Supreme Court Criminal Law Digest 2021 [Part 1- CrPC-IPC-Evidence ]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

On Bail and Anticipatory Bail [Section 436- 439 CrPC]

An Accused Who Was Released On Default Bail Cannot Be Re-arrested On Filing Of Charge Sheet

[Case: Kamlesh Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 8]

A bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao, Navin Sinha and Indu Malhotra held that an accused who was released on default bail cannot be re-arrested on filing of charge-sheet by police. Reliance was placed on Bashir v. State of Haryana [(1977) 4 SCC 410] wherein it was held that it is open to the prosecution to file an application for cancellation of bail on the grounds known to law and the receipt of the charge sheet in Court can by itself be no ground for cancellation of bail.

Manipal Fraud Case: Supreme Court Grants Bail To Former Employee Sandeep Gururaj

[Case: Sandeep Gururaj v. State of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 24]

A bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Dinesh Maheshwari and Hrishikesh Roy granted bail to Sandeep Gururaj, Former Deputy General Manager of Manipal Education and Medical Group (MEMG), accused of siphoning off funds (reportedly 62 Crores) from the company accounts. It noted that the instant case is not one of public money being involved but monies of the concerned corporate entities.

Criminal Court Exercising Bail Jurisdiction Is Not Expected To Act As Recovery Agent To Realize Dues Of Complainant: Supreme Court

[Case: Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 31]

A bench comprising Justices Indira Banerjee and Sanjiv Khanna observed that a criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant. It observed thus while setting aside a condition imposed by Madhya Pradesh High Court on an accused while granting him anticipatory bail.

Supreme Court Grants Bail To Kannada Actress Ragini Dwivedi In Sandalwood Drug Case

[Case: Ragini Dwivedi @ Gini @ Rags v. State Of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 38]

A Bench headed by Justice Rohinton F. Nariman granted bail to Kannada actor Ragini Dwivedi, who had been arrested by the police for allegedly consuming and supplying drugs at parties and events organized by her and others, and set aside a Karnataka High Court order wherein her bail plea was dismissed. The Bench noted that Section 37 of the NDPS Act had been wrongly invoked by the Sessions Court and the High Court.

High Court Exercising Bail Jurisdiction Cannot Pass Directions Which Will Have Direct Bearing Upon Trial: Supreme Court

[Case: Prashant Dagajirao Patil v. Vaibhav @ Sonu Arun Pawar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 39]

A bench comprising Justice NV Ramana, Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose observed that a High Court, while exercising bail jurisdiction, cannot issue directions which will have a direct bearing upon the trial. It observed thus while setting aside a direction of the High Court in a case, in which it directed the Investigating Officer to examine a CCTV footage and to submit a report.

Successive Anticipatory Bail Applications Ought Not To Be Entertained On Specious Ground Of 'Changed Circumstances': Supreme Court

[Case: GR Ananda Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu; Citation: LL 2021 SC 48]

A bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar, BR Gavai and Krishna Murari observed that successive anticipatory bail applications ought not to be entertained. It said, "As a matter of fact, successive anticipatory bail applications ought not to be entertained and more so, when the case diary and the status report, clearly indicated that the accused (respondent No. 2) is absconding and not cooperating with the investigation. The specious reason of change in circumstances cannot be invoked for successive anticipatory bail applications, once it is rejected by a speaking order and that too by the same Judge."

Violation Of Fundamental Right To Speedy Trial Is A Ground For Constitutional Court To Grant Bail In UAPA Cases: Supreme Court

[Case: Union of India v. KA Najeeb; Citation: LL 2021 SC 56]

A bench comprising Justices NV Ramana, Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose held that Section 43D (5) of UAPA per se does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on ground of violation of Fundamental Right to Speedy Trial. It held, "Whereas at commencement of proceedings, Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence."

Whether Day Of Remand Is To Be Included For Considering A Claim For Default Bail? Supreme Court Refers To Larger Bench

[Case: Enforcement Directorate v. Kapil Wadhawan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 118]

A bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hrishikesh Roy noticed that, in State of MP v. Rustom & Ors.1995 (Supp) 3 SCC 221 , Ravi Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar (2015) 8 SCC 340 and M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Director of Revenue Intelligence, it was held that the date of remand is to be excluded for computing the permitted period for completion of investigation. On the other hand, the judgments in Chaganti Satyanarayan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1986) 3 SCC 141 , CBI v. Anupam J Kulkarni (1992) 3 SCC 141 , State v. Mohd. Ashraft Bhat (1996) 1 SCC 432, State of Maharashtra v. Bharati Chandmal Varma (2002) 2 SCC 121, and Pragyna Singh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 10 SCC 445, have held that the date of remand must be included for computing the available period for investigation for determining entitlement to default bail.

Anticipatory Bail Once Granted Does Not Automatically End With Filing Of Chargesheet, Reiterates Supreme Court

[Case: Dr. Rajesh Pratap Giri v. State Of UP; Citation: LL 2021 SC 140]

A bench comprising Justices NV Ramana, Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose reiterated that the anticipatory bail once granted does not automatically end on the filing of the charge­sheet. In this case, the Allahabad High Court, on an application made by the complainant­ held that the anticipatory bail granted to the accused by the Trial Court came to an end with the filing of a charge­sheet, and directed him to surrender and apply for regular bail.

The Top Court noted that in Sushila Aggarwal and Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., (2020) 5 SCC 1, it was observed that 'mere fact that an accused is given relief under Section 438 at one stage, per se does not mean that upon the filing of a charge­sheet, he is necessarily to surrender or/and apply for regular bail.'

Seriousness Of Offence A Relevant Consideration While Considering The Grant Of Bail, Reiterates Supreme Court

[Case: Naveen Singh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 162]

Seriousness of the offence is one of the relevant considerations while considering the grant of bail, a bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah reiterated. " High Court ought to have been more cautious/serious in granting the bail to a person who is alleged to have forged/manipulated the court record and taken the benefit of such manipulated and forged court record more particularly when he has been charge­sheeted having found prima facie case and the charge has been framed," the bench observed while taking note of the allegations raised in the FIR against the accused.

Default Bail: State Cannot Take Advantage Of Filing One Charge Sheet First And Seeking Time To File Supplementary Charge-sheets To Extend The Time Limit U/S 167(2)

[Case: Fakhrey Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 165]

A bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and R. Subhash Reddy observed that the time period for investigation specified under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be extended by seeking to file supplementary charge sheet qua UAPA offences.

The Court while granting default bail to Fakhrey Alam, a person accused under Section 18 of the UAPA Act, reiterated that default bail under first proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is a fundamental right and not merely a statutory right.

Criminal Proceedings Are Not For Realization Of Disputed Dues, Reiterates Supreme Court

[Case: Manoj Kumar Sood v. State Of Jharkhand; Citation: LL 2021 SC 171

A bench comprising Justices Indira Banerjee and Krishna Murari reiterated that criminal proceedings are not for realization of disputed dues. A Criminal Court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial, the bench observed.

Seriousness Of Charge Relevant Factor: Supreme Court Sets Aside Bail Granted To Man Accused Of Murdering Lady Doctor

[Case: State of Kerala v. Mahesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 192]

A bench comprising Justices Indira Banerjee and Krishna Murari set aside the Kerala High Court order which granting bail to a man accused murder of a lady doctor and observed that seriousness of the charge is one of the relevant considerations while considering bail applications. It observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C is discretionary, such discretion has to be exercised judiciously. Moreover, it was observed that seriousness of the charge is undoubtedly one of the relevant considerations while considering bail applications.

Quality Of Reasons Matters The Most: Supreme Court Sets Aside Bail Granted To Accused In Dowry Death Case

[Case: Sonu v. Sonu Yadav; Citation: LL 2021 SC 200]

A bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah that while the reasons may be brief, it is the quality of the reasons which matters the most. The observation came while the bench was setting aside an Allahabad High Court which granted bail to a man accused in a dowry death case.

Payment Of Extortion Money Does Not Amount To Terror Funding: Supreme Court Grants Bail To UAPA Accused

[Case: Sudesh Kedia v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 204]

Payment of extortion money does not amount to terror funding, a bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao and S. Ravindra Bhat observed while granting bail to an accused arrested under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act [UAPA]. In this case, the bail application of Sudesh Kedia was dismissed by the High Court on a finding that he had been paying extortion money, and thus contributed to funding of the terrorist organization. The Supreme Court on the other hand observed Prima facie, it cannot be said that the Appellant conspired with the other members of the TPC and raised funds to promote the organization.

Consent Of Parties Cannot Obviate Duty Of Court To Indicate Its Reasons For Granting Or Refusing Bail: Supreme Court

[Case: Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana Makwana (Koli); Citation: LL 2021 SC 221]

A bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that consent of parties cannot obviate the duty of the High Court to indicate its reasons why it has either granted or refused bail.

The observation came while setting aside the orders of the High Court of Gujarat granting bail, under Section 439 of CrPC, to six murder accused who were arrested for their alleged involvement in five homicidal deaths. In the order granting bail, the High Court recorded that 'Learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties do not press for further reasoned order'.

Liberty Is Important But Courts Must Consider Potential Threat To Witnesses, Victims While Granting Bail: Supreme Court

[Case: Sudha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.; Citation: LL 2021 SC 229]

A Bench of then CJI SA Bobde, Justices AS Bopanna and V Ramasubramanian reiterated that it is necessary for courts to consider the impact on the witnesses or victims in a criminal case while granting bail to an accused. Observing thus, it set aside an order of the Allahabad High Court which granted bail to an accused who was arrested under the U.P. Gangster and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986.

The accused was alleged to be a contract killer and sharp shooter. Challenging the bail granted by the High Court, the widow of the deceased approach the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court has overlooked several aspects, such as the potential threat to witnesses, forcing the trial court to grant protection.

High Courts Can Grant Protection To Accused While Dismissing Anticipatory Bail Plea In Exceptional Circumstances: Supreme Court

[Case: Nathu Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 261]

A bench comprising of CJI Ramana, Justices Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose observed that a High Court, while dismissing anticipatory bail applications, can issue protective orders only when there are exceptional circumstances.

'He Has Already Undergone More Than Half Of The Sentence Which Could Be Awarded To Him If Convicted: SC Grants Bail To Man Accused In A Corruption Case

[Case: Pawandeepsingh Mahendrasingh Kohli v. State of Maharashtra; Citation: LL 2021 SC 287]

The Supreme Court granted bail to an under trial in a corruption case on the ground that he has already undergone more than half of the sentence which could be awarded to him if convicted. The Bench comprising Justices Vineet Saran and Dinesh Maheshwari observed, "considering the facts and circumstances of this case and keeping in view that the petitioner has already undergone more than half of the sentence which could be awarded if convicted, and in view of the order dated 25.03.2021 passed in SLP(Crl.) No.6355/2020, we consider it to be a fit case for grant of bail."

[Case: Dharmesh @ Dharmendra @ Dhamo Jagdishbhai @ Jagabhai Bhagubhai Ratadia v. State Of Gujarat; Citation: LL 2021 SC 292]

The Supreme Court observed that a condition for payment of compensation to victims cannot be imposed at the stage of bail. In the instant case, the accused was granted bail by the High Court with a condition requiring them to deposit Rs.2.00 lakh each as compensation to the victims. The Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hemant Gupta observed, "we may hasten to add that we are not saying that no monetary condition can be imposed for grant of bail. We say so as there are cases of offences against property or otherwise but that cannot be a compensation to be deposited and disbursed as if that grant has to take place as a condition of the person being enlarged on bail.

Honour Killing: Supreme Court Cancels Bail Granted To Man Accused Of Conspiracy To Murder Brother-in-Law In front Of Pregnant Wife

[Case: Mamta Nair v. State of Rajasthan and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 294]

The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Rajasthan High Court which granted bail to a man accused of conspiracy to murder in a case of honour killing. A Bench headed by Chief Justice of India NV Ramana set aside the High Court's order observing that the same was not sustainable and asked the accused Mukesh Choudhury to surrender. The trial court was directed to complete the trial within a period of one week. The Supreme Court also noted that the examination of 17 out of 47 witnesses were complete.

No Discussion Or Analysis: Supreme Court Sets Aside HC Order Granting Bail To Murder Accused

[Case: Kumer Singh v. State of Rajasthan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 332]

There is no discussion or analysis of circumstances at all, the Supreme Court observed while setting aside a High Court order granting bail to murder accused. The Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that in a case where an earlier application for bail has been rejected, there is a higher burden on the appellate court to furnish specific reasons as to why the bail should be granted.

How To Exercise The Discretionary Power For Granting Bail? Principles Summarized By Supreme Court

[Case: Harjit Singh v. Inderpreet Singh @ Inder; Citation: LL 2021 SC 401]

The Supreme Court has observed that seriousness of crime is an aspect to be considered while granting bail to an accused. The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah set aside a bail granted by the High Court to a murder accused. "We are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in granting bail to respondent no.1 herein without taking into consideration the overall facts, otherwise having a bearing on exercise of its discretion on the issue. The order passed by the High Court fails to notice material facts and shows nonapplication of mind to the seriousness of the crime and circumstances, which ought to have been taken into consideration.", the Court said.

Supreme Court Grants Bail To YSRCP MP Raghu Rama Krishna Raju In Sedition Case

[Case: Kanumuri Raghurama Krishnam Raju v. Stateof Andhra Pradesh & Ors.; Citation: LL 2021 SC 407]

A Bench of Justices Vineet Saran and BR Gavai granted bail to YSR Congress MP K. Raghu Rama Krishnam Raju from Andhra Pradesh, who was arrested by Guntur CID on May 14 for alleged sedition and promotion of communal hatred over his speeches. It observed that custodial interrogation would not be required as all statements of Petitioner are on record. The bench also took note of the medical condition of the petitioner, having regard to the heart surgery underwent by him last year. The bench also opined on the basis of the medical report from Army Hospital, Secundarabad, that possibilities of the petitioner's ill-treatment in custody cannot be ruled out.

What The Court Says, And How It Says It, Is Equally Important As What It Decides': Supreme Court Explains Purpose & Importance Of Judgment

[Case: Shakuntala Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 422]

The Supreme Court, while setting aside a High Court order that granted bail to a murder accused, explained the 'importance of judgment; purpose of judgment and what should be contained in the judgment'. The Court said that a judgment should have a clarity, both on facts and law and on submissions, findings, reasoning's and the ultimate relief granted. What the court says, and how it says it, is equally important as what the court decides, the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed.

Unilateral Cancellation Of Registered Sale Deed Can't Be An Anticipatory Bail Condition

[Case: Syed Afsar Pasha Quadri v. The State of Telangana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 474]

The Supreme Court has observed that a registered sale deed cannot be cancelled unilaterally by one party to the said document in purported compliance of the direction given by the High Court, since that adversely affects the rights of the purchasers who are not a party before the High Court. The bench of Chief Justice NV Ramana, Justice Surya Kant and Justice Hima Kohli in the present matter was hearing a special leave petition filed assailing the order dated June 8, 2021 by the High Court of Telangana wherein the High Court while granting anticipatory bail had directed the accused to cancel the registered sale deed executed by him and return the money received from the complainant.

NDPS: Absence Of Recovery Of Contraband From Possession Of Accused By Itself Not A Ground To Grant Bail

[Case: Union of India v. Md. Nawaz Khan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 489]

The Supreme Court observed that bail cannot be granted to an accused under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, merely on a finding of the absence of possession of the contraband on the person of the accused. Such a finding does not absolve the court of the level of scrutiny required under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna observed. The court reiterated that the test to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail.

Role Attached To Accused Has To Be Considered While Deciding Bail Plea Citing Parity

[Case: Mahadev Meena v. Raveen Rathore; Citation: LL 2021 SC 503]

The Supreme Court observed that the role attached to the accused has to be considered while deciding the plea seeking bail on the ground of parity. The seriousness and gravity of the crime alleged has to be considered while granting bail to the accused, the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna reiterated while setting aside a bail grant to a murder accused.

Right To Apply For Bail Is An Individual Right Implicit In Articles 14, 19 & 21

[Case: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. State of Rajasthan and Another; Citation: LL 2021 SC 523]

Disapproving the blanket orders passed by a single judge of the Rajasthan High Court to not list applications for bail and suspension of sentence as urgent matters during the lockdown, the Supreme Court has observed that the right to apply for bail is an individual right implicit in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. A Bench comprising Justices L Nageswara Rao and Aniruddha Bose observed that such blanket bans would suspend Fundamental Rights of individuals and block access for seekers of liberty to apply for bail.

Conduct Of Accused, Gravity Of Offence, Societal Impact Etc. Are Grounds To Revoke Bail

[Case: Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab; Citation: LL 2021 SC 537]

The Supreme Court observed that bail granted to an accused can be revoked by a superior court if the court has considered irrelevant factors or has ignored relevant material available on record which renders the order granting bail legally untenable. "The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and societal impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration of criminal justice system", the bench of CJI NV Ramana, Justices Surya Kant and Hima Kohli observed. The court observed thus while setting aside an anticipatory bail granted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana to a 'mother in law' in a dowry death case. The offence alleged in the instant case is heinous and protrudes our medieval social structure which still wails for reforms despite multiple efforts made by Legislation and Judiciary, the court remarked in this case. The court noted that the accused had remained absconding for more than two years after being declared a proclaimed offender.

Supreme Court Issues Guidelines On Grant Of Bail To Accused Not Arrested During Investigation On Filing Of Chargesheet

[Case: Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI; Citation: LL 2021 SC 550]

The Supreme Court issued guidelines on the aspect of grant of bail to accused who are not arrested during investigation on charge sheet being filed. The bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh accepted the suggestions made by Additional Solicitor General SV Raja and Senior Advocate Sidharth Luthra in this regard. The requisite conditions for this guideline to apply are (1) Not arrested during investigation. (2) Cooperated throughout in the investigation including appearing before Investigating Officer whenever called. The Court laid down guidelines for Category (A) offences, Category (B) and (D) offences and Category (C) offences. The court also agreed with the suggestion that, to consider bail, the trial Court is not precluded from granting interim bail taking into consideration the conduct of the accused during the investigation which has not warranted arrest.

Anticipatory Bail Granted Ignoring Material Aspects, Nature & Gravity Of Offence Liable To Be Cancelled

[Case: Prashant Singh Rajput v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 566]

The Supreme Court observed that anticipatory bail granted ignoring material aspects including the nature and gravity of the offence is liable to be canceled. The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna in the present matter was hearing a criminal appeal assailing High Court's order granting anticipatory bail to the accused(s) in connection with a crime registered for offences punishable u/s 302 and 323 r/w 34 of IPC, 1860. The Apex Court while setting aside the orders granting anticipatory bail observed, "The Court has to determine whether, on the basis of the material available at this stage, the High Court has applied the correct principles in allowing the applications for anticipatory bail. The offence is of a serious nature in which Vikas Singh was murdered. The FIR and the statements under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC indicate a specific role to Jogendra Singh and Suryabhan Singh in the crime. The order granting anticipatory bail has ignored material aspects, including the nature and gravity of the offence, and the specific allegations against Jogendra Singh and Suryabhan Singh. Hence, a sufficient case has been made out for cancelling the anticipatory bail granted by the High Court."

Court Shall Not Help An Absconding Accused Who Is Not Cooperating With Investigation

[Case: Sanatan Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 568]

The Supreme Court observed that a Court shall not come to the rescue or help an absconding accused who is not cooperating with the investigation. The bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed thus while upholding an Allahabad High Court order refusing anticipatory bail. The accused, Sanatan Pandey, was charged for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 307, 308, 504 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code. "There is a prima facie case found against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences and even the charge-sheet has been filed and the petitioner is found to be absconding. Therefore, this is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner.", the court said taking note of the above facts. "The Court shall not come to the rescue or help the accused who is not cooperating the investigating agency and absconding and against whom not only nonbailable warrant has been issued but also the proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. has been issued.", the bench said.

Absconder/Proclaimed Offender Not Entitled To Anticipatory Bail

[Case: Prem Shankar Prasad v. State Of Bihar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 579]

The Supreme Court observed that an absconder/proclaimed offender is not entitled to relief of anticipatory bail. In this case, the Trial Court dismissed the anticipatory bail application on the ground that as the accused is absconding and even the proceedings under section 82/83 Cr.PC has been issued, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail. Thereafter, the accused approached the High Court which granted the anticipatory bail. In appeal, the Top court noted that the High Court ignored the factum of initiation of proceedings under sections 82-­83 of Cr.PC by simply observing that "be that as it may". "In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Pradeep Sharma (Supra), it is observed and held by this court that if anyone is declared as an absconder/proclaimed offender in terms of section 82 of Cr.PC, he is not entitled to relief of anticipatory bail", the bench comprising Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed.

Mere Support To Terrorist Organization Without Intention To Further Its Activities Does Not Attract Section 38/39 UAPA

[Case: Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 605]

In its judgment restoring the bail granted to Thwaha Fasal and Allan Shuhaib, the Supreme Court observed that mere support given to a terrorist organization or mere association with it, is not sufficient to attract offences under Sections 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The association and the support have to be with intention of furthering the activities of a terrorist organisation, the bench comprising Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka observed. Such intention, according to the court, can be inferred from the overt acts or acts of active participation of the accused in the activities of a terrorist organization which are borne out from the materials forming a part of charge sheet. Further, the court reiterated that the restrictions imposed by sub-section (5) of Section 43D per se do not prevent a Constitutional Court from granting bail on the ground of violation of Part III of the Constitution.

Seriousness & Gravity Of Crime Relevant Considerations For Grant Of Bail

[Case: Bhoopendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 615]

The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Rajasthan High Court by which it granted bail to an accused for murder of the village sarpanch, after noting that the High Court did not consider the relevant considerations of seriousness and gravity of the crime and the specific role attributed to the accused. While directing the accused to surrender, a Bench comprising Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice BV Nagarathna opined that the High Court failed to notice relevant circumstances bearing on the seriousness and gravity of the crime and the role attributed to the accused.

Imposition Of Onerous Conditions For Grant Of Bail Tantamount To Denial Of Bail

[Case: Mithun Chatterjee v. State of Odisha; Citation: LL 2021 SC 652]

The Supreme Court observed that imposition of onerous conditions for grant of bail is tantamount to a denial of bail. "We are of the considered view that imposition of onerous conditions for grant of bail tantamount to denial of bail", the Court said. A Bench comprising Justice Nageswara Rao and Justice BR Gavai made the observation while setting aside Orissa High Court's order directing petitioner to deposit cash of Rs.20 lakhs and providing security of immovable property to the tune of Rs.20 lakhs for grant of bail. The present petitioner is an accused in a criminal case for committing offence under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act. He was granted bail by the Orissa High Court on 25th March 2021, subject to him depositing cash of Rs.20 lakhs and providing security of immovable property to the tune of Rs.20 lakhs.

Having An Option To Surrender & Apply For Regular Bail After Filing Charge Sheet Does Not Preclude Parties From Seeking Anticipatory Bail

[Case: Vinod Kumar Sharma and Anr v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 663]

The Supreme Court observed that merely because it was kept open for the parties to surrender and apply for Regular Bail after filing of the charge sheet, the same did preclude them to apply for anticipatory bail u/s 438 Cr.P.C. after filing the charge sheet. "Merely because it was kept open for the petitioners to surrender and apply for Regular Bail after filing of the charge sheet, the same does not preclude the petitioners to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. after filing of the charge sheet. It also cannot be said, that same is a second application for grant of anticipatory bail as pleaded by learned counsel appearing for respondents, on the same cause of action", the bench of Justices R Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy observed.

UAPA- Period Of Deprivation Of Personal Liberty Pending Trial Cannot Be Unduly Long: Supreme Court Grants Bail To Accused

[Case: Ashim v. National Investigation Agency; Citation: LL 2021 SC 697]

The Supreme Court observed that period of deprivation of personal liberty pending trial/appeal cannot be unduly long. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge him on bail, the bench comprising Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka observed.

The court was considering a case of an under trial accused under Sections 120B, 121, 121A, 122 IPC, Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act 1959, Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 18,20,40(1)(b)(c) of the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967. It noted that the accused, who is presently 74 year old is in custody since 6th July, 2012 and has completed nine and half years of incarceration as an undertrial prisoner.

'Forum Shopping Cannot Be Approved; A Ground To Refuse Relief' : Supreme Court Sets Aside Interim Bail

[Case: State of Maharashtra v. Pankaj Jagshi Gangar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 716]

While setting aside an interim bail granted by the High Court in a MCOCA case, the Supreme Court observed that "forum shopping" can also be a ground to refuse relief. A Bench comprising Justice MR Shah and Justice Sanjiv Khanna said, "The aforesaid can be said to be forum shopping by the accused which is highly deprecated and which cannot be approved. On this ground also, the accused is not entitled to be released on bail and the impugned order passed by the High Court releasing the accused on bail deserves to be quashed and set aside."

Sexual Enhancement Drugs Do Not Attract NDPS Act: Supreme Court Grants Bail To Accused

[Case: Bharat Chaudhary v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 733]

Sexual enhancement tablets meant to enhance male potency do not attract the provisions of the NDPS Act, the Supreme Court observed while granting bail to NDPS Accused. A bench comprising CJI NV Ramana, Justices Surya Kant and Hima Kohli observed that the test report stated that the "quantitative analysis of the samples could not be carried out for want of facilities"

"In the absence of any clarity so far on the quantitative analysis of the samples, the prosecution cannot be heard to state at this preliminary stage that the petitioners have been found to be in possession of commercial quantity of psychotropic substances as contemplated under the NDPS Act. Further, a large number of the tablets that have been seized by the DRI admittedly contain herbs/medicines meant to enhance male potency and they do not attract the provisions of the NDPS Act.", the court said.

No Need To Examine Complainant Before Ordering Investigation Under Section 156(3) CrPC

[Case: M/s Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd v. State of Maharashtra and another; Citation: LL 2021 SC 330]

The Supreme Court has reiterated that there is no requirement of examining the complainant on oath under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure(CrPC) before a Judicial Magistrate orders police investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. Holding so, the Supreme Court set aside an order passed by the Bombay High Court which had granted anticipatory bail on the ground that order of magistrate to direct registration of FIR under Sec 156(3) CrPC was given without examining the complainant on oath as under Section 200 CrPC.

[Case: Noorulla Khan v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board; Citation: LL 2021 SC 305]

Sanction U/S 197 CrPC Required To Prosecute Public Servants If Alleged Act Committed Is Directly Concerned With Official Duty

[Case: Indra Devi v. State of Rajasthan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 318]

The Supreme Court has observed that sanction from competent authorities under Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure is required to prosecute public servants if the alleged act committed is directly concerned with the official duty. The Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hemant Gupta opined that the yardstick to be followed is to form a prima facie view whether the act of omission for which the accused was charged had a reasonable connection with the discharge of his duties. The case against the accused was that he had conspired with his superiors who issued a forged lease.

Offences Committed Outside India: Previous Sanction Of Central Govt U/S 188 CrPC Not Required At The Stage Of Cogizance But Trial Can't Be Commenced Without It

[Case: Nerella Chiranjeevi Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 350]

The Supreme Court has observed that the trial of the criminal case against an Indian citizen for offences committed outside India cannot commence without sanction of the Central Government under Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But such previous sanction is not required at the stage of cognizance, the bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Aniruddha Bose said.

[Case: Major M.C. Ashish Chinappa v. Central Bureau of Investigation; Citation: LL 2021 SC 514]

The Supreme Court observed that the validity of sanction order can also be raised in the course of trial. Taking note of the fact that, in this case, the cognizance has already been taken and trial is in progress, the bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari referred to the following observations made in Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, Airport Authority of India (2012) 1 SCC 532 : "In our view, having regard to the facts of the present case, now since cognizance has already been taken against the appellant by the trial Judge, the High Court cannot be said to be have erred in leaving the question of validity of sanction open for consideration by the trial court and giving liberty to the appellant to raise the issue concerning validity of sanction order in the course of trial. Such course is in accord with the decision of this Court in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1 and not unjustified."

Defence On Merits Is Not To Be Considered At Stage Of Framing Of Charge And/ Or At The Stage Of Discharge Application: Supreme Court

[Case: State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap; Citation: LL 2021 SC 210]

A bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that defence on merits is not to be considered at the stage of framing of the charge and/or at the stage of discharge application. The Court observed that at the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.

Section 311 CrPC

Aim Of Every Court Is To Discover The Truth: Supreme Court Explains Scope Of Section 311 CrPC

[Case: VN Patil v. K. Niranjan Kumar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 135; Case: State v. Tr N Seenivasagan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 136]

The Supreme court briefly explained the scope of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in its two recent judgments. Section 311 deals with the power to summon material witness, or examine person present. Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re­examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re­examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case, the provision reads.

Section 313 CrPC - Examination Of Accused

Non-Explanation By Accused In Section 313 CrPC Statement Cannot Be Used As A Link To Complete Chain Of Circumstances: Supreme Court

[Case: Pramila v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 342]

The Supreme Court has observed that the burden of proof on an accused in support of the defence taken under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the prosecution to prove the charge. The accused has merely to create a doubt and it is for the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the same to the accused, the bench of Justices Navin Sinha and R. Subhash Reddy said while acquitting a woman accused of murdering her sister in law.

[Case: Ajay Kumar @ Bittu v. State of Uttarakhand; Citation: LL 2021 SC 54]

A bench comprising Justices Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and MR Shah reiterated that the power of a Trial Court under Section 319 of CrPC to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence is a discretionary and extra-ordinary power which has to be exercised sparingly.

Accused Can Be Summoned U/s 319 CrPC Even On The Basis Of Examination-In-Chief Of Witness: Supreme Court

[Case: Sartaj Singh v. State of Haryana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 161]

A bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that an accused can be summoned under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of even examination ­in ­chief of the witness and the Court need not wait till his cross­ examination.

The bench observed that If on the basis of the examination ­in­ chief of the witness the Court is satisfied that there is a prima facie case against the proposed accused, the Court may in exercise of powers under Section 319 CrPC array such a person as accused and summon him to face the trial.

Scope And Ambit Of Powers Of Court Under Section 319 CrPC: Supreme Court Summarizes Principles

[Case: Manjeet Singh v. State of Haryana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 398]

The Supreme Court summarized the scope and ambit of the powers of the Court under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even in a case where the stage of giving opportunity to the complainant to file a protest petition urging upon the trial Court to summon other persons as well as who were named in the FIR but not implicated in the charge-sheet has gone, in that case also, the court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC, the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed.

Section 319 CrPC: Summoning Power Should Be Exercised Only When Strong And Cogent Evidence Occurs Against A Person

[Case: Ramesh Chandra Srivastava v. State of UP; Citation: LL 2021 SC 468]

The Supreme Court has observed that the power under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be exercised only when strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence. The bench of Justices KM Joseph and PS Narasimha reiterated that the power under Section 319 CrPC cannot be exercised in a casual and cavalier manner. The test to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case which is applied at the time of framing of charge, the bench added

[Case: Prakash Gupta v. Securities and Exchange Board of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 320]

The Supreme Court has observed that the power of compounding must be expressly conferred by the statute which creates the offence. The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that in respect of offences which lie outside the Indian Penal Code, compounding may be permitted only if the statute which creates the offence contains an express provision for compounding before such an offence can be made compoundable. This is because Section 320 CrPC provides for the compounding of offences only under the IPC.

Grant Of Leave For Compounding Offences At Appellate Stage Is Not Automatic On Settlement Between Accused & Victim: Supreme Court

[Case: Pravat Chandra Mohanty v. State of Odisha; Citation: LL 2021 SC 80]

A division bench comprising of Justices Ashok Bhushan and Ajay Rastogi held that grant of leave as contemplated by Section 320(5) of CrPC is not automatic nor it has to be mechanical on receipt of request by the accused which may be agreed by the victim. The observation came while the bench rejected a plea seeking compounding of offences of two police officers accused in a custodial violence case. Pravat Chandra Mohanty and Pratap Kumar Chaudhary were convicted under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code.

Section 378 CrPC

High Court Must Give Brief Reasons In Order Disposing Application Seeking Leave To Appeal Against Acquittal

[Case: Brijesh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 331]

The Supreme Court has reiterated that brief reasons must be given in an order disposing an application for leave to appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 against an order of acquittal. Merely observing that the order of the trial Judge has taken a possible view without an application of mind to the evidence and the findings is not consistent with the duty which is cast upon the High Court while determining whether leave should be granted to appeal against an order of acquittal, the bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed.

Section 321 CrPC- Withdrawal of Prosecution

'Must Subserve Administration Of Justice': Supreme Court Formulates Principles On Withdrawal Of Prosecution Under Section 321 CrPC

[Case: State of Kerala v. K.Ajith; Citation: LL 2021 SC 328 ]

The Supreme Court, in its judgment dismissing the plea seeking withdrawal of prosecution in assembly ruckus case, also formulated the principles on the withdrawal of a prosecution under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that while deciding a plea to withdraw prosecution, the court must be satisfied that the grant of consent sub-serves the administration of justice; and that the permission has not been sought with an ulterior purpose.

1. Section 321 entrusts the decision to withdraw from a prosecution to the public prosecutor but the consent of the court is required for a withdrawal of the prosecution;
2. The public prosecutor may withdraw from a prosecution not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but also to further the broad ends of public justice;
3. The public prosecutor must formulate an independent opinion before seeking the consent of the court to withdraw from the prosecution;
4. While the mere fact that the initiative has come from the government will not vitiate an application for withdrawal, the court must make an effort to elicit the reasons for withdrawal so as to ensure that the public prosecutor was satisfied that the withdrawal of the prosecution is necessary for good and relevant reasons;
5. In deciding whether to grant its consent to a withdrawal, the court exercises a judicial function but it has been described to be supervisory in nature. Before deciding whether to grant its consent the court must be satisfied that: (a) The function of the public prosecutor has not been improperly exercised or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes; (b) The application has been made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice, and not to thwart or stifle the process of law; (c) The application does not suffer from such improprieties or illegalities as would cause manifest injustice if consent were to be given; (d) The grant of consent sub-serves the administration of justice; and (e) The permission has not been sought with an ulterior purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law which the public prosecutor is duty bound to maintain;
6. While determining whether the withdrawal of the prosecution subserves the administration of justice, the court would be justified in scrutinizing the nature and gravity of the offence and its impact upon public life especially where matters involving public funds and the discharge of a public trust are implicated; and
7. In a situation where both the trial judge and the revisional court have concurred in granting or refusing consent, this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution would exercise caution before disturbing concurrent findings. The Court may in exercise of the well-settled principles attached to the exercise of this jurisdiction, interfere in a case where there has been a failure of the trial judge or of the High Court to apply the correct principles in deciding whether to grant or withhold consent.

Section 397 CrPC

Condition Of Pre-deposit Of Fine Amount Cannot Be Imposed To Hear Revision Petition Filed By Convict

[Case: R. Kalai Selvi v. Bheemappa; Citation: LL 2021 SC 361]

The Supreme Court has observed that deposit of fine amount cannot be made a condition precedent for hearing revision petition under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code.In this case, the accused was convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, was sentenced to fine in the sum of Rs.6,00,000/-. It was also stipulated that the stipulation that in the event of default in payment of fine, she would undergo simple imprisonment for six months. An amount of Rs.5,90,000/- was directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation in terms of Section 357 Cr.P.C. and the balance amount was to be remitted to the State.

Section 406 CrPC- Transfer

Mere Apprehension Of Threat Of life Without Substantiating It Not Sufficient Ground To Transfer A Criminal Case U/Sec 406 CrPC

[Case: Dinesh Mahajan v. Vishal Mahajan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 620]

The Supreme Court observed that mere apprehension of threat of life is not a sufficient ground to transfer a case, without lodging a complaint or substantiating the said ground. In this case, the petition sought transfer of Complaint filed under Sections 420 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu to Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. "No complaint has been lodged by the petitioner to the authorities concerned or before any Court. Mere apprehension of threat of life is not a sufficient ground to transfer a case, without lodging a complaint or substantiating the said ground.", the court noted.

Section 433A CrPC

Governor Can Exercise Pardon Power Even If Prisoner Has Not Undergone 14 Years Imprisonment

[Case: State of Haryana v. Rajkumar @ Bittu; Citation: LL 2021 SC 345]

The Supreme Court has observed that the power of Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution to commute sentence or to pardon will override the restrictions imposed under Section 433-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. Even if the prisoner has not undergone 14 years or more of actual imprisonment, the Governor has a power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites and remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person, the bench comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and AS Bopanna observed.

Section 465 CrPC

Irregularity In Order Taking Cognizance Will Not Vitiate Criminal Proceedings

[Case: Pradeep S Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 691]

The Supreme Court held that an irregularity in the order taking cognizance will not vitiate the proceedings in a criminal trial. Referring to Section 465 (finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, omission irregularity) CrPC, a bench comprising Justice DY Chandrachud, Justice Vikram Nath, and Justice BV Nagarathna said, "The objective of Section 465 is to prevent the delay in the commencement and completion of trial. Section 465 CrPC is applicable to interlocutory orders such as an order taking cognizance and summons order as well. Therefore, even if the order taking cognizance is irregular, it would not vitiate the proceedings in view of Section 465 CrPC."

Section 482 CrPC - Inherent Power Of High Courts

Blanket Order Of Protection From Arrest Cannot Be Passed By High Court While Dismissing A Petition U/s 482 CrPC: Supreme Court

[Case: Ravuri Krishna Murthy v. State of Telangana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 150]

A Bench comprising of Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that a blanket order of protection from arrest cannot be passed by the High Court while dismissing a petition filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of FIR. The issue raised in this appeal was whether the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was justified in passing a blanket direction restraining the police from arresting the accused while at the same time having come to the conclusion that there was no merit in the petition for quashing under Section 482.

Mere Existence Of Civil Remedies Not A Ground To Quash Criminal Proceedings: Reiterates Supreme court

[Case: Priti Saraf v. State Of NCT Of Delhi; Citation: LL 2021 SC 154]

A bench comprising of Justices Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi observed that existence of civil remedies by itself is not a ground to quash criminal proceedings. It observed that simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract or arbitral proceedings initiated at the instance of the complainant, that does not by itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing such proceedings.

The bench said that to exercise powers under Section 482 CrPC, the complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and the High Court at that stage was not under an obligation to go into the matter or examine its correctness.

High Courts Shall Not Pass Order Of 'Not To Arrest' Or 'No Coercive Steps' While Dismissing/Disposing Petition U/s 482 CrPC: Supreme Court

[Case: M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra; Citation: LL 2021 SC 211]

A bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud, MR Shah and Sanjiv Khanna held that a High Court, while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, shall not pass order of not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 CrPC.

It observed that when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC before the competent court.

Power Under Section 482 CrPC Cannot Be Used To Undermine Statutory Dictate Under Section 14, 17 IBC: Supreme Court

[Case: Case: Sandeep Khaitan, Resolution Professional For National Plywood Industries Ltd. v. JSVM Plywood Industries Ltd.; Citation: LL 2021 SC 228]

The power under Section 482 of CrPC cannot be used to overlook the undermining of a statutory dictate, a Bench comprising of Justices UU Lalit and KM Joseph observed.

In this case, the High Court allowed an interlocutory application filed by a Company claiming to be an operational creditor to allow it to operate its bank account maintained with the ICICI Bank and to unfreeze the bank account of its creditors over which the lien has been created and the accounts frozen pursuant to the lodging of an FIR by the Interim Resolution Professional. "We have to also in this context bear in mind that the High Court appears to have, in passing the impugned order, which is an interim order for that matter, overlooked the salutary limits on its power under Section 482. The power under Section 482 may not be available to the Court to countenance the breach of a statuary provision. The words 'to secure the ends of justice' in Section 482 cannot mean to overlook the undermining of a statutory dictate, which in this case is the provisions of Section 14, and Section 17 of the IBC", the bench observed.

Dismissal Of An Earlier Section 482 CPC Petition Does Not Bar Filing Of Subsequent Petition, If Facts So Justify

[Case: Vinod Kumar IAS v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 281]

Dismissal of an earlier Section 482 CrPC petition does not bar filing of subsequent petition under Section 482, in case the facts so justify, the Supreme Court reiterated while dismissing a writ petition filed by an IAS Officer. The Bench comprising Justice UU Lalit and Justices Indira Banerjee and Ajay Rastogi observed that it sees no reason to entertain the petition under Article 32. "The petitioner, if so advised, can always file appropriate applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of the individual criminal cases or complaints", the bench further opined.

Section 482 CrPC: Interim Protection Order Can Be Passed In Exceptional Cases Giving Brief Reasons

[Case: A P Mahesh Cooperative Urban Bank Shareholders Welfare Association v. Ramesh Kumar Bung; Citation: LL 2021 SC 309]

The Supreme Court observed that the High Courts can pass interim protection order in Section 482 CrPC petitions in exceptional cases by giving brief reasons. What is frowned upon in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra is the tendency of the courts to pass blanket, cryptic, laconic, nonspeaking orders reading "no coercive steps shall be adopted", the bench comprising Justices Indira Banerjee and V. Ramasubramanian said.

Quashing Of FIR: Detailed Enquiry On Merits Not Warranted U/s 482 CrPC

[Case: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kunwar Singh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 344]

The Supreme Court has reiterated that a detailed enquiry into the merits of the allegations is not warranted while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court ought not to be scrutinizing the material in the manner in which the trial court would do in the course of the criminal trial after evidence is adduced.

Improper To Quash FIR U/s 482 CrPC When There Are Serious Triable Allegations In Complaint, Reiterates Supreme Court

[Case: Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 379]

The Supreme Court has observed that it is improper to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code when there are serious triable allegations in the complaint. Appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the stage of quashing of proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah reiterated while setting aside a High Court judgment.

Section 482 CrPC: High Court Not Required To Appreciate Evidence To Find Out Whether Accused Is Likely To Be Convicted Or Not

[Case: Saranya v. Bharati; Citation: LL 2021 SC 402]

The Supreme Court reiterated that, at Section 482 CrPC stage, a High Court is not required to appreciate the evidence to find out whether the accused is likely to be convicted or not. A Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed, "The High Court has entered into the appreciation of the evidence and considered whether on the basis of the evidence, the accused is likely to be convicted or not, which as such is not permissible at all at this stage while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C."

Section 482 CrPC: High Court Not Required To Appreciate Evidence To Find Out Whether Accused Is Likely To Be Convicted Or Not

[Case: Saranya v. Bharati; Citation: LL 2021 SC 402]

The Supreme Court reiterated that, at Section 482 CrPC stage, a High Court is not required to appreciate the evidence to find out whether the accused is likely to be convicted or not. A Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed, "The High Court has entered into the appreciation of the evidence and considered whether on the basis of the evidence, the accused is likely to be convicted or not, which as such is not permissible at all at this stage while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C."

Non Compoundable' Criminal Cases Of Predominantly Private Nature Can Be Quashed U/s 482 CrPC Even If Compromise Is Reached After Conviction

[Case: Ramgopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 516]

The Supreme Court observed that a High Court can quash criminal proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable and the compromise is reached after conviction. The bench comprising CJI NV Ramana and Justice Surya Kant added that criminal proceedings involving non-­heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be quashed irrespective of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction.

Civil Dispute Given Colour Of Criminal Offence: Supreme Court Says Criminal Proceedings Should Not Become Weapons Of Harassment

[Case: Randheer Singh v. State of UP; Citation: LL 2021 SC 574]

Dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence, the Supreme Court has observed in a judgment while it quashed criminal proceedings initiated against a property purchaser. The bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and JK Maheshwari observed that while considering a petition seeking quashing of criminal proceedings, the High Court should examine whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not. Section 482 is designed to achieve the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to generate into weapons of harassment, the court reiterated. In this case, an FIR was lodged against the power of attorney of the complainant and the purchaser of the property. Examining the FIR, the court observed that the criminal proceedings are being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment against the purchaser.

Offences Under Special Statutes Including SC/ST Act Can Also Be Quashed By Exercising Powers U/S 482 CrPC/ Article 142

[Case: Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 589]

The Supreme Court observed that criminal proceedings arising out of Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 can be quashed invoking powers under Article 142 of Constitution or Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. "The mere fact that the offence is covered under a 'special statute' would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC", a three judges bench comprising CJI NV Ramana, Justices Surya Kant and Hima Kohli observed. The Bench opined, "where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings."

Criminal Cases Having Overwhelmingly & Predominatingly A Civil Flavour Stands On Different Footing For Purpose Of Quashing

[Case: Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab; Citation: LL 2021 SC 623]

The allegations made in the FIR had an overwhelmingly and predominatingly a civil flavour, the Supreme Court remarked while quashing a criminal proceeding. The bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath observed that inherent powers should be exercised in a given and deserving case where the Court is satisfied that exercise of such power would either prevent abuse of such power or such exercise would result in securing the ends of justice. In this case, the complainant alleged that he had paid money to the accused to get employment for his son abroad. That they did not honour their promise and harassed his son and did not arrange for a job as per their promise. The High Court dismissed the petition filed by the accused and declined to quash the proceedings on the ground that a perusal of the FIR goes to show that the name of the accused is specifically mentioned in the FIR and criminal acts have been attributed to him. "In our view, the present one is amongst those fittest cases where the High Court ought to have exercised its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and ought to have secured the ends of justice by closing the proceedings against the appellants", the Apex Court noted.

High Court Cannot Quash Criminal Proceedings U/Sec 482 CrPC Relying On 'Draft Charge Sheet' Which Is Yet To Be Filed Before Magistrate

[Case: Jitul Jentilal Kotecha v. State of Gujarat; Citation: LL 2021 SC 642]

A High Court cannot place reliance on a "draft charge-sheet" which is yet to be placed before the Magistrate to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court has observed. The bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna observed that a High Court can neither direct an investigating agency to submit the investigation report before it nor can it quash a criminal proceeding under Section 482 relying on such a report when the report has not been submitted to the Magistrate.

Reliability Or Genuineness Of Allegations Made In FIR/Complaint Cannot Be Gone Into While Exercising Jurisdiction U/Sec 482 CrPC: Supreme Court

[Case: State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty; Citation: LL 2021 SC 730]

The Supreme Court observed that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, a High court cannot embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the FIR/complaint. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious, the bench comprising Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna said.

Section 482 CrPC - High Court Can't Pass Adverse Orders Or Observations Against Third Party Who Is Not Before It: Supreme Court

[Case: Anu Kumar v. State (UT Administration) & Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 757]

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court in a petition for quashing filed by the accused u/s 482 CrPC cannot issue directions for proceeding against a third party who was neither before the Court and nor was given any opportunity before passing the order. A bench of Justices AM Khanwilkar and CT Ravikumar examine whether the High Court in a petition for quashing filed by the accused u/s 482 CrPC could issue directions to proceed against a third party who was neither before the Court and nor was given any opportunity before passing the order and also make observations.

Indian Penal Code

[Case: Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab; Citation: LL 2021 SC 262]

A Bench of CJI NV Ramana and Justice Aniruddha Bose observed that the phrase "soon before" as appearing in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code cannot be construed to mean 'immediately before'. The prosecution must establish existence of "proximate and live link" between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives. It also observed that Section 304­B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

Kidnapping For Ransom - Necessary To Prove Threat To Cause Death Or Harm For Conviction Under Section 364A IPC: Supreme Court

[Case: Shaik Ahmed v. State of Telangana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 272]

A bench comprising Justices Ashok Bhuhsan and R Subhash Reddy held that merely proving the kidnap of a person is not sufficient for conviction for the offence of 'kidnapping for ransom' under Section 364A of the Indian Penal Code. It must also be proved that there was threat to cause death or harm to the kidnapped person or the kidnapper, by his conduct, which gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death.

Accused Cannot Be Discharged U/s 306 IPC While Confirming Charge U/s 304B IPC

[Case: Bhagwanrao Mahadeo Patil v. Appa Ramchandra Savkar ; Citation: LL 2021 SC 303]

The Supreme Court has observed that an accused cannot be discharged for an offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code while confirming the charge under Section 304B IPC. A Bench comprising Justices Vineet Saran and Dinesh Maheshwari observed, "having heard learned counsel parties, considering the totality of the circumstances and keeping in view the suicide notes as well as the statements of witnesses, we are of the opinion that the accused ought not to have been discharged of the offence under Section 306 IPC, especially when the charges under Section 304B IPC and other related sections had already been framed and confirmed."

[Case: Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 319]

The Supreme Court has observed that production of injury report is not a sine qua non for establishing the case for the offence under Section 323 Indian Penal Code. The Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed, "it may be that there might not be any serious injuries and/or visible injuries, the hospital might not have issued the injury report. However, production of an injury report for the offence under Section 323 IPC is not a sine qua non for establishing the case for the offence under Section 323 IPC. Section 323 IPC is a punishable section for voluntarily causing hurt."

Benefit Of Probation (PO Act) Is Not Excluded By Mandatory Minimum Sentences Prescribed For IPC Offences: Supreme Court

[Case: Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab; Citation: LL 2021 SC 27]

A bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hrishikesh Roy observed that the benefit of probation under Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is not excluded by the provisions of the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed for offences under IPC.

'Sudden Provocation Without Premeditation': Supreme Court Orders Release Of Murder Accused Farmer Who Spent 18 Years In Jail

[Case: Pardeshiram v. State of M.P.; Citation: LL 2021 SC 73]

A bench comprising of Justices Hemant Gupta and S. Ravindra Bhat while ordering for release of a murder accused farmer who spent 18 years in jail, held that he is liable to be convicted for the offence under Section 304 Part I of IPC and not under Section 302. The Supreme Court sentenced him to the sentence already undergone taking note of the period of custody undergone (eighteen years); the relationship between the accused and the deceased and the background in which the injuries were caused.

[Case: State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chekka Guru Murali Mohan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 316]

In a blow to Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Jagan Mohan Reddy, the Supreme Court has dismissed the state's SLPs against the quashing of criminal cases filed in connection with the alleged 'insider trading' in land transactions at Amaravati. The Bench of Justices Vineet Saran and Dinesh Maheshwari was hearing the SLPs at the instance of the AP state government against the January 19 judgment of the Single Judge of the AP High Court observing that private sale transactions cannot be criminalized and that the concept of the offence of "insider trading", which is essentially an offence in the field of stock market relating to selling and buying the securities and bonds, cannot be applied to the offences under Indian Penal Code and cannot be read into Section 420, IPC or into any provisions in the scheme of IPC.

Accused Cannot Be Discharged U/s 306 IPC While Confirming Charge U/s 304B IPC

[Case: Bhagwanrao Mahadeo Patil v. Appa Ramchandra Savkar ; Citation: LL 2021 SC 303]

The Supreme Court has observed that an accused cannot be discharged for an offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code while confirming the charge under Section 304B IPC. A Bench comprising Justices Vineet Saran and Dinesh Maheshwari observed, "having heard learned counsel parties, considering the totality of the circumstances and keeping in view the suicide notes as well as the statements of witnesses, we are of the opinion that the accused ought not to have been discharged of the offence under Section 306 IPC, especially when the charges under Section 304B IPC and other related sections had already been framed and confirmed."

[Case: Shabbir Hussain v. State of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 341]

Mere harassment would not amount to an offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, the Supreme Court has reiterated. The bench of Justices L. Nagaswera Rao and Aniruddha Bose observed that, in order to bring a case within Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigating or by doing a certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide.

[Case: Velladurai v. State; Citation: LL 2021 SC 456]

The Supreme Court has observed that mere quarrel on the day of occurrence cannot attract the offence of abetment of suicide under section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The bench of Justices MR Shah and Aniruddha Bose reiterated that mere harassment without any positive action on the part of the accused proximate to the time of occurrence which led to the suicide would not amount to an offence under Section 306.

[Case: Mohd. Rafiq @ Kallu v. State Of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 461]

In a judgment delivered on September 15, 2021, the Supreme Court has explained the difference between culpable homicide under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code and murder under Section 300 IPC. The Court observed that, though it difficult to distinguish between culpable homicide and murder as both involve death, there is a subtle distinction of intention and knowledge involved in both the crimes. "This difference lies in the degree of the act. There is a very wide variance of degree of intention and knowledge among both the crimes", the bench of Justices KM Joseph and S. Ravindra Bhat observed.

'No Positive Act': Supreme Court Quashes Criminal Case Against Girl Accused Of Abetting Suicide Of A Man By Refusing Marriage

[Case: Kanchan Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 467]

The Supreme Court has quashed criminal proceedings against a girl accused of abetting suicide of a man by allegedly refusing to marry him. The bench of Justices R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy reiterated that Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code will not be attracted if there was no positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide. The court said that it would be travesty of justice to compel the accused to face a criminal trial without any credible material whatsoever. It requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide, seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide, the bench added.

Section 375-376 IPC

Rape Conviction Can Be Based On Sole Testimony Of Victim If Credible & Trustworthy, Reiterates Supreme Court

[Case: Phool Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 696]

The Supreme Court reiterated that a rape accused can be convicted on sole testimony of prosecuterix if she is found to be credible and trustworthy. A bench comprising Justices MR Shah and Sanjiv Khanna noted:

There can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy; If credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration; Testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement.

No Allegation That Promise To Marry Was False At The Inception: Supreme Court Quashes Rape Case

[Case: Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 137]

A Division Bench comprising of Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah quashed an FIR alleging rape observing that there is no allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given by the accused was false at the inception.

The court also referred to the judgment in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra in which it was observed thus: "To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."

Nothing On Record To Even Remotely Suggest That The Act Was Consensual: Supreme Court Upholds Rape Conviction

[Case: Lelu Alias Lain Kumar v. State Of Chhattisgarh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 201]

A Bench of Justices UU Lalit and Indira Banerjee upheld the conviction of a rape accused rejecting his contention that the act was consensual. The court perused the statement made by the prosecuterix. It noted that the prosecuterix had clearly stated that the accused had raped her and she could not raise alarm as her mouth was shut.

Distinction Between "Preparation" & "Attempt To Rape": Supreme Court Explains

[Case: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahendra Alias Golu; Citation: LL 2021 SC 590]

While upholding conviction of a man accused of attempt to rape, the Supreme Court explained the distinction between 'Preparation' and 'Attempt' to commit rape. The issue before the Court was whether the offence proved to have been committed by the accused amounts to 'attempt' to commit rape within the meaning of Section 376(2)(f) read with Section 511 IPC or was it a mere 'preparation' which led to outraging the modesty of the victims? The court noticed that, it has come in evidence that the accused had taken the minor girls were taken inside the room, closing the doors and taking the victims to a room. That then he stripped the girls and himself, and rubbed his genitals against those of the victims. It also found that the statements of both the victim children inspire full confidence, establish their innocence and evince a natural version without any remote possibility of tutoring.

The court observed that these acts were committed with endeavour to commit sexual intercourse. "These acts were deliberately done with manifest intention to commit the offence aimed and were reasonably proximate to the consummation of the offence. The acts of the accused exceeded the stage beyond preparation and preceded the actual penetration". the bench comprising Justices Surya Kant and Hima Kohli observed holding that the Trial Court rightly convicted him for attempting to commit rape as punishable within the ambit and scope of Section 511 read with Section 375 IPC as it stood in force at the time of occurrence.

Offender Who Had Not Used Deadly Weapon During Robbery Cannot Be Convicted Under Section 397 IPC

[Case: Ganesan v. State; Citation: LL 2021 SC 614]

The Supreme Court observed that an offender who had not used any deadly weapon at the time of committing robbery/dacoity cannot be convicted under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code. The use of deadly weapon by one offender at the time of committing robbery/dacoity cannot attract Section 397 IPC for the imposition of minimum punishment on another offender who has not used any deadly weapon. A Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah observed, "The term 'offender' under Section 397 IPC is confined to the 'offender' who uses any deadly weapon and use of deadly weapon by one offender at the time of committing robbery cannot attract Section 397 IPC for the imposition of minimum punishment on another offender who has not used any deadly weapon. Even there is distinction and difference between Section 397 and Section 398 IPC. The word used in Section 397 IPC is 'uses' any deadly weapon and the word used in Section 398 IPC is 'offender is armed with any deadly weapon'. Therefore, for the purpose of attracting Section 397 IPC the 'offender' who 'uses' any deadly weapon Section 397 IPC shall be attracted"

Section 307 IPC - Intention To Be Ascertained From Weapon Used, Body Part Chosen For Assault & Nature Of Injury

[Case: Sadakat Kotwar v. State of Jharkhand; Citation: LL 2021 SC 643]

The Supreme Court observed that, in an attempt to murder cases (Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code), the intention has to be ascertained from the weapon used, part of the body chosen for assault, and the nature of the injury caused. The Court observed thus while dismissing the appeal filed by the accused whose conviction under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC was upheld by the High Court of Jharkhand. Taking note of the evidence on record, the bench comprising Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed that the injury of a single blow was on the vital part of the body i.e. stomach and near chest and that the nature of the injury is a grievous injury caused by a sharp cutting weapon.

Witness Testimony Inconsistent With Medical Evidence: Supreme Court Alters Conviction For Murder

[Case: Viram @ Virma v The State of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 677]

The Supreme Court converted the conviction of appellants from Murder (S.302/149) to Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons (326/149) under the Indian Penal Code on the basis of inconsistencies between oral testimony of witnesses and medical evidence on record. A Bench of Justices L.Nageswara Rao and B.V.Nagarathna relied on Amar Singh v State of Punjab, wherein the Supreme Court had examined the point relating to inconsistencies between oral evidence and medical opinion. In that case, it was held that the inconsistency between the medical evidence on record and the oral evidence of the witnesses was found to be sufficient to discredit the entire prosecution case.

Intention To Cause Death Immaterial If Prosecution Proves Ingredients Of "Thirdly" Of Section 300 IPC

[Case: Vinod Kumar v. Amritpal @ Chhotu & Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 695]

The Supreme Court observed that once the prosecution establishes the existence of three ingredients forming part of "thirdly" in Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, it is irrelevant whether there was an intention on the accused part to cause death. The bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and AS Oka was considering a criminal appeal against an order dated July 18, 2016 passed by the Rajasthan High Court. By the impugned order, the High Court while maintaining the conviction u/s 147, 364, 201 and 329/149 of IPC, had brought down the conviction u/s 302, IPC to Part II of Section 304 and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 8 years. The fine amount was not disturbed. The 5 respondents were the accused(s) who were prosecuted u/s 147, 364, 302/149, 201 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code.

Section 149 IPC -Merely Because A Person Disclosed Victim's Hideout, He Can't Be Held To Part Of Unlawful Assembly : Supreme Court

[Case: Taijuddin v. State of Assam; Citation: LL 2021 SC 702]

Setting aside the conviction of a person in a murder case, the Supreme Court recently held that merely because a person revealed the hideout of the victim to the murderous mob, he cannot be presumed to share the common object of the unlawful assembly.

A bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh struck a word of caution by observing that the Courts must guard against the tendency of convicting mere passive onlookers of the crime using the medium of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code for sharing the common object of the unlawful assembly.

Ingredients Necessary To Prove Charges Under Section 409, 420 & 477A IPC: Supreme Court Explains

[Case: N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh, CBI; Citation: LL 2021 SC 734]

The Supreme Court explained the ingredients necessary to prove a charge under Section 409, 420 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code. Referring to the evidence on record, the bench comprising CJI NV Ramana, Surya Kant and Hima Kohli noted the following: First, no financial loss was caused to the Bank. Second, the record does not indicate that any pecuniary loss was caused to B. Satyajit Reddy or to any other customer of the Bank. Third, the material before us does not disclose any conspiracy between the accused persons. Therefore, it held that none of the acts proved against the accused constitute 'criminal misconduct' or fall under the ambit of Sections 409, 420 and 477-A IPC.

Indian Evidence Act 

Mere Absence Of Doctor's Certification Would Not Ipso Facto Render Dying Declaration Unacceptable: Supreme Court

[Case: Surendra Bangali v. State of Jharkhand; Citation: LL 2021 SC 82]

A division bench comprising of Justices Ashok Bhushan and Ajay Rastogi reiterated that mere absence of doctor's certification as to the fitness of the declarant's state of mind would not ipso facto render the dying declaration unacceptable. The contention of the accused in this case was that the conviction is solely based on the dying declaration of the deceased which finds no corroboration.

[Case: Kalabhai Hamirbhai Kachhot v. State of Gujarat; Citation: LL 2021 SC 239]

A bench comprising of Justices Ashok Bhushan and R. Subhash Reddy reiterated that minor contradictions cannot be a ground to discredit the testimony of the witnesses in a criminal trial. "The contradictions which are sought to be projected are minor contradictions which cannot be the basis to discard their evidence... If the entire evidence of all the witnesses is examined with reference to medical and other evidence on record, it is clear that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt", it observed in a case.

Non-Examination Of Independent Witnesses Not Fatal To Prosecution Case, Reiterates Supreme Court

[Case: Guru Dutt Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 245]

A Bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah reiterated that non-examination of independent witnesses is not fatal to the case of the prosecution when other prosecution witnesses are found to be trustworthy and reliable. The Court observed thus while dismissing an appeal against Allahabad High Court judgment which had reversed the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court acquitting the accused in a murder case. One of the accused approached the Apex Court by filing an appeal.

Before the Apex Court, he contended that all the prosecution witnesses, so called eyewitnesses, are all related and interested witnesses. It was further contended that no independent witness has been examined and that the prosecution witnesses are chance witnesses. Referring to the High Court judgment, the bench observed that when there are clinching evidence of eyewitnesses, mere non-examination of some of the witnesses/independent witnesses and/or in absence of examination of any independent witnesses would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution.

[Case: Achhar Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 249]

A bench comprising CJI NV Ramana, Justices Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose observed that evidence given by a witness cannot be discarded as a whole on the ground that it is exaggerated. "To make a mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have to exist primarily. A Court of law, being mindful of such distinction is duty bound to disseminate 'truth' from 'falsehood' and sift the grain from the chaff in case of exaggerations", it observed.

Dying Declaration Can Be Sole Basis For Conviction Only When Court Is Satisfied That It Is True And Voluntary, Reiterates Supreme Court

[Case: Jayamma v. State of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 251]

A Bench of CJI NV Ramana, Justices Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose reiterated that a Court must be satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, and only then could it be the sole basis for conviction without corroboration. The court noted the following factors (i) interpolation in the dying declaration (ii) contradiction in the statements of prosecution witnesses regarding injuries on the palm, (iii) the victim with 80% injuries was apparently not in a situation to talk or give statement, (iv) PW-2, son of the deceased himself has stated that his mother committed suicide as she could not bear that her another son had been sent to jail, (v) there being no corroborative evidence to the statement , and (vi) there is no other evidence led by the prosecution to connect the appellants with the crime except the statement.

[Case: Pruthiviraj Jayantibhai Vanol v. Dinesh Dayabhai Vala; Citation: LL 2021 SC 324]

Ocular evidence is considered the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it, the Supreme Court has observed while setting aside an order of High Court that acquitted an accused in a murder case. The Bench comprising Justices Navin Sinha and R. Subhash Reddy observed that the ocular evidence may be disbelieved only when there is a gross contradiction between medical evidence and oral evidence, and the medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable and rules out all possibility of ocular evidence being true. In this case, the High Court had reversed the Trial Court order convicting the accused on the ground that the evidence of the eye­witnesses is inconsistent with the medical evidence, regarding the nature of injuries vis­à­vis the weapons of offence.

[Case: State of Odisha v. Banabihari Mohapatra; Citation: LL 2021 SC 103]

A bench comprising Justices Indira Banerjee and Hemant Gupta reiterated that suspicion, however strong cannot take the place of proof. "It is well settled by a plethora of judicial pronouncement of this Court that suspicion[, however strong cannot take the place of proof. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt," the court observed.

It added that before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must fully be established and the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused.

[Case: Rahul v. State of Haryana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 130]

A Bench comprising of Justices Ashok Bhushan and R. Subhash Reddy observed that the evidence of interested person can be considered provided such evidence is corroborated by other evidence on record.

Dying Declaration Cannot Be Discarded Merely Because Relatives Of Deceased Were Present In Hospital While Recording It: Supreme Court

[Case: Satpal v. State of Haryana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 131]

A Bench comprising of Justices Ashok Bhushan and R. Subhash Reddy observed that a dying declaration cannot be disbelieved merely because parents and relatives of the deceased were present in the hospital while recording it.