Supreme Court Monthly Digest: July 2021 [Citation LL 2021 SC 279 To LL 2021 SC 335]

1. Accident By Rash Driving 26 Years Ago: Bus Driver Sentenced To Rs.2000 Fine 

[Case: Surendran v. Sub Inspector of Police; Citation: LL 2021 SC 279]

A Bench comprising Justices Ashok Bhushan, Vineet Saran and MR Shah sentenced a bus driver accused of causing accident by rash driving 26 years ago to a fine of Rs. 2000. Surendran, while driving bus caused an accident on 16.02.1995 in which a car driver was injured. He was charged with offence under Sections 279, 337 and 338 IPC. The Judicial First Class Magistrate convicted him under Section 279 IPC and 338 IPC and sentence him to undergo six months imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/- was imposed, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month under Section 337 IPC. Sessions Court and later the High Court, upheld this judgment. In appeal, Surendran submitted that he is sole bread earning member of a poor family consisting of four children and his wife, and if sent to jail after more than 21 years, will suffer irreparable injury.

"The conviction of appellant is affirmed, however, looking to the facts and circumstances of the present case specially the fact that 26 years have elapsed from the incident, we are inclined to substitute the sentence of six months imprisonment under Section 279 and 338 into fine. Six months sentence under Section 279 and 338 IPC are substituted by fine of Rs.1000/- each whereas sentence of fine under Section 337 IPC is maintained", the Bench observed while allowing the appeal. 

2. Bar Under Order XXIII Rule 3A Attracted If Compromise On The Basis Of Which Decree Was Passed Was Void Or Voidable

[Case: R. Janakiammal v. SK Kumarasamy (Deceased); Citation: LL 2021 SC 280]

A bench comprising Justices Ashok Bhushan and R. Subhash Reddy held that the Bar under Rule 3A shall be attracted if compromise on the basis of which decree was passed was void or voidable. It observed that only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and separate suit is not maintainable. 

3. Dismissal Of An Earlier Section 482 CPC Petition Does Not Bar Filing Of Subsequent Petition, If Facts So Justify

[Case: Vinod Kumar IAS v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 281]

Dismissal of an earlier Section 482 CrPC petition does not bar filing of subsequent petition under Section 482, in case the facts so justify, the Supreme Court reiterated while dismissing a writ petition filed by an IAS Officer. IAS Officer, Vinod Kumar, had approached the Apex Court by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking quashing of about 28 cases against him. The Bench comprising Justice UU Lalit and Justices Indira Banerjee and Ajay Rastogi observed that it sees no reason to entertain the petition under Article 32. "The petitioner, if so advised, can always file appropriate applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of the individual criminal cases or complaints", the bench further opined. 

4. Recovery Of Weapon Used In Commission Of Offence Is Not A Sine Qua Non For Conviction

[Case: Rakesh v. State of UP; Citation: LL 2021 SC 282]

For convicting an accused, recovery of the weapon used in commission of offence is not a sine qua non, the Supreme Court observed while upholding a conviction of a murder accused. The accused had been convicted under Section 302 r/w 34 of the IPC for having killed one Bhishampal Singh in an incident which happened on 28.01.2006. In appeal, one of the contention raised on behalf of the accused was that as per the ballistic report the bullet found does not match with the fire arm/gun recovered and therefore the use of gun as alleged is doubtful and therefore benefit of doubt must be given to the accused is concerned.

The Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that minor contradictions which do not go to the root of the matter and/or such contradictions are not material contradictions, the evidence of such witnesses cannot be brushed aside and/or disbelieved. "At the most, it can be said that the gun recovered by the police from the accused may not have been used for killing and therefore the recovery of the actual weapon used for killing can be ignored and it is to be treated as if there is no recovery at all. For convicting an accused recovery of the weapon used in commission of offence is not a sine qua non", the Bench added. 

5. Filing Of Caveat By Itself Does Not Entitle Caveators To Be Treated As A Party To The Proceeding

[Case: Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 283]

The Supreme Court observed that filing of Caveat by itself does not entitle caveators to be treated as a party to the proceeding. Justice Aniruddha Bose observed thus while considering a plea of Central Indian Police Service Association to intervene in a Special Leave Petition on the strength of caveat applications lodged by them. However, the Association had not filed any application for impleadment or intervention before the High Court, but they were heard in the case. 

"While as caveators they have the right of being notified of the lodging of the SLPs in terms of Clause 2 of Order XV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, mere filing of caveat application cannot grant them an entry into a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal. Filing of Caveat by itself does not entitle them to be treated as a party to the proceeding", the Supreme Court opined while granting them liberty to file impleadment application.

6. Managements Of Colleges Acting Contrary To Law And Later Projecting Students To Claim Equities Is Deplorable

[Case: Anakha K. v. The Admission And Fee Regulatory Committee For Medical Education In Kerala; Citation: LL 2021 SC 284]

Managements of Colleges acting contrary to law and later projecting students to claim equities is deplorable, the Supreme Court observed while disposing of a special leave petition filed by a student. In the instant case, the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee had disapproved the admission of some students in P.N. Panicker Soudhruda Ayurveda Medical College Hospital and Research Centre on the ground that they had not submitted their applications on-line. This order was challenged before the Kerala High Court by the Principal of the said College. The said writ petition was dismissed, but the students were permitted by the College to attend on-line classes for the 2nd year which commenced on 1.4.2021. In appeal, the students contended that there is no statutory provision which makes it compulsory for admissions to be made only on the basis of on-line applications.

The bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao and S. Ravindra Bhat, however, noted that the procedure that was contemplated for filling up the NRI seats through on-line counselling has not been followed by the Management. The Management should not have permitted the students to attend classes after the judgment of the High Court, especially, when there is no order passed by this Court staying the said judgment, it said. The Court added that the students should have approached the Supreme Court Court immediately after the judgment of the High Court. 

7. 'Court Cannot Be Unmindful Of The Impact Of Covid': SC Refuses To Disturb Admission Of B-Tech Students Admitted Without Entrance Test

[Case: State of Odisha v. Orissa Private Engineering College Association (OPECA); Citation: LL 2021 SC 285]

The Court cannot be unmindful of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court observed while refusing to disturb the admission to the students for the B.Tech (Engineering) degree course for academic session 2020-21 on the basis of the marks obtained in the qualifying examinations. The bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud, R. Subhash Reddy and S. Ravindra Bhatt observed, "The Court cannot be unmindful of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. The number of students who actually could appear for the entrance examination is a small proportion of the total number of seats available in the State. To displace such a body of students who have already been admitted would not be in the interests of justice. Hence, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, we are of the view that for the current year, the admission which has been granted by the institutions to 592 students under direct entry and 243 students under lateral entry to the B.Tech degree courses should not be disturbed. We are passing this direction having regard to the overwhelming hardship which has been faced during the course of the Covid-19 pandemic"

8. Trial Courts Cannot Order Denial Of Remission To Convicts While Imposing Life Imprisonment

[Case: Manohar @ Manu v. State of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 286]

The Supreme Court reiterated that Trial Courts cannot, while imposing life imprisonment, order denial of remission to the convicts. In this case, the Trial Court convicted the accused under Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code [Dacoity with murder] and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life without any entitlement of remission for a period not less than 20 years. The High Court upheld this order of the Trial Court. In appeal before the Supreme Court, the accused relied on the Constitution Bench decision in V. Sriharan case and contended that whether the trial court while imposing a sentence of life imprisonment could not have ordered denial of remission before 20 years.

"In view of the Constitution Bench judgment, the sentence denial remission for a period of 20 years is therefore unsustainable. The High Court failed to consider this aspect of the matter. We, therefore, allow the appeal only to the extent that the part of the sentence for denial of remission before expiry of 20 years is set aside. The conviction of the appellant under Sections 396 is not interfered with", the bench comprising Justices Navin Sinha and R. Subhash Reddy observed while partly allowing the appeal.

9. 'He Has Already Undergone More Than Half Of The Sentence Which Could Be Awarded To Him If Convicted: SC Grants Bail To Man Accused In A Corruption Case

[Case: Pawandeepsingh Mahendrasingh Kohli v. State of Maharashtra; Citation: LL 2021 SC 287]

The Supreme Court granted bail to an under trial in a corruption case on the ground that he has already undergone more than half of the sentence which could be awarded to him if convicted. The allegation against the accused was that he had helped the main accused, who is a Government servant, in misappropriating amount of Rs.35.50 Lakhs. Before the Apex Court, the accused submitted that he has already undergone more than half of the sentence which could be awarded to him. The Bench comprising Justices Vineet Saran and Dinesh Maheshwari observed while granting bail to the accused, "considering the facts and circumstances of this case and keeping in view that the petitioner has already undergone more than half of the sentence which could be awarded if convicted, and in view of the order dated 25.03.2021 passed in SLP(Crl.) No.6355/2020, we consider it to be a fit case for grant of bail."

10. 'Delhi Can Ill-Afford Another Riots; Role Of Facebook Must Be Looked Into': Supreme Court Upholds Delhi Assembly Summons

[Case: Ajit Mohan & Others v. Legislative Assembly, National Capital Territory of Delhi and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 288]

The Supreme Court refused to quash the summons issued to Facebook India Managing Director Ajit Mohan by the Peace and Harmony committee of the Delhi Assembly Committee seeking his appearance in an enquiry related to Delhi Riots. A Bench comprising of Justice S.K. Kaul, Justice Dinesh Maheshwari and Justice Hrishikesh Roy held that the Delhi Assembly's enquiry cannot encroach into "prohibited domains" of law and order and criminal prosecution, as they are subjects under the domain of the Union Government. Therefore, the Court held that any representative of the petitioner can deny answering any question by the committee if it falls within the prohibited domains. 

Ajit Mohan had approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the summons issued by the Peace and Harmony committee of the Delhi Assembly, headed by Raghav Chadha MLA, to probe the role of fake social media posts in creating communal riots in North East Delhi in February 2020. The Court rejected the argument that the Delhi Assembly has no legislative competence to enquire into the matter of Delhi riots. The committee has right to seek information on any matter related to peace and harmony without encroaching in any subject of the Union under the 7th schedule, it said.

Also Read: Facebook Can't Disrupt India's 'Unity In Diversity' Claiming Ignorance Or Lack Of Pivotal Role : Supreme Court

11. 'Judges Must Not Behave Like Emperors': Supreme Court Strongly Condemns High Courts' Practice Of Summoning Of Public Officers Unnecessarily

[Case: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr. Manoj Kumar Sharma; Citation: LL 2021 SC 289]

The Supreme Court reiterated that public officers should not be called to court unnecessarily. Summoning of officers frequently is not appreciable at all and is liable to be condemned in the strongest words, the bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hemant Gupta observed while disapproving the practice in certain High Courts to call officers at the drop of a hat and to exert direct or indirect pressure. The Bench was considering an appeal against Allahabad High Court judgment as it noticed that the High Court summoned the Secretary, Medical Health in the Court.

"The actions or decisions by the officers are not to benefit them, but as a custodian of public funds and in the interest of administration, some decisions are bound to be taken. It is always open to the High Court to set aside the decision which does not meet the test of judicial review but summoning of officers frequently is not appreciable at all. The same is liable to be condemned in the strongest words", the Court added.

12. CB Judgment Which Held Delay Beyond 45 Days In Filing Written Statement Before NCDRC Can't Be Condoned Applies Only Prospectively

[Case: Dr. A Suresh Kumar v. Amit Agarwal; Citation: LL 2021 SC 290]

The Supreme Court reiterated that the Constitution Bench judgment in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited (2020) 5 SCC 757, which held that the delay beyond the period of 30+15 day (45 days) in filing the written statement cannot be condoned by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission operates only prospectively. The Bench comprising Justice Vineet Saran and Dinesh Maheshwari observed, "In our view, since the application for condonation of delay was filed prior to the judgment of the Constitution Bench, which was delivered on 04.03.2020, the said application for condonation of delay ought to have been considered on merits and should not have been dismissed on the basis of the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited (supra) because the said judgment was to operate prospectively and the written statement as well as the application for condonation of delay had been filed much prior to the said judgment."

13. Grant Of Benefits Of Higher Pay Scale To Central/State Govt Employees Stand On Different Footing Than That By An Instrumentality Of The State

[Case: Punjab State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd. v. Balbir Kumar Walia; Citation: LL 2021 SC 291]

The Supreme Court observed that the grant of benefits of higher pay scale to the Central/State Government employees stand on different footing than grant of pay scale by an instrumentality of the State. The bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hemant Gupta allowed the appeal filed by Punjab State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd. against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana which held that the Federation is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and that the employees are therefore entitled to pay scale equivalent to their counterparts in the State of Punjab from 1.1.1986, though the revised pay scale was allowed by the Federation w.e.f. 1.1.1994.

"We find that the decision that the Federation was in financial difficulties is based upon relevant material before the Federation. The process to arrive at such decision can be said to be flawed only on the permissible grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. We find that neither the decision-making process, nor the decision itself suffers from any such vice. we find that the order of the High Court is unjustified and in excess of the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court", the Bench observed. 

14. Bail Condition To Compensate Victims Cannot Be Imposed

[Case: Dharmesh @ Dharmendra @ Dhamo Jagdishbhai @ Jagabhai Bhagubhai Ratadia v. State Of Gujarat; Citation: LL 2021 SC 292]

The Supreme Court observed that a condition for payment of compensation to victims cannot be imposed at the stage of bail. In the instant case, the accused was granted bail by the High Court with a condition requiring them to deposit Rs.2.00 lakh each as compensation to the victims. The Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hemant Gupta observed, "we may hasten to add that we are not saying that no monetary condition can be imposed for grant of bail. We say so as there are cases of offences against property or otherwise but that cannot be a compensation to be deposited and disbursed as if that grant has to take place as a condition of the person being enlarged on bail." Having held thus, the bench set aside the condition to deposit Rs.2.00 lakh each as compensation to the victims. 

15. Compromise Decree In Respect Of Land Which Is Not Subject-matter Of Suit But Is Part Of Family Settlement Does Not Require Compulsory Registration  

[Case: Ripudaman Singh v. Tikka Maheshwar Chand; Citation: LL 2021 SC 293]

The Supreme Court has observed that a compromise decree in respect of land which is not the subject-matter of suit but is part of the settlement between the family members does not require compulsory registration. The Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hemant Gupta observed that a compromise decree entered into between the parties in respect of land which was not the subject matter of the suit is valid and a legal settlement. The issue in appeal was whether a compromise decree in respect of land which is not the subject-matter of suit but is part of the settlement between the family members requires compulsory registration in terms of Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act.

"An aggrieved person can seek enforcement of family settlement in a suit for declaration wherein the family members have some semblance of right in property or any pre-existing right in the property. The family members could enter into settlement during the pendency of the proceedings before the Civil Court as well. Such settlement would be binding within the members of the family. If a document is sought to be enforced which is not recognized by a decree, the provision of clause (v) of sub-section 2 of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 would be applicable. However, where the decree has been passed in respect of family property, clause (vi) of sub-section 2 of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 would be applicable. The principle is based on the fact that family settlement only declares the rights which are already possessed by the parties",  the Bench observed. 

16. Honour Killing : Supreme Court Cancels Bail Granted To Man Accused Of Conspiracy To Murder Brother-in-Law In front Of Pregnant Wife 

[Case: Mamta Nair v. State of Rajasthan and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 294]

The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Rajasthan High Court which granted bail to a man accused of conspiracy to murder in a case of honour killing. A Bench headed by Chief Justice of India NV Ramana set aside the High Court's order observing that the same was not sustainable and asked the accused Mukesh Choudhury to surrender. The trial court was directed to complete the trial within a period of one week. The Supreme Court also noted that the examination of 17 out of 47 witnesses were complete.

17. Franklin Templeton : Consent Of Majority Shareholders Needed For Winding Up Funds After Publication Of Notices

[Case: Franklin Templeton Trustee Services Private Limited v. Amruta Garg; Citation: LL 2021 SC 295] 

A bench comprising Justices S Abdul Nazeer and Sanjiv Khanna observed that when the trustees decide to wind up a scheme by majority, they are required to seek consent of the majority of the unit holders, present and voting, under Regulation 18(15)(c) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996. The use of the word "shall" in the provision is couched as a command. A harmonious construction of Regulation 18(15)(c) read with Regulations 39 to 42, would showcase that the even though the "opinion" of the trustees would stand, the consent of the unit holders would be a pre-requisite for winding up, the Bench opined. It was further held that trustees are mandated to disclose reasons for winding up a scheme in a public notice under Regulation 39(3). The public notice is to be issued in two daily newspapers having an all-India circulation and in a vernacular paper having circulation where the mutual fund is located.

Also Read: Delegated Legislation That Are Forbiddingly Excessive Or Disproportionate Can Also Be Manifestly Arbitrary: Supreme Court In Franklin Templeton Case

Also Read: SEBI Has Power To Regulate Winding-Up Of Mutual Fund Schemes To Protect Investors : Supreme Court

18. Tribunals Reforms Ordinance : Supreme Court Strikes Down Provisions Fixing Term Of Members As 4 Years

[Case: Madras Bar Association v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 296]

The Supreme Court  by 2 :1 majority set aside the provisions in the Tribunals Reforms Ordinance 2021 which fixed the term of members of various tribunals as four years. The majority comprising Justices L Nageswara Rao and S Ravindra Bhat held that this term violated the express direction given in the earlier judgments in Rojer Mathew and Madras Bar Association cases that the term of tribunal members should be 5 years. Accordingly, the bench set aside those provisions. Justice Hemant Gupta dissented saying that a law cannot be struck down merely for the reason of being contrary to judgments. 

The Madras Bar Association had filed the writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalization and Conditions of Service) Ordinance 2021, to the extent it amends Sections 184 and 186 of the Finance Act 2017. Delivering its judgment in the writ petition filed by the Madras Bar Association challenging the Ordinance, the majority stated that its provisions will not apply to appointments made prior to February 4, 2021( the date when the Ordinance was notified).

Also Read: Excludes Young Successful Advocates; Arbitrary & Discriminatory' : Supreme Court Strikes Down Minimum Age Limit Of 50 Years For Appointment As Tribunal Members

Also Read: 'Law Can't Be Struck Down Merely For Being Contrary To Court's Guidelines': Justice Hemant Gupta's Dissent In Tribunals Case

Also Read: Judicial Independence Can Be Sustained Only When Incumbents Are Assured Fair Service Conditions, Security Of Tenure : Supreme Court

Also Read: Fill Up Vacancies In Tribunals Without Delay: Supreme Court Directs Centre

19. Enhancement Of Superannuation Age A Policy Matter' : Supreme Court Sets Aside Allahabad HC Direction On Retirement Age In NOIDA

[Case: New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and others v. BD Singhal and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 297]

The Supreme Court has set aside a judgment of the Allahabad High Court which directed that retrospective effect from September 2002 should be given to the decision taken by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) in September 2012 to enhance the retirement age of its employees from 58 to 60. Allowing an appeal filed by the NOIDA against the judgment, a bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that the High Court trenched upon a domain of executive policy regarding retirement age.

"The infirmity in the judgment lies in the fact that the High Court has trenched upon the realm of policy making and has assumed to itself, jurisdiction over a matter which lies in the domain of the executive. Whether the age of superannuation should be increased and if so, the date from which this should be effected is a matter of policy into which the High Court ought not to have entered", the Bench observed. 

20. Right To Summon Document Has To Be Exercised When Trial Is In Progress And Not When Trial Is Completed

[Case: Md. Ghouseuddin v. Syed Riazul Hussain; Citation: LL 2021 SC 298]

The Supreme Court has observed that the right to summon document(s) has to be exercised when the trial is in progress and not when the trial is completed. A Bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and Sanjiv Khanna observed, "The right to summon document(s), indeed, is available but that has to be exercised when the trial is in progress and not when the trial is completed, including after the statement of accused under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code had been recorded. The efficacy of the trial cannot be whittled down by such belated application."

21. Violation Of Retrenchment Conditions U/s 25F Industrial Disputes Act Would Not Automatically Entail Reinstatement With Full Backwages

[Case: Madhya Bharat Gramin Bank v. Panchamlal Yadav; Citation: LL 2021 SC 299]

The Supreme Court observed that the violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, [Retrenchment conditions] would not automatically entail in the reinstatement with full back wages. In this case, one Panchamlal Yadav challenged the action of the management of Bundelkhand Kshatriya Gramin Bank, in terminating his services before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT). The Tribunal answered the reference against the claimant and held that he was not a regular employee as he was employed on daily wages. It was further observed that he could not prove that he had continuously worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year. Later, allowing his writ petition, the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that it was incumbent on the part of the management to produce all the material in their possession to establish and prove that the respondent was appointed on a daily wage basis and did not work continuously for 240 days in a calendar year.

The Bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Aniruddha Bose observed while allowing the appeal,  "Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties, we are of the view that the respondent is not entitled for reinstatement in view of the law settled by this Court. The judgments relied upon by Mr. Kapur are clear to the effect that violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would not automatically entail in the reinstatement with full back wages. The relief to be granted depends on the facts of individual cases."  The Bench however directed the bank to pay a compensation of Rs. 5 Lakhs to him.

22. Religious Sentiments Subservient To Right To Health & Life : Case Against Kanwar Yatra 

[Case: In Re : Alarming Newspaper Report Regarding Kanwar Yatra in State of UP; Citation: LL 2021 SC 300]

The Supreme Court has observed that religious sentiments are subservient to the fundamental right to life and health while adjudicating in the suo motu case taken against the decision of the Uttar Pradesh government to allow the Kanwar Yatra pilgrimage amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The Bench comprising Justices RF Nariman and BR Gavai observed that the State of Uttar Pradesh cannot go ahead with the Kanwar Yatra, especially so when the Union Government has taken a stand against holding the same. 

"We are of the view that this is a matter which concerns everyone of us as citizens of India, and goes to the very heart of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which has a pride of place in the fundamental rights Chapter of our Constitution. The health of the citizenry of India and their right to "life" are paramount .All other sentiments, al beit religious, are subservient to this most basic fundamental right", the Bench observed in the order.

23. Ex-Parte Decree Against Minor Not Represented By A Duly Appointed Guardian A Nullity

[Case: KP Natarajan and another v. Muthalammal and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 301]

The Supreme Court has upheld a judgment of the Madras High Court which held that an ex-parte decree passed against a minor not represented by a guardian who is duly appointed is a nullity. A bench comprising Justices Indira Banerjee and V Ramasubramanian was considering an appeal filed against the High Court judgment, which had set aside the ex-parte decree passed against a minor on the ground that he was not represented by a guardian appointed in terms of procedure contemplated under Order XXXII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court also held that the failure to appoint guardian ipso facto will result in prejudice to the minor and it need not be specially established.  

24. Supreme Court Permits 5 Civil Service Aspirants Who Cleared Mains But Were Disqualified For Submitting Degree Certificate Late To Attend UPSC Interview

[Case: Deepak Yadav &Ors v. UPSC &Ors; Vaidehi Gupta v. UPSC &Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 302]

In an extraordinary move, the Supreme Court has allowed five civil service candidates who cleared the UPSC civil service main examinations held this year, but were disqualified for submitting the degree certificates after the cut-off date, to appear for the interview. A bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and Sanjiv Khanna passed this direction as a "special case" considering the fact that the candidates missed the last date as their universities declared their results late due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The Bench clarified that this will not be treated as a precedent. Further, the Court clarified that this order will not disturb the already published list and that these 5 candidates will be in addition to the candidates already short-listed for interview.

25. Accused Cannot Be Discharged U/s 306 IPC While Confirming Charge U/s 304B IPC

[Case: Bhagwanrao Mahadeo Patil v. Appa Ramchandra Savkar ; Citation: LL 2021 SC 303]

The Supreme Court  has observed that an accused cannot be discharged for an offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code while confirming the charge under Section 304B IPC. In the instant case, within a period of about 15 months of marriage, a married woman committed suicide, leaving behind two suicide notes. The complainant/father of the deceased filed an FIR for offences under Sections 304B, 306, 498A, 406, 506 read with Section 34 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the husband and also against the father in-law and mother-in-law. Later, the mother-in-law and father-in-law of the deceased, were discharged by the High Court of the offence under Section 306 IPC while confirming the charges under Section 304B IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act.

A Bench comprising Justices Vineet Saran and Dinesh Maheshwari thus observed while setting aside the High Court order, "having heard learned counsel parties, considering the totality of the circumstances and keeping in view the suicide notes as well as the statements of witnesses, we are of the opinion that the accused ought not to have been discharged of the offence under Section 306 IPC, especially when the charges under Section 304B IPC and other related sections had already been framed and confirmed."

26. Relief To Doctor Who Could Not Secure Admission To PG Course Because He Was Denied Study Leave Due To Covid 19 Situation In Delhi

[Case: Dr. Rohit Kumar v. Secretary, Office of Lt. Governor of Delhi; Citation: LL 2021 SC 304]

"It would be a travesty of justice to deny relief to the Doctor, who had to make a personal sacrifice in the larger public interest, to serve the cause of humanity",  the Supreme Court has observed while directing PGI Chandigarh to grant admission to a Doctor who could not join the post graduate course as he was denied study leave in view of the COVID-19 pandemic in Delhi. The bench comprising Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice V. Ramasubramanian clarified that the policy decision not to grant Study Leave to doctors for a certain length of time, in apprehension of a rise in COVID-19 cases, to ensure the availability of as many doctors, as possible for duty, is neither arbitrary, nor discriminatory, nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. But the said policy is obviously a temporary one and cannot continue indefinitely irrespective of changes in circumstances, the bench had observed taking note of the present COVID-19 situation in Delhi. 

Invoking powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Bench opined, "these directions are being passed in exercise of the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, in the facts and circumstances of this case, having regard to the fact that the Appellant had cleared INICET 2020 held in November 2020 and had been offered admission to PGI, Chandigarh, but could not join as he was not released on Study Leave in view of the serious COVID-19 situation prevailing in NCT of Delhi at the material time, and this order will not be treated as a precedent."

Also Read: Policy Not To Grant Study Leave To Govt. Doctors In View Of Covid19 Situation Cannot Continue Indefinitely

27. Protection Of Sanction U/s 197 CrPC Not Available For Public Servants Prosecuted U/s 48 Water Act 

[Case: Noorulla Khan v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board; Citation: LL 2021 SC 305]

The Supreme Court has observed that protection of sanction under Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure is not available to public servants prosecuted under Section 48 the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act. In the instant case, Sandur Gram Panchayat, Sandur, District Bellary, Karnataka and the Chief Officer of said Gram Panchayat, were accused of having committed offences punishable under Sections 43 and 44 of the Water Act. The bench comprising Justices Uday Umesh Lalit and Ajay Rastogi, referring to previous judgments in V.C. Chinnappa Goudar v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board and Karnataka State Pollution Control Board v. B. Heera Naik observed, "If the violation of the provisions of the Water Act was at the hands of a Department, subject to the satisfaction of the requirements under Section 48 of the Water Act, "the Head of the Department" would be deemed to be guilty..because of deeming fiction under Section 48 of the Water Act, the protection under Section 197 of the Code would not be available and the matter ought to be considered de hors such protection."

28. CB Judgment In Indore Development Authority Case Doesn't Affect Haryana Govt's Power U/s 101A RFCTLARR To Denotify Acquired Lands

[Case: Raghubhir Singh v. State of Haryana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 306]

The Supreme Court has observed that the Constitution Bench judgment in Indore Development Authority case will not affect the power of the Government of Haryana under Section 101A of the RFCTLARR Act, to denotify the land acquired under the old Land Acqusition Act for stated reasons in public interest. The bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and Sanjiv Khanna observed that denotification can be done only if the State Government is fully satisfied that the land has become unviable or non-essential for the purpose of development and in particular for reason for which it was so acquired. The fact that the land owners have already constructed some structures on the acquired land, which has vested in the State Government, by itself can be no reason to denotify the acquired land, the bench clarified. 

"Indeed, the Constitution Bench considered the question of lapsing of acquisition proceedings in reference to Section 24 of the 2013 Act. While examining that question, it had also noticed Section 101 of the 2013 Act, which deals with return of unutilised land. In that context, the Constitution Bench had observed that Section 101 of the 2013 Act cannot apply to acquisition made under the 1894 Act. However, it had no occasion to deal with the efficacy of Section 101A of the 2013 Act, as applicable to the State of Haryana.", the Court opined. 

29. Supreme Court Disapproves Practice Of Delayed Filing Of Review Petition After Judges Retire

[Case: Vedanta Ltd. v. The Goa Foundation; Citation: LL 2021 SC 307]

The Supreme Court has disapproved the practise of delayed filing of review petitions after waiting for judges to retire. "Such practice must be firmly disapproved to preserve the institutional sanctity of the decision making of this Court", the bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah remarked while dismissing the review petitions filed against the judgment in Goa Foundation v. Sesa Sterlite Limited. 

The bench comprising Justices Madan B Lokur and Deepak Gupta had delivered the judgment on on 7 February 2018. The State of Goa preferred its four review petitions in the month of November 2019 and Vedanta Limited preferred its four review petitions in the month of August 2020. While considering these review petition, the Court noted that, in accordance with Rule 2 of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, an application for review of a judgment has to be filed within thirty days of the date of the judgment or order that is sought to be reviewed. No cogent grounds have been furnished for the delay between 20 and 26 months by the two parties in filing their applications for review, the Court said. 

30. Supreme Court Sets Aside Allahabad High Court's Blanket Ban On DJ Services In Uttar Pradesh

[Case: Sachin Kashyap v. Sushil Chandra Srivastava; Citation: LL 2021 SC 308]

The Supreme Court has set aside the 2019 order of the Allahabad High Court imposing a blanket ban on the use of DJ services in the state of Uttar Pradesh. A Division Bench of Justice Vineet Saran and Justice Dinesh Maheshwari clarified that music/DJ can be played only in accordance with law and after obtaining the requisite license/permission from the concerned authorities. The Court observed that since there were neither pleadings nor any prayer with regard to the playing of music or DJ in public place, the direction of the High Court with regard to the noise generated by DJ and restriction on playing music, cannot be justified.

"The Writ Petition having been filed for a particular cause and with a particular prayer cannot be expanded to cover within its ambit all the issues which may be of general or public importance without there being any pleadings or prayer with regard to a particular issue. In our view, no such directions could have been issued, especially in a private litigation which was not in the nature of Public Interest Litigation. We say so, particularly, because prior to passing any such order of public importance, the affected parties should be impleaded, at least in a representative capacity, which is not done in the present case. The appellants herein are the affected parties who were neither impleaded nor given any opportunity to present their case",  the Bench observed.

31. Section 482 CrPC: Interim Protection Order Can Be Passed In Exceptional Cases Giving Brief Reasons

[Case: A P Mahesh Cooperative Urban Bank Shareholders Welfare Association v. Ramesh Kumar Bung; Citation: LL 2021 SC 309]

The Supreme Court observed that the High Courts can pass interim protection order in Section 482 CrPC petitions in exceptional cases by giving brief reasons. What is frowned upon in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra is the tendency of the courts to pass blanket, cryptic, laconic, nonspeaking orders reading "no coercive steps shall be adopted", the bench comprising Justices Indira Banerjee and V. Ramasubramanian said. In this case, the Telangana High Court, in a petition filed by accused under Section 482 CrPC, stayed further proceedings in the matter. The High Court also gave reasons in its order. It also took note of the fact that the criminal case is related to election disputes between the accused and the complainants. 

"Neeharika (supra) certainly allowed space for the High Court to pass an interim order of the nature impugned 22 herein, "in exceptional cases with caution and circumspection, giving brief reasons". What is frowned upon in Neeharika (supra) is the tendency of the courts to pass blanket, cryptic, laconic, nonspeaking orders reading "no coercive steps shall be adopted". In Paragraph 60 of the Report in Neeharika (supra), this Court recognized that there may be allegations of abuse of process of law, converting a civil dispute into a criminal dispute, with a view to pressurize the accused. In the order impugned in these petitions, the High Court has given elaborate reasons as to how the allegations of bank fraud were developed during the proceedings concerning allegations of election fraud. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be said to be bad in the light of Neeharika principles.", the Bench noted. 

32. To Give In To Pressure Groups A Sorry State Of Affairs' : Supreme Court Slams Kerala's Lockdown Relaxations Ahead Of Bakrid

[Case: In Re Alarming News Report About Kanwar Yatra In UP; Citation: LL 2021 SC 310]

The Supreme Court  slammed the decision taken by the State of Kerala to give relaxations in the COVID19 lockdown norms for three days on account of Bakrid. The Court took a highly critical view of the State's decision to allow the opening of all shops in areas marked as Category D- where the COVID infection rates are critical with Test Positivity Rate above 15% - to function without any restrictions on July 19. 

A Bench comprising Justices RF Nariman and BR Gavai observed, "the relaxation for one day to Category D areas was wholly uncalled for. In these circumstances, we direct the state of Kerala to give heed to Article 21 of the Constitution read with Article 144 of the Constitution and follow our directions given in the UP case. Also, pressure groups of all kinds, religious or otherwise, cannot in any manner interfere with this most fundamental right of all the citizens of India." "To give in to pressure groups so that that the citizenry of India is then laid-bare to a nationwide pandemic discloses a sorry state of affairs", the Bench further added. 

33. Section 34 Arbitration Act Gives No Power To Modify Arbitral Award; Appellate Court Can Only Set Aside Or Remand

[Case: Project Director, National Highways v. M. Hakeem; Citation: LL 2021 SC 311]

The Supreme Court held that a Court, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, cannot modify an award. "If one were to include the power to modify an award in Section 34, one would be crossing the Lakshman Rekha", Justices RF Nariman and BR Gavai observed. In this case, the court was considering appeals filed by NHAI against the Madras High Court judgment which held that, at least insofar as arbitral awards made under the National Highways Act, 1956, Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 must be so read as to permit modification of an arbitral award made under the National Highways Act so as to enhance compensation awarded by a Arbitrator.

"To state that the judicial trend appears to favour an interpretation that would read into Section 34 a power to modify, revise or vary the award would be to ignore the previous law contained in the 1940 Act; as also to ignore the fact that the 1996 Act was enacted based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 which, as has been pointed out in Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, makes it clear that, given the limited judicial interference on extremely limited grounds not dealing with the merits of an award, the 'limited remedy' under Section 34 is coterminus with the 'limited right', namely, either to set aside an award or remand the matter under the circumstances mentioned in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996", the Bench opined. 

34. Supreme Court Strikes Down 97th Constitutional Amendment To The Extent It Relates To Co-operative Societies

[Case: Union of India v. Rajendra Shah and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 312]

The Supreme Court upheld a 2013 judgment of the Gujarat High Court which struck down the provisions of the Constitution(97th Amendment) Act 2011 to the extent it introduced Part IX B in the Constitution to deal with co-operative societies. A 3-judge bench comprising Justices Rohinton Nariman, KM Joseph and BR Gavai dismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court. The bench unanimously held that the 97th Constitutional Amendment required ratification by at least one-half of the state legislatures as per Article 368(2) of the Constitution, since it dealt with a entry which was an exclusive state subject (co-operative societies). Since such ratification was not done in the case of the 97th Constitutional amendment, it was liable to be struck down. 

There was a split in the bench on the point whether Part IX B will survive with respect to multi-state co-operative societies. While the majority comprising Justices Nariman and Gavai upheld those provisions of Part IX B which deal with multi-state co-operative societies by applying the doctrine of severability, Justice Joseph dissented on this count. Justice Joseph held that the doctrine of severability was not applicable and struck down the entire amendment. 

Also Read: States Have Exclusive Legislative Power In Cooperative Societies' Matter 

Also Read: Once Substantive Provisions Of Part IXB Are Held Unconstitutional, Provisions On Multi-State Co-operative Societies Can't Be Saved: Justice Joseph's Dissent 

Also Read: Supreme Court Sheds Light On The Contours Of Ministry Of Cooperation

Also Read: 'Fundamental Right To Form Cooperative Societies', 'Article 43B': Remnants Of 97th Constitutional Amendment After Supreme Court Judgment

Also Read: Supreme Court Upholds A Citizen's Right To Challenge A Constitutional Amendment Affecting States' Power

35. Motor Vehicles Act - Third Party Insurance Deemed To Be Transferred Along With Effective Control Over Vehicle In A Hire Agreement

[Case: Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. National Insurance Company Limited & Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 313]

The Supreme Court has held that when a transport corporation hires a motor vehicle for use from its registered owner, the third-party insurance coverage will also be deemed to be transferred along with the vehicle. The person who is having the effective control and command of the vehicle will be regarded as the 'owner'. Therefore, along with the vehicle it must be deemed that the existing insurance policy also remains transferred for the period of hire, the Court noted. 

A division bench of Justices S. Abdul Naseer and Krishna Murari were deciding the issue - if an insured vehicle is plying under an agreement with the Corporation on the route as per permit granted in favour of the Corporation and in case of any accident during that period, whether the Insurance Company would be liable to pay compensation or would it be the responsibility of the Corporation or the owner.  The Bench observed, . "..through the definition of "vicarious liability" it can be inferred that the person supervising the driver is liable to pay the compensation to the victim. During such time, however, it will be deemed that that vehicle was transferred along with the insurance policy, even if it were insured at the instance of the original owner. Thus, the Insurance Company would not be able to escape its liability to pay the amount of compensation"

36. Court Cannot Grant Liberty To Amend Plaint While Rejecting It Under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC 

[Case: Sayyed Ayaz Ali v. Prakash G Goyal; Citation: LL 2021 SC 314]

The Supreme Court held that while rejecting a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure, the Court cannot grant liberty to the plaintiff to amend the plaint. The proviso to Rule 11 covers the cases falling within the ambit of clauses (b) and (c) and has no application to a rejection of a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d), the Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed. 

The Apex Court bench noted the proviso in Order 7 Rule 11 and said that it deals with a situation where time has been fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or for supplying of the requisite stamp paper.

"Under the proviso, the time so fixed shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by a cause of an exceptional nature from complying within the time fixed by the court and that a refusal to extend time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff. The proviso evidently covers the cases falling within the ambit of clauses (b) and (c) and has no application to a rejection of a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). In the circumstances, the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the further direction that was issued by the Trial Judge was not in consonance with law", the Court opined. 

37. There Is No Per Se Bar To Grant Relief Of Interest On Refund To A Subsequent Purchaser Of Flat

[Case: Laureate Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. v. Charanjeet Singh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 315]

The Supreme Court has held that there is no per se bar to grant relief of interest on refund to a subsequent purchaser of flat. The bench comprising Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, Hemant Gupta and S. Ravindra Bhat observed, "it cannot be said that a subsequent purchaser who steps into the shoes of an original allottee of a housing project in which the builder has not honoured its commitment to deliver the flat within a stipulated time, cannot expect any even reasonable time, for the performance of the builder's obligation." The three judge Bench also observed that per se bar to the relief of interest on refund, enunciated by the decision in HUDA v. Raje Ram which was applied in Wing Commander Arifur Rahman Khan and Anr. v. DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd., cannot be considered good law.

38. Supreme Court Dismisses Andhra Govt.'s Plea Against Quashing Of Criminal Cases Related To Alleged "Amaravati Land Scam"

[Case: State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chekka Guru Murali Mohan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 316]

In a blow to Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Jagan Mohan Reddy, the Supreme Court has dismissed the state's SLPs against the quashing of criminal cases filed in connection with the alleged 'insider trading' in land transactions at Amaravati. The Bench of Justices Vineet Saran and Dinesh Maheshwari was hearing the SLPs at the instance of the AP state government against the January 19 judgment of the Single Judge of the AP High Court observing that private sale transactions cannot be criminalized and that the concept of the offence of "insider trading", which is essentially an offence in the field of stock market relating to selling and buying the securities and bonds, cannot be applied to the offences under Indian Penal Code and cannot be read into Section 420, IPC or into any provisions in the scheme of IPC. 

Also Read: Amaravati Land Scam Case:Supreme Court Allows Andhra Govt To Withdraw Its Plea To Lift Stay On Investigation

39. Trial Judges Work Amidst Appalling Conditions; Colonial Mindset Towards District Judiciary Must Change

[Case: Somesh Chaurasia v. State of M.P; Citation: LL 2021 SC 318] 

The colonial mindset which pervades the treatment meted out to the district judiciary must change, the Supreme Court observed in a judgment passed on July 22. The Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and Hrishikesh Roy noted that the Trial judges work amidst appalling conditions and thus observed, "lack of infrastructure, inadequate protection, examples of judges being made targets when they stand up for what is right and sadly, a subservience to the administration of the High Court for transfers and postings which renders them vulnerable." The Court was considering an appeal against the Madhya Pradesh High Court order concerning the Congress leader Devendra Chaurasia's murder in Damoh, Madhya Pradesh. In this case, the Court had earlier taken note of the harassment faced by Additional Sessions Judge, Hata who is in charge of the criminal case. 

"An independent and impartial judiciary is the cornerstone of democracy. Judicial independence of the district judiciary is cardinal to the integrity of the entire system. The courts comprised in the district judiciary are the first point of interface with citizens. If the faith of the citizen in the administration of justice has to be preserved, it is to the district judiciary that attention must be focused as well as the 'higher' judiciary", the Court opined. 

Also Read:  "We Cannot Have Two Parallel Legal Systems, One For Rich And Powerful And The Other For Common Man": SC Pulls Up MP Govt. For Protecting Murder Accused

40. Sanction U/S 197 CrPC Required To Prosecute Public Servants If Alleged Act Committed Is Directly Concerned With Official Duty

[Case: Indra Devi v. State of Rajasthan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 318]

The Supreme Court has observed that sanction from competent authorities under Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure is required to prosecute public servants if the alleged act committed is directly concerned with the official duty. The Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hemant Gupta opined that the yardstick to be followed is to form a prima facie view whether the act of omission for which the accused was charged had a reasonable connection with the discharge of his duties. The case against the accused was that he had conspired with his superiors who issued a forged lease. 

"Such sanction is necessary if the offence alleged against the public servant is committed by him "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" and in order to find out whether the alleged offence is committed "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty", the yardstick to be followed is to form a prima facie view whether the act of omission for which the accused was charged had a reasonable connection with the discharge of his duties. [See State of Maharashtra Vs. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao] . The real question, therefore, is whether the act committed is directly concerned with the official duty.", the Bench observed.

41. Production Of Injury Report Is Not A Sine Qua Non For Establishing Offence Under Section 323 IPC Booth Capturing & Bogus Voting Affects Rule Of Law & Democracy; Should Be Dealt With Iron Hands

[Case: Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 318]

The Supreme Court has observed that production of injury report is not a sine qua non for establishing the case for the offence under Section 323 Indian Penal Code. In this case, the accused had been convicted for the offences under Section 323 and 147 IPC and are sentenced to undergo six months simple imprisonment. The accused had allegedly formed an unlawful assembly "to snatch the voters list and to cast bogus voting" and attacked some political workers during an election. The Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed, "it may be that there might not be any serious injuries and/or visible injuries, the hospital might not have issued the injury report. However, production of an injury report for the offence under Section 323 IPC is not a sine qua non for establishing the case for the offence under Section 323 IPC. Section 323 IPC is a punishable section for voluntarily causing hurt. "Hurt" is defined under Section 319 IPC. As per Section 319 IPC, whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause "hurt". Therefore, even causing bodily pain can be said to be causing "hurt". Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, no error has been committed by the courts below for convicting the accused under Section 323 IPC"

Also Read: Booth Capturing & Bogus Voting Affects Rule Of Law & Democracy; Should Be Dealt With Iron Hands

42. Power Of Compounding Must Be Expressly Conferred By Statute Which Creates Offence

[Case: Prakash Gupta v. Securities and Exchange Board of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 320]

The Supreme Court has observed that the power of compounding must be expressly conferred by the statute which creates the offence. The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that in respect of offences which lie outside the Indian Penal Code, compounding may be permitted only if the statute which creates the offence contains an express provision for compounding before such an offence can be made compoundable. This is because Section 320 CrPC provides for the compounding of offences only under the IPC. In its judgment interpreting the compounding provision under Section 24A of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, the bench referred to provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 

"Section 320 provides for the compounding of offences only under the IPC. Hence, in respect of offences which lie outside the IPC, compounding may be permitted only if the statute which creates the offence contains an express provision for compounding before such an offence can be made compoundable. The power of compounding must, in other words, be expressly conferred by the statute which creates the offence", the Bench observed. 

Also Read: "Due Deference Must Be Given To SEBI's Opinion": Supreme Issues Court Guidelines For Compounding Offences Under Section 24A SEBI Act

43. No Disrespect Shown To Judge; No Offence Under SC-ST Act Attracted: Supreme Court Quashes Criminal Case Against MP RS Bharathi

[Case: RS Bharathi v. State; Citation: LL 2021 SC 321]

The Supreme Court quashed a charge sheet filed against DMK leader and Rajya Sabha MP RS Bharathi under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act over a speech made by him. The chargesheet was filed against the MP after he made a speech at a meeting organised by the leaders of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in the name of 'Kalaignar Vasagar Vattam'. He had also spoken about the appointment of Justice Varadarajan as a High Court Judge after Late M. Karunanidhi came to power. He also allegedly said that all these appointments to persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes community is because of the alms of the Dravidian movement.

A Bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Aniruddha Bose observed, "a careful reading of the speech does not show that there is any attempt made by the appellant to promote or attempt to promote enmity, hatred or ill will against the members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community. On the other hand, the speech indicates that members of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribes have been benefited due to the benevolence of Late M. Karunanidhi." The Court noted that Section 3(1)(u) of the Act would show that it is attracted only in a case where a person not belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe has through his speech promotes or attempts to promote feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will against members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. 

44. Supreme Court Dismisses Telecom Companies' Pleas To Recomputate AGR Dues

[Case: Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 322]

The Supreme Court has rejected the pleas of telecom companies seeking recomputation of the Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) dues demanded by the Department of Telecommunications (DoT). A bench comprising Justices L Nageswara Rao, S Abdul Nazeer and MR Shah pronounced the order dismissing the applications filed by Vodafone Idea, Bharti Airtel and Tata Teleservices. The bench had observed that reassessment was prohibited in view of an earlier order passed on July 20 last year. Though the applications by telcos "appear to be innocuous at first blush, the end result of the relief sought in the guise of correction or rectification of the defects or arithmetical errors in calculation of AGR dues, would be recalculation....", the order stated. 

45. Student Becomes Bedridden Due To School's Negligence During Tour : Supreme Court Restores Rs 88.73 Lakh Compensation 

[Case: Akshatha v. Secretary BNM Education Institution & Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 323]

While hearing an appeal against reduction of compensation by National Consumer Redressal Commission in case of a student taken ill during a school tour and was consequentially bed ridden due to School's negligence, the Supreme Court has restored the compensation amount of Rs.88,73,798 awarded to her by the State Commission. A Division Bench comprising Justice Navin Sinha and Justice Subhash Reddy issued the direction in an appeal filed by the complainant being aggrieved by the order of the National Consumer Redressal Commission reducing the compensation awarded to her from Rs.88,73,798/- to 50 lakhs. While noting that that an appellate authority has the jurisdiction to reduce the compensation, Supreme Court has stated that, that jurisdiction draws its source from the power of judicial discretion to be exercised in the given facts of a case.

"The power to exercise judicial discretion is indeed wide but is inherently limited by the requirement of a judicious exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction." the Apex Court observed. 

46. Ocular Evidence Is The Best Evidence Unless There Are Reasons To Doubt It 

[Case: Pruthiviraj Jayantibhai Vanol v. Dinesh Dayabhai Vala; Citation: LL 2021 SC 324]

Ocular evidence is considered the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it, the Supreme Court has observed while setting aside an order of High Court that acquitted an accused in a murder case. The Bench comprising Justices Navin Sinha and R. Subhash Reddy observed that the ocular evidence may be disbelieved only when there is a gross contradiction between medical evidence and oral evidence, and the medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable and rules out all possibility of ocular evidence being true. In this case, the High Court had reversed the Trial Court order convicting the accused on the ground that the evidence of the eye­witnesses is inconsistent with the medical evidence, regarding the nature of injuries vis­à­vis the weapons of offence.

"Ocular evidence is considered the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it. The evidence of PW­2 and PW­10 is unimpeachable. It is only in a case where there is a gross contradiction between medical evidence and oral evidence, and the medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable and rules out all possibility of ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved. In the present case, we find no inconsistency between the ocular and medical evidence. The High Court grossly erred in appreciation of evidence by holding that muddamal no.5 was a simple iron rod without noticing the evidence that it had a sharp turn edge", the Bench observed. 

47. Letter Of Intent Is Not A Binding Contract Unless Such An Intention Is Evident From Its Terms

[Case: South Eastern Coalfields Ltd v. S. Kumar's Associates AKM (JV); Citation: LL 2021 SC 325]

A Letter of Intent (LOI)  is not a binding contract unless such an intention is evident from its terms, the Supreme Court observed while dismissing an appeal filed by South Eastern Coalfields Ltd, a Government company. The Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hemant Gupta observed that such intention must be clear and unambiguous as LOI normally indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract with the other party in future. 

"The judicial views before us leave little doubt over the proposition that an LoI merely indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract with the other party in future. No binding relationship between the parties at this stage emerges and the totality of the circumstances have to be considered in each case. It is no doubt possible to construe a letter of intent as a binding contract if such an intention is evident from its terms. But then the intention to do so must be clear and unambiguous as it takes a deviation from how normally a letter of intent has to be understood. ", the Bench observed.

48. Direction To Undergo Other Sentences After Life Sentence Illegal

[Case: Imran Jalal @ Bilal Ahmed v. State Of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 326]

The Supreme Court has observed that a court cannot stipulate that other sentences would begin after expiration of life sentence awarded to convict. In this case, the Trial court had convicted the accused Imran Jalal under sections 121 (Waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India), 121A (Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by section 121), 122 (Collecting arms, etc., with intention of waging war) of the Indian Penal Code, Section 5(b) of Explosive Substances Act, Sections 20, 23(1) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and Sections 25(1A), 26(2) of Arms Act. The sentence of imprisonment for the offence punishable under section 5(b) of Explosive Substances Act, 1908, which is the rigorous imprisonment for 10(ten) years, shall commence at the expiration of other sentences of imprisonments (life imprisonment for IPC offences and other sentences under other provisions), the Trial Court had directed. 

The bench comprising Justices Uday Umesh Lalit and Ajay Rastogi observed "in the instant case, the appellant was awarded life sentence on three counts and sentence of 10 years each on five counts, out of which it was only the sentence in respect of the offence punishable under Section 5(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, which was subject matter of the last part of the directions in paragraph 9 of the order of sentence. 9. Paragraph 9 of the order of sentence contemplated commencement of the sentence awarded under paragraph 4 of the order of sentence, after the expiration of other sentences of imprisonment. It would, therefore, mean that the sentence in paragraph 4 would begin after the expiration of other sentences including sentence for life awarded under three counts. This stipulation would be against the law laid down by this Court in Muthuramalingam, especially paragraph 35 of the decision as quoted above."

49. Umadevi' Judgment Doesn't Absolve Duty To Comply With Earlier SC Judgment Directing Regularization

[Case: Vice Chancellor Anand Agriculture University v. Kanubhai Nanubhai Vaghela; Citation: LL 2021 SC 327]

The Supreme Court has observed that the judgment in Umadevi case does not absolve the Anand Agricultural University of its duty to comply with the direction in an earlier judgment. "Eligible daily wagers in accordance with the scheme have been eagerly awaiting regularization as per the judgment of this Court in Gujarat Agricultural University's case", the bench of Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Aniruddha Bose observed while dismissing the appeal filed by Anand Agriculture University. By a judgment in 2001 in Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar, the Supreme court had directed phase wise regularization of daily wagers. Challenging this judgment, the University had approached the Apex Court contending that after the judgment in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors., the respondents are not entitled for regularization as there are no sanctioned posts available. 

"We are not impressed with the submissions made on behalf of the university that the judgment of this Court in Umadevi's case overruled the judgment in Gujarat Agricultural University (supra). The judgment of this Court in Gujarat Agricultural University (supra) inter partes has become final and is binding on the university. Even according to Para 54 of Uma Devi's case, any judgment which is contrary to the principles settled in Umadevi shall be denuded of status as precedent. This observation at Para 54 in Umadevi's case does not absolve the university of its duty to comply with the directions of this Court in Gujarat Agricultural University", the Court observed. 

50. Legislative Privileges & Immunities Not Gateways To Claim Exemption From Criminal Law : Supreme Court In Kerala Assembly Ruckus Case

[Case: State of Kerala v. K.Ajith; Citation: LL 2021 SC 328]

While refusing to allow the withdrawal of criminal prosecution against six LDF members in the Kerala assembly ruckus case of 2015, the Supreme Court made certain significant observations on the scope of legislative privileges and immunities. The State of Kerala and the accused persons had raised an argument that the criminal prosecution was not sustainable against the members for acts committed in the floor of the assembly as they are protected by legislative privileges under Article 194 of the Constitution. Rejecting this argument ,a Division bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that legislative privileges cannot be claimed to seek exemption from the application of criminal law. "Privileges and immunities are not gateways to claim exemptions from the general law of the land, particularly as in this case, the criminal law which governs the action of every citizen. To claim an exemption from the application of criminal law would be to betray the trust which is impressed on the character of elected representatives as the makers and enactors of the law", the order stated. 

"The purpose of bestowing privileges and immunities to elected members of the legislature is to enable them to perform their functions without hindrance, fear or favour. It is to create an environment in which they can perform their functions and discharge their duties freely that the Constitution recognizes privileges and immunities", the Bench further observed. 

Also Read: 'Destruction Of Property Not Freedom Of Speech In House' : Supreme Court Rejects Kerala Govt Plea To Withdraw Prosecution In Assembly Ruckus Case

Also Read: 'Must Subserve Administration Of Justice': Supreme Court Formulates Principles On Withdrawal Of Prosecution Under Section 321 CrPC

Also Read: What Is The Larger Public Interest In Withdrawing Prosecution?' Supreme Court Reserves Judgment In Kerala Assembly Ruckus Case

51. Arbitration Award Which Ignores Vital Evidence Or Rewrites The Contract Is Liable To Be Set Aside

[Case: PSA Sical Terminals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Board Of Trustees Of V.O. Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin; Citation: LL 2021 SC 329]

The Supreme Court observed that an arbitration award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision or rewrites a contract is liable to be set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on the ground of patent illegality. The Bench comprising Justices RF Nariman and BR Gavai observed that a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse. Re­writing a contract for the parties would be breach of fundamental principles of justice, the court remarked. 

"A decision which is perverse, though would not be a ground for challenge under "public policy of India", would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. However, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality", the Bench opined. 

52. No Need To Examine Complainant Before Ordering Investigation Under Section 156(3) CrPC

[Case: M/s Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd v. State of Maharashtra and another; Citation: LL 2021 SC 330]

The Supreme Court has reiterated that there is no requirement of examining the complainant on oath under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure(CrPC) before a Judicial Magistrate orders police investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. Holding so, the Supreme Court set aside an order passed by the Bombay High Court which had granted anticipatory bail on the ground that order of magistrate to direct registration of FIR under Sec 156(3) CrPC was given without examining the complainant on oath as under Section 200 CrPC. 

"Any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein", the Court quoted from the judgment authored by Justice KT Thomas in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of MP.  

53. High Court Must Give Brief Reasons In Order Disposing Application Seeking Leave To Appeal Against Acquittal

[Case: Brijesh Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 331]

The Supreme Court has reiterated that brief reasons must be given in an order disposing an application for leave to appeal under Section 378 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 against an order of acquittal. Merely observing that the order of the trial Judge has taken a possible view without an application of mind to the evidence and the findings is not consistent with the duty which is cast upon the High Court while determining whether leave should be granted to appeal against an order of acquittal, the bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed. 

"The High Court must set forth its reasons, indicating at least in brief, an application of mind to the nature of the evidence and the findings which have been arrived at. In other words, merely observing that the order of the trial Judge has taken a possible view without an application of mind to the evidence and the findings is not consistent with the duty which is cast upon the High Court while determining whether leave should be granted to appeal against an order of acquittal", the order stated. 

54. No Discussion Or Analysis: Supreme Court Sets Aside HC Order Granting Bail To Murder Accused 

[Case: Kumer Singh v. State of Rajasthan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 332]

There is no discussion or analysis of circumstances at all, the Supreme Court observed while setting aside a High Court order granting bail to murder accused. The Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that in a case where an earlier application for bail has been rejected, there is a higher burden on the appellate court to furnish specific reasons as to why the bail should be granted. 

"Such an order has been disapproved by this Court time and again. The High Court has not at all taken into consideration the facts of the case; the nature of allegations; gravity of offences and role attributed to the accused. As a matter of fact, there is no discussion or analysis of circumstances at all. 13.2 The observations made by the High Court "considering the contentions put forth by counsel for the petitioner, I deem it proper to allow the second bail application" does not constitute the kind of reasoning which is expected of a judicial order. The impugned order passed by the High Court can be said to be perverse and suffers from non-application of mind to the relevant factors to be considered while grant of bail and therefore the interference of this Court is warranted." the Court remarked while setting aside the bail order passed by the High Court. 

55. Lender Who Advanced Interest Free Loans To Corporate Body Is Also A Financial Creditor; Can Initiate CIRP

[Case: Orator Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Samtex Desinz Pvt. Ltd; Citation: LL 2021 SC 333]

The Supreme Court has observed that a lender who advanced interest free loans to finance the business operations of a corporate body is a Financial Creditor and competent to initiate the Corporate Resolution Process under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. "There is no discernible reason, why a term loan to meet the financial requirements of a Corporate Debtor for its operation, which obviously has the commercial effect of borrowing, should be excluded from the purview of a financial debt", the bench comprising Justices Indira Banerjee and V. Ramasubramanian observed. The Court also held that Financial Debt' would include interest free loans advanced to finance the business operations of a corporate body. 

56. Senior, Even Though Less Meritorious, Shall Have Priority: Supreme Court Explains Seniority Cum Merit Principle For Promotion

[Case: Tek Chand v. Bhakra Beas Management Board; Citation: LL 2021 SC 334]

The Supreme Court has reiterated that seniority-­cum-­merit means that given the minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency of administration, the senior though the less meritorious shall have priority. In this case, the appellants were promoted to the post of Leading Fireman under the Bhakra Beas Management Board Class ­III and Class­ IV Employees (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1994. Their promotions were annulled by the High Court while allowing a writ petition filed by another employee who was junior to then. The court held them to be ineligible for promotion under the Regulations.

Referring to facts of this case, the bench said that a person possessing good reports is eligible to be considered for appointment by promotion as Leading Fireman based on selection. "Other things being equal between competing candidates, seniority is to be given due weightage. But it does not mean that even if a junior is more meritorious by way of possessing an appreciable initiative certificate which the senior does not, irrespective of the same, the senior shall march ahead on the seniority ­cum­ merit principle", the Court added.

57. Benefit Of 'Krishna Sradha' Judgment Can Be Availed Only If NEET Candidate Approached Court Without Any Delay

[Case: Medical Council of India v. Ritwik; Citation: LL 2021 SC 335]

The Supreme Court has observed that the benefit of S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra Pradesh judgment can be availed only if the NEET candidate approached the Court without delay. In Krishna Sradha, the Supreme Court has observed that, in exceptional cases, a direction can be issued to grant admission to meritorious candidates to MBBS Course even after cut-off date. One crucial condition is that the student has to approach the Court at the earliest and without any delay, the bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Aniruddha Bose noted.