When Conviction Is Under Both POCSO Act & IPC, Offender Liable To Be Sentenced Under Provision Prescribing Higher Punishment : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court clarified that when a person is convicted for an offence under both the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”) and the rape provisions of the IPC, Section 42 of the POCSO Act mandates the imposition of the higher degree of punishment prescribed either under the POCSO Act or Indian Penal Code (“IPC”).

The court further stated that no plea for a lesser punishment under the POCSO Act can be entertained if the IPC prescribes a higher punishment for certain offences by arguing that Section 42A, as a special law, overrides the IPC, which is considered a general law.

“Section 42 specifically deals with the quantum of punishment mandating that when a particular act or omission constitutes an offence, both under the POCSO Act and also under the provisions of the IPC or the Information Technology Act, 2000 then, the offender found guilty of the offence would be liable to punishment under the POCSO Act or under the provisions of the IPC whichever provides a punishment of a greater degree.”, the Court observed

“Section 42A of POSCO Act, on the other hand, deals with the procedural aspects and gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the POCSO Act over any other law for the time being in force where the two acts are inconsistent with each other. Hence, the provisions of Section 42A of POSCO Act, by no stretch of imagination, can be interpreted so as to override the scope and ambit of enabling provision, i.e., Section 42 of POCSO Act.”, the Court added.

The Case

The bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta heard the case where the appellant was convicted by the trial court for sexually assaulting his minor daughter under Sections 376(2)(f) (rape by a relative or person in a position of trust) and 376(2)(i) (rape of a woman incapable of giving consent) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3/4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 (penetrative sexual assault and punishment).

Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) provide for a higher punishment (life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life) compared to Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act (which provides for a minimum of 10 years and a maximum of life imprisonment).

Following the mandate of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, the trial court sentenced the appellant to suffer life imprisonment under the IPC and imposed a fine.

Aggrieved by the conviction, the Appellant appeals to the High Court. Upholding the conviction, the High Court modified the sentence from simple life imprisonment to life imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life.

Challenging the High Court's decision, the Appellant moved to the Supreme Court, arguing that the punishment prescribed under the POCSO Act should be applied instead of that prescribed under the IPC because of the overriding effect of Section 42A of the POCSO Act. Apart from this argument, the Appellant also challenged the enhancement of the sentence by the High Court, arguing that the court cannot enhance the sentence in an appeal against conviction filed by the accused.

Issues

The main issue before the Court was whether the appellant should have been convicted under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) or under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. Specifically, the question was whether Section 42A of the POCSO Act should take precedence, which would invalidate the appellant's sentence under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC.

Further, the Court also considered the issue of whether the High Court erred in enhancing the sentence in an appeal against conviction filed by the accused, when no appeal was preferred by the State for enhancement against the trial court's decision.

Decision

The Court referred to Section 42 of the POCSO Act, which states that when an act constitutes an offence under both the POCSO Act and the IPC, the offender shall be liable to punishment under the law that provides for the greater degree of punishment.

The Court held that the IPC provisions (Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i)) provide for a higher punishment (life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life) compared to the POCSO Act (which provides for a minimum of 10 years and a maximum of life imprisonment).

Therefore, the Court concluded that the conviction under the IPC was justified, as it provided for a more severe punishment.

High Court Erred In Enhancing Sentence In Absence Of Appeal For Enhancement By State

The Court noted that the High Court had clarified that the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court would mean imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life.

The Court held that while the trial court had the discretion to award life imprisonment, the High Court could not enhance the sentence in an appeal filed by the accused, especially without an appeal for enhancement by the State.

The Court relied on precedents, including Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka and Navas v. State of Kerala, which allow courts to impose fixed-term sentences in cases where life imprisonment is awarded, but the case does not fall under the “rarest of rare” category.

“The High Court, while deciding the appeal against conviction preferred by the appellant, observed that the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC would extend to the remainder of the natural life of the appellant. This direction was merely a clarification to keep the sentence in tune with the language of the sentencing provision. Nevertheless, the fact remains that because of this clarification, the rigour of the sentence awarded has been increased to the effect that the appellant would have to spend the remainder of his natural life in prison without any possibility of early release.”, the court observed.

“Thus, under this provision, the Courts have been given discretion to award punishment for a term sentence of minimum 10 years or of imprisonment for life. Where the sentence awarded in the discretion of the Court is for life, the same shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life. Hence, there is no mandate of law that under these provisions, the convict must be awarded life imprisonment.”, the court added.

“Consequently, we are of the view that conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC and Sections 3/4 of POCSO Act is wholly justified. However, we feel that the High Court erred while directing that the appellant would have to serve life imprisonment for remainder of his natural life as provided under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC.”, the court held.

In terms of the aforesaid, the Court modified the sentence, holding that the appellant would serve life imprisonment (as awarded by the trial court) but without the stipulation that it would extend to the remainder of his natural life. The Court also imposed a fine of Rs. 5,00,000/- to be paid to the victim.

Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed.

Case Title: GYANENDRA SINGH @ RAJA SINGH VERSUS STATE OF U.P.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Click here to read/download the judgment

Appearances:

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. R Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv. Mr. Santosh Kumar Pandey, AOR Mr. B Venkatraman, Adv. Mr. Debasish Mishra, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Adarsh Upadhyay, AOR Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Adv. Mr. Shashank Pachauri, Adv.