Subsequent Change In Law Can't Be A Ground For Condonation Of Delay: Supreme Court

In a batch of land acquisition cases, the Supreme Court recently observed that subsequent change in law cannot be a ground for condonation of delay.

"...if subsequent change of law is allowed as a valid ground for condonation of delay, it would open a Pandora's Box where all the cases that were subsequently overruled, or the cases that had relied on the judgements that were subsequently overruled, would approach this Court and would seek a relief based on the new interpretation of law. There would be no finality to the proceedings and every time this Court would reach a different conclusion from its previous case, all such cases and the cases relying on it would be reopened,"  said the bench of Justices Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta and Ujjal Bhuyan.

The case pertained to land acquisition process initiated by Delhi government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for planned development of Delhi. Between 1957-2006, various notifications were issued for acquiring lands and awards passed fixing compensation.

In some cases, compensation amounts were deposited in treasury, as landowners did not come forward. In some others, possession could not be taken by the government entities, as landowners challenged the proceedings and obtained stay.

Subsequently, the 1894 Act was replaced by the 2013 Act, which brought various reforms. Section 24 of the new Act provided that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the earlier regime would be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases, including when compensation had not been paid or possession had not been taken.

Section 24 was interpreted in various Supreme Court decisions, such as Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harak Chand Mistrimal Solanki, Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra and Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal.

The last in line, ie Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal was a 5-judge bench decision, which overruled Pune Municipal Corporation, Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association, and Shailendra. As a consequence of this decision, Delhi government entities (DDA, DMRC, etc) filed appeals against orders of the Delhi High Court which declared acquisition proceedings as lapsed based on Pune Municipal Corporation and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association.

As most of the cases were filed after expiration of the period of limitation, the Supreme Court examined at the outset the issue of maintainability of the petitions.

Among the many grounds taken for condonation of delay by the appellants, one was "subsequent change in law" brought about by the decisions in Shailendra and Manoharlal. Refusing to accept the same as a ground, the court made the above-noted observation. It noted that the prescribed period of limitation had already expired long before the judgments in Shailendra and Manoharlal were delivered.

"The appellants let the limitation period lapse, perhaps because they saw no case on merits for appeal. When the law was subsequently re-interpreted in the afore-cited two cases, the appellants approached this Court with the present appeals, petitions, and applications. Instead of showing a sufficient cause arising within the period of limitation, they are using an event after the expiry of such period to justify the delay. This does not square with our understanding of the law, and cannot be allowed", the court said.

It was also opined that subsequent overruling of a judgment cannot be "sufficient cause" for the purposes of Section 5 of Limitation Act, because when a case is overruled, only its binding nature as precedent is taken away.

"...the lis between the parties is still deemed to have been settled by the overruled case...Hence, when Manoharlal (supra) overruled Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), as well as all other cases relying on them, it only overruled their precedential value, and did not reopen the lis between the parties. The mere fact that the impugned orders in the present case were overruled by Manoharlal (supra) would not, therefore, be a sufficient ground to argue that the cases should be reopened".

The court summed up its observation on the point thus, "subsequent change of law will not be attracted unless a case is pending before the competent court awaiting its final adjudication. To say it differently, if a case has already been decided, it cannot be re-opened and re-decided solely on the basis of a new interpretation given to that law."

Although the ground of "subsequent change in law" was rejected, the court permitted condonation of delay on other grounds, including "public interest". Most appeals were accordingly allowed. Separate orders/directions were passed in others.

Case Title: Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal & Ors., SLP(C) No. 26697 of 2019 (and connected matters)

Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 415

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