Supreme Court Quarterly Digest - Constitution Of India [Jan-Mar, 2024]

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22 May 2024 11:41 AM IST

  • Supreme Court Quarterly Digest - Constitution Of India [Jan-Mar, 2024]

    Constitution - Supreme Court Quarterly Digest 2024 Article 13 – Scope of Judicial Review in matters of economic policy – Courts must adopt a less stringent form of judicial review while adjudicating challenges to legislation and executive action which relate to economic policy as compared to laws relating to civil rights such as the freedom of speech or the freedom of religion....

    Constitution - Supreme Court Quarterly Digest 2024

    Article 13 – Scope of Judicial Review in matters of economic policy – Courts must adopt a less stringent form of judicial review while adjudicating challenges to legislation and executive action which relate to economic policy as compared to laws relating to civil rights such as the freedom of speech or the freedom of religion. The amendment to Section 31 of the RBI Act can be classified as a financial provision to the extent that it seeks to introduce a new form of a bearer banking instrument. However, any resemblance to an economic policy ends there. The amendments in question can be clubbed into two heads: first, provisions mandating non-disclosure of information on electoral financing; and second, provisions permitting unlimited corporate funding to political parties. Both these amendments relate to the electoral process. The Bonds were introduced only to curb black money in the electoral process, and protect informational privacy of financial contributors to political parties. The Union of India has itself classified the amendments as an “electoral reform”. Thus, the submission of the Union of India that the amendments deal with economic policy cannot be accepted. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

    Article 14 – Unlimited corporate funding – Arbitrariness of Section 182 - Removal of restrictions on political contributions is arbitrary and violates Article 14 of the Constitution – Unlimited contribution by companies to political parties is antithetical to free and fair elections because it allows certain persons/companies (including shell companies) to influence the electoral process and policy making. This is violative of the principle of free and fair elections and political equality captured in the value of “one person one vote”. The ability of a company to influence the electoral process through political contributions is much higher when compared to that of an individual. Companies and individuals cannot be equated for the purpose of political contributions. Companies before the amendment to Section 182 could only contribute a certain percentage of the net aggregate profits and could be classified between loss-making companies and profit-making companies for the purpose of political contributions. The underlying principle of this distinction was that it is more plausible that loss-making companies will contribute to political parties with a quid pro quo and not for the purpose of income tax benefits. The amended provision does not recognize that the harm of contributions by lossmaking companies in the form of quid pro quo is much higher. Thus, the amendment to Section 182 is manifestly arbitrary for (a) treating political contributions by companies and individuals alike; (b) permitting the unregulated influence of companies in the governance and political process violating the principle of free and fair elections; and (c) treating contributions made by profit-making and loss-making companies to political parties alike. The observations means that the law must not treat companies and individual contributors alike because of the variance in the degree of harm on free and fair elections. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

    Article 14 – Exemption of certain projects or activities from mandatory obtaining environment clearance – Unguided and blanket exemption, is, per se, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Item 6 grants exemption from the requirement of obtaining EC for “extraction or sourcing or borrowing of ordinary earth for linear projects, such as roads, pipelines, etc. Held, when an exception is sought to the requirement of obtaining EC, the exception must be specific. There is no specification about the quantum of ordinary earth, which can be extracted or the area which can be used to extract ordinary earth. “Linear projects” have not been defined making the term “linear projects” very vague. Even the amended item 6 continues to suffer from the same vice of arbitrariness, which Article 14 of the Constitution of India prohibits. The exemption granted without incorporating any safeguards is completely unguided and arbitrary and such blanket exemption completely defeats the very object of the EP Act. Hence, on account of the violation of Article 14, item 6 in the impugned notification, as well as the amended impugned notification, is struck down. (Para 25, 26 & 27) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252

    Articles 14 and 51A - Appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers in the States - Submission that no such office is stipulated in the Constitution – Held, Appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers not unconstitutional. A Deputy Chief Minister is, first and foremost, a Minister in the Government of the State. The appellation of a Deputy Chief Minister does not breach the constitutional position. (Para 1) Public Political Party v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 130

    Article 19(1) (a) – Freedom to criticise decisions of the government – Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, under which, every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the action of abrogation of Article 370 or every other decision of the State. If every criticism or protest of the actions of the State is to be held as an offence under Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature of the Constitution of India, will not survive. The appellant intended to criticise the action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and did not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community. Describing the day the abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of protest and anguish. The effect of the words used by the appellant will have to be judged from the standards of reasonable women and men. Merely because a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will not be sufficient to attract Section 153-A (1) (a) of the IPC. Further, every citizen has the right to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their respective independence days. It cannot be said that such acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed only because the person belongs to a particular religion. WhatsApp status of the appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among various groups. Thus, continuation of the prosecution under Section 153-A of the IPC will be a gross abuse of the process of law. (Para 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208

    Article 19(1)(a) – Constitutionality of Section 182(3) of Companies Act as amended by Section 154 of Finance Act – Non-disclosure of particulars of political contribution is violative of Right to Information – After amendment, Section 182(3) only requires the disclosure of the total amount contributed to political parties in a financial year. The deletion of the mandate of disclosing the particulars of contributions violates the right to information of the voter since they would not possess information about the political party to which the contribution was made which, is necessary to identify corruption and quid pro quo transactions in governance. Such information is also necessary for exercising an informed vote. The only purpose of amending Section 182(3) was to bring the provision in tune with the amendment under Section 29C of the RPA exempting disclosure requirements for contributions through electoral bonds. The amendment to Section 182(3) of the Companies Act serves no practical purpose as the Electoral Bond Scheme and relevant amendments to the RPA and the IT Act mandating non-disclosure of particulars on political contributions through electoral bonds is held unconstitutional. Hence, Section 182(3) as amended by the Finance Act 2017 is unconstitutional. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

    Article 19(1) (a) & 21– Right to dissent – The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) and every individual must respect the right of others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against the decisions of the Government is an essential part of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner must be treated as a part of the right to lead a dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21, but the protest or dissent must be subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance with Article 19(2). Further, the police machinery must be enlightened on the concept of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and the extent of reasonable restraint on this freedom. The police machinery must be sensitised about the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. (Para 10 & 13) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208

    Article 19(1)(a) – Infringement of the Right to information of the voter – The non-disclosure of information about electoral contributions under amendments introduced by the Finance Act 2017 and the Electoral Bond Scheme is violative of the right to information of the voter traceable to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The voters have a right to the disclosure of information which is “essential” for choosing the candidate for whom a vote should be cast. The information about funding to a political party is such an 'essential' information for a voter to exercise their freedom to vote in an effective manner. The right to information of the voter includes the right to information of financial contributions to a political party because of the influence of money in electoral politics (through electoral outcomes) and governmental decisions. Information about political funding would enable a voter to assess if there is a correlation between policy making and financial contributions. Anonymizing contributions through electoral bonds are violative of Article 19(1)(a). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

    Article 19(1)(a) and Indian Evidence act, 1872; Section 124 – Scope of right to information in the context of deciding the disclosure of evidence relating to affairs of the State – Conflict between public interest and private interest – Article 19(1)(a) has been held to guarantee the right to information to citizens. It is the role of citizens to hold the State accountable for its actions and inactions and they must possess information about State action for them to accomplish this role effectively. Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act stipulate that evidence which is relevant and material to proceedings need not be disclosed to the party if the disclosure would violate public interest. When such disclosure is denied on the ground that it would violate public interest, there is a conflict between private interest and public interest. There is a public interest in the impartial administration of justice which can only be secured by the disclosure of relevant and material documents. There is a close relationship between the right to information and open governance. Citizens have a duty to hold the government of the day accountable for their actions and inactions, and they can effectively fulfil this duty only if the government is open and not clothed in secrecy. The right to information has an instrumental exegesis, which recognizes the value of the right in facilitating the realization of democratic goals. But beyond that, the right to information has an intrinsic constitutional value; one that recognizes that it is not just a means to an end but an end in itself. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

    Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) and Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 - Infringement of the right to information of the voters for the purposes of curbing black money – Proportionality standard applied – Least restrictive means stage –The Electoral Bond Scheme is not the only means for curbing black money in Electoral Finance. There are other alternatives which substantially fulfill the purpose and impact the right to information minimally when compared to the impact of electoral bonds on the right to information. The legal regime itself provides other alternatives to curb black money such as contributions through cheques, bank draft, electronic clearing system or electoral trusts. Hence, the Electoral Bond Scheme does not fulfill the least restrictive means test. Further, the right to information under Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted based on the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2). The purpose of curbing black money is not traceable to any of the grounds in Article 19(2). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

    Article 20(1) – Article 20(1) does not prohibit this Court, to award a lesser punishment in a befitting case, when this Court is of the opinion that a lesser punishment may be awarded since the new law on the penal provision provides a lesser punishment i.e. lesser than what was actually applicable at the relevant time. The prohibition contained in Article 20 of the Constitution of India is on subjecting a person to a higher punishment than which was applicable for that crime at the time of the commission of the crime. There is no prohibition for this Court to impose a lesser punishment which is now applicable for the same crime. (Para 8) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

    Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the soul of the Constitution as the liberty of a citizen is of paramount importance. Not deciding the matter pertaining to liberty of a citizen expeditiously and shunting away the matter on one or the other ground would deprive the party of their precious right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 3) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159

    Article 21 and 32 - Writ petition aggrieved by non-consideration and non-disposal of criminal appeal is not maintainable. If priority has not been given to the criminal appeal by the High Court for early hearing, for whatever reason, the same is also part of the judicial process and cannot be made amenable to a challenge in a writ petition under Article 32 citing breach of Article 21. A judicial decision rendered by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him does not infringe a Fundamental Right. If the petitioner wishes to be released on bail pending the criminal appeal, cannot invoke the writ remedy but has to take recourse to an application under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Para 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147

    Article 21 and 47 – Right to food – Although the Constitution of India does not explicitly provide for Right to food, the fundamental Right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution does include Right to live with human dignity and right to food and other basic necessities. Article 47 of the Constitution also provides that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties. (Para 5) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

    Article 22(4) and Act, 1986; Section 9, 10, 11 & 12 - Advisory Board - Article 22(4) mandates that, any law pertaining to preventive detention must provide for constitution of an Advisory Board consisting of persons who have been or qualified to be appointed as judges of the High Court. It further vests the Advisory Board with the pivotal role of reviewing an order of detention within three-months by forming an opinion as to whether there is a sufficient cause for such detention or not, after consideration of all the material on record including representation if any, of the detenu. Under preventive detention legislations, Advisory Boards(s) are constitutional safeguards available to the detenu against an order of detention. Under the Act, 1986, Section 9 gives expression to this constitutional requirement, and provides for the constitution and composition of an Advisory Board for the purposes of the Act. Under section 10, any order of detention that has been made under the Act shall be placed before an Advisory Board thereunder within three-weeks from the date of its passing. As per Section 11, the Advisory Board must form an opinion and specify as to whether there is sufficient cause warranting the detention of the detenu. (Para 50, 52 & 53) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610

    Article 32 – Quashing the order of detention – The Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction but may ascertain whether the subjective satisfaction is based on objective facts or influenced by any caprice, malice or irrelevant considerations or non-application of mind. (Para 43) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610

    Article 32 – Writ of Habeas Corpus – 'Habeas Corpus' literally means 'have his body'. This is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective relief of immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention, whether in prison or in private custody. It is the duty of the Court to issue this writ to safeguard the freedom of the citizen against arbitrary and illegal detention. By the writ of habeas corpus, the Court can cause any person who is imprisoned to be brought before the Court and obtain knowledge of the reason why he is imprisoned and then either set him free then and there if there is no legal justification for the imprisonment, or see that he is brought speedily to trial. The writ may be addressed to any person whatsoever an official or a private individual who has another in his custody. (Para 29 & 30) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610

    Article 32 - Writ or direction for expeditious disposal of Criminal Appeal - Held, the Supreme Court has no power of superintendence over the High Courts. There is no provision in Chapter-IV (titled The Union Judiciary) under Part-V (The Union) of the Constitution of India which, in terms similar to Article 227 of the Constitution (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court) under Chapter-V thereof, confers power of superintendence on the Supreme Court over the High Courts. In our constitutional scheme there is a clear division of jurisdiction between the two institutions and both the institutions need to have mutual respect for each other. Accepting the prayer of the petitioner and issuing any direction, as prayed, would amount to inappropriate exercise of discretionary jurisdiction showing disrespect to another constitutional court; hence, no such direction, as prayed by the petitioner, can be issued. That apart, assuming that an extraordinary case requires a nudge from Supreme Court for early hearing of a long pending criminal appeal, it is only a request that ought to be made to the High Court to such effect in appropriate proceedings, care being taken to ensure that the proceeding before Supreme Court is otherwise maintainable. (Para 1 - 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147

    Article 136 – Interference under Article 136 is not warranted – The Supreme Court may exercise its power under Article 136 sparingly and only when exceptional circumstances exist which justify the exercise of its discretion. The court is not inclined under Article 136 of the Constitution to re-appreciate the findings of facts which have been arrived at by the High Court. The order of the High Court does not suffer from any error that would warrant the invocation of jurisdiction under Article 136. (Para 18 & 23) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

    Article 136 – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court – Discretion to interfere – In cases where there is no substantial question of law this court would not exercise its discretion. (Para 18) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230

    Article 136 – Power to interfere in acquittal passed by High Court – Once the appellate court acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence as it existed before conviction by the Trial Court, stands restored. Court, while scrutinizing the evidence, will proceed with great circumspect and will not routinely interfere with an order of acquittal, save when the impeccable prosecution evidence nails the accused beyond any doubt. An intervention is warranted when the High Court's approach or reasoning is deemed perverse or when based on suspicion and surmises court rejects evidence or when the acquittal is primarily rooted in an exaggerated adherence to the rule of giving the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. Further circumstance for intervention arises when the acquittal would lead to a significant miscarriage of justice. An erroneous or perverse approach to the proven facts of a case and/or ignorance of some of the vital circumstances would amount to a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice. Supreme Court will be justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction to undo the injustice mete out to the victims of a crime. (Para 15, 17 & 18) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

    Article 136 – Wrongful denial of employment and regularization – Distinction between the two sets of workers – Artificial distinction asserted by appellant between two set of workers is unjustified. The appellant has failed to establish any distinction between the 19 workers who were regularized and the 13 workers who were left out. The tribunal came to the conclusion that the nature of the duties performed by the 13 workmen are perennial in nature and they hold the same status as the 19 regularized employees but were wrongly not made part of the settlement. There is no merit in the appeals filed by the appellant. (Para 20, 21 & 22) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230

    Article 142 doesn't empower Courts to ignore substantive rights of litigants - Issued guidelines on exercise of inherent powers. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

    Article 142 – Direction of Supreme Court for automatic vacation of interim stay due to lapse of time – The jurisdiction of Supreme Court under article 142 cannot be exercised to make judicial legislation. By a blanket direction in the exercise of power under Article 142, the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court of granting interim relief by limiting its jurisdiction to pass interim orders valid only for six months at a time. Putting such constraints on the power of the High Court will amount to making a dent on the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. Elementary principles of natural justice, mandate that an order vacating or modifying interim relief is to be passed only after hearing all the affected parties and order passed without hearing the beneficiary is against the basic tenets of justice. If an interim order is automatically vacated only because the High Court cannot hear the main case within the time limit, the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” will apply, i.e. no litigant should be allowed to suffer due to the fault of the Court. Further, automatic vacation on lapse of time gives an unfair advantage to the respondent in the case and adversely affects a litigant's right to the remedies under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Such orders virtually defeat the right of a litigant to seek and avail of statutory remedies such as revisions, appeals, and applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as well as the remedies under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Constitutional Courts may issue directions for the time-bound disposal of cases only in exceptional circumstances. (Para 16, 17, 24, 28 & 32) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

    Article 142 – Direction of Supreme court to dispose stay cases on a day-to-day basis – Such directions of the Supreme Court virtually amounts to judicial legislation. The High Courts cannot be expected to decide, on a priority basis or a day-to-day basis, only those cases in which a stay of proceedings has been granted while ignoring several other categories of cases that may require more priority to be given. Therefore, the issue of giving out-ofturn priority to certain cases should be best left to the concerned Courts. (Para 28, 30 & 32) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

    Article 142 – Scope of powers of Supreme Court under Article 142 – The jurisdiction under Article 142 cannot be invoked to pass blanket orders setting at naught a very large number of interim orders lawfully passed by all the High Courts, and that too, without hearing the contesting parties. The jurisdiction under Article 142 can be invoked only to deal with extraordinary situations for doing complete justice between the parties before the Court. Although the Supreme Court under Article 142 can always issue procedural directions to other Courts, the right to be heard before an adverse order is passed is not a matter of procedure but a substantive right. Hence, Article 142 does not empower this Court to ignore the substantive rights of the litigants. Power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to defeat the principles of natural justice, which are an integral part of our jurisprudence. (Para 19 & 22) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

    Article 142 – Power to ensure electoral democracy – The Court is duty-bound, to do complete justice to ensure that the process of electoral democracy is not allowed to be thwarted by subterfuges. The Court must step in exceptional situations to ensure that the basic mandate of electoral democracy at the local participatory level is preserved. The extraordinary situation of electoral misconduct by the presiding officer himself, justifies the invocation of the power of this Court under Article 142. (Para 37) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

    Article 142 – Setting aside the Election Process – It would be inappropriate to set aside the election process in its entirety when the only infirmity which has been found is at the stage when the counting of votes was recorded by the Presiding Officer. Allowing the entire election process to be set aside would further compound the destruction of fundamental democratic principles which has taken place as a consequence of the conduct of the Presiding Officer. (Para 35) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

    Article 226 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 – Categories of cases wherein quashing power could be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice are: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are absurd and inherently improbable to reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is provision providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is mala fide. (Para 32) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

    Article 226 – Error of jurisdiction of High Court – The petitioner had expressly consented to the High Court to evaluate the entirety of the matter in its full perspective. As the petitioner has agreed to the evaluative action by the High Court, it cannot be concluded that the High Court has committed an error of jurisdiction. (Para 16 & 17) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

    Article 226 – Jurisdiction to interfere in administrative decisions – The judiciary must exercise restraint and avoid unnecessary intervention qua administrative decision(s) of the executive involving specialised expertise in the absence of any mala-fide and / or prejudice. The process of evaluation of an IAS officer, ought to have been left to the executive on account of it possessing the requisite expertise and mandate for the said task. The High Court entered into a specialised domain i.e., evaluating the competency of an IAS officer without the requisite domain expertise and administrative experience to conduct such an evaluation. The High Court ought not to have ventured into the said domain particularly when the Accepting Authority is yet to pronounce its decision qua the Underlying Representation. (Para 25, 27 & 28) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : AIR 2024 SC 1397

    Article 226(3) – Clause (3) will not apply when an interim order in a writ petition under Article 226 is passed after the service of a copy of the writ petition on all concerned parties and after giving them an opportunity of being heard. It applies only to ex-parte ad interim orders. It provides for an automatic vacation of interim relief only if the aggrieved party makes an application for vacating the interim relief and when the application for vacating stay is not heard within the time specified. (Para 26) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

    Article 226 - the High Court by way of the interim order could not have passed an order which had the effect of encroaching upon the areas reserved for the Legislature and the Executive. Our Constitution recognizes the independence of the three wings of the State, i.e. the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. No doubt that if the High Court found that the legislature concerned was not valid on account of any of the grounds available within the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it could set aside such a legislation. But by way of an interim order it could not have in effect stayed the operation of the said Statute. (Para 8 - 10) State of Uttar Pradesh v. In Re Constitution of Education Tribunals, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 71

    Article 226 – Exercise of extraordinary power to quash proceedings – Such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Some instances where such power can be exercised is: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Held, present case would squarely fall under categories (1), (3) and (5) and even if the allegations made in the FIR and the material on which the prosecution relies, are taken at its face value, there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. (Para 17 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242

    Article 229 - Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts - Article 229 (2) pertains only to the service conditions of 'officers and servants' of the High Courts and does not include Judges of the High Court (both sitting and retired judges). The Chief Justice does not have the power, under Article 229, to make rules pertaining to the post-retiral benefits payable to former Chief Justices and judges of the High Court. Therefore, the Rules proposed by the Chief Justice, in the present case, do not fall within the competence of the Chief Justice under Article 229. (Para 25) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

    Article 229 (2) - The High Court did not have the power to direct the State Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High Court. The Chief Justice did not have the competence to frame the rules under Article 229 of the Constitution. Further, the High Court, acting on the judicial side, does not have the power to direct the Government to frame rules proposed by it on the administrative side. (Para 24 – 30) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

    Article 285 - 'Enemy property' vested in the possession of the Union Government-appointed 'custodian', as per the Enemy Property Act, 1968, cannot be considered a property of the Union Government to claim the exemption from the municipal taxes under Article 285 (1) of the Constitution of India. (Para 22) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156

    Article 300A - The expression person in Article 300-A covers not only a legal or juristic person but also a person who is not a citizen of India. The expression property is also of a wide scope and includes not only tangible or intangible property but also all rights, title and interest in a property. (Para 18) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156

    Articles 341 and 342 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Public notification of 'tribes or tribal communities' by the President of India, upon consultation with the Governor, is a sine qua non for deeming such tribes or tribal communities to be 'Scheduled Tribes' in relation to that State or Union Territory for the purposes of the Constitution. (Para 15) Chandigarh Housing Board v. Tarsem Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 139

    Articles 341 and 342 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Insofar as a person claiming benefit having regard to his status as a Scheduled Tribe in a State, when he migrates to a Union Territory where a Presidential Order has not been issued at all insofar Scheduled Tribe is concerned, or even if such a Notification is issued, such an identical Scheduled Tribe does not find a place in such a Notification, the person cannot claim his status on the basis of his being noted as a Scheduled Tribe in the State of his origin. (Para 29) Chandigarh Housing Board v. Tarsem Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 139

    Ad-interim order of stay – When a High Court grants a stay of the proceedings while issuing notice without giving an opportunity of being heard to the contesting parties, it is not an interim order, but it is an ad-interim order of stay. It can be converted into an interim order of stay only after an opportunity of being heard is granted on the prayer for interim relief to all the parties to the proceedings. Ad-interim orders, by their very nature, should be of a limited duration. (Para 14) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

    A very strange and unusual Writ Petitions have been filed by the State against the Directorate of Enforcement under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, before the High Court seeking relief, which would indirectly stall or delay the inquiry/investigation. The Writ Petitions filed, at the instance of the State Government, challenging summons issued to the District Collectors prima facie appears to be thoroughly misconceived, and the impugned order passed by the High Court also being under utter misconception of law. Directorate of Enforcement v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 172

    Bar association's resolution to not represent a party - Such a Resolution could not have been passed. Right to defend oneself is a Fundamental Right under Part III of the Constitution of India and further right to appear for a client is also a Fundamental Right being a part of carrying on one's profession as a lawyer. (Para 3) Rupashree H.R. v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 126

    Grounds on which interim order comes to an end – Can come to an end by disposal of the main case either on merits or for default or other reasons, by the High Court, in which the interim order has been passed or by a judicial order vacating interim relief, passed after hearing the contesting parties on the above stated grounds. (Para 16) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

    Guidelines issued to secure the fundamental rights and dignity of intimate partners, and members of the LGBTQ+ communities in illegal detention – Mandatory in nature – Habeas corpus petitions and petitions for protection must be given a priority in hearing and courts must avoid adjournments or delays in the disposal of the case; In evaluating the locus standi of a partner or friend, the court must not make a roving enquiry into the precise nature of the relationship between the appellant and the person; Effort must be to create an environment conducive for a free and un-coerced dialogue to ascertain the wishes of the corpus; The court must ensure that the corpus is produced before the court and given the opportunity to interact with the judges in-person in chambers to ensure the privacy and safety of the detained or missing person; The court must ensure that the wishes of the detained person is not unduly influenced by the Court, or the police, or the natal family during the course of the proceedings; Upon securing the environment and inviting the detained or missing person in chambers, the court must make active efforts to put the detained or missing person at ease; If a detained or missing person expresses their wish to not go back to the alleged detainer or the natal family, then the person must be released immediately without any further delay; Courts must grant an ad-interim protection while dealing with a petition for police protection by intimate partners on the grounds that they are a same sex, transgender, inter-faith or inter-caste couple to maintain their privacy and dignity; The Court must not adopt counselling or parental care as a means of changing the mind of the appellant, or the detained/missing person; The Judge during the interaction with the corpus to ascertain their views must not attempt to change or influence the admission of the sexual orientation or gender identity of the appellant or the corpus and Sexual orientation and gender identity fall in a core zone of privacy of an individual and no stigma or moral judgment must be imposed when dealing with cases involving parties from the LGBTQ+ community. (Para 16 & 17) Devu G. Nair v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 249

    High Court's power to vacate or modify interim relief – The High Courts are always empowered to vacate or modify an order of interim relief passed after hearing the parties if (a) A litigant, after getting an order of stay, deliberately prolongs the proceedings either by seeking adjournments on unwarranted grounds or by remaining absent when the main case in which interim relief is granted is called out for hearing before the High Court with the object of taking undue advantage of the order of stay; (b) The High Court finds that the order of interim relief is granted as a result of either suppression or misrepresentation of material facts by the party in whose favour the interim order of stay has been made; and (c) The High Court finds that there is a material change in circumstances requiring interference with the interim order passed earlier. A long passage of time may bring about a material change in circumstances. These grounds are not exhaustive and there can be other valid grounds for vacating an order of stay. (Para 15) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

    Object of passing interim orders – An order of interim relief is usually granted in the aid of the final relief sought in the case. An occasion for passing an order of stay of proceeding arises as it is not possible for the High Court to take up the case for final hearing immediately. Further, to avoid the possibility of passing an order of remand, the grant of stay of proceedings is called for in many cases. (Para 13) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

    Parliamentary processes not taking place on the floor of the house are also covered by parliamentary privilege. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185

    Position of the High Courts and its power of superintendence – Both the Supreme Court and the High Court are constitutional Courts. A High Court is constitutionally independent of the Supreme Court of India and is not judicially subordinate to the Supreme Court. (Para 23) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

    Quashing of proceedings – Held, tested on the touchstone of the principles stated in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., allowing continuance of the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR is gross abuse of process of law because the allegations as set out in the FIR do not disclose necessary ingredients of any cognizable offence. Hence, the impugned FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant are quashed and set aside. (Para 33) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

    Quashing of proceedings – The object of dispute, manifestly rife with mala fide intentions of only recovering the tainted money by coercion and threat of criminal proceedings. Such proceedings cannot be allowed to proceed further and exploit the time and resources of the law enforcement agency. The valuable time of the police is consumed in investigating disputes that seem more suited for civil resolution. The need for vigilance on the part of the police is paramount, and a discerning eye should be cast upon cases where unscrupulous conduct appears to eclipse the pursuit of justice. There is a need for a circumspect approach in discerning the genuine from the spurious and thus ensuring that the resources of the state are utilised for matters of true societal import. (Para 14 & 15) Deepak Kumar Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2024 Cri LJ 1388 : (2024) 3 SCC 601

    Right to free and fair elections – It is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Elections at the local participatory level act as a microcosm of the larger democratic structure in the country. Local governments, such as municipal corporations, engage with issues that affect citizens' daily lives and act as a primary point of contact with representative democracy. The process of citizens electing councillors, who in turn, elect the Mayor, serves as a channel for ordinary citizens to ventilate their grievances through their representatives – both directly and indirectly elected. Ensuring a free and fair electoral process throughout this process, therefore, is imperative to maintain the legitimacy of and trust in representative democracy. (Para 36) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

    Rajya Sabha's role is part of basic structure - Rajya Sabha elections protected by legislative privileges under Article 194. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185

    Right to legal aid – When the examination-in-chief of a prosecution witness is being recorded, the presence of the Advocate for the accused is required, as the advocate has a right to object to a leading or irrelevant question being asked to the witness. The report of trial court records that the evidence of prosecution witnesses was recorded in the presence of the appellants, but their Advocate was not present as they had not engaged any Advocate. Held, after finding that the appellants-accused had not engaged any Advocate, the Trial Court ought to have provided a legal aid Advocate to the appellants accused so that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses could have been recorded in the presence of the Advocate representing the appellants-accused. Recording of evidence in this fashion is not justified even if the High Court had fixed a time-bound schedule for disposal of the case. The trial court could have always sought an extension of time from the High Court. (Para 5 & 6) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261

    Scope of judicial review in matters of transfer – The scope of judicial review is only available when there is a clear violation of statutory provision or the transfer is persuaded by malafide. In absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegation are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. The impugned transfer order is not alleged to be malafide or violative of any prescribed statutory provision, hence, the interference made by the Division Bench setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the Single Judge is not justified. The Division Bench has committed an error in setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. (Para 12 & 13) Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 231

    Scope of judicial review in policy matters – The Courts do not and cannot examine the correctness, suitability or appropriateness of a policy, nor are the courts advisors to the executive on the matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The Courts cannot direct the States to implement a particular policy or scheme on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, would be the subject of judicial review. The scope of judicial review in examining the policy matters is very limited. (Para 8) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

    Special leave Petition against order of High Court – To set aside impugned termination order – Class-IV employee, when in financial hardship, may represent directly to the superior but that by itself cannot amount to major misconduct for which punishment of termination from service should be imposed. It is trite law that ordinarily the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer should not be interfered by the appellate authority or by the writ court. However, when the finding of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer is based on perverse finding the same can always be interfered. Termination from service order is liable to be set aside. Chatrapal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : AIR 2024 SC 948

    The proportionality standard - To determine if the violation of the fundamental right is justified – The proportionality standard is by nature curated to give prominence to the fundamental right and minimize the restriction on it. The measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage); The measure must be a suitable means for furthering the goal (suitability or rational connection stage); The measure must be least restrictive and equally effective (necessity stage); and The measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the right holder (balancing stage). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

    Though, the Right to Property is no more a Fundamental Right, still it is recognized as a Constitutional Right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Depriving a citizen of his Constitutional Right to use the land for 20 years and then showing graciousness by paying the compensation and beating drums that the State has been gracious is unacceptable. The state is not doing charity by paying compensation to the citizens for acquisition of land. (Para 25 & 26) Sudha Bhalla @ Sudha Punchi v. Rakesh Kumar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 167

    Writ petition – Lack of proper procedure – The writ petition filed claiming title on the disputed plot of land was taken up by the High Court in hot haste and was allowed without issuing formal notice to all the respondents. Further, the State authorities were not given proper opportunity of filing a counter and the standing counsel was instructed to appear without any formal notice being issued and was given a single day's opportunity to present the factual report. Impugned order passed by the High Court suffers from patent illegality, perversity and in sheer violation of principles of natural justice. (Para 16 & 18) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226

    Writ petition – Writ petition was manifestly tainted on account of concealment of material facts. Factum of filing of two earlier writ petitions with similar prayers was concealed by respondent while filing the present writ petition. (Para 14 & 16) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226

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