Supreme Court Weekly Digest With Subject /Statute Wise Index [March 11 to 17]

Citations 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220 to 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 239

Anticipatory Bail

Custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating into the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also not be a ground to release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for the purpose of investigation. (Para 12) Ashok Kumar v. State of Union Territory Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 223

Dispute

Nature of dispute – Dispute between the parties was essentially of a civil nature – There is no criminal element and consequently the case is nothing but an abuse of the process. The complainant has not been able to establish that the appellants had intention to cheat right from the beginning. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case. Every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. (Para 4, 7, 8) Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293; referred. Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Settlement of dispute between parties – The additional amount paid by the appellants pursuant to a settlement is primarily to bring a quietus to the dispute and to have peace and to avoid litigation. The mere fact that the appellants have paid an additional amount pursuant to the settlement, cannot be presumed as an act of cheating. The allegation that the complainant was coerced into a settlement, looks unlikely because there is no FIR or Complaint that the complainant was coerced into this settlement and the amount was duly accepted by the complainant. Further the complainant does not dispute that the additional amount paid by the appellants under the terms of the compromise deed. Hence, the dispute is settled. (Para 4) Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 82(1) - An accused would not be entitled to pre-arrest bail if the non-bailable warrant and the proclamation under Section 82(1) Cr.P.C. is pending against him. (Para 5) Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 232

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 82 and 83 - Mere filing of an anticipatory bail application by the accused could not be treated as his appearance before the court which had initiated proceedings under Section 82/83 Cr.P.C. against the accused. (Para 20) Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 232

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 173 – Police report – It is an opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the concerned court that on the material collected during the course of investigation, an offence appears to have been committed by the particular person or persons, or that no offence appears to have been committed. (Para 13) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 173(2) – Mandatory requirements of police report – It is found that the investigating officers while submitting the chargesheet/Police Report do not comply with the requirements of the Section 173(2). Though the form of the report to be submitted under Section 173(2) has to be prescribed by the State Government and each State Government has its own Police Manual, the mandatory requirements required to be complied with by such officers in the Police Report/Chargesheet are laid down in Section 173. It is incumbent on the part of the Investigating Officer to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 173(2). Only the report forwarded by the police officer to the Magistrate under Section 173(2). can form the basis for the competent court for taking cognizance thereupon. A chargesheet is nothing but a final report of the police officer under Section 173(2) of. (Para 12 & 13) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 173(2) – Directions issued and particulars listed for compliance in a police report on completion of investigation – Report of police officer on the completion of investigation shall contain (i) A report in the form prescribed by the State Government stating- (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170 Cr.PC. (h) Whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under [sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB] or section 376E of the IPC. (ii) If upon the completion of investigation, there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the Police officer in charge shall clearly state in the Report about the compliance of Section 169 Cr.PC. (iii) When the report in respect of a case to which Section 170 Cr.PC. applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report, all the documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; and the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC. of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. (iv) In case of further investigation, the Police officer in charge shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and shall also comply with the details mentioned in the above sub para (i) to (iii). (Para 17) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 172 – Diary of proceedings – Every police officer making an investigation under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. is required to enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary day by day. Sub-section (IA) of Section 172 requires that the statements of the witnesses recorded during the course of investigation under section 161 have to be inserted in the case diary; and sub-section (1B) of Section 172 requires that such diary shall be a volume and duly paginated. (Para 11) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Power of Magistrate to act on Police report – When such a Police Report concludes that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons, the Magistrate has three options: (i) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, (ii) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report, or (iii) he may disagree with the report and discharge the accused or drop the proceedings. If such Police Report concludes that no offence appears to have been committed, the Magistrate again has three options: (i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings, or (ii) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (iii) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156. (Para 14) Bhagwant Singh vs. Commissioner of Police & Anr; (1985) 2 SCC 537; referred. Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 173(2) – Right to default bail on grounds of incomplete police report – Once from the material produced along with the chargesheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the chargesheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet or that the chargesheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. (Para 15) CBI vs. Kapil Wadhwan & Anr, Criminal Appeal No. 391 of 2024 (@ SLP (Crl) No. 11775 of 2023); referred. Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 – Inherent power of court – High Court should have exercised power under Section 482 to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice. Although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature but are given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. (Para 5 & 6) Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90; referred. Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Constitution of India

Constitution of India – Scope of judicial review in matters of transfer – The scope of judicial review is only available when there is a clear violation of statutory provision or the transfer is persuaded by malafide. In absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegation are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. The impugned transfer order is not alleged to be malafide or violative of any prescribed statutory provision, hence, the interference made by the Division Bench setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the Single Judge is not justified. The Division Bench has committed an error in setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. (Para 12 & 13) Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 231

Constitution of India; Article 136 – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court – Discretion to interfere – In cases where there is no substantial question of law this court would not exercise its discretion. (Para 18) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230

Constitution of India; Article 136 – Wrongful denial of employment and regularization – Distinction between the two sets of workers – Artificial distinction asserted by appellant between two set of workers is unjustified. The appellant has failed to establish any distinction between the 19 workers who were regularized and the 13 workers who were left out. The tribunal came to the conclusion that the nature of the duties performed by the 13 workmen are perennial in nature and they hold the same status as the 19 regularized employees but were wrongly not made part of the settlement. There is no merit in the appeals filed by the appellant. (Para 20, 21 & 22) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230

Constitution of India; Article 226 – Jurisdiction to interfere in administrative decisions – The judiciary must exercise restraint and avoid unnecessary intervention qua administrative decision(s) of the executive involving specialised expertise in the absence of any mala-fide and / or prejudice. The process of evaluation of an IAS officer, ought to have been left to the executive on account of it possessing the requisite expertise and mandate for the said task. The High Court entered into a specialised domain i.e., evaluating the competency of an IAS officer without the requisite domain expertise and administrative experience to conduct such an evaluation. The High Court ought not to have ventured into the said domain particularly when the Accepting Authority is yet to pronounce its decision qua the Underlying Representation. (Para 25, 27 & 28) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220

Constitution of India – Writ petition – Lack of proper procedure – The writ petition filed claiming title on the disputed plot of land was taken up by the High Court in hot haste and was allowed without issuing formal notice to all the respondents. Further, the State authorities were not given proper opportunity of filing a counter and the standing counsel was instructed to appear without any formal notice being issued and was given a single day's opportunity to present the factual report. Impugned order passed by the High Court suffers from patent illegality, perversity and in sheer violation of principles of natural justice. (Para 16 & 18) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226

Constitution of India – Writ petition – Writ petition was manifestly tainted on account of concealment of material facts. Factum of filing of two earlier writ petitions with similar prayers was concealed by respondent while filing the present writ petition. (Para 14 & 16) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226

Contempt of Court

Maintainability of contempt petition – Even consent terms incorporated in the Court's order when breached would give rise to allegations of contempt, but by mere filing of a civil suit asserting certain legal rights over the lands in question, it cannot be stated that the plaintiffs have breached the consent terms. Filing of the suit for asserting the rights of the plaintiffs/respondents could not be said to be amounting to contempt of the Court. Hence, no interference is warranted in the impugned order. (Para 10 & 25) Shah Enterprises v. Vaijayantiben Ranjitsingh Sawant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 224

Customs Act, 1962

The Importer's Bill of Entry of subsequent imported goods can be discarded if the subsequent imported goods are undervalued to the previously imported identical or similar goods. (Para 8 - 10) Global Technologies and Research v. Principal Commissioner of Customs, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 239

Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954

Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 and Rules, 1955; Section 3 (d) - Contempt of Court Proceedings – Violation of Undertaking – The Court restrained Patanjali Ayurved Limited from advertising products intended to cure diseases specified in relevant laws and cautioned against making statements against any system of medicine in the media, as previously undertaken. Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 229

Evidence Act, 1872

Testimony of the prosecution witness identifying the accused persons at the police station cannot be considered a proper Test Identification Parade to convict the accused. (Para 5 - 7) Jafar v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 238

Evidence act, 1872 – Credibility of testimony of the victim in matters involving sexual offences –The statement of the prosecutrix ought to be consistent from the beginning to the end (minor inconsistences excepted), from the initial statement to the oral testimony, without creating any doubt qua the prosecution's case. The Court can rely on the victim as a “sterling witness” without further corroboration, but the quality and credibility must be exceptionally high. While a victim's testimony is usually enough for sexual offence cases, an unreliable or insufficient account from the prosecutrix, marked by identified flaws and gaps, casts serious doubt with regard to the veracity of the prosecution version and could make it difficult for a conviction to be recorded. Considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident and allows the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. Material contradictions apparent in the depositions of prosecution witnesses, including the victim, significantly undermine the credibility of the prosecution version. Enough missing links present to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused. (Para 15, 16, 17 & 22) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Evidence act, 1872 – Conviction on sole evidence of victim – Conviction undoubtedly can be recorded on the sole evidence of a victim of crime; however, it must undergo a strict scrutiny through the well settled legal principles. (Para 22) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Evidence act, 1872 – Offence of sexual harassment in a public place, as opposed to one committed within the confines of a room or a house, or even in a public place but away from the view of the public, stands on different premise. If any doubt arises in the Court's mind regarding the veracity of the victim's version, the Court may, at its discretion, seek corroboration from other witnesses who directly observed the incident or from other attending circumstances to unearth the truth. (Para 18) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Land Law

The tenant holding possession of the Watan property under the Maharashtra Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, on the 'Tiller's Day', which is not subjected to payment of land revenue to the State Government, would be entitled to exercise their right of statutory purchase for purchasing the tenanted Watan property under the Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Offices) Act, 1962. Baban Balaji More v. Babaji Hari Shelar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 234

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Negotiable Instruments Act,1882 - Director of the company not responsible for its day-to-day affairs cannot be held liable for dishonor of cheque. (Para 10) Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 237

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 143A - Mere filing of the cheque dishonor complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act would not grant a right to a complainant to seek interim compensation under Section 143A (1) of the N.I. Act, as the power of the court to grant interim compensation, isn't mandatory but discretionary and needs to be decided after prima facie evaluating the merits of the case. (Para 14) Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 235

Penal Code, 1860

Penal Code, 1860; Section 299, 302 & 304 Part II – The act of celebratory firing during marriage ceremonies is an unfortunate practice – In the absence of any evidence on record to suggest that the Appellant aimed at and / or pointed at the large crowd whilst engaging in such celebratory firing; or there existed any prior enmity between the Deceased and the Appellant, the act cannot be punishable under Section 302 IPC. On grounds that (i) there was no previous enmity between the Deceased; (ii) no intention may be attributed to the Appellant as may be culled out from the record to cause death of the Deceased; and (iii) person carrying a gun with live cartridges has knowledge that firing the gun in presence of several people is an act likely to cause death, the Appellant is guilty of commission of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 IPC i.e., punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant under Section 302 IPC is liable to set aside. (Para 13, 14 & 15) Shahid Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 222

Registration Act, 2008

Land Revenue Code; Section 36A and Registration Act, 2008; Section 17 – Restriction in conveyance of land by tribal in favour of non-tribal – Under Section 36A, restriction is only in case of transfer by way of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or otherwise and there is no bar for a tribal to enter into an agreement to sell and seeking advance sale consideration. Previous sanction is to be taken before conveyance could be made and conveyance by way of sale would take place only at the time of registration of a sale deed in accordance with Section 17 of the Registration Act, 2008. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225

Service Law

Consumer Protection (Qualification for Appointment, Method of Recruitment, Procedure for Appointment, Term of Office, Resignation and Removal of the President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules 2020 - No written test would be either feasible or practicable for the appointment of the President of the SCDRC for which a former Judge of the High Court is eligible for appointment. Hence, insofar as appointments to the post of President of the SCDRC are concerned, we direct that the requirement of holding a written examination and viva voce in the terms as envisaged shall stand relaxed for the present. At the same time, it is clarified that the appointments to the office of President of the SCDRC shall be made in consultation with and subject to the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court. (Para 4) Ganeshkumar Rajeshwarrao Selukar v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 236

It is not open for an employer to change the qualifications prescribed in the advertisement midstream, during the course of the ongoing selection process. Any such action would be hit by the vice of arbitrariness as it would tantamount to denial of an opportunity to those candidates who are eligible in terms of the advertisement but would stand disqualified on the basis of a change in the eligibility criteria after the same is announced by the employer. (Para 8) Anil Kishore Pandit v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 233

PAR Rules; Rule 5(1) – Mandatory nature of timelines – Outcome of contravention of timelines prescribed under the schedule in view of Rule 5(1) of the PAR Rules – The previous performance appraisal report(s) of Respondent were admittedly beyond the timelines prescribed under the Schedule, however within the period prescribed under Rule 5(1) of the PAR Rules. The High Court observed that the timelines prescribed under the Schedule were not water-tight and in fact, were flexible. Admittedly, the Accepting Authority has met the timelines prescribed under Rule 5(1) of the PAR Rules and accordingly, there is no reason to expunge the remarks and overall grades awarded to Respondent by the Accepting Authority on the PAR on account of a contravention of the timelines prescribed under the Schedule. (Para 19, 20 & 21) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220

Reduction of grade by accepting authority challenged on grounds of prejudice – Contention of prejudice caused cannot be accepted on account of the fact that Respondent was awarded an overall grade '9' which undisputedly forms a part of the 'outstanding' grade i.e., the highest category awarded to an IAS officer. There can be no qualm that the said overall grade is more than sufficient for the purposes of empanelment / promotion vis-à-vis Respondent. (Para 24) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220

Validity of transfer order – Absence of malafide intention – Even if transfer order was made on the recommendation of an MLA, that by itself would not vitiate the transfer order. It is the duty of the representatives of the people in the legislature to express the grievances of the people and if there is any complaint against an official the State Government is certainly within its jurisdiction to transfer such an employee. (Para 9.3) Mohd. Masood Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. and others; (2007) 8 SCC 150; referred. Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 231

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Land Revenue Code; Section 36A – Specific performance of agreement to sell –The stage of taking previous sanction under Section 36A of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1959 had not arisen in the present case, for the reason that the defendant did not come forward to execute the sale deed. Courts could not have declined to grant the decree for specific performance on the basis of non-compliance of Section 36A inasmuch as the considerations under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 only had to be made for the purpose of adjudicating the suit between the parties. As the plaintiff has performed his part of the agreement as required under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief specific performance of the agreement to sell. On grant of the decree of specific performance, the appellant-plaintiff shall proceed under Section 36A of Act of 1959 before seeking conveyance of the subject land in his favour in case the defendant is a tribal. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Where there is no reason to decline a decree for specific performance, the Courts ought to grant the same rather than give an alternative relief. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225

Tribunal

Jurisdiction of Tribunal – Tribunal was justified in giving its award on the reference made by the central government. Central Government invoked the power of reference to refer the matter to the Tribunal to adjudicate the interest of all the 32 workers. The Tribunal was naturally bound by the reference to consider the claim of all the 32 workers. Hence, despite the fact that there was a settlement with respect to some of the workmen, the Tribunal was tasked to examine the entire reference and give independent findings on the issue. (Para 16 & 17) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230