Supreme Court Criminal Digest -March 2024

Anticipatory Bail

Custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating into the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also not be a ground to release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for the purpose of investigation. (Para 12) Ashok Kumar v. State of Union Territory Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 223

Bail

An accused, while joining investigation as a condition for remaining enlarged on bail, is not expected to make self-incriminating statements under the threat that the State shall seek withdrawal of such interim protection. Bijender v State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 209

Bail condition restraining political activities violates fundamental rights, can't be imposed. Siba Shankar Das v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 259

Code of Criminal procedure, 1973

Section 82(1) - An accused would not be entitled to pre-arrest bail if the non-bailable warrant and the proclamation under Section 82(1) Cr.P.C. is pending against him. (Para 5) Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 232

Section 82 and 83 - Mere filing of an anticipatory bail application by the accused could not be treated as his appearance before the court which had initiated proceedings under Section 82/83 Cr.P.C. against the accused. (Para 20) Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 232

Section 156 (3) - An affidavit is necessary with the application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. - Directions in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 are mandatory. Ramesh Kumar Bung v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 213

Section 172 – Diary of proceedings – Every police officer making an investigation under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. is required to enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary day by day. Sub-section (IA) of Section 172 requires that the statements of the witnesses recorded during the course of investigation under section 161 have to be inserted in the case diary; and sub-section (1B) of Section 172 requires that such diary shall be a volume and duly paginated. (Para 11) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173 – Power of Magistrate to act on Police report – When such a Police Report concludes that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons, the Magistrate has three options: (i) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, (ii) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report, or (iii) he may disagree with the report and discharge the accused or drop the proceedings. If such Police Report concludes that no offence appears to have been committed, the Magistrate again has three options: (i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings, or (ii) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (iii) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156. (Para 14) Bhagwant Singh vs. Commissioner of Police & Anr; (1985) 2 SCC 537; referred. Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173 – Police report – It is an opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the concerned court that on the material collected during the course of investigation, an offence appears to have been committed by the particular person or persons, or that no offence appears to have been committed. (Para 13) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Mandatory requirements of police report – It is found that the investigating officers while submitting the chargesheet/Police Report do not comply with the requirements of the Section 173(2). Though the form of the report to be submitted under Section 173(2) has to be prescribed by the State Government and each State Government has its own Police Manual, the mandatory requirements required to be complied with by such officers in the Police Report/Chargesheet are laid down in Section 173. It is incumbent on the part of the Investigating Officer to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 173(2). Only the report forwarded by the police officer to the Magistrate under Section 173(2). can form the basis for the competent court for taking cognizance thereupon. A chargesheet is nothing but a final report of the police officer under Section 173(2) of. (Para 12 & 13) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Directions issued and particulars listed for compliance in a police report on completion of investigation – Report of police officer on the completion of investigation shall contain (i) A report in the form prescribed by the State Government stating- (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170 Cr.PC. (h) Whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under [sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB] or section 376E of the IPC. (ii) If upon the completion of investigation, there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the Police officer in charge shall clearly state in the Report about the compliance of Section 169 Cr.PC. (iii) When the report in respect of a case to which Section 170 Cr.PC. applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report, all the documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; and the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC. of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. (iv) In case of further investigation, the Police officer in charge shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and shall also comply with the details mentioned in the above sub para (i) to (iii). (Para 17) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Right to default bail on grounds of incomplete police report – Once from the material produced along with the chargesheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the chargesheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet or that the chargesheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. (Para 15) CBI vs. Kapil Wadhwan & Anr, Criminal Appeal No. 391 of 2024 (@ SLP (Crl) No. 11775 of 2023); referred. Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 242(3) and Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 138 – The general rule is that witnesses shall be examined in the order laid down in Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. An exception to this rule is Section 242(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 under which, in a warrant case, the learned Magistrate, by recording reasons, can permit cross-examination of a witness to be postponed till a particular witness or witnesses are examined. Held, recording only the examination-in-chief of 12 prosecution witnesses without recording cross-examination is contrary to the law. (Para 6 & 7) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261

Section 319 – Discretionary powers of High Court –The materials on record could not be said to have satisfied the threshold envisaged under Hardeep Singh v State of Punjab & Ors., i.e., more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. The High Court failed to appreciate that the discretionary powers under Section 319 of the CrPC ought to have been used sparingly where circumstances of the case so warrant. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence laid before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. (Para 7 & 10) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 319 - High Court overturned the Trial Court Order; and accordingly impleaded the Appellants' as accused person(s) in the Underlying Proceedings on the satisfaction of a prima-facie finding that the materials on record i.e., (i) vague allegations emanating from the underlying complaint; (ii) the Complainant's statement under Section 161 of the CrPC; and (iii) the Complainant's examination-in-chief, are sufficient to proceed against the Appellant(s). Held, the High Court failed to appreciate that the discretionary powers under Section 319 of the CrPC ought to have been used sparingly where circumstances of the case so warrant. The Trial Court Order was well reasoned and did not suffer from any perversity. Moreover, the materials on record could not be said to have satisfied the threshold i.e., more than a prima facie case, as exercised at the time of framing of charge but short of evidence that if left unrebutted would lead to conviction. (Para 9 & 10) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 438 – Pre-arrest/Anticipatory Bail – Grant of pre-arrest bail to a police officer facing allegations of manipulating the investigation so as to favour an accused would send out a wrong signal in society and would be against public interest. Presumptions and other considerations applicable to a layperson facing criminal charges may not carry the same weight while dealing with a police officer who is alleged to have abused his office. Considering the position held by the respondent, even if he was suspended from service, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and the evidence was sufficiently high. Bail order is liable to be set aside. (Para 9 & 10) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Section 438 – Pre-arrest/Anticipatory Bail – Court must record reasons for grant of Bail – An order of bail, bereft of any cogent reason, could not be sustained. Though grant of bail is discretionary, it calls for exercise of such discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. The High Court did not deem it necessary to record as to what weighed with it while granting pre-arrest bail to the respondent, hence, bail order is set aside. (Para 5, 6 & 7) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Section 438 – Bail / Anticipatory Bail – Considerations by Court while dealing with a bail petition – Similar considerations would apply even for grant of anticipatory bail – The nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case. (Para 7) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Section 482 and Constitution of India; Article 226 – Exercise of extraordinary power to quash proceedings – Such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Some instances where such power can be exercised is: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Held, present case would squarely fall under categories (1), (3) and (5) and even if the allegations made in the FIR and the material on which the prosecution relies, are taken at its face value, there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. (Para 17 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – The entire case of prosecution is based on unauthorizedly and illegally collected sample of meat. Hence, the High Court was right when it interfered by quashing the First Information Report. (Para 9) Joshine Antony v. Asifa Sultana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 195

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – Law with regard to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings - Discussed. (Para 9, 10 & 21) A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 197

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – Offence of Rape - A relationship may be consensual at the beginning but the same state may not remain so for all time to come. Whenever one of the partners show their unwillingness to continue with such relationship, the character of such relationship at it was when started will not continue to prevail. In the instant case, we do not think the relationship had remained consensual to justify quashing of the criminal complaint at the threshold. Rajkumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 214

Section 482 – Inherent power of court – High Court should have exercised power under Section 482 to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice. Although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature but are given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. (Para 5 & 6) Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90; referred. Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Constitution of India

Article 19(1) (a) & 21– Right to dissent – The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) and every individual must respect the right of others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against the decisions of the Government is an essential part of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner must be treated as a part of the right to lead a dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21, but the protest or dissent must be subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance with Article 19(2). Further, the police machinery must be enlightened on the concept of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and the extent of reasonable restraint on this freedom. The police machinery must be sensitised about the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. (Para 10 & 13) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208

Article 20(1) – Article 20(1) does not prohibit this Court, to award a lesser punishment in a befitting case, when this Court is of the opinion that a lesser punishment may be awarded since the new law on the penal provision provides a lesser punishment i.e. lesser than what was actually applicable at the relevant time. The prohibition contained in Article 20 of the Constitution of India is on subjecting a person to a higher punishment than which was applicable for that crime at the time of the commission of the crime. There is no prohibition for this Court to impose a lesser punishment which is now applicable for the same crime. (Para 8) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Article 22(4) and Act, 1986; Section 9, 10, 11 & 12 - Advisory Board - Article 22(4) mandates that, any law pertaining to preventive detention must provide for constitution of an Advisory Board consisting of persons who have been or qualified to be appointed as judges of the High Court. It further vests the Advisory Board with the pivotal role of reviewing an order of detention within three-months by forming an opinion as to whether there is a sufficient cause for such detention or not, after consideration of all the material on record including representation if any, of the detenu. Under preventive detention legislations, Advisory Boards(s) are constitutional safeguards available to the detenu against an order of detention. Under the Act, 1986, Section 9 gives expression to this constitutional requirement, and provides for the constitution and composition of an Advisory Board for the purposes of the Act. Under section 10, any order of detention that has been made under the Act shall be placed before an Advisory Board thereunder within three-weeks from the date of its passing. As per Section 11, the Advisory Board must form an opinion and specify as to whether there is sufficient cause warranting the detention of the detenu. (Para 50, 52 & 53) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253

Article 32 – Quashing the order of detention – The Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction but may ascertain whether the subjective satisfaction is based on objective facts or influenced by any caprice, malice or irrelevant considerations or non-application of mind. (Para 43) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253

Article 32 – Writ of Habeas Corpus – 'Habeas Corpus' literally means 'have his body'. This is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective relief of immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention, whether in prison or in private custody. It is the duty of the Court to issue this writ to safeguard the freedom of the citizen against arbitrary and illegal detention. By the writ of habeas corpus, the Court can cause any person who is imprisoned to be brought before the Court and obtain knowledge of the reason why he is imprisoned and then either set him free then and there if there is no legal justification for the imprisonment, or see that he is brought speedily to trial. The writ may be addressed to any person whatsoever an official or a private individual who has another in his custody. (Para 29 & 30) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253

Article 136 – Power to interfere in acquittal passed by High Court – Once the appellate court acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence as it existed before conviction by the Trial Court, stands restored. Court, while scrutinizing the evidence, will proceed with great circumspect and will not routinely interfere with an order of acquittal, save when the impeccable prosecution evidence nails the accused beyond any doubt. An intervention is warranted when the High Court's approach or reasoning is deemed perverse or when based on suspicion and surmises court rejects evidence or when the acquittal is primarily rooted in an exaggerated adherence to the rule of giving the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. Further circumstance for intervention arises when the acquittal would lead to a significant miscarriage of justice. An erroneous or perverse approach to the proven facts of a case and/or ignorance of some of the vital circumstances would amount to a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice. Supreme Court will be justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction to undo the injustice mete out to the victims of a crime. (Para 15, 17 & 18) Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar,, (2022) 3 SCC 471; referred. State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Article 226 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 – Categories of cases wherein quashing power could be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice are: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are absurd and inherently improbable to reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is provision providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is mala fide. (Para 32) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Quashing of proceedings – Held, tested on the touchstone of the principles stated in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., allowing continuance of the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR is gross abuse of process of law because the allegations as set out in the FIR do not disclose necessary ingredients of any cognizable offence. Hence, the impugned FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant are quashed and set aside. (Para 33) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Right to legal aid – When the examination-in-chief of a prosecution witness is being recorded, the presence of the Advocate for the accused is required, as the advocate has a right to object to a leading or irrelevant question being asked to the witness. The report of trial court records that the evidence of prosecution witnesses was recorded in the presence of the appellants, but their Advocate was not present as they had not engaged any Advocate. Held, after finding that the appellants-accused had not engaged any Advocate, the Trial Court ought to have provided a legal aid Advocate to the appellants accused so that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses could have been recorded in the presence of the Advocate representing the appellants-accused. Recording of evidence in this fashion is not justified even if the High Court had fixed a time-bound schedule for disposal of the case. The trial court could have always sought an extension of time from the High Court. (Para 5 & 6) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261

Corruption

Bribery not protected by legislative privileges - No immunity for MPs / MLAs taking bribes for vote/speech in legislature. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185

Corruption and bribery of members of the legislature erode the foundation of Indian parliamentary democracy. It is disruptive of the aspirations and deliberative ideals of the Constitution and creates a polity which deprives citizens of a responsible, responsive, and representative democracy. (Para 104) Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185

Offence of bribery not dependent on actual performance of act for which bribe is taken, mere acceptance of bribe enough. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185

The offence of bribery is complete the moment illegal gratification is accepted and is not dependent on the actual performance of the promise for which the bribe was sought. Offence is complete one mere acceptance of undue advantage. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185

Cow Slaughter

Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964 (Karnataka); Section 10 – Power of competent authority to enter and inspect – The power of the authorized person was confined to enter and inspect. As per the provisions, the assistant director had no power to seize any sample of meat. (Para 9) Joshine Antony v. Asifa Sultana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 195

Criminal Law

Appropriate sentence – Principle of proportionality – The aggravating and mitigating circumstances which the Court considers while deciding commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment, have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of compulsory imprisonment without remission, too. In the process of arriving at the number of years which the convict will have to undergo before which the remission powers could be invoked, some of the relevant factors that the courts bear in mind are:- (a) the number of deceased who are victims of that crime and their age and gender; (b) the nature of injuries including sexual assault if any; (c) the motive for which the offence was committed; (d) whether the offence was committed when the convict was on bail in another case; (e) the premeditated nature of the offence; (f) the relationship between the offender and the victim; (g) the abuse of trust if any; (h) the criminal antecedents; and whether the convict, if released, would be a menace to the society. Some of the positive factors have been, (1) age of the convict; (2) the probability of reformation of convict; (3) the convict not being a professional killer; (4) the socioeconomic condition of the accused; (5) the composition of the family of the accused and (6) conduct expressing remorse. The Court would be additionally justified in considering the conduct of the convict in jail; and the period already undergone to arrive at the number of years which the Court feels the convict should, serve as part of the sentence of life imprisonment and before which he cannot apply for remission. These are not exhaustive but illustrative and each case would depend on the facts and circumstances therein. No interference required for sentence of offences under Section 449 and Section 309. However, sentence under Section 302 is modified from 30 years imprisonment without remission to 25 years imprisonment without remission. (Para 57) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Framing of charge – Even a strong suspicion founded on material on record which is ground for presuming the existence of factual ingredients of an offence would justify the framing of charge against an accused person. (Para 43) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260

Quashing of Charge – Appellants have not made out a case for interference with the order on charge and the order of framing charge. The Court is only required to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of charge without blindly accepting the decision of the prosecution. (Para 43) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260

Power of constitutional courts to transfer case to CBI – The powers of the Supreme Court for directing further investigation regardless of the stage of investigation are extremely wide. This can be done even if the chargesheet has been submitted by the prosecuting agency. Held, unresolved crimes tend to erode public trust in institutions which have been established for maintaining law and order. In the present case the investigation has been ineffective is self-evident. Hence, this case needs to be handed over to CBI, for a proper investigation and also to remove any doubts in the minds of the appellants, and to bring the real culprits to justice. Case shall be transferred from SIT to the CBI. (Para 14 & 16) Awungshi Chirmayo v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 263

Standard of proof – Beyond reasonable doubt – Various lapses cumulatively affect the overall sanctity of the prosecution case, making it fall short of the threshold of beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution case stands shaken beyond a point to which no conviction resting thereupon can be said to be just in the eyes of law. (Para 47) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244

Custodial Death

It is a fact that, in ordinary circumstances, we ought not to invoke our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to invalidate an order granting bail to an accused. But this criteria, while dealing with the question of granting bail, would not apply in a case of custodial death, where police officials are arraigned as accused. Such alleged offences are of grave and serious nature. Ajay Kumar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 266

Dying Declaration

Dying declaration can be the sole basis of the conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court. The Court is required to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where the Court is satisfied about the dying declaration being true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. There cannot be an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (Para 7) Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 199

Evidence Law

Burden of Proof – The threshold of the 'burden of proof' required to be discharged, when challenging a particular charge as an “illegal charge”, is only on the preponderance of probabilities, upon which the onus will shift on the authorities to establish how the particular charge is valid. Railways failed to establish that 444 kms was the correct chargeable distance, hence, it was declared that the said computation was illegal. (Para 121) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256

Conclusive Evidence – The accused persons had sought to place reliance on income tax returns and income tax assessment orders. Held, income tax returns and orders may be admissible as evidence but are not themselves conclusive proof of lawful source of income under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and that independent evidence to corroborate the same would be required. The probative value of value of the Orders of the Income Tax Authorities, including the Order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the subsequent Assessment Orders, would depend on the nature of the information furnished and findings recorded in the order, and would not ipso facto either conclusively prove or disprove a charge. The High Court has rightly not discharged the appellants based on the Orders of the Income Tax Authorities. (Para 29 & 32) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260

Conviction on sole evidence of victim – Conviction undoubtedly can be recorded on the sole evidence of a victim of crime; however, it must undergo a strict scrutiny through the well settled legal principles. (Para 22) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Court has to strike a balance between testimonies of Injured Witness & Interested Witness. The evidence of an injured witness is considered to be on a higher pedestal than that of a witness simpliciter. (Para 28 & 34) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244

Credibility of testimony of the victim in matters involving sexual offences –The statement of the prosecutrix ought to be consistent from the beginning to the end (minor inconsistences excepted), from the initial statement to the oral testimony, without creating any doubt qua the prosecution's case. The Court can rely on the victim as a “sterling witness” without further corroboration, but the quality and credibility must be exceptionally high. While a victim's testimony is usually enough for sexual offence cases, an unreliable or insufficient account from the prosecutrix, marked by identified flaws and gaps, casts serious doubt with regard to the veracity of the prosecution version and could make it difficult for a conviction to be recorded. Considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident and allows the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. Material contradictions apparent in the depositions of prosecution witnesses, including the victim, significantly undermine the credibility of the prosecution version. Enough missing links present to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused. (Para 15, 16, 17 & 22) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Circumstantial evidence – Chain of circumstances – The circumstances set out are by themselves consistent with the sole hypothesis that the accused and the accused alone is the perpetrator of these murders which were most foul. Held, the circumstances presented in evidence in this case meets the ingredients that are required to be established. Hence, no reason to interfere with the concurrent conviction recorded by the trial Court and the High Court against the appellant. (Para 15) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Circumstantial evidence – Panchsheel or the five principles essential to be kept in mind while convicting an accused in a case based on circumstantial evidence: - (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established, (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. (Para 14) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Delay in filing the FIR and delay in examination of prosecution witness – The delay therefore renders the circumstances questionable. Hence, it cannot be said that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing its case against the two accused persons beyond reasonable doubt warranting a conviction under Section 302 IPC. (Para 42) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244

Incidental witnesses – The incident, which transpired partly within the confines of the house and extended slightly beyond the deceased's premises, the family members and close relatives naturally become the witnesses. These individuals cannot be considered incidental witnesses; instead, they emerge as the most natural witnesses. (Para 29) Thoti Manohar v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) SCC 7 723; referred. State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Independent witness – No independent witnesses were examined – The non-examination of independent witnesses would not be fatal to a case set up by the prosecution but if witnesses examined are found to be 'interested' then, the examination of independent witnesses would assume importance. It is hard to conceive how the Trial Court concluded that despite being the first cousin of D-1 and himself a person injured in the incident, PW-1 was not an interested witness. Further, considering categorical statement that “the wine shop is in the main road” and “the wine shop would be crowded always” the joining of independent witnesses ought not to have been a difficult task but, yet, it remained unachieved. (Para 31) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244

Insufficiency of evidence – Sufficiency of the materials on record - Ordinarily the court should not get into or look into the sufficiency of the materials on record on the basis of which the requisite subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the Detaining Authority. However, if the facts of the case are such that the court is required to go into such issues, it may be done. The detention of the detenue is only relied upon on his confessional statement before the police and there is no test identification parade carried out by the police. There is nothing to indicate that the nefarious activities of the detenu created an atmosphere of panic and fear in the minds of the people of the concerned locality. Held, it is a case of and it prima facie, appears that the detenu might have been picked up by the police on suspicion and then relied upon his confessional statement before the police. (Para 33) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253

Offence of sexual harassment in a public place, as opposed to one committed within the confines of a room or a house, or even in a public place but away from the view of the public, stands on different premise. If any doubt arises in the Court's mind regarding the veracity of the victim's version, the Court may, at its discretion, seek corroboration from other witnesses who directly observed the incident or from other attending circumstances to unearth the truth. (Para 18) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Evidence Act, 1872

Section 9 – Test Identification parade – Identification of the appellant by witness is quite doubtful as no proper identification parade has been conducted. Witness clearly states that he has identified the accused persons out of two people shown by the police. In the absence of proper identification parade being conducted, the identification for the first time in the Court cannot be said to be free from doubt. (Para 6 & 7) Jafar v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 238

Section 106 – Burden of proof – When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its duty. However, in exceptional cases where it could be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish the facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused, the burden will be on the accused since he could prove as to what transpired in such scenario, without difficulty or inconvenience. In this case, when an offence like multiple murders is committed inside a house in secrecy, the initial burden has to be discharged by the prosecution and once the prosecution successfully discharged the burden cast upon it, the burden did shift upon the appellant being the only other person inside the four corners of the house to offer a cogent and plausible explanation as to how the offences came to be committed. The appellant has miserably failed to prove. (Para 12) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Section 25 – Confession before a police office – Confession of an accused recorded by a Police Officer is not admissible in evidence as the same is hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. (Para 23) Mohammed Khalid v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Goonda Act

Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (Act 1986); Section 2(g) – Preventive detention is challenged – Difference between 'law and order' and 'public order' – In order to pass an order of detention under the Act 1986 against any person, the Detaining Authority must be satisfied that he is a “GOONDA” within the meaning of Section 2(g) and to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it necessary that he is preventively detained. Held, mere registration of the two FIRs for the alleged offences of robbery etc. could not have been made the basis to preventively detaining the appellant herein on the assumption that he is a “GOONDA”. What has been alleged against the detenu could have raised the problems relating to 'law and order' but it is difficult to say that they impinged on 'public order'. Further held, to bring the activities of a person within the expression of “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” the activities must be of such a nature that the ordinary laws cannot deal with them or prevent subversive activities affecting society. The true distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Inability on the part of the state's police machinery to tackle the law and order situation should not be an excuse to invoke the jurisdiction of preventive detention. (Para 20, 31, 32) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253

Act 1986; Section 2(a) –The Explanation to Section 2(a) provides that a person shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” when such person is a “GOONDA” and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 'Public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in Section 2(a) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. (Para 23) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253

Act 1986; Section 3(2) – Subjective satisfaction of detaining authority – The Detaining Authority should take into consideration only relevant and vital material to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction. There is an implicit duty to apply mind to the pertinent and proximate matters and eschew those which are irrelevant & remote. If the detaining authority does not consider relevant circumstances or considers wholly unnecessary, immaterial and irrelevant circumstances, then such subjective satisfaction would be vitiated. The satisfaction cannot be inferred by mere statement in the order that “it was necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”. To arrive at a proper satisfaction, the detaining authority must examine (i) the material adduced against the prospective detenu to satisfy itself whether his conduct or antecedent(s) reflect that he has been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and, (ii) whether it is likely that the said person would act in a manner prejudicial to the public order in near future unless he is prevented from doing so by passing an order of detention. Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253

Act 1986; Section 2(a) –The Explanation to Section 2(a) provides that a person shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” when such person is a “GOONDA” and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 'Public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in Section 2(a) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. (Para 23) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253

Act 1986 – Object – To prevent crime and to protect the society from the anti-social elements and dangerous characters by placing them under detention for such a duration as would disable them from resorting to undesirable criminal activities. The provisions of the Act are intended to deal with habitual criminals, dangerous and desperate outlaws, who are so hardened and incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of the penal laws and the mortal/moral fear of punishment for crime are not sufficient deterrence for them. (Para 19) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253

Act 1986 – Invocation of Section 3 of the 1986 Act is not justified as mere involvement in a sexual offence, including one under Section 376D, by itself will not be sufficient to invoke Section 3 of the 1986 Act. This is for the reason that the 5 offence must be integrally connected 'with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order'. It is not decipherable from the order of Detaining Authority coupled with the grounds of detention, or from the Confirmation Order dated 09.08.2023, how the offence is connected to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. (Para 7) Vaddi Lakshmi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 254

Information Technology Act, 2000

Section 67 – Criminalises the publication and transmission of obscene material in electronic form, covers material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it. (Para 7.1) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243

Section 67A – The facts of the present case certainly do not attract Section 67A as the complainant's grievance is about excessive usage of vulgar expletives, swear words, and profanities. There is no allegation of any 'sexually explicit act or conduct' in the complaint and as such, Section 67A does not get attracted. Section 67A criminalises publication, transmission, causing to publish or transmit – in electronic form – any material that contains sexually explicit act or conduct. Though the three expressions “explicit”, “act”, and “conduct” are open-textured and are capable of encompassing wide meaning, the phrase may have to be seen in the context of 'obscenity' as provided in Section 67. (Para 46 & 47) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

Section 15(1) & 19(1) – The procedure provided under Sections 15 and 19 has been held to be mandatory by this Court in the case of Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh. Held, there has been a flagrant violation of the mandatory requirements of Sections 15 and 19 of the JJ Act. Neither was the charge sheet against the accused appellant filed before the Board nor was any preliminary assessment conducted by the Board under Section 15, so as to find out whether the accused appellant was required to be tried as an adult. In absence of a preliminary assessment being conducted by the Board under Section 15, and without an order being passed by the Board under Section 15(1) read with Section 18(3), it was impermissible for the trial Court to have accepted the charge sheet and to have proceeded with the trial of the accused. All the proceedings taken against the accused appellant are vitiated as being in total violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed under the JJ Act. (Para 37 & 38) Thirumoorthy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 262

Section 15(1), 18(3) & 19(1) – Section 15(1) provides that in case where a heinous offence/s (defined under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act) are alleged to have been committed by a child who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he committed the offence. Section 18(3) provides that where the Board after preliminary assessment under Section 15 opines that there is a need for the said child to be tried as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences. By virtue of Section 19(1), the Children's Court, upon receiving such report of preliminary assessment undertaken by the Board under Section 15 may further decide as to whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult or not. (Para 32, 33 & 34) Thirumoorthy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 262

Section 94(2) – Mode for determination of age – In the order of priorities, the date of birth certificate from the school stands at the highest pedestal in determination of age. The ossification test has been kept at the last rung to be considered, only in the absence of both certificate from school and birth certificate issued by a Corporation/Municipal Authority/Panchayat. Opinion of medical board that estimation of age based on X-ray examination becomes uncertain after 25 years is accepted. (Para 19 & 20) Vinod Katara v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 210

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Section 52A – Safe custody of sample packets – Proceedings required to be followed as per Section 52A of the NDPS Act, by the investigating officer of preparing an inventory and obtaining samples in presence of the jurisdictional magistrate is not followed. Due to lack of proper procedure followed, the FSL report is held to be nothing but a waste paper and cannot be read in evidence. Glaring loopholes in the prosecution case give rise to an inescapable inference that the prosecution has failed to prove the required link evidence to satisfy the Court regarding the safe custody of the sample packets from the time of the seizure till the same reached the Forensic Science laboratory (FSL). (Para 21 & 22) Mohammed Khalid v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Section 67 - Confession statements are not admissible evidence. The authorities / officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau must comply and abide by the judgment in Toofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. Sharik Khan v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 216

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Director of the company not responsible for its day-to-day affairs cannot be held liable for dishonor of cheque. (Para 10) Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 237

Section 143A - Mere filing of the cheque dishonor complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act would not grant a right to a complainant to seek interim compensation under Section 143A (1) of the N.I. Act, as the power of the court to grant interim compensation, isn't mandatory but discretionary and needs to be decided after prima facie evaluating the merits of the case. (Para 14) Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 235

Penal Code, 1860

Quashing of FIR – A court must exercise its jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal complaint when the allegations made therein, taken prima facie, do not disclose the commission of any offence. (Para 48) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243

Right of Private Defence – The law provides that the person claiming such a right bears the onus to prove the legitimacy of the actions done in furtherance thereof and it is not for the Court to presume the presence of such circumstances or the truth in such a plea being taken. (Para 19) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244

Section 34 & 120B – Since the foundational facts essential for constituting the substantive offences under Sections 153A and 504 IPC are not available from the admitted allegations of prosecution, the allegations qua the subsidiary offences under Sections 34 and 120B IPC would also be non est. (Para 30) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 153A – For applying Section 153A IPC, the presence of two or more groups or communities is essential. Held, in the present case, no such groups or communities were referred to in the news article. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence. (Para 29) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 153-A (1) (a) & Section 153-A (1) (b) and Constitution of India; Article 19(1) (a) – Freedom to criticise decisions of the government – Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, under which, every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the action of abrogation of Article 370 or every other decision of the State. If every criticism or protest of the actions of the State is to be held as an offence under Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature of the Constitution of India, will not survive. The appellant intended to criticise the action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and did not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community. Describing the day the abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of protest and anguish. The effect of the words used by the appellant will have to be judged from the standards of reasonable women and men. Merely because a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will not be sufficient to attract Section 153-A (1) (a) of the IPC. Further, every citizen has the right to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their respective independence days. It cannot be said that such acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed only because the person belongs to a particular religion. WhatsApp status of the appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among various groups. Thus, continuation of the prosecution under Section 153-A of the IPC will be a gross abuse of the process of law. (Para 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Obscenity – Profanity is not per se obscene – Vulgarity and profanities do not per se amount to obscenity. While a person may find vulgar and expletive-filled language to be distasteful, unpalatable, uncivil, and improper, that by itself is not sufficient to be 'obscene'. The specific material which the High Court found to be obscene, was “foul, indecent and profane” language and nothing more. The High Court has equated profanities and vulgarity with obscenity, without undertaking a proper or detailed analysis into how such language, by itself, could be sexual, lascivious, prurient, or depraving and corrupting. (Para 35) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Standard to determine obscenity – 'Community standard test' – The Supreme Court in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal markedly moved away from the Hicklin test to the “community standard test”. The standard of determination is that of an ordinary common person and not a hypersensitive person such as an adolescent's or child's mind, who is susceptible to influences. The High Court has incorrectly used the standard of “impressionable minds” to gauge the effect of the material and has therefore erred in applying the test for obscenity correctly. (Para 7. 1 & 39) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Objective consideration while assessing whether the material is obscene – The court must consider the work as a whole and then the specific portions that have been alleged to be obscene in the context of the whole work to arrive at its conclusion. The High Court has taken the meaning of the language in its literal sense, outside the context in which such expletives have been spoken. While the literal meaning of the terms used may be sexual in nature and they may refer to sexual acts, their usage does not arouse sexual feelings or lust in any viewer of ordinary prudence and common sense. Rather, the common usage of these words is reflective of emotions of anger, rage, frustration, grief, or perhaps excitement. By taking the literal meaning of these words, the High Court failed to consider the specific material (profane language) in the context of the larger web-series and by the standard of an “ordinary man of common sense and prudence”. Neither did the creator of the web-series intend for the language to be taken in its literal sense nor is that the impact on a reasonable viewer who will watch the material. Therefore, there is a clear error in the legal approach adopted by the High Court in analysing and examining the material to determine obscenity. (Para 36 & 37) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243

Section 292 – Obscene material – Section 292 defines 'obscene' as a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object that is lascivious, appeals to the prurient interest, or has such effect, if taken as a whole, that tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, see or hear the matter contained in it. The provision criminalises the sale, distribution, public exhibition, circulation, import, export, etc of obscene material. The provision excludes such material when the publication is justified as being for public good on the ground that it is in the interest of science, art, literature, or learning or other objects of general concern; such material is kept or used for bona fide religious purposes; it is sculptured, engraved, painted or represented on or in ancient monuments and temples. (Para 12) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243

Section 299, 302 & 304 Part II – The act of celebratory firing during marriage ceremonies is an unfortunate practice – In the absence of any evidence on record to suggest that the Appellant aimed at and / or pointed at the large crowd whilst engaging in such celebratory firing; or there existed any prior enmity between the Deceased and the Appellant, the act cannot be punishable under Section 302 IPC. On grounds that (i) there was no previous enmity between the Deceased; (ii) no intention may be attributed to the Appellant as may be culled out from the record to cause death of the Deceased; and (iii) person carrying a gun with live cartridges has knowledge that firing the gun in presence of several people is an act likely to cause death, the Appellant is guilty of commission of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 IPC i.e., punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant under Section 302 IPC is liable to set aside. (Para 13, 14 & 15) Shahid Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 222

Section 302 – Acquittal order reversed in conviction – Reason assigned by High Court to discard evidence of complainant (PW2) and his daughter (PW3) is untenable. Complainant narrated the entire occurrence on a call made to the Police Control Room within ten minutes of the occurrence, hence, the court fails to find any meeting of the minds in such few minutes so as to create a false narrative only to implicate Gurpreet Singh. The presence of Gursewak Singh at the time of occurrence, his prompt reporting of the crime, and the swift action taken by the police immediately upon receipt of the said report, have cumulatively and unequivocally established the prosecution case beyond any doubt. On the contrary, the prosecution has successfully established that accused had been nursing a grudge against the deceased, hence, the attribution of motive by the prosecution stands proved. The reasons assigned by the High Court while granting acquittal are totally perverse and as a result of misreading of the evidence on record. Hence, it warrants interference by Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136. (Para 28, 30, 31, 33) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Section 302 & 34 – Co-accused –There is also not an iota of evidence to suggest that other respondents had any meeting with Accused and/or they had conspired with him for the execution of the crime. As there is no specific motive attributed, benefit of doubt can be extended to them. There is no convincing explanation to implicate them as co­accused. (Para 35) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Sections 302 and 316 - From every available evidence, which was placed by the prosecution, it is a case where a sudden fight took place between the husband and wife. The deceased at that time was carrying a pregnancy of nine months and it was the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased that resulted in the fire and the subsequent burn injuries and the ultimate death of the deceased. This act at the hands of the appellant will be covered under the fourth exception given under Section 300 of the IPC, i.e., “Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner”. The act of the appellant is not premeditated, but is a result of sudden fight and quarrel in the heat of passion. Therefore, we convert the findings of Section 302 to that of 304 Part-II, as we are of the opinion that though the appellant had knowledge that such an act can result in the death of the deceased, but there was no intention to kill the deceased. Therefore, this is an offence which would come under Part-II not under Part-I of Section 304 of the IPC. (Para 20 & 21) Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 215

Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Apprehensions expressed in the suicide note, by no stretch of imagination, can be considered sufficient to attribute to the appellant, an act or omission constituting the elements of abetment to commit suicide. The necessary ingredients of the offence of abetment to commit suicide are not made out from the chargesheet and hence allowing prosecution of the appellant is grossly illegal. (Para 21 & 23) Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 201

Section 306 - Before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative to put an end to her life. It must be borne in mind that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable. (Para 36) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187

Section 306 - In order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. (Para 39) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187

Section 306 - Human mind is an enigma. There can be myriad reasons for a man or a woman to commit or attempt to commit suicide: it may be a case of failure to achieve academic excellence, oppressive environment in college or hostel, particularly for students belonging to the marginalized sections, joblessness, financial difficulties, disappointment in love or marriage, acute or chronic ailments, depression, so on and so forth. Therefore, it may not always be the case that someone has to abet commission of suicide. Circumstances surrounding the deceased in which he finds himself are relevant. (Para 47) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187

Section 306 - The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that the victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. (Para 40) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187

Section 306 - Where the accused by his act or omission or by his continued course of conduct creates a situation that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide, then instigation may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. (Para 34) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187

Section 375 – “Consent” of a woman – To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. Held, the allegations in the FIR so also in the restatement made before the Dy. S.P., do not, on their face, indicate that the promise by accused was false or that the complainant engaged in the sexual relationship on the basis of such false promise. No error has been committed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court by holding that permitting further proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. (Para 11, 15 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - Ingredients to constitute the offence - Discussed. (Para 11 - 13) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - For attracting the provisions of Section 420 of IPC, it must be shown that the FIR / complaint discloses: (i) the deception of any person; (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person; and (iii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement. (Para 13) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - The dishonest inducement is the sine qua non to attract the provisions of Sections 415 and 420 of IPC. (Para 20) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 504 – This offence can be invoked when the insult of a person provokes him to break public peace or to commit any other offence. Held, there is no such allegation in the FIR that owing to the alleged offensive post attributable to the appellant, the complainant was provoked to such an extent that he could indulge in disturbing the public peace or commit any other offence. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence. (Para 30) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

Section 2(ix) (k) and Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; Rule 32(c) & (f) – Misbranded food – The packets taken from shop/godown of the appellants by the food inspector were misbranded as defined under Section 2(ix) (k) of the Act, as they were not labelled in accordance with the requirements of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. (Para 7) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; Rule 32(c) & (f) and Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; Section 52 – Reduction of sentence as per current law applicable – Sentence of imprisonment and fine converted to only fine – The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, repealed by the introduction of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, wherein Section 52 provides a maximum penalty of Rs.3,00,000/- for misbranded food and no provision for imprisonment. When an amendment is beneficial to the accused it can be applied even to cases pending in Courts where such a provision did not exist at the time of the commission of offence. (Para 9) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Once cognizance of a complaint filed under Section 44 is taken by the Special Court under the PMLA Act, the power to arrest vesting under Section 19 of the PMLA Act cannot be exercised. Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 191

Section 45 - The appellants have miserably failed to satisfy that there are reasonable grounds for believing that they are not guilty of the alleged offences. On the contrary, there is sufficient material collected by the respondent-ED to show that they are prima facie guilty of the alleged offences. (Para 30) Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 240

Preventive Detention

Difference between preventive and punitive detention – The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. An order of preventive detention, may be made before or during prosecution, with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. (Para 25) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253

Mere involvement in sexual offence not sufficient : Supreme Court quashes Preventive Detention Order. Vaddi Lakshmi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 254

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

'One day trial' in POCSO case - Supreme Court affirms High Court Order for fresh trial after setting aside conviction. Bablu Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 203

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Section 3(2)(v) – It is nowhere the case of the prosecution that the offence committed upon the deceased was on the basis of his caste. From the admitted allegations of the prosecution, the necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are not made out. Prosecution for the offence is ex facie illegal and unwarranted. (Para 16 & 18) Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 201