Trial Courts Have To Clearly Specify Whether Sentences Would Run Concurrently Or Consecutively: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court observed that the Trial Courts, while awarding multiple punishments of imprisonment, have to specify in clear terms as to whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. 

Any omission to carry out this obligation causes unnecessary and avoidable prejudice to the parties, the bench comprising Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose observed.

The court reiterated that the omission to state whether the sentences awarded to the accused would run concurrently or would run consecutively essentially operates against the accused because, unless stated so by the Court. The omission to state the order of consecutive running cannot ipso facto lead to concurrent running of sentences, the bench said.

In this case, the appellants were convicted of offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code. The Trial Court sentenced the appellants to several punishments, but did not  specify as to whether the punishments of imprisonment would run concurrently or consecutively. The High Court, though modified the Trial Court judgment, did not clarify on this aspect in its judgment. While so, the Jail Superintendent, District Jail, Meerut, while issuing certificates of confinement, stated that the accused had undergone 10 years and 1 month of imprisonment but, there being no mention in the sentencing order about concurrent running of sentences, they were serving 22 years of imprisonment. 

Advocate Amit Pai, who appeared for the accused relied on Nagaraja Rao v. Central Bureau of Investigation: (2015) 4 SCC 302 and Gagan Kumar v. State of Punjab: (2019) 5 SCC 154, to contend that it is obligatory for the Court awarding punishments to specify whether they shall be running concurrently or consecutively; and the omission on the part of the Trial Court and the High Court, to state the requisite specifications, cannot be allowed to operate detrimental to the interests of the accused-appellants. It was also contended that though as per the mandate of Section 31 CrPC, unless specified to run concurrently, the sentences do run consecutively but, for that purpose, the Court is required to direct the order in which they would run; and no such direction having been given by the Trial Court or by the High Court, it cannot be said that the Courts were consciously providing for consecutive running of sentences. Further, he also referred to judgment in O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala (2015) 2 SCC 501, to contend that it is not the normal rule that multiple sentences are to run consecutively.

Referring to precedents, the bench made the following observations:

10.2. Thus, it is beyond a shadow of doubt that Section 31(1) CrPC vests complete discretion with the Court to order the sentences for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently having regard to the nature of offences and the surrounding factors. Even though it cannot be said that consecutive running is the normal rule but, it is also not laid down that multiple sentences must run concurrently. There cannot be any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the Court; but this discretion has to be judiciously exercised with reference to the nature of the offence/s committed and the facts and circumstances of the case. However, if the sentences (other than life imprisonment) are not provided to run concurrently, one would run after the other, in such order as the Court may direct.

11. For what has been provided in Section 31(1) CrPC read with the expositions of this Court, it follows that the Court of first instance is under legal obligation while awarding multiple sentences to specify in clear terms as to whether they would run concurrently or consecutively.

12. As noticed, if the Court of first instance does not specify the concurrent running of sentences, the inference, primarily, is that the Court intended such sentences to run consecutively, though, as aforesaid, the Court of first instance ought not to leave this matter for deduction at the later stage. Moreover, if the Court of first instance is intending 10 consecutive running of sentences, there is yet another obligation on it to state the order (i.e., the sequence) in which they are to be executed. The disturbing part of the matter herein is that not only the Trial Court omitted to state the requisite specifications, even the High Court missed out such flaws in the order of the Trial Court

13. Even when we find the aforementioned shortcomings in the orders passed by the Trial Court as also by the High Court, the question is as to whether the sentences awarded to the appellants could be considered as running concurrently? As noticed, the omission to state whether the sentences awarded to the accused would run concurrently or would run consecutively essentially operates against the accused because, unless stated so by the Court, multiple sentences run consecutively, as per the plain language of Section 31(1) CrPC read with the expositions in Muthuramalingam and O.M. Cherian (supra). The other omission to state the order of consecutive running cannot ipso facto lead to concurrent running of sentences.

Another contention raised was that the concurrent or consecutive running of sentences is also to be governed by 'single transaction' principle, as discernible from a combined reading of Sections 31(1) and 220(1) CrPC. 

"14. Faced with the position that the stated omissions will not, by themselves, provide a room for concurrent running of sentences, learned counsel for the appellants has endeavored to invoke the 'single transaction' principle. In our view, the said principle is essentially referable to Section 220 CrPC, which provides that if more offences than one are committed in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, then the accused may be charged with and tried at one 11 trial for every such offence. In a given case, after such trial for multiple offences, if the accused is convicted and awarded different punishments, concurrent running thereof may be provided depending on the facts and the relevant surrounding factors. We are afraid, the principle related with 'single transaction' cannot be imported for dealing with the question at hand."

However, taking note of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,  and modified the punishment awarded to the appellants in the manner that the maximum period of imprisonment to be served by them in relation to offences in question shall be 14 years and not beyond.  While partly allowing the appeal, the bench added:

21. While closing on the matter, we deem it appropriate to reiterate what was expounded in the case of Nagaraja Rao (supra), that it is legally obligatory upon the Court of first instance, while awarding multiple punishments of imprisonment, to specify in clear terms as to whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. It needs hardly an  emphasis that any omission to carry out this obligation by the Court of first instance causes unnecessary and avoidable prejudice to the parties, be it the accused or be it the prosecution.

Case: Sunil Kumar @ Sudhir Kumar Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh LL 2021 SC 267

Coram: Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose

Citation: LL 2021 SC 267

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