Magistrate Can't Direct FIR Registration Under S.156(3) CrPC If Complainant Didn't Approach Police Before u/s 154(1) & 154(3) : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has reiterated that before a complainant can seek a Magistrate's direction under Section 156(3) of the CrPC to register an FIR and investigate a cognizable offence, they must first exhaust the remedies under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the CrPC.

Under Section 154(1), a person must report the offence to the officer in charge of a police station, who is required to record it in writing, read it back to the informant, and obtain their signature.

If the police refuse to register the complaint, Section 154(3) allows the complainant to escalate the matter by submitting a written complaint to the Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent may then investigate the case or assign a subordinate officer to do so.

Only after these steps are taken and the remedies under Section 154 are exhausted can the complainant approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) to seek an order for investigation.

A bench of Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan made these observations while quashing an order passed by a Judicial Magistrate on June 14, 2017, which had directed the registration of an FIR under Sections 420 (Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property) and 120-B (Criminal conspiracy) of the IPC.

“Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CRPC are the two remedies available for setting the criminal law in motion. Therefore, this Court held that before a complainant chooses to adopt a remedy under Section 156(3) of the CRPC, he must exhaust his remedies under sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CRPC and he must make those averments in the complaint and produce the documents in support. However, in this case, the second respondent did not exhaust the remedies. In this view of the matter, we find that both the learned Magistrate and the High Court have completely ignored the binding decision of this Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava.”

In Priyanka Srivastava and Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2015) 6 SCC 287, the Supreme Court had expressed concern about the misuse of Section 156(3). It had reiterated that applications under this section must be accompanied by an affidavit to ensure the applicant takes responsibility for the allegations made.

The Court also set aside all further steps taken based on the Magistrate's order. The Court allowed an appeal by the accused against a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment that had dismissed a petition seeking to quash the Magistrate's order.

The appellants' counsel relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Priyanka Srivastava and Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. and Babu Venkatesh & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., both of which emphasized the necessity of exhausting remedies under Section 154 before invoking Section 156(3). The counsel pointed out that the complaint lacked specific averments regarding compliance with these procedural requirements.

The counsel for the complainant argued that although there was no express statement of compliance with Section 154, a written complaint had been submitted to the Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh. The complaint was subsequently marked to the Economic Offences Wing for inquiry on January 29, 2014. However, the complainant's counsel admitted the absence of a clear averment concerning the use of Section 154(3).

The bench emphasized that the complainant had not exhausted the remedies available under Section 154. It concluded that both the Magistrate and the High Court had disregarded the principles laid down in Priyanka Srivastava. Consequently, the Court quashed the orders of the Magistrate and the High Court.

Case no. – Criminal Appeal No. 4313 of 2024

Case Title – Ranjit Singh Bath & Anr. v. Union Territory Chandigarh & Anr.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 329

Click Here To Read/Download Order