penal Code, 1860

Section 34 - Common Intention - The appeals arose from a judgment of the High Court, which reversed the trial court's acquittal of Constables in a case involving the death of a woman caused by a bullet fired by Head Constable (A1) during an attempt to intercept a car suspected of smuggling illegal liquor. The trial court had convicted A1 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 27(1) of the Arms Act but acquitted the other accused due to lack of evidence of shared common intention. The High Court, however, convicted the other accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, holding that their presence in the car with A1 was sufficient to infer common intention. The Supreme Court reiterated the legal principle that for conviction under Section 34 IPC, the prosecution must prove prior meeting of minds and shared common intention among all accused to commit the crime. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellants (accused Nos. 2, 3, and 4) had any prior common intention with A1 to shoot the deceased. The trial court's acquittal of the appellants was based on the lack of evidence of their mental involvement in the crime, and the High Court's reversal of this acquittal was deemed unwarranted. The Supreme Court emphasized that interference in an acquittal is only justified if the trial court's decision is perverse, based on a misreading of evidence, or if no reasonable view other than guilt is possible. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, quashed the High Court's judgment, and restored the trial court's acquittal of the appellants. Mere presence in the same vehicle as the principal accused was insufficient to convict the appellants under Section 34 IPC without evidence of shared common intention. The trial court's acquittal was upheld, and the High Court's interference was found to be unjustified. Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 134

Sections 96 to 106 and Section 300 - Murder - Right of private defence - The right of private defence under Sections 96 to 106 IPC is subject to the restrictions in Section 99, which prohibits the use of excessive force. Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC applies only if the accused acts in good faith, without premeditation, and without intending to cause more harm than necessary. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC applies to acts committed in the heat of passion without premeditation, provided there is no undue advantage or cruelty. The burden of proving self-defence lies on the accused, but it can be discharged by establishing a preponderance of probabilities. Ratheeshkumar @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Sections 96 to 106 and Section 302 - Murder - Right of private defence - Private defence must be strictly preventive and not punitive or retributive. Causing death can only be justified when the accused is faced with a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. The impending danger must be present, real or apparent. Ratheeshkumar @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Section 174A IPC is a standalone offence, and prosecution under it can continue independently of the status of the proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. However, acquittal in the main offence may warrant the closure of proceedings under Section 174A IPC. Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 12

Section 186 - Cognizance of an offence under Section 186 IPC, which criminalizes obstruction of a public servant in the discharge of official duty, requires a written complaint by a public servant to a Judicial Magistrate. The absence of such a compliant renders the cognizance illegal. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Sections 186 and 353 - Distinction between - Section 186 IPC pertains to obstruction without the use of criminal force, punishable by imprisonment up to three months. Section 353 IPC addresses aggravated acts involving criminal force or assault to deter a public servant from duty, punishable by imprisonment up to two years. Mere obstruction does not meet the threshold for Section 353 IPC. In the absence of a valid written complaint filed before a Judicial Magistrate, the cognizance of offences under Section 186 IPC by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate was deemed illegal. Furthermore, invoking Section 353 IPC requires evidence of criminal force or assault, which is distinct from obstruction covered under Section 186 IPC. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Section 302 - Brutal murder of wife and four minor daughters - Death Sentence Commuted to Life Imprisonment - Circumstantial Evidence - Mitigating Factors - Held, even in cases involving multiple murders, no death sentence could be imposed if the convicts display a reform potential supported by other mitigating factors such as age, lack of criminal antecedents, income, etc. The Court found the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's presence at the scene with a blood-stained axe, recovery of weapons, and postmortem reports, sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While confirming the conviction, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life. The case, though heinous, did not fall under the "rarest of rare" category warranting the death penalty, considering mitigating factors such as the appellant's lack of criminal antecedents, satisfactory conduct in prison, and potential for reformation. The prosecution successfully established a complete chain of circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's presence at the crime scene, recovery of incriminating weapons, and medical evidence corroborating the cause of death. The appellant's failure to provide a plausible explanation under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act further strengthened the prosecution's case. Reports from the jail superintendent and probation officer indicated the possibility of reformation, leading the Court to opt for life imprisonment instead of the death penalty. Deen Dayal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 124

Sections 302, 364, 366, 376(2)(m), 376A, 392 r/w. 397 and 201 - The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death by the Trial Court for the murder, rape, and other offences. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, including the last seen theory, CCTV footage, and an alleged extra-judicial confession. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. Whether the circumstantial evidence, including the last seen theory, CCTV footage, and extra-judicial confession, was sufficient to convict the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the failure to produce a Section 65-B certificate for the CCTV footage rendered it inadmissible. Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, satisfying the principles of circumstantial evidence as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116. Held, the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The CCTV footage, which was a crucial piece of evidence, was rendered inadmissible due to the prosecution's failure to produce a Section 65-B certificate, as mandated by the Indian Evidence Act. The Court emphasized that in cases involving the death penalty, strict adherence to procedural requirements is essential. The evidence of witnesses who claimed to have last seen the appellant with the deceased was found unreliable due to delays in recording their statements, contradictions in their testimonies, and the possibility of prior exposure to the appellant's photograph in the media. The time gap between when the accused and deceased were last seen together and the discovery of the deceased's body must be sufficiently small to rule out the possibility of any other person being involved. The alleged extra-judicial confession made to PW-9 was deemed unreliable due to inconsistencies, lack of corroboration, and the fact that PW-9 had a prior quarrel with the appellant, casting doubt on his credibility. The recoveries of the trolley bag and other items were not convincingly linked to the appellant, and the prosecution failed to explain why the appellant would retain the deceased's college ID card for over two months. The prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence pointing solely to the guilt of the appellant. The evidence presented was insufficient to meet the stringent standards required for a conviction, especially in a death penalty case. The Court reiterated the caution required in cases based on circumstantial evidence, as outlined in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, and emphasized that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Appeal allowed; appellant acquitted. Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 119

Section 302 r/w. 34 - Murder - Conviction and Appeal - The Court reiterated the principle that concurrent findings of fact by two courts should not be interfered with unless there is a grave miscarriage of justice or manifest illegality. The recovery of weapons (axe and iron pipe) and the medical evidence supported the prosecution's case, even though some witnesses turned hostile. While the Court upheld the appellants' involvement in the assault, it found that the intent to kill was not conclusively established. The death resulted from cumulative injuries, and the appellants did not have a clear motive or premeditation. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, modifying the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and sentenced the appellants to the time already served, with a fine imposed for the benefit of the deceased's family. Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 50

Section 302 - Murder - Extra judicial confession - Held, the High Court erred in relying on the extra-judicial confession made to the Village Police Patil even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer. The Court emphasized the need for clear and unambiguous evidence of the confession, which was lacking in this case. Further, the Court found the evidence regarding the discovery of the alleged murder weapon, an iron rod, to be insufficient, as the panch witnesses turned hostile and the Investigating Officer's testimony did not adequately prove the contents of the discovery panchnama. While acknowledging the circumstantial nature of the case and the principle that the accused, especially in domestic murder cases, should offer an explanation, the Court stressed that the initial burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. The prosecution must establish foundational facts before invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof to the accused. In this case, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish these foundational facts, rendering the reliance on Section 106 improper. The Court reiterated the importance of evaluating extra-judicial confessions with great care and caution, especially when surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the prosecution's case rested on weak and unreliable evidence, insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 97

Section 302 and 376 - Circumstantial Evidence - Principles explained - The Court found that the prosecution had successfully established a complete chain of incriminating circumstances, including the recovery of the victim's body from the accused's bathroom, forensic evidence linking the accused to the crime, and the presence of the accused's DNA on the victim's clothing. The Court upheld the conviction for the heinous crime of sexual assault and murder of a minor but noted deficiencies in the lower courts' evaluation of the evidence. The appeal was dismissed, and the death sentence awarded to the accused was rendered moot due to his demise. Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Section 302 - Murder - Right of private defence - The appellant did not have a reasonable apprehension of imminent danger to justify the use of lethal force in self-defence or defence of property. The appellant's actions exceeded the necessary force required for private defence, as he continued to assault the deceased even after inflicting fatal injuries. The case did not fall under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, as the appellant's actions were not in good faith and were disproportionate to the threat faced. The case also did not fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, as the appellant used a deadly weapon against an unarmed deceased, indicating cruelty and undue advantage. The Court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the conviction. Ratheeshkumar @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Section 302 r/w. 34 - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - Reliability of Related Witnesses - Medical Evidence - The prosecution alleged that the accused attacked the deceased with sticks, causing fatal head injuries. The Trial Court acquitted all accused, citing inconsistencies in witness testimonies and lack of corroborative medical evidence. Held, being a relative does not automatically render a witness unreliable, and their testimonies were consistent on material facts. The Court found that the post-mortem report, which documented fatal head injuries caused by blunt objects, corroborated the eyewitness accounts. The absence of multiple head injuries did not negate the possibility of multiple blows, as forensic limitations could explain such discrepancies. The Trial Court erred by focusing excessively on minor inconsistencies and ignoring the overall credibility of the evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment and holding that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterated that minor inconsistencies in witness testimonies do not undermine their credibility, and medical evidence should be viewed as corroborative rather than determinative. Baban Shankar Daphal v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 103

Section 302 - Murder - The appellant was convicted for murder and the Trial Court sentenced him to life imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The conviction was upheld by the High Court. The prosecution's case was based on the testimony of two eyewitnesses who claimed to have seen the appellant stab the deceased. The appellant and the deceased had a history of enmity, as the deceased was allegedly involved in the murder of the appellant's elder brother. Whether the testimony of the eyewitnesses was reliable and free from material omissions and contradictions. Whether the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in light of the unreliability of the eyewitnesses and the lack of corroborative evidence. Held, the testimony of the two key eyewitnesses was riddled with material omissions and contradictions, rendering their accounts unreliable. Key issues included : PW-4's failure to report the incident to the police or take the deceased to the hospital, despite being present at the scene. PW-4 and PW-5's omission of critical details, such as the number of stab wounds and their distance from the scene. The prosecution's failure to examine other potential eyewitnesses whom PW-4 claimed to have informed about the incident. The Court also noted that the recovery of the weapon (a knife) and bloodstained clothes at the appellant's instance was insufficient to secure a conviction, as disclosure statements alone, without corroborative evidence, cannot establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Relied on: Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P., 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 629. The Supreme Court quashed the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court, acquitting the appellant. The appellant, who had already served over 12 years in prison, was ordered to be released immediately unless required in connection with any other case. Vinobhai v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 127

Sections 302 r/w. 149 - Explosive Substances Act, 1908; Section 5 - The appellants challenged the FIR's timing, alleging it was ante-timed and contained interpolations. They argued that the prosecution's case was fabricated, with inconsistencies in witness testimonies and improper investigation. They contended that the recovery of weapons and the inquest report were flawed, and the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The State defended the High Court's judgment, asserting that the evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and medical reports, sufficiently established the guilt of the convicted accused. Held, minor contradictions in witness testimonies do not render them unreliable. It upheld the principle that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) does not apply in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Court found the testimonies of eyewitnesses credible and consistent, corroborated by medical evidence and weapon recovery. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the investigation was flawed, stating that defective investigation alone cannot lead to acquittal if other evidence supports the prosecution's case. The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was upheld. Edakkandi Dineshan @ P. Dineshan v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 25

Section 304 Part I and 201 - The appellant, along with friends, encountered the deceased in an inebriated condition beneath a bridge. An altercation ensued, during which the appellant struck the deceased with a cement brick, causing fatal head injuries. The appellant subsequently set the deceased's body on fire to destroy evidence. Both Trial Court and High Court held the appellant guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC, citing grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. The appellant was sentenced to 5 years of rigorous imprisonment for Section 304 Part I and 2 years for Section 201 IPC. Held, the Court examined the applicability of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, which requires the provocation to be both grave and sudden, depriving the accused of self-control. The Court noted that the incident was not premeditated and occurred in the heat of the moment, with the appellant using a nearby cement brick, not a weapon. However, the Court found that the provocation (a slap and verbal abuse) was not sufficiently grave to fully justify the reduction of the crime from murder to culpable homicide. While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (4 years), considering the appellant's time served and the circumstances of the case. Appeal partly allowed; conviction upheld but sentence reduced to time already served. Vijay @ Vijayakumar v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 94

Sections 304B and 498A - Essential ingredients of - The testimonies contained significant omissions and contradictions, particularly regarding dowry demands and acts of cruelty. The prosecution failed to prove any specific instances of cruelty or harassment "soon before the death," which is a crucial requirement under Section 304-B. The belated statements of the witnesses, recorded more than two months after the incident, appeared to be afterthoughts and lacked credibility. The Court quashed the impugned judgments of the lower courts and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reiterates the importance of proving the essential ingredients of Section 304-B, particularly the requirement of cruelty or harassment "soon before death," and highlights the need for credible and consistent evidence in dowry death cases. The Court also emphasized the role of State Judicial Academies in addressing recurring errors in the application of dowry-related laws. Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 135

Section 306 r/w. 107 - Abetment of Suicide – Ingredients of Instigation – Proximity and Mens Rea – Quashing of Proceedings - The appellant challenged the order of the High Court which quashed the charges against two co-accused but upheld the charges against her under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide). It was alleged that the appellant disapproved of her son's relationship with the deceased and made remarks suggesting that the deceased "need not be alive" if she could not live without her son. The High Court concluded that these remarks constituted sufficient instigation for framing charges under Section 306 IPC. Whether the remarks made by the appellant amounted to abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. Held, to sustain a charge under Section 306 IPC, there must be a clear proximate link between the act of the accused and the commission of suicide. Mere disapproval of a relationship or casual remarks do not amount to instigation under Section 107 IPC unless accompanied by clear mens rea and an act that pushes the victim to commit suicide. The remarks made by the appellant were found to be too remote and indirect to constitute abetment of suicide. There was no evidence of intentional aid, conspiracy, or direct instigation. A casual remark or expression of disapproval cannot be construed as instigation without any evidence of a positive act that left the deceased with no option but to commit suicide. For an act to constitute abetment of suicide under Sections 306 and 107 IPC, it must involve (i) direct or indirect instigation, (ii) proximity to the commission of suicide, and (iii) clear mens rea to abet the act. Mere disapproval or casual remarks, in the absence of intentional and proximate incitement, do not satisfy the ingredients of abetment. Appeal allowed. Proceedings against the appellant were quashed, while the trial against the other accused was allowed to continue. Laxmi Das v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 88

Section 306 - Abetment of suicide - Communications demanding repayment of a loan - Held, to constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC, there must be: (i) Instigation or intentional aiding of suicide. (ii) An active or direct role in the commission of suicide. (iii) Mens rea (guilty mind) to push the deceased to commit suicide. Mere demand for loan repayment, even if harsh or persistent, does not amount to abetment unless it leaves no option but suicide. Emotional exchanges or heated arguments without intent to incite suicide cannot be termed as instigation. Demanding loan repayment was within the appellant's duty and did not constitute instigation or abetment to suicide. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was discharged from the charges. Mere financial disputes or demands for loan repayment, without any evidence of intentional instigation or a direct act compelling the deceased to commit suicide, do not constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC. Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 80

Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - The complainant alleged that she was subjected to mental and physical harassment by the appellants, who were senior officials at the company. She claimed that she was forced to resign under duress, her personal belongings (including a laptop containing proprietary intellectual property) were confiscated, and she was forcibly removed from the premises by security personnel. The chargesheet accused the appellants of assault, criminal intimidation, and outraging the complainant's modesty. The High Court dismissed the appellants' petitions to quash the chargesheet, leading to the present appeals. Held: Section 323 IPC (Voluntarily Causing Hurt): The complaint and chargesheet did not establish that the appellants voluntarily caused hurt to the complainant. The alleged assault was attributed to security personnel, not the appellants. Thus, no prima facie case under Section 323 IPC was made out. Sections 504 & 509 IPC (Intentional Insult and Outraging Modesty): The use of "filthy language" by the appellants, as alleged in the chargesheet, was insufficient to establish intentional insult or outraging of modesty. The complaint lacked specific details or context to prove the requisite intent or knowledge to insult the complainant's modesty. Section 506 IPC (Criminal Intimidation): The allegations of threats by the appellants were related to termination of employment, which is a civil dispute. No prima facie case of criminal intimidation was made out. Section 511 IPC (Attempt to Commit Offences): Since the ingredients of the primary offences (Sections 323, 504, 506, and 509 IPC) were not established, the charge under Section 511 IPC could not stand. The criminal proceedings against the appellants were an abuse of the legal process and amounted to a travesty of justice. The chargesheet and proceedings were quashed, and the High Court's order was set aside. However, the Court clarified that its findings would not affect the pending labour dispute between the parties. Appeals allowed. Madhushree Datta v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 108

Sections 323, 294, 500, 504, and 506 - The appellant, a police officer, challenged the order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class directing the registration of an FIR against him under Sections 323, 294, 500, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) based on a complaint filed by a practicing advocate. Whether the allegations in the complaint disclosed cognizable offences under Sections 294, 504, and 506 of the IPC. Held, mere abusive, humiliating, or defamatory words do not constitute an obscene act under Section 294 IPC. The Magistrate failed to ascertain whether the necessary ingredients of the offence were present. The allegations under Sections 504 and 506 IPC did not meet the essential elements of intentional insult or criminal intimidation. The Magistrate's order was passed without proper scrutiny of the complaint. Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Sections 326, 324, 341 and 34 - Common Intention – The incident arose from a property dispute between close relatives, resulting in a physical altercation. Accused No. 3 stabbed the complainant with a knife, causing severe injuries. Accused No. 2 was armed with a chopper and inflicted injuries on the complainant's son. The Sessions Court convicted all accused under Sections 326 and 341 read with Section 34 IPC, acquitting them under Section 307. The High Court partly allowed the appeal, reducing sentences and acquitting Accused No.1. It also converted Accused No.2's conviction from Section 326 to Section 324, reducing his sentence to the period already undergone. Whether the High Court was justified in converting the conviction of Accused No.2 from Section 326 to Section 324 and reducing his sentence, despite the presence of common intention under Section 34 IPC. Held, severity of injuries caused by individuals acting with common intention cannot justify reducing a harsher punishment to a lighter one. The High Court erred in concluding that Section 34 IPC was not made out against Accused No.2. Both Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were present at the scene, armed with deadly weapons, and actively participated in the assault. The Court observed that common intention could arise spontaneously during the incident. Thus, the conversion of conviction from Section 326 to Section 324 was incorrect. The Court restored the conviction of Accused No.2 under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced him to two years of rigorous imprisonment, similar to Accused No.3, along with a fine of ₹75,000/-. The acquittal of Accused No.1 was not disturbed. State of Karnataka v. Battegowda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 76

Section 326 – Compounding of Offense – Post-conviction compromise - Exercise of Inherent Powers - The applicant/petitioner, convicted under Section 326 IPC for causing grievous hurt and sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment, sought compounding of the offense based on a post-conviction compromise. Despite Section 326 IPC being non-compoundable under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Supreme Court exercised its inherent powers considering the voluntary settlement, the complainant's consent, and the need to maintain social harmony. The Court allowed the application, recalled the earlier order dismissing the Special Leave Petition, granted leave, and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone while upholding the conviction. H.N. Pandakumar v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 31

Section 353 - Ingredients of Offense - Mere allegations of "creating disturbance" do not satisfy the requirements of "criminal force" or "assault" as defined under Sections 350 and 351 IPC. For an offense under Section 353 IPC, specific acts that amount to "assault" or "criminal force" must be alleged and substantiated. Absence of essential allegations renders cognizance under Section 353 IPC invalid. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Sections 363 and 366A - Procuration of Minor Girl - Kidnapping - The prosecutrix testified that she voluntarily went with the appellant, with no evidence of coercion or force. Testimonies revealed that discussions of marriage between the appellant and prosecutrix were ongoing but opposed by her father due to caste differences. No evidence indicated illicit intent, which is essential to sustain a charge under Section 366-A IPC. The prosecutrix's sister, who allegedly saw the incident of kidnapping, was not produced as a witness, weakening the prosecution's case. Medical evidence suggested the prosecutrix's age ranged between 16-18 years. In the absence of contrary evidence, the possibility of her being 18 years old could not be ruled out, impacting the kidnapping charge. The absence of bodily injuries does not negate allegations of sexual assault, referring to established legal principles and the Supreme Court's Handbook on Gender Stereotypes (2023). However, in this case, the prosecutrix herself stated that no force was used, and there was no evidence of sexual assault. The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of Sections 363 and 366-A IPC. The conviction was therefore unsustainable. The impugned judgment was quashed, and the appellant was discharged from his bail bond. Appeal allowed. Conviction set aside. Dalip Kumar @ Dalli v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 81

Sections 363, 366, 376, 342, 506 - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Section 4 - Credibility of the testimony of the prosecutrix - Delay in lodging FIR and contradictions in testimony - Requirement of confidence-inspiring evidence for conviction in rape cases - An FIR was lodged based on the statement of the prosecutrix, aged 16 years, alleging that the accused kidnapped her, threatened her with a knife, and sexually assaulted her. The Trial Court acquitted the accused citing inconsistencies in the testimony, unexplained delay in filing the FIR, and lack of corroborative evidence. The High Court upheld the acquittal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court that the testimony of the prosecutrix did not inspire confidence. It was noted that: The prosecutrix's statement had multiple contradictions. There was no corroborative medical evidence of physical injuries. The delay in lodging the FIR was unexplained. Conviction in rape cases can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, but such testimony must be credible and consistent, which was not the case here. The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal of the respondent was upheld. State (Gnct of Delhi) v. Vipin @ Lalla, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Section 363 and 366 - Kidnapping from lawful guardianship - Age of the victim crucial for invoking Sections 361 and 363 IPC - Victim was 19 years old at the time of the incident, and thus, the provisions of Sections 361 and 363 IPC were not applicable. Venkatesha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 116

Section 415 and 420 - The complaint did not establish the essential elements of cheating under Section 415 IPC. The appellant had not deceived the 4th respondent, nor had the 4th respondent suffered any harm or damage due to the sale deeds. The Court noted that the 4th respondent had filed the FIR two years after initiating civil suits, suppressing the fact that civil proceedings were already pending. This delay and suppression indicated an abuse of the legal process. The appeal was allowed, and the FIR and related proceedings were quashed. The Court emphasized that the dispute was primarily civil in nature and that the initiation of criminal proceedings was an abuse of process. Jit Vinayak Arolkar v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 38

Section 498A - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Section 4 - Groom refuses to cooperate with wedding reception over gold demand - The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for harassing his wife for dowry. The High Court modified the sentence from three years to two years imprisonment under Section 498A IPC, with one year imprisonment under Section 4 of the DP Act, to run concurrently. The Court relied on the testimonies of PW-1 (family friend), PW-4 (wife/de facto complainant), PW-7 (mother of PW-4), and PW-11 (photographer), which established the appellant's demand for 100 sovereigns of gold and harassment of PW-4. The Court noted the appellant's willingness to render community service as an IT professional and the prolonged duration of the case. The conviction was upheld, but the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone (approximately 3 months), considering the prolonged litigation (19 years) and the fact that both parties had moved on in life, with a direction to pay compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- to the victim. The appeal was partly allowed. M. Venkateswaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 117

Practice and Procedure

All constitutional courts in India accept oral statements made by counsels on behalf of parties, and an order cannot be reviewed solely on the ground that consent was not provided in writing. Rimpa Saha v. District Primary School Council Malda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 143

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Section 13(1)(b) r/w. 13(2) - Disproportionate Assets - Income Tax Returns - Quashing of FIR - Economic Inflation - Long-Term Asset Valuation - The Appellant argued that his wife's income and other declared sources of income were not properly considered in the calculation of assets. The Appellant submitted income tax returns and other supporting documents to justify the declared assets. Held, the income of the Appellant's wife and other declared sources were not adequately considered by the Vigilance Department. It was observed that while calculating disproportionate assets over a long period (1996-2020), inflation and economic changes should be considered. Referring to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 the Court noted that powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could be exercised when allegations in the FIR do not constitute any offence. The Court found that the alleged disproportionate assets were not substantiated when the Appellant's and his wife's declared income was properly accounted for. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the Appellant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed. Nirankar Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 90

Section 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) - LIC Officer - The appellant, a Development Officer of Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), was convicted for offenses under Sections 468, 465, 420 read with Section 120(B) IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. He was found guilty of fraudulently obtaining the settlement of insurance claims by projecting the insured as deceased, despite the insured being alive. The trial court sentenced the appellant to two years of rigorous imprisonment for most offenses under the IPC and three years for offenses under the PC Act. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence. Whether the appellant could be convicted under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Held, an officer of LIC is considered a public servant under the PC Act, making them liable for offenses under the Act if corruption is proven. As a Development Officer of LIC, established under the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956, the appellant was a public servant under Section 2(c)(iii) of the PC Act. Therefore, his conviction under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act was justified. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and sentences imposed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court. Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 89

Sections 7, 13(2), 19(3) and (4) - Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the Sanction Order and the consequent proceedings when the trial had already commenced and seven witnesses had been examined. Held, the High Court erred in quashing the Sanction Order and the proceedings without examining whether any failure of justice had occurred due to the alleged incompetency in granting the sanction. As per Section 19 (3) and (4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the absence or error in sanction does not invalidate the proceedings unless it resulted in a failure of justice, which was neither pleaded by the respondent nor established by the High Court. The matter of competency of the sanctioning authority is to be determined as an issue of evidence during the trial. The appellate or revisional court should not interfere with an order passed by the Special Judge on the ground of an invalid sanction unless it leads to a failure of justice, as per Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The appeal was allowed, and the trial proceedings were ordered to continue, reaffirming the principle that technical errors in sanction do not vitiate proceedings unless they cause a failure of justice. State of Punjab v. Hari Kesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 62

Section 7 - Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946; Section 6 - Consent of State Government - Bifurcation of States - CBI challenged the judgment of the High Court which quashed criminal proceedings in two cases involving allegations of corruption. The respondents were accused of demanding and accepting illegal gratification while serving as public servants in the Central departments. The High Court held that the CBI lacked jurisdiction to register and investigate the FIRs in Telangana for offences committed in Andhra Pradesh, as the State of Andhra Pradesh had not granted specific consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. The High Court also ruled that the absence of a notification designating a Special Court under the PC Act vitiated the proceedings. Held, the Supreme Court examined the impact of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, and the continuity of laws post-bifurcation. It held that the general consent granted to the CBI prior to bifurcation continued to apply to both Telangana and Andhra Pradesh unless explicitly repealed or amended. The Court emphasized that the CBI's jurisdiction to investigate offences under the PC Act involving Central Government employees did not require State consent, as the PC Act is a Central legislation. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restoring the criminal cases to the Special Judge for CBI Cases for trial. The Court clarified that the CBI's jurisdiction and the validity of the proceedings were not vitiated by the absence of State consent or notification, as the offences involved Central Government employees and were governed by Central laws. The appeals were allowed, and the quashed proceedings were reinstated, with directions for the trial court to proceed in accordance with the law. Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Satish Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 11

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Applicability of Cr.P.C. to PMLA - The Court clarified that Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which incorporates the requirement of Article 22(2), applies to PMLA proceedings by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA. There is no inconsistency between the PMLA and Cr.P.C. in this regard. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Duty of Courts to Uphold Fundamental Rights - The Court reiterated that when a court finds that the fundamental rights of an accused have been violated during or after arrest, it is the court's duty to release the accused on bail. The illegality of the arrest vitiates the detention, and bail cannot be denied based on the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's bail was upheld. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Prisoners Act, 1900

Section 29 - The respondent, a life convict, serving a sentence for multiple offenses, was transferred from Hazaribagh Central Jail to Dumka Central Jail by the Inspector General of Prisons, Jharkhand citing security concerns and the risk of a gang war within the prison. The respondent challenged the transfer before the High Court, which quashed the transfer order, relying on a previous order and a character certificate issued by the Jail Superintendent. The State appealed the High Court's decision, arguing that the transfer was necessary for prison security and the safety of the respondent. Held, the transfer of the respondent was lawful under Section 29 of the Prisoners Act, 1900, and Rule 770(b) of the State Jail Manual. The Inspector General of Prisons has the authority to transfer prisoners based on administrative grounds, including security concerns. Such transfers are not arbitrary if based on tangible inputs and are necessary for maintaining prison discipline and safety. The High Court's reliance on a previous order and the character certificate was misplaced, as the respondent was now a convict, not an undertrial prisoner. The transfer was justified to prevent potential gang violence and ensure the safety of the respondent and other inmates. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the transfer order issued by the Inspector General of Prisons. The Court directed the State of Jharkhand to ensure the protection of the respondent's fundamental rights and expedite the formulation of a Jail Manual for effective prison administration. The appeal was allowed, and the transfer of the respondent was deemed lawful and necessary for prison security. The Court emphasized the importance of balancing administrative discretion with prisoners' rights and called for reforms in prison administration. State of Jharkhand v. Vikash Tiwary @ Bikash Tiwary @ Bikash Nath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 78

Model Prison Manual, 2016 - Prison Reforms - The Court underscored the need for prison reforms and the protection of prisoners' rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. It directed the State of Jharkhand to expedite the formulation of a Jail Manual based on the 2016 Model Prison Manual to ensure effective prison administration. State of Jharkhand v. Vikash Tiwary @ Bikash Tiwary @ Bikash Nath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 78

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

Section 11 - The appellant along with other accused, was convicted under various sections of IPC including Sections 148, 307/149, 326, 323/149, and 452. The High Court partly allowed the appeal, acquitted charges under Sections 307, 148, and 149 IPC but upheld his conviction under Sections 326, 325, 452, and 323 IPC, modifying his sentence. A related criminal case involving a clash between two family groups on the same day was settled amicably, and the accused in that case were granted the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The appellant sought similar relief, citing the settlement and prolonged legal proceedings. The Supreme Court, considering the settlement between the parties, the appellant's age (70 years), and the fact that he had already served over four months of his six-month sentence, extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the appellant. The Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and Section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, directing the appellant's release on executing a personal bond of Rs. 10,000 with a surety of like amount for six months. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted probation under the same terms as the accused in the cross case, with an additional Rs. 100 imposed as prosecution expenses. The Court emphasized the interconnected nature of the cross cases and the need for consistency in judicial outcomes. Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 43

Section 12 - When a Court confirms a conviction but extends the benefit of probation on grounds of good conduct, it cannot deny the consequential benefit which is the removal of disqualification, if any, attached to the conviction. Amit Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Issuance of bailable warrant - Proceedings under the D.V. Act are quasi-criminal and do not warrant such coercive measures unless there is a violation of a protection order. Alisha Berry v. Neelam Berry, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 33

Railways Act, 1989

Section 143 - Scope of - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Whether the creation of multiple/fake user IDs by an individual (authorized or unauthorized) to procure and supply railway e-tickets through the IRCTC portal constitutes an offence under Section 143 of the Railways Act, 1989. Whether the criminal proceedings in the two sets of appeals were rightly quashed by the High Courts. The Managing Director of a finance company was accused of creating fraudulent user IDs to procure and sell railway e-tickets without authorization. The Kerala High Court quashed the criminal proceedings, holding that Section 143 did not apply to online ticket sales as the provision predated the internet era. Connected Appeals, an authorized railway ticket agent, was accused of creating multiple user IDs to procure and sell e-tickets for illegal gain. The Madras High Court refused to quash the proceedings, holding that such actions violated Section 143. Held: Section 143 prohibits unauthorized persons (not being railway servants or authorized agents) from carrying on the business of procuring and supplying railway tickets, irrespective of the mode (physical or online). The provision is broad enough to cover technological advancements like e-ticketing, even if such developments were not contemplated when the Act was enacted. The Kerala High Court erred in holding that Section 143 was inapplicable to online ticket sales. The criminal proceedings were wrongly quashed by the Kerala High Court. Being an unauthorized agent, prima facie committed an offence under Section 143 by creating fake user IDs to sell tickets. The Supreme Court restored the proceedings against him. J. In connected appeals as an authorized agent, the accused could not be prosecuted under Section 143 for creating multiple user IDs, as the provision does not criminalize such actions by authorized agents. The Madras High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings was overturned, and the criminal proceedings were quashed. The lead appeal was allowed, and the criminal proceedings were restored. The connected appeals were allowed, and the criminal proceedings were quashed. Section 143 is a penal provision aimed at preventing unauthorized procurement and supply of railway tickets, regardless of the mode of sale. Authorized agents cannot be prosecuted under Section 143 for breaches of contract terms; such disputes must be resolved through civil remedies. The Kerala High Court's interpretation of Section 143 as inapplicable to online ticket sales was erroneous. Inspector, Railway Protection Force v. Mathew K. Cherian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) - Essential ingredients of - "within public view" - The Appellant was accused of abusing a Revenue Inspector by using his caste name in a government office, leading to charges under Sections 294(b) and 353 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act. The High Court dismissed the Appellant's petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the criminal proceedings. Whether the incident occurred in a place "within public view" as required under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, and whether the High Court erred in not quashing the proceedings. Held, For an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, the act of insult or abuse must occur in a place "within public view." A place "within public view" refers to a location where members of the public can witness or hear the incident, even if it is a private place. The incident occurred within the confines of the Revenue Inspector's office, and not in a place "within public view." Therefore, the essential ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act were not satisfied. The Court quashed the criminal proceedings, ruling that the High Court failed to consider this crucial aspect. The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of proving that an offence under the SC-ST Act occurred in a place "within public view." Since the incident took place in a private office without public witnesses, the charges under the SC-ST Act were not sustainable, and the proceedings were quashed. Karuppudayar v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 133

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002

Jurisdiction of Civil Courts vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) - Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the validity of a sale deed and mortgage deed, or whether such matters fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the DRT under the SARFAESI Act. Held, Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the validity of the sale deed and mortgage deed, as these matters do not fall within the scope of the DRT's powers under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The DRT is only empowered to examine whether the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act are in accordance with the law, and it cannot adjudicate on title disputes or the validity of documents executed prior to the invocation of the SARFAESI Act. The DRT's powers are limited to restoring possession to the borrower or someone claiming through the borrower. It cannot hand over possession to a third party who was never in possession. The DRT also lacks jurisdiction to decide on the validity of sale deeds or mortgage deeds, which are matters for the civil court. Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96

Section 34 - The respondent filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that a sale deed and mortgage deed were null and void, and for possession of the suit property. The property was allegedly sold by her brother-in-law without her consent, and the buyer mortgaged it to the Central Bank of India. The Bank filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, arguing that the civil court had no jurisdiction due to Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, which bars civil courts from entertaining matters that the DRT is empowered to decide. The trial court rejected the plaint, but the High Court reversed this decision, holding that the civil court had jurisdiction to decide the validity of the sale and mortgage deeds, as these matters were outside the scope of the DRT's powers. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Court emphasized that the DRT's powers are limited and do not extend to adjudicating on title disputes or the validity of documents. The civil suits were allowed to proceed, and the interim orders were vacated. Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96

Service Law

The appellant, a Senior Medical Officer with 34 years of unblemished service, was served a charge-sheet 11 days before his retirement on March 31, 2017, alleging misconduct, including non-compliance with Election Commission directives, unauthorized leave, and failure to participate in the pulse polio program. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and the appellant was denied an extension of service. An inquiry officer was appointed a year later, and the appellant was found guilty of most charges, leading to a 2% permanent pension cut. The High Court modified the penalty to a 2% pension cut for 5 years, but the appellant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Whether the disciplinary proceedings and the penalty imposed were justified. Whether the High Court's modification of the penalty was adequate. Whether the appellant's procedural rights were violated during the inquiry. Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and the disciplinary authority's penalty, holding that the charges were not substantiated by legal evidence. The Court found that the inquiry officer's findings were based on perceived moral duties rather than the actual charges, and the disciplinary authority failed to provide a fair hearing. The appellant was exonerated of all charges, and the Court directed the restoration of his full pension, along with repayment of deducted amounts with 6% interest. The Court also awarded costs of ₹50,000 to the appellant, citing mala fide intent by the respondents in initiating disciplinary proceedings as retaliation for the appellant's prior litigation against high-ranking officials. The Court emphasized that disciplinary actions must be based on legal evidence and procedural fairness, and penalties must be proportionate to the misconduct. The Court deprecated the misuse of disciplinary proceedings to target employees, especially those nearing retirement, for personal vendettas. The Election Commission's policy exempting employees nearing retirement from election duty was highlighted, and the Court found the disciplinary action contrary to this policy. The appellant's full pension was restored, and deducted amounts were ordered to be repaid with interest. Costs of ₹50,000 were awarded to the appellant, with liberty for the State to recover the amount from responsible officials. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing all penalties and restoring the appellant's pension, while condemning the misuse of disciplinary proceedings for personal vendettas. Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 85

The respondent, a former branch manager of Syndicate Bank, was accused of financial irregularities, including fictitious debits, fraudulent withdrawals, and misappropriation of funds during his tenure at the Mudigubba branch (2007-2008). A disciplinary inquiry found the charges proven, leading to his dismissal in 2012. The respondent was acquitted in criminal proceedings but failed to overturn the dismissal in subsequent appeals. The High Court set aside the dismissal, citing lack of evidence and procedural unfairness, and ordered reinstatement with full benefits. Whether the disciplinary inquiry was conducted fairly and based on sufficient evidence. Whether the High Court erred in interfering with the disciplinary authority's decision. Whether the penalty of dismissal was proportionate to the misconduct. Held, the disciplinary inquiry was fair, principles of natural justice were followed, and the findings were based on substantial evidence, including the respondent's admissions and documentary proof. The Court reiterated that acquittal in criminal proceedings does not exonerate an employee in disciplinary proceedings, as the standards of proof differ. However, considering the respondent's long unblemished service (21 years), the pressure of work, and the reimbursement of the financial loss, the penalty of dismissal was deemed disproportionate. The Court modified the penalty to a reduction in the time scale of pay for one year, without cumulative effect or adverse impact on pension. The appeal was partly allowed. The findings of misconduct were upheld, but the penalty was reduced to a minor penalty under Regulation 4(e) of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The respondent was entitled to retiral benefits, to be paid within four months. The judgment reaffirms the high standards of integrity expected from bank officers and the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters. It underscores the principle of proportionality in imposing penalties, especially in cases involving long-standing employees with otherwise clean records. General Manager Personnel Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 92

Promotion - Direct Recruitment - Procedure - Whether an employee is entitled to claim promotion to a post that is required to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment, and not through promotion from a feeder cadre? Whether a vacancy meant for direct recruitment can be filled merely by issuing an internal circular, without a public advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates? The importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid miscarriage of justice. The petitioner, employed as a peon since 1978, sought promotion to the post of Tracer, claiming eligibility based on a 3-month training course. The Administrative Tribunal initially directed the State to consider her case for promotion. However, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order, holding that the post of Tracer was to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the Orissa Subordinate Architectural Service Rules, 1979. The petitioner challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Held, the post of Tracer, as per the 1979 Rules, is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment and not through promotion. Rule 5(1)(e) of the 1979 Rules explicitly states that all posts of Tracers in Categories I, II, and III shall be filled by direct recruitment. The petitioner, being a peon, was not eligible for promotion to the post of Tracer, as it is not a promotional post under the Rules. The Court reiterated that direct recruitment to public posts must follow a transparent process, including public advertisements and competitive examinations, as mandated by Rule 7 of the 1979 Rules. The State's failure to issue a public advertisement and follow the prescribed procedure rendered the appointments invalid. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91

Deputation and Pension – Right to Absorption – Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules - West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules – No right to absorption in borrowed department – Service rendered by a state government employee on a deputation basis in a central government's department would not entitle him to pension as per Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972 - Appeal Allowed. Union of India v. Phani Bhusan Kundu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Frivolous Litigation - The petitioner, a former employee of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), was dismissed in 2000 for habitual absenteeism and misconduct. Despite multiple judicial and administrative forums upholding his dismissal, the petitioner engaged in persistent and frivolous litigation, including filing multiple review petitions, appeals, and complaints alleging corruption against judges. The Court condemned the petitioner's abuse of the judicial process, emphasizing that such conduct wastes valuable judicial time and resources. The Court imposed a cost of ₹1,00,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority, as a deterrent against unscrupulous litigants. The SLP and the application for condonation of delay were dismissed, and the Court underscored the need to curb frivolous litigation to ensure timely justice for genuine cases. Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 57

Promotion - Eligibility criteria - Medical Education Service - Post of Associate Professor - Distinction Between Administrative and Teaching Cadres - Whether the High Court of Kerala was justified in interfering with the promotion to the post of Associate Professor in the Department of Neurosurgery on the ground of lacking five years of physical teaching experience as an Assistant Professor after acquiring the M.Ch. degree. Whether Government Order (G.O.) dated April 7, 2008, or G.O. dated December 14, 2009, governed the eligibility criteria for promotion to the post of Associate Professor in the Medical Education Service. Whether the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules (KS & SSR), particularly Rule 10(ab), applied to the promotional appointment in question. Held, G.O. dated April 7, 2008, which governed the recruitment and promotion in the Medical Education Service, did not explicitly require five years of teaching experience after acquiring the M.Ch. degree for promotion to the post of Associate Professor. The absence of such a requirement in the Teaching Cadre (Branch-II) was deliberate, as it was explicitly mentioned in the Administrative Cadre (Branch-I). The Court applied the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing excludes the other) to conclude that the omission of the phrase “after acquiring postgraduate degree” in the Teaching Cadre was intentional. Rule 10(ab) of the KS & SSR, which generally requires experience to be gained after acquiring the basic qualification, was held inapplicable to the promotional appointment in question. The Court reasoned that G.O. dated April 7, 2008, being a special rule, superseded the general rules under the KS & SSR. The phrase “unless otherwise specified” in Rule 10(ab) allowed for exceptions, and the specific requirements of G.O. dated April 7, 2008, constituted such an exception. The High Court's reliance on Rule 28(b)(1A) of the KS & SSR was also deemed erroneous, as it applied only when no qualified candidate was available for promotion, which was not the case here. The requirement of post-qualification experience was more relevant for administrative posts (Branch-I) than for teaching posts (Branch-II), where the emphasis was on overall teaching experience. Dr. Sharmad v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 51

Rule Against Bias - Audi Alteram Partem - Cure at Revisional Stage - Whether the selection of Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar in the year 1998 was vitiated due to violation of the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) ? Whether the cancellation of appointments without affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing (audi alteram partem) violated the principles of natural justice, and whether demonstrating prejudice is necessary to establish such a violation ? Whether the breach of natural justice at the initial stage (Collector's order) can be cured at the revisional stage (Commissioner's order) ? The appellants, relatives of members of the selection committee, were selected for the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in 1998. Their selection was challenged by an unsuccessful candidate alleging nepotism and bias. The Collector quashed the selection, citing bias and nepotism, without issuing notice to the appellants. The Commissioner and High Court upheld the decision, despite the appellants' contention that they were denied a fair hearing. Held, the selection was not vitiated by bias. The recusal of committee members with relatives among the candidates, as per the Panchayat's resolution, eliminated any reasonable likelihood of bias. The statutory definition of "relative" was not fully considered by the lower authorities, and the absence of a hearing prevented the appellants from demonstrating the fairness of the selection process. The Court found a gross violation of the principle of audi alteram partem, as the appellants were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard at the initial stage. The breach of natural justice was fundamental, and the prejudice exception did not apply. The Court emphasized that procedural fairness is inherent and cannot be dispensed with, even if no prejudice is demonstrated. The denial of natural justice at the initial stage could not be cured at the revisional stage. The appellate process cannot rectify a fundamentally flawed initial decision, especially when the revisional authority did not conduct a fresh hearing or address the procedural defects. The selection process was not vitiated by bias, but the cancellation of appointments without a fair hearing violated the principles of natural justice. Given the 25-year tenure of the appellants under interim orders, the Court declined to remand the matter for fresh inquiry, deeming it impractical and unjust. The judgment reaffirms the importance of procedural fairness in administrative decisions, emphasizing that the principles of natural justice, particularly the right to a fair hearing, are fundamental and cannot be overlooked. The Court also clarified that the rule against bias must be assessed contextually, and the doctrine of necessity may apply in cases where recusal is impractical due to small jurisdictions or statutory mandates. Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129

Employees appointed on a temporary basis against sanctioned posts are entitled to a regular pay scale after completing three years of service, as per the relevant government circular. The designation of employees as "part-time" does not negate their entitlement to a regular pay scale if they are appointed against sanctioned posts and fulfill the conditions of the applicable rules. The absence of a Screening Committee for scrutinizing eligibility does not justify denying benefits to employees who are otherwise similarly situated to those who have received such benefits. The appellants were granted the benefit of a regular pay scale, and the State was directed to pay arrears accordingly. Rakesh Kumar Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 136

Recruitment - Qualification - Teacher Eligibility Test - Whether the High Court erred in permitting candidates with Central Teacher Eligibility Test (CTET) or State Teacher Eligibility Test (STET) qualifications to participate in the recruitment process for Assistant Teachers in Jharkhand, despite the Jharkhand Teacher Eligibility Test (JTET) being the prescribed eligibility criterion under the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023? Whether the State of Jharkhand acted arbitrarily by altering the eligibility criteria mid-way through the recruitment process, in violation of the principles laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 864 ? Whether the State Government has the authority to relax the minimum qualifications for teacher recruitment under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) Guidelines, 2011 ? Held, the Jharkhand High Court erred in permitting CTET and STET qualified candidates to participate in the ongoing recruitment process for Assistant Teachers in Jharkhand. The Court emphasized that the eligibility criteria, as per the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023, required candidates to pass the JTET, and this criterion could not be altered mid-way through the recruitment process. The Court reiterated the principle laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak that the eligibility criteria for recruitment cannot be changed after the recruitment process has commenced, as it would violate the guarantee of equal opportunity under Article 16 of the Constitution. The State's decision to relax the eligibility criteria based on the Advocate General's concession was deemed arbitrary and unfair. The State Government does not have the authority to relax the minimum qualifications for teacher recruitment under the RTE Act and NCTE Guidelines unless the Central Government issues a notification under Section 23(2) of the RTE Act. The State's actions in this case were not in compliance with the statutory framework. The impugned judgment of the High Court permitting CTET and STET holders to participate in the recruitment process was set aside. Only JTET holders who possessed the requisite qualifications under the 2022 Recruitment Rules prior to the 2024 amendment were declared eligible for appointment. CTET and STET holders who applied after the High Court's judgment or the amendment in the rules were deemed ineligible for recruitment under Advertisement No. 13/2023. The appeals were allowed, and the recruitment process was directed to proceed strictly in accordance with the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023, without any mid-way alterations to the eligibility criteria. Parimal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Role of Teachers - The Court highlighted the pivotal role of teachers in shaping the future of the nation, especially in primary and upper primary education. Teachers are instrumental in moulding young minds, instilling values, and preparing students to be responsible citizens. The Court emphasized the need for teachers to adapt to modern challenges, including the use of technology and artificial intelligence, while guiding students to discern right from wrong. Parimal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Transfer - Distinction between transfers on request and transfers by absorption in public interest - Determination of seniority of employees absorbed from the Directorate of Health Services (DHS) into the Directorate of Medical Education (DME) following the abolition of the dual control system in medical colleges in Kerala - Held, the transfer of employees from DHS to DME was a result of a policy decision by the Kerala government to abolish the dual control system, and the absorption was not based on the employees' request but on their option to join DME. The proviso to Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules (KS&SS Rules), which applies to transfers on request, does not apply to transfers by absorption made in public interest or administrative exigency. The seniority of the absorbed employees should be maintained as per Rule 27(a) and 27(c) of the KS&SS Rules, meaning their seniority would include their past service in DHS. The Division Bench's judgment was set aside, and the State of Kerala was directed to prepare the seniority list of DME employees, including both original and absorbed employees, in accordance with the Court's ruling. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the absorbed employees, holding that their seniority should include their past service in DHS, as the transfer was a result of a policy decision and not a request-based transfer. Geetha V.M. v. Rethnasenan K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 39

Prolonged suspension - Reinstatement - Subsistence Allowance - The applicant, an Assistant Superintendent (Jail), sought revocation of his suspension which was extended periodically. The suspension followed allegations of providing undue facilities to ex-promoters/directors of Unitech Ltd. who were under trial for financial misappropriation involving home buyers' funds. The Supreme Court directed the suspension of 32 Tihar Jail officials, including the applicant, pending further proceedings. The applicant argued for reinstatement, citing the prolonged suspension and lack of progress in the criminal case. The Court recalled the suspension order, leaving it to the Competent Authority to decide on reinstatement based on whether it would impede the ongoing departmental proceedings. The Court noted that suspended officials are entitled to 75% of their pay as subsistence allowance after six months of suspension, unless denied for valid reasons. Bhupinder Singh v. Unitech Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 147

Societies Registration Act, 1975 (Tamil Nadu)

Whether prior approval from the District Registrar is required before passing a Special Resolution for the amalgamation of societies under Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. Whether societies with divergent objectives can amalgamate under the Act. Held, Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, requires approval from the District Registrar for amalgamation but does not mandate such approval before passing the Special Resolution by the societies. There is no statutory requirement that societies seeking amalgamation must have identical objectives. The Inspector General of Registration and the High Court erred in interpreting the statutory provisions and imposing additional conditions not prescribed by the law. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Single Judge, Division Bench of the High Court, and the Inspector General of Registration, restoring the District Registrar's approval of the amalgamation. Appeal allowed. Manurkula Devanga Vasaga Salai v. Inspector General of Registration, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Special Investigation Team

The petitioners sought anticipatory bail involving allegations of corruption and fraudulent compensation payments by NOIDA officials. The Court noted that the interim protection granted to the petitioners had been confirmed as they had joined the investigation. The Court expressed dissatisfaction with the earlier Fact-Finding Committee's investigation, which had deviated from its mandate by questioning judicial orders on compensation. Consequently, the Court constituted a Special Investigation Team (SIT) comprising senior IPS officers from outside Uttar Pradesh to ensure transparency and fairness. The SIT was tasked with investigating: (1) whether compensation payments exceeded legal entitlements, (2) identifying responsible officials, (3) examining collusion between beneficiaries and NOIDA officials, and (4) assessing NOIDA's overall transparency and public interest commitment. The SIT was directed to submit its report within two months, and no coercive action was to be taken against landowners/farmers without the Court's prior permission. Virendra Singh Nagar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 28 - Doctrine of Merger - Whether the trial court's decree merges with the appellate court's decree, and whether the time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration, as stipulated in the trial court's decree, revives after the appellate court's decision. The plaintiffs filed suits for specific performance of agreements to sell, which were decreed by the trial court in 1994, directing the plaintiffs to deposit the balance sale consideration within 20 days. The defendants appealed, and the first appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. The plaintiffs then filed second appeals, which were allowed by the High Court in 2018, restoring the trial court's decree. The plaintiffs deposited the balance sale consideration in 2018, and the defendants filed applications under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of the contract, which were rejected by the executing court. The High Court upheld the executing court's decision, leading to the present appeals. Held, the doctrine of merger applies irrespective of whether the appellate court affirms, modifies, or reverses the trial court's decree. The doctrine of merger ensures that only one operative decree exists at any given time, and the appellate court's decree supersedes the trial court's decree. The trial court's decree merged with the High Court's decree in the second appeals. Since the High Court did not specify a time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration, the 20-day period stipulated by the trial court did not revive. The executing court has the discretion to extend the time for depositing the amount, and there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiffs. Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 82

Section 28 - Rescission of Contract - Whether the defendants (judgment debtors) were entitled to rescind the contract on the grounds that the plaintiffs (decree holders) failed to deposit the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time. Held, under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the executing court retains jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration, even after the decree for specific performance has been passed. The court's power to extend time is discretionary and must be exercised based on the conduct of the parties and the facts of the case. The defendants were not entitled to rescind the contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as the plaintiffs had deposited the balance sale consideration promptly after the High Court's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the High Court committed no error in rejecting the defendants' applications for rescission of the contract. The Court reaffirmed the principles of the doctrine of merger and the discretionary powers of the executing court under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 82

Section 12 - Specific Performance of Part of Contract - Legal Principle - Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 allows specific performance of part of a contract only if: The plaintiff is ready and willing to perform their obligations. The contract terms are severable, and the plaintiff relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part and to any compensation. Inability to perform may arise due to various factors, including legal prohibitions or deficiencies in quantity or quality of the subject matter. Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 59

Section 12 (3) – Specific Performance of Part of Contract – Readiness and Willingness to Perform - The petitioner filed suit for specific performance of an agreement and delivery of possession of the suit property. In the alternative, he claimed damages of Rs. 60,00,000/- with interest. The Trial Court dismissed the prayer for specific performance, finding the petitioner was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but directed a refund of Rs. 20,00,000/- with 12% interest. The High Court affirmed this decision, holding that Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act was not applicable as the petitioner had not relinquished all claims and was seeking damages. Whether the petitioner was entitled to specific performance of part of the contract under Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act despite not relinquishing all claims to performance of the remaining part of the contract or compensation. Held, Section 12(3) is a discretionary relief and cannot be invoked where the terms of the contract are not severable or when the plaintiff has not relinquished all claims to performance and compensation. Section 12(3) could not be invoked as the petitioner sought damages in addition to specific performance, indicating non-relinquishment of claims. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court that the petitioner was not ready and willing to perform his contractual obligations. Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 59

Stamp

Stamp Act, 1899; Section 47-A – Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 1968; Rules 3, 4, 6, 7 – Forms I & II – Undervaluation of property in sale deeds – Reference to Collector for determination of market value – Validity of proceedings – Held, in case of undervaluation of property sale's price, the Registering Authority under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 cannot mechanically make reference to the Collector (stamps) for determination of the correct market value of the property. Instead, an opportunity is to be provided to the party, and reasons have to be furnished by the Registering Authority for arriving at a conclusion that the property is undervalued. The Registering Officer must record reasons for believing undervaluation before referring the instrument to the Collector. A roving inquiry is impermissible. Form I notice must contain reasons for considering the document undervalued. Absence of reasons vitiates the inquiry. Collector (Stamps) must pass a provisional order under Rule 4(4) indicating the basis of valuation before issuing Form II. Issuing a final order directly without a provisional order and opportunity for representation violates Rules 4 and 6. "Reason to believe" under Section 47-A is not subjective satisfaction but must be based on material having a rational connection to the belief of undervaluation. The Registering Officer cannot refuse registration merely because the document is undervalued. Their power is limited, and they cannot conduct a detailed inquiry, which is the Collector's prerogative. The Collector's power to determine market value is quasi-judicial, requiring adherence to procedural rules and principles of natural justice. The High Court's view that Form I must contain reasons for undervaluation and the Collector must follow the prescribed procedure is upheld. Appeals dismissed. Chief Revenue Controlling Officer Cum Inspector General of Registration v. P. Babu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 40

Stamp Act, 1958 (Maharashtra); Section 48(1) - Refund of stamp duty - Cancellation Deed - Applicability of Limitation Period - The Appellants entered into an Agreement to Sell on August 30, 2014, for the purchase of a residential flat in Mumbai, paying ₹27,34,500 as stamp duty. Due to delays in possession, the Appellants canceled the agreement, and a Cancellation Deed was executed on March 17, 2015, but registered on April 28, 2015. The Appellants applied for a refund of the stamp duty on August 6, 2016, contending that their case fell under the pre-amendment regime, which allowed a two-year window for refund claims. The CCRA initially granted the refund on January 8, 2018, but later recalled the order on March 3, 2018, citing the amended six-month limitation period. The High Court dismissed the Appellants' writ petition, holding that the amended limitation period applied, and the CCRA's recall of the refund order was valid. Whether the amended six-month limitation period under Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, introduced on April 24, 2015, applies to the Appellants' claim for stamp duty refund, given that the Cancellation Deed was executed before the amendment but registered thereafter. Held, technicalities of limitation should not defeat legitimate claims, especially when the claimant is not at fault. The Appellants' right to claim a refund accrued on the date of execution of the Cancellation Deed (March 17, 2015), which was before the amendment. Therefore, the unamended two-year limitation period under Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, applied. The Court emphasized that amendments reducing limitation periods cannot extinguish vested rights retrospectively. Harshit Harish Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Stamp Act, 1958 (Maharashtra); Section 48(1) - Refund of stamp duty - Whether the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) had the statutory power to review and recall its earlier order granting a refund of stamp duty. Held, the CCRA lacked statutory authority to review or recall its earlier order granting the refund. The subsequent orders recalling the refund were vitiated in law, as the CCRA had no express power of review under the Act. The statutory authorities cannot exercise powers not conferred upon them, such as reviewing their own orders without express statutory mandate. Harshit Harish Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Succession Act, 1925

Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - Validity of a Will - Partition of Property – The Trial Court rejected the Will, holding it was not proved in accordance with the law, and granted the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in the properties. The High Court reversed this decision, upholding the validity of the Will and restricting the plaintiffs' share to Schedule A property alone. Held, a propounder who substantially benefits from a Will and participates in its execution raises suspicion, which must be dispelled with clear evidence. The propounder is expected to testify about the proper execution, the presence of attesting witnesses, and other key details. Under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, presenting one attesting witness is insufficient to prove execution unless they confirm the presence and actions of the other attesting witnesses. The Will was not proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of the attesting witnesses was insufficient, and the propounder of the Will failed to establish its due execution. The Court noted suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, including the lack of proper attestation and the involvement of the propounder in its preparation. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decision, granting the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in both Schedule A and Schedule B properties. The judgment reiterates the strict requirements for proving a Will under the Indian Succession Act and the Evidence Act, emphasizing the need for proper attestation and the removal of suspicious circumstances by the propounder. It also highlights the Court's role in ensuring that testamentary documents are executed freely and voluntarily by the testator. Chinu Rani Ghosh v. Subhash Ghosh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 56

Section 63(c) - Requirement of attestation "by the direction of the testator." - Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of explicit testimony from the attesting witness regarding the testator's direction. Facts: Sanjhi Ram, the testator, executed a Will on November 7, 2005, bequeathing his property to his nephew, Gopal Krishan (Appellant No. 1). He passed away the next day. The Respondents (legal heirs of Sanjhi Ram) challenged the Will, alleging it was forged and the subsequent mutation of property was illegal. The Trial Court and the High Court held the Will invalid, citing suspicious circumstances, including the absence of testimony from the attesting witness that the testator directed the signing of the Will. The Lower Appellate Court, however, upheld the validity of the Will, ruling that the testator's mental faculties were sound, and the Will complied with legal requirements. Supreme Court's Decision: Interpretation of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925: The Court clarified that Section 63(c) provides alternative conditions for attestation: (a) The attesting witness must have seen the testator sign or affix their mark to the Will; or (b) The witness must have seen another person sign the Will in the presence and by the direction of the testator. The use of the word "or" is disjunctive, meaning compliance with either condition suffices. The High Court erred in interpreting "or" as "and," thereby imposing an unnecessary requirement that the attesting witness explicitly state the testator's direction. Validity of the Will: The testimony of the attesting witness (DW-1) confirmed that he had seen the testator affix his mark to the Will. This alone satisfied Section 63(c). The requirement of the testator's direction applies only when another person signs the Will on the testator's behalf, which was not the case here. The High Court's finding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of testimony regarding the testator's direction was incorrect. Restoration of Lower Appellate Court's Judgment: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Lower Appellate Court's decision, holding the Will valid. Consequently, the subsequent sale deeds executed by Gopal Krishan were also upheld. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the Will executed by Sanjhi Ram was valid and complied with the requirements of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The High Court's interpretation of the attestation requirements was erroneous, and the Lower Appellate Court's judgment was reinstated. Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 26

Section 63(c) - Requirement of attestation "by the direction of the testator." Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of explicit testimony from the attesting witness that the Testator directed the signing of the Will. The testator executed a Will bequeathing his property to his nephew. He passed away the next day. The Respondents challenged the Will, alleging it was forged and the subsequent mutation of property was illegal. The Trial Court and the High Court held the Will invalid, citing suspicious circumstances, including the absence of a death certificate and irregularities in the Will's execution. The Lower Appellate Court, however, upheld the Will, finding no evidence that the testator was of unsound mind or that the Will was fabricated. Held, the High Court erred in interpreting Section 63(c). The phrase "by the direction of the testator" applies only when an attesting witness sees someone other than the testator sign the Will. In this case, the attesting witness had seen the testator affix his mark, which was sufficient to comply with Section 63(c). The Court emphasized that the word "or" in Section 63(c) is disjunctive, and the requirement of "direction" is not applicable when the witness has seen the testator sign the Will. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Lower Appellate Court's decision, declaring the Will valid and the subsequent sale deeds executed lawful. The appeal was allowed, and the Will was upheld as valid. The Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, emphasizing that the requirement of "direction" is not necessary when the attesting witness has seen the testator sign the Will. Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 21

Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - A finding of valid execution does not automatically imply genuineness. Suspicious circumstances must be addressed before concluding the genuineness of a Will. Mere registration of a Will does not validate it; it must be proved in accordance with legal mandates. Lilian Coelho v. Myra Philomena Coalho, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 15

Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - Requirements of - Validity of the Will – Mere proof of execution of a Will does not make it genuine if it is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The defendants failed to prove that the testator executed the Will with a sound disposing mind and understood its contents. The stamp papers for the Will were purchased in the name of the first defendant and she played an active role in its execution, which cast doubt on its authenticity. The defendants' claim under the Will was rejected due to the suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution. Leela v. Muruganantham, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Supreme Court Rules, 2013

Order IV Rule 18 - Advocates on Record (AoRs) who are designated as Senior Advocates must inform their clients about their designation and submit a report to the Registry confirming that alternate arrangements have been made for their clients' representation. Failure to comply with this obligation would bar such Senior Advocates from appearing before the Court. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dileep, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 146

Transfer of Property Act, 1881

Section 54 - An agreement for sale of immovable property does not transfer title under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Title can only be transferred by a registered sale deed as per the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Indian Overseas Bank v. M.A.S Subramanian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Section 54 - The appellant, Indian Overseas Bank, challenged the findings of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) regarding the ownership of a property allegedly agreed to be sold to a company in exchange for shares. The NCLAT held that the company was in possession of the property by way of part performance of the contract and that the sale deed executed by legal representatives was not binding on the company. Whether the NCLAT was correct in holding that the sale deed was not binding on the company based on the company's possession under part performance of an unregistered agreement. Held, the NCLAT exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the sale deed as not binding, as no registered sale deed was executed. The Court reiterated that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, an agreement for sale does not transfer ownership rights. Consequently, the legal owner remained the same until a registered sale deed was executed. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the NCLAT's declaration regarding the non-binding nature of the sale deed. However, the Court clarified that no adjudication was made on the ownership rights claimed by the parties, and all remedies for seeking declarations or enforcing rights were kept open. This judgment reinforces the principle that title to immovable property can only be transferred through a duly registered sale deed and not merely by possession under an agreement for sale. Indian Overseas Bank v. M.A.S Subramanian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Section 52 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order I Rule 10 or Order XXII Rule 10 - Rights of transferees pendente lite - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the outcome of the litigation and may seek leave to appeal if their interests are affected. While a transferee pendente lite is not automatically entitled to be impleaded as a party, they may seek leave to appeal if their interests are prejudicially affected by the decree. However, such leave is discretionary and must be granted judiciously. In the present case, the Court found that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who purchased the suit property during the pendency of litigation and while an injunction was in force, failed to establish a valid case for leave to appeal. The Court set aside the High Court's order granting leave, holding that the Respondents could pursue separate legal remedies if they believed they were defrauded by the original owner. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Vicarious Liability

Whether the complaint under Section 4 read with Section 19 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 (PLPA) discloses any prima facie offence against the appellants. Whether the directors and officers of a company can be held vicariously liable in the absence of specific allegations. Held, vicarious liability does not automatically attach to directors or officers of a company unless there are specific allegations of personal involvement in the alleged offence. In the present case, there were no direct accusations against the appellants regarding their role in the alleged illegal uprooting of trees using JCBs. The complainant failed to array the company as an accused despite it being the entity responsible for obtaining necessary permissions for land development. The Court reaffirmed that mere designation as a director or officer does not suffice to establish liability unless there is material evidence of direct involvement in the offence. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the complaint against the appellants, reiterating that liability for environmental violations under the PLPA, 1900, cannot be imputed without clear allegations of direct participation in the offence. Sanjay Dutt v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 32

Writ Jurisdiction

Money Claim - Availability of Alternative Remedy – Long Pendency – Held, merely because an alternative remedy was available, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions after a delay of over a decade, particularly when the parties had already exchanged affidavits. Non-payment of admitted dues could be seen as arbitrary action, justifying the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court restored the writ petitions to their original numbers for fresh adjudication by the High Court, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction could be exercised even in money claims under certain circumstances. Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General Manager, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 63