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Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest...

Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest 2024 - Criminal Minor Acts

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK

8 Sept 2024 1:02 PM IST

Goonda Act

Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (Act 1986); Section 2(g) – Preventive detention is challenged – Difference between 'law and order' and 'public order' – In order to pass an order of detention under the Act 1986 against any person, the Detaining Authority must be satisfied that he is a “GOONDA” within the meaning of Section 2(g) and to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it necessary that he is preventively detained. Held, mere registration of the two FIRs for the alleged offences of robbery etc. could not have been made the basis to preventively detaining the appellant herein on the assumption that he is a “GOONDA”. What has been alleged against the detenu could have raised the problems relating to 'law and order' but it is difficult to say that they impinged on 'public order'. Further held, to bring the activities of a person within the expression of “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” the activities must be of such a nature that the ordinary laws cannot deal with them or prevent subversive activities affecting society. The true distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Inability on the part of the state's police machinery to tackle the law and order situation should not be an excuse to invoke the jurisdiction of preventive detention. (Para 20, 31, 32) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986; Section 2(a) –The Explanation to Section 2(a) provides that a person shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” when such person is a “GOONDA” and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 'Public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in Section 2(a) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. (Para 23) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610

Act 1986; Section 3(2) – Subjective satisfaction of detaining authority – The Detaining Authority should take into consideration only relevant and vital material to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction. There is an implicit duty to apply mind to the pertinent and proximate matters and eschew those which are irrelevant & remote. If the detaining authority does not consider relevant circumstances or considers wholly unnecessary, immaterial and irrelevant circumstances, then such subjective satisfaction would be vitiated. The satisfaction cannot be inferred by mere statement in the order that “it was necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”. To arrive at a proper satisfaction, the detaining authority must examine (i) the material adduced against the prospective detenu to satisfy itself whether his conduct or antecedent(s) reflect that he has been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and, (ii) whether it is likely that the said person would act in a manner prejudicial to the public order in near future unless he is prevented from doing so by passing an order of detention. Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986 – Object – To prevent crime and to protect the society from the anti-social elements and dangerous characters by placing them under detention for such a duration as would disable them from resorting to undesirable criminal activities. The provisions of the Act are intended to deal with habitual criminals, dangerous and desperate outlaws, who are so hardened and incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of the penal laws and the mortal/moral fear of punishment for crime are not sufficient deterrence for them. (Para 19) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986 – Invocation of Section 3 of the 1986 Act is not justified as mere involvement in a sexual offence, including one under Section 376D, by itself will not be sufficient to invoke Section 3 of the 1986 Act. This is for the reason that the 5 offence must be integrally connected 'with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order'. It is not decipherable from the order of Detaining Authority coupled with the grounds of detention, or from the Confirmation Order dated 09.08.2023, how the offence is connected to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. (Para 7) Vaddi Lakshmi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 254

Information Technology Act, 2000

Section 67 – Criminalises the publication and transmission of obscene material in electronic form, covers material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it. (Para 7.1) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781

Section 67A – The facts of the present case certainly do not attract Section 67A as the complainant's grievance is about excessive usage of vulgar expletives, swear words, and profanities. There is no allegation of any 'sexually explicit act or conduct' in the complaint and as such, Section 67A does not get attracted. Section 67A criminalises publication, transmission, causing to publish or transmit – in electronic form – any material that contains sexually explicit act or conduct. Though the three expressions “explicit”, “act”, and “conduct” are open-textured and are capable of encompassing wide meaning, the phrase may have to be seen in the context of 'obscenity' as provided in Section 67. (Para 46 & 47) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781

Juvenile Justice Act, 1986

Section 2 (h) and 21 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302 and 201 r/w. 34 – Murder - Issue of juvenility was raised in Appeal - On the date on which the incident constituting the offence took place, the age of the appellant was less than 18 years. The 2000 JJ Act was admittedly not in force when the incident occurred. Therefore, the case will be governed by the 1986 JJ Act. Under clause (h) of Section 2 of the 1986 JJ Act, a 'juvenile' has been defined to mean a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. Thus, on the date of occurrence of the offence, the appellant was a juvenile. As per Section 22(1) of the 1986 JJ Act, there was a prohibition on sentencing a juvenile to undergo imprisonment. As the appellant has undergone incarceration for a period of more than eight years, no purpose will be served by sending the appellant before the Juvenile Justice Board. Pramila v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 57

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

Section 7 – Procedure in relation to the Board – The Principal Magistrate passed the order, that the child in conflict with Law (CCL) is to be tried by the Children's Court as an adult. Held, at the time of final disposal of the case or making an order under Section 18(3) of the Act, there shall be at least two members including the Principal Magistrate. When the arguments in the matter were heard with reference to the order under Section 18(3) of the Act, the Board consisted of a Principal Magistrate and a Member. Further held, even if the other member of the Board had not signed the order and had merely mentioned that he had a dissenting view, without any reasons being recorded, the order of the Principal Magistrate will prevail. Order passed by the Board as signed by the Principal Magistrate was final. However, the same is subject to right of appeal of the aggrieved party. (Para 15.2, 15.3, 15.5 & 18) Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 353

Section 14(3) & 15 – Time limit for preliminary assessment is directory in nature – Section 15 of the Act enables the Board to make preliminary assessment into heinous offences alleged to have been committed by a child between 16 and 18 years of age, with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such an offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which the offence was allegedly committed. Section 14(3) of the Act provides that the preliminary assessment in terms of Section 15 is to be completed by the Board within a period of three months from the date of first production of the child before the Board. Held, the time so provided in Section 14(3) cannot be held to be mandatory, as no consequences of failure have been provided. Where consequences for default for a prescribed period in a Statute are not mentioned, the same cannot be held to be mandatory. (Para 9, 9.2, 9.14, 9.15 & 18) Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 353

Section 101(1), 101(2) & 15 – Time for filing appeal against order of the Board under Section 15 – Appeal, under Section 101(2) of the Act against an order of the Board passed under Section 15 of the Act, can be filed within a period of 30 days. The appellate court can entertain the appeal after the expiry of the aforesaid period, provided sufficient cause is shown. (Para 13.1 & 18) Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 353

Section 101(2) and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2016 – 'Children's Court' or the 'Sessions Court' – Section 101(2) of the JJ Act provides that against an order passed by the Board the appeal is maintainable before the Court of Sessions – Held, the words 'Children's Court' and 'Court of Sessions' in Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the 2016 Rules shall be read interchangeably – Where Children's Court is available, even if the appeal is said to be maintainable before the Sessions Court, it has to be considered by the Children's Court. Whereas where no Children's Court is available, the power is to be exercised by the Sessions Court. (Para 12.2 & 18) Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 353

Section 102 – Maintainability of revision petition – Section 102 of the Act enables the High Court to exercise its revisional powers with reference to any order or proceeding by the Board or the Children's Court. The High Court can exercise its revisional powers for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit. (Para 10.2, 10.4 & 18) Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 353

The plea of juvenility of the accused may be raised before any court at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, such a plea of juvenility couldn't be rejected without conducting a proper inquiry. Delay in raising the plea of juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of such a claim. For making a claim with regard to juvenility after conviction, the claimant must produce some material which prima facie may satisfy the court that an inquiry into the claim of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has to be discharged by the person who claims juvenility. (Para 10 - 13) Rahul Kumar Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 341 : AIR 2024 SC 2739

The Supreme Court prescribes 30 days time limit to prefer appeal against the juvenile justice board preliminary assessment order. Rahul Kumar Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 341 : AIR 2024 SC 2739

Section 15(1) & 19(1) – The procedure provided under Sections 15 and 19 has been held to be mandatory by this Court in the case of Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh. Held, there has been a flagrant violation of the mandatory requirements of Sections 15 and 19 of the JJ Act. Neither was the charge sheet against the accused appellant filed before the Board nor was any preliminary assessment conducted by the Board under Section 15, so as to find out whether the accused appellant was required to be tried as an adult. In absence of a preliminary assessment being conducted by the Board under Section 15, and without an order being passed by the Board under Section 15(1) read with Section 18(3), it was impermissible for the trial Court to have accepted the charge sheet and to have proceeded with the trial of the accused. All the proceedings taken against the accused appellant are vitiated as being in total violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed under the JJ Act. (Para 37 & 38) Thirumoorthy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 262

Section 15(1), 18(3) & 19(1) – Section 15(1) provides that in case where a heinous offence/s (defined under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act) are alleged to have been committed by a child who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he committed the offence. Section 18(3) provides that where the Board after preliminary assessment under Section 15 opines that there is a need for the said child to be tried as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences. By virtue of Section 19(1), the Children's Court, upon receiving such report of preliminary assessment undertaken by the Board under Section 15 may further decide as to whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult or not. (Para 32, 33 & 34) Thirumoorthy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 262

Section 94(2) – Mode for determination of age – In the order of priorities, the date of birth certificate from the school stands at the highest pedestal in determination of age. The ossification test has been kept at the last rung to be considered, only in the absence of both certificate from school and birth certificate issued by a Corporation/Municipal Authority/Panchayat. Opinion of medical board that estimation of age based on X-ray examination becomes uncertain after 25 years is accepted. (Para 19 & 20) Vinod Katara v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : AIR 2024 SC 1430

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Can accused get default bail if FSL report isn't submitted with chargesheet within prescribed time? The Supreme Court refers to the Larger Bench. Hanif Ansari v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 302

Section 37 – Constitution of India; Article 21 - Bail on grounds of undue delay in Trial despite bar in NDPS Act – Failure to conclude the trial within a reasonable time resulting in prolonged incarceration militates against the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act may, in such circumstances, be considered. Held, section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, does not fetter the grant of bail to an accused on the ground of undue delay in the completion of the trial. Direction given to enlarge the petitioner on bail. Ankur Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 416

Sections 41 & 42 – Mandatory compliance of procedure before search – Power of Magistrate and an Officer of Gazetted rank to issue warrant – Empowers a Magistrate to issue search warrant for the arrest of any person or for search, whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence under the provisions of the NDPS Act 1985. As per Section 41(2), such reason to believe must arise from either personal knowledge or information given by any person to him and is required to be reduced into writing. The search conducted at the house of Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 was not based on the personal knowledge, rather it was an action bereft of mandatory statutory compliance of Section 41(2). The raid at the house of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 is in violation of the statutory mandate of Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985. (Para 32, 42, 46 & 47) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778

Section 42(1) – Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation – The provision obligates an officer empowered by virtue of Section 41(2) to record the information received from any person regarding an alleged offence under Chapter IV of the NDPS Act 1985 or record the grounds of his belief as per the Proviso to Section 42(1), in case an empowered officer proceeds on his personal knowledge. The grounds of belief is to be conveyed to the immediate official superior, prior to the search and in case of any inability to do so, the Section 42(2) provides that a copy of the same shall be sent to the concerned immediate official superior along with grounds of his belief as per the proviso. Absolute noncompliance of the statutory requirements under the Section 42(1) and (2) of the NDPS Act 1985 is verboten. However, any delay in the said compliance may be allowed considering the same is supported by well-reasoned explanations for such delay. (Para 31) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778

Section 63 – Order of confiscation and auction of article is challenged – The court cannot order confiscation of an article until the expiry of one month from the date of seizure or without hearing any person who may claim any right thereto. Held, the appellant is the registered owner of the article and has a right to be heard by the court before the final order of confiscation is passed and the seized vehicle is put to auction. Hence, the order passed by the trial court to the extent it orders confiscation and auction of the dumper is set aside. (Para 13, 14 & 15) Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 395

Section 67 – Evidentiary value of confessional statements recorded under Section 67 – Information received under section 67 is not in the nature of a confessional statement. Such statements cannot be used against the accused. (Para 51 & 53) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778

Section 52A – Safe custody of sample packets – Proceedings required to be followed as per Section 52A of the NDPS Act, by the investigating officer of preparing an inventory and obtaining samples in presence of the jurisdictional magistrate is not followed. Due to lack of proper procedure followed, the FSL report is held to be nothing but a waste paper and cannot be read in evidence. Glaring loopholes in the prosecution case give rise to an inescapable inference that the prosecution has failed to prove the required link evidence to satisfy the Court regarding the safe custody of the sample packets from the time of the seizure till the same reached the Forensic Science laboratory (FSL). (Para 21 & 22) Mohammed Khalid v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183 : (2024) 5 SCC 393

Section 67 - Confession statements are not admissible evidence. The authorities / officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau must comply and abide by the judgment in Toofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. Sharik Khan v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 216

Section 37 – Bail to the accused charged in connection with offence involving commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance – In case of recovery of huge quantities of narcotic substance, the Courts should be slow in granting even regular bail to the accused, more so when the accused is alleged to be having criminal antecedents. The Court would have to mandatorily record the satisfaction in terms of the rider contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act that there are grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The High Court not only omitted to record any such satisfaction, but has rather completely ignored the factum of recovery of narcotic substance, multiple times the commercial quantity. The impugned order is cryptic and perverse on the face of the record and cannot be sustained. Thus, the same is quashed and set aside. State v. B. Ramu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 128

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; Section 22(1) & 22(3) – Power of Chief Judge cum City Sessions Court for trial of offences set out in the Schedule to the NIA Act – The State Government has been given exclusive power under Section 22(1) to constitute one or more Special Courts for trial of offences under any or all the enactments specified in the Schedule to NIA Act. The jurisdiction conferred by this Act on a Special Court shall, until a Special Court is designated by the State Government, be exercised by the Court of Session of the division in which such offence has been committed. Held, the State has not constituted a special court under Section 22, hence, the Chief Judge cum City Sessions Court had the power and jurisdiction to deal with the case by virtue of Section 22 (3). Hence, the order of Chief Judge cum City Sessions Court permitting the addition of the offences under UAPA to the case does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. (Para 23, 24, 28, 29 & 30) State of West Bengal v. Jayeeta Das, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : AIR 2024 SC 2161

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Director of the company not responsible for its day-to-day affairs cannot be held liable for dishonor of cheque. (Para 10) Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 237

Section 138 – Maintainability of suit – Criminal law can be set in motion by anyone, even by a stranger or legal heir. A complaint under Section 138, preferred by the Power of Attorney Holder is held maintainable and also that such Power of Attorney Holder can depose as complainant. (Para 11) Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 407

Section 138 – Civil and Criminal course adopted on same issue – Whether, a criminal proceeding can be initiated and the accused therein held guilty, in connection with a transaction, in respect of which a decree by a competent Court of civil jurisdiction, already stands passed? Held, civil court judgments are not binding on criminal courts, but the ratio of the civil proceedings would be binding on criminal proceedings for certain limited purposes such as sentence or damages imposed by the criminal court. The Court in criminal jurisdiction would be bound by the civil Court having declared the cheque to be only for the purposes of security. The civil Court having declared the cheque (subject matter of dispute) to be only for the purposes of security, the criminal proceedings for cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would be unsustainable in law and, therefore liable to be quashed and set aside. The damages as imposed by the Courts must be returned to the appellant. (Para 8, 11 & 12) Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 272 : (2024) 6 SCC 143

Section 138 – Dishonouring of cheque – Held, existence of any “enforceable debt or other liability” not found. Petitioner's case not made out. (Para 11) Rajco Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 306 : AIR 2024 SC 2105

Section 138 - Amendment of Complaint - Cheque Date - Typographical Error - The appellant challenged the High Court's decision permitting the respondent to amend the complaint to correct the date on a cheque from 22.07.2010 to 22.07.2012. The application for amendment was filed after evidence had been tendered, and the learned Magistrate rejected the amendment on the grounds that the date had been consistently recorded as 22.07.2010 in both the complaint and the evidence. The legal notice issued before the complaint also mentioned the date 22.07.2010. The High Court allowed the amendment, but the Supreme Court found that the amendment was not justified since the original date was crucial for compliance with the statutory time frame and the financial status of the account. The High Court's order permitting the amendment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. Munish Kumar Gupta v. Mittal Trading Company, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 339

Section 138 – Requirement of 'consent' in compounding of offence under section 138 – Even though compensation is duly paid by the accused, yet if the complainant does not agree for the compounding of the offence, the courts cannot compel the complainant to give 'consent' for compounding of the matter. Held, as the complainant has compensated the complainant and has already been in jail for more than 1 year, even though the complainant is unwilling to compound the case, the proceedings must come to an end. (Para 12 & 14) Raj Reddy Kallem v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 336

Section 147 & 138 – Compoundable offence – All offences punishable under the Negotiable Instruments Act are compoundable – In cases of section 138 the accused must try for compounding at the initial stages instead of the later stage, however, there is no bar to seek the compounding of the offence at later stages of criminal proceedings including after conviction. (Para 12) Raj Reddy Kallem v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 336

Section 143A - Mere filing of the cheque dishonor complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act would not grant a right to a complainant to seek interim compensation under Section 143A (1) of the N.I. Act, as the power of the court to grant interim compensation, isn't mandatory but discretionary and needs to be decided after prima facie evaluating the merits of the case. (Para 14) Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : (2024) 4 SCC 419

Section 118 r/w. 139 - Even if a blank cheque leaf is voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused towards some payment would attract the presumption under Section 139 of the Act and in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of the debt, the presumption would hold good. (Para 5) K. Ramesh v. K. Kothandaraman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Section 118 r/w. 139 - Accused has signed the cheque. The only dispute is with regard to the age of the ink used in making the signature on the cheque and the age of the signature and contents of the cheque. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence. (Para 5 & 6) K. Ramesh v. K. Kothandaraman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Sections 138 and 141 - The Director of the company wouldn't be held liable for the dishonor of a cheque issued by the company pursuant to the retirement of the Director unless some credible evidence is brought on record proving the guilt of the director. The director could be held liable for the dishonor of the cheque after his retirement only when it is proved that any act of a company is proved to have been done with the connivance or consent or may be attributable to a director. (Para 10) Rajesh Viren Shah v. Redington (India) Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : AIR 2024 SC 1047

Section 118(e) and 138 - If the accused is disputing the signature on the cheque, then the certified copies of the signatures from the bank could be summoned from the bank to compare the same with the signature appearing on the cheque. The indorsements on a cheque carry a presumption of genuineness as per Section 118(e) of the Act. Hence, it is incumbent upon the accused to lead evidence to rebut the presumption of genuineness of signatures. (Para 16) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Section 118(e) and 138 - The accused had not taken any efforts to disprove his signature at the trial stage. No question was put to the witness from the bank regarding the genuineness of the signature. Also, the cheque was returned not on the grounds of any discrepancy in the signatures. If at all, the accused was desirous of proving that the signatures as appearing on the cheque issued from his account were not genuine, then he could have procured a certified copy of his specimen signatures from the Bank and a request could have been made to summon the concerned Bank official in defence for giving evidence regarding the genuineness or otherwise of the signature on the cheque. (Para 16) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Section 138 - Accused persons filed an undertaking based on a settlement. Since the amount agreed was not paid, the interim protection, granted via suspension of sentence and bail, was withdrawn. Appeal dismissed with cost of Rs 5 lakhs and directed to surrender within a period of four weeks. Satish P. Bhatt v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 16

Section 138 - Once the settlement has been arrived at and the complainant has signed the deed accepting a particular amount in full and final settlement of the default amount and the fine amount awarded by the Trial Court, the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act need to be quashed. (Para 4) Ghanshyam Gautam v. Usha Rani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 23

Section 138 - Question regarding the time-barred nature of an underlying debt or liability in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is a mixed question of law and fact which ought not to be decided by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. (Para 7) Atamjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 76

Police Act, 1861

The information disclosing the commission of the cognizable offence needs to be recorded as a First Information Report (FIR) in the form of a book and not in the General Diary maintained by the Police. (Para 28) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 19 - Sanction - The Sessions Court could not have acquitted the accused only on the ground of alleged invalid sanction, without recording its findings on all the issues involved. (Para 8) P.I. Babu v. C.B.I., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 56

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A - Interpretation of - Split Verdict - Referred to Larger Bench. Nara Chandrababu Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 41

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960

Animal Birth Control Rules, 2001 - Under all circumstances, there cannot be any indiscriminate killings of canines and the authorities have to take action in terms of the mandate and spirit of the prevalent legislation(s) in place. There is no gainsaying in the fact that exhibiting compassion to all living beings, is the enshrined Constitutional value and mandate, and cast obligation on the authorities to maintain. (Para 11) Animal Welfare Board of India v. People For Elimination of Stray Troubles, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 434

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

Section 2(ix) (k) and Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; Rule 32(c) & (f) – Misbranded food – The packets taken from shop/godown of the appellants by the food inspector were misbranded as defined under Section 2(ix) (k) of the Act, as they were not labelled in accordance with the requirements of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. (Para 7) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; Rule 32(c) & (f) and Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; Section 52 – Reduction of sentence as per current law applicable – Sentence of imprisonment and fine converted to only fine – The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, repealed by the introduction of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, wherein Section 52 provides a maximum penalty of Rs.3,00,000/- for misbranded food and no provision for imprisonment. When an amendment is beneficial to the accused it can be applied even to cases pending in Courts where such a provision did not exist at the time of the commission of offence. (Para 9) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Once a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA is filed, it will be governed by Sections 200 to 205 of the CrPC as none of the said provisions are inconsistent with any of the provisions of the PMLA. (Para 23 (a)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

If the accused was not arrested by the ED till filing of the complaint, while taking cognizance on a complaint under Section 44(1)(b), as a normal rule, the Court should issue a summons to the accused and not a warrant. Even in a case where the accused is on bail, a summons must be issued. (Para 23 (b)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

In the facts of this case, the appellant will complete 3½ years of incarceration on 26th May, 2024. Thus, he will complete half of the prescribed sentence. In this case, obviously the trial has not started, as the charge has not been framed. This Court has held that Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "CRPC") will apply even to a case under the PMLA. But the Court can still deny the relief owing to the ground such as where the trial was delayed at the instance of the accused. As stated earlier, here there is no occasion for the appellant to cause the delay in trial, as even charge has not been framed. Moreover, there is no other circumstance brought on record which will compel us to deny the benefit of Section 436A of the CRPC to the appellant. Ajay Ajit Peter Kerkar v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 400

After a summons is issued under Section 204 of the CrPC on taking cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA on a complaint, if the accused appears before the Special Court pursuant to the summons, he shall not be treated as if he is in custody. Therefore, it is not necessary for him to apply for bail. However, the Special Court can direct the accused to furnish bond in terms of Section 88 of the CrPC. (Para 23 (c)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

In a case where the accused appears pursuant to a summons before the Special Court, on a sufficient cause being shown, the Special Court can grant exemption from personal appearance to the accused by exercising power under Section 205 of the CrPC. (Para 23 (d)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

If the accused does not appear after a summons is served or does not appear on a subsequent date, the Special Court will be well within its powers to issue a warrant in terms of Section 70 of the CrPC. Initially, the Special Court should issue a bailable warrant. If it is not possible to effect service of the bailable warrant, then the recourse can be taken to issue a nonbailable warrant. (Para 23 (e)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

A bond furnished according to Section 88 is only an undertaking by an accused who is not in custody to appear before the Court on the date fixed. Thus, an order accepting bonds under Section 88 from the accused does not amount to a grant of bail;. (Para 23 (f), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

In a case where the accused has furnished bonds under Section 88 of the CrPC, if he fails to appear on subsequent dates, the Special Court has the powers under Section 89 read with Sections 70 of the CrPC to issue a warrant directing that the accused shall be arrested and produced before the Special Court; If such a warrant is issued, it will always be open for the accused to apply for cancellation of the warrant by giving an undertaking to the Special Court to appear before the said Court on all the dates fixed by it. While cancelling the warrant, the Court can always take an undertaking from the accused to appear before the Court on every date unless appearance is specifically exempted. When the ED has not taken the custody of the accused during the investigation, usually, the Special Court will exercise the power of cancellation of the warrant without insisting on taking the accused in custody provided an undertaking is furnished by the accused to appear regularly before the Court. When the Special Court deals with an application for cancellation of a warrant, the Special Court is not dealing with an application for bail. Hence, Section 45(1) will have no application to such an application. (Para 23 (g). Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

When an accused appears pursuant to a summons, the Special Court is empowered to take bonds under Section 88 of the CrPC in a given case. However, it is not mandatory in every case to direct furnishing of bonds. However, if a warrant of arrest has been issued on account of nonappearance or proceedings under Section 82 and/or Section 83 of the CrPC have been issued against an accused, he cannot be let off by taking a bond under Section 88 of the CrPC, and the accused will have to apply for cancellation of the warrant. (Para 23 (h), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

After cognizance is taken of the offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA based on a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b), the ED and its officers are powerless to exercise power under Section 19 to arrest a person shown as an accused in the complaint. (Para 23 (i), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

If the ED wants custody of the accused who appears after service of summons for conducting further investigation in the same offence, the ED will have to seek custody of the accused by applying to the Special Court. After hearing the accused, the Special Court must pass an order on the application by recording brief reasons. While hearing such an application, the Court may permit custody only if it is satisfied that custodial interrogation at that stage is required, even though the accused was never arrested under Section 19. However, when the ED wants to conduct a further investigation concerning the same offence, it may arrest a person not shown as an accused in the complaint already filed under Section 44(1)(b), provided the requirements of Section 19 are fulfilled. (Para 23 (j), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

A very strange and unusual Writ Petitions have been filed by the State against the Directorate of Enforcement under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, before the High Court seeking relief, which would indirectly stall or delay the inquiry/investigation. The Writ Petitions filed, at the instance of the State Government, challenging summons issued to the District Collectors prima facie appears to be thoroughly misconceived, and the impugned order passed by the High Court also being under utter misconception of law. Directorate of Enforcement v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 172

Once cognizance of a complaint filed under Section 44 is taken by the Special Court under the PMLA Act, the power to arrest vesting under Section 19 of the PMLA Act cannot be exercised. Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

Section 2(1) (y), 2(1) (u) & 3 and Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 203 & 204 – Schedule offence – In absence of scheduled offence, there cannot be any proceeds of crime within the meaning Section 2(1) (u) of the PMLA. Proceeds of crime means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property. Existence of the proceeds of crime is a condition precedent for the applicability of Section 3 of the PMLA. If there are no proceeds of crime, the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is not made out. Hence, there is no need of the Special Court to apply its mind in accordance with Section 203 r.w 204 of the Cr.PC to find out whether a prima facie case is made out or not. (Para 4, 6 & 7) Yash Tuteja v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 310

Section 45 - The appellants have miserably failed to satisfy that there are reasonable grounds for believing that they are not guilty of the alleged offences. On the contrary, there is sufficient material collected by the respondent-ED to show that they are prima facie guilty of the alleged offences. (Para 30) Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : AIR 2024 SC 1576

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Failure to mask victim's identity in POCSO case - Sensitization of Judicial and Police Officers ordered - In this order, the court considers an application for anticipatory bail in a case under the POCSO Act. While denying bail, the court notes a violation of Section 33(7) of the POCSO Act and Section 228A of the IPC regarding the disclosure of the victim's identity. Citing the importance of safeguarding the victim's identity, the court directs the need for sensitization of judicial and police officers in West Bengal to ensure compliance with these provisions. The order emphasizes that disclosing the victim's identity is permissible only in specific circumstances for the child's best interest. The court orders a copy of the order to be forwarded to the Registrar General of the High Court of Calcutta for further action. Utpal Mandal @ Utpal Mondal v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 282

'One day trial' in POCSO case - Supreme Court affirms High Court Order for fresh trial after setting aside conviction. Bablu Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 203

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989

To punish a person for casteist insults under SC / ST Act, comments have to be made within public view. Priti Agarwalla v. State of GNCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Section 3(1)(xi) - Conviction for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act 1989 cannot be sustained if the act of outraging the modesty of a woman was not committed on the ground of caste. (Para 8 & 11) Dashrath Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 66

Section 3(2)(v) – It is nowhere the case of the prosecution that the offence committed upon the deceased was on the basis of his caste. From the admitted allegations of the prosecution, the necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are not made out. Prosecution for the offence is ex facie illegal and unwarranted. (Para 16 & 18) Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : AIR 2024 SC 1405 : (2024) 3 SCC 665 : 2024 Cri LJ 1461

Section 4 – Taking cognizance of an offence punishable for the negligence of duty by a public servant – To constitute a prima facie case of negligence of duty, the proviso to section 4(2) contemplates an administrative enquiry and recommendations. The absence of recommendation would bar taking cognizance by the Court. The proviso is an inbuilt safeguard to the public servant from initiation of prosecution by every dissatisfied complainant. Held, for taking cognizance for an offence of commission and omission under section 4(2) of the Act of 1989, the recommendation of the administrative enquiry is a sine qua non. The recommendation of administrative enquiry on alleged failure of duty or function by a public servant would make the neglect of an offence clear and the cognizance of such an offence is legal. Further held, the Magistrate did not call for an administrative enquiry report on the dereliction of duties complained against the named public servants. Taking up the merits of the negligence of duty by the public servant without the recommendation of the administrative enquiry is impermissible. Hence, no case warranting penal proceedings under section 4 has been made out and the impugned judgment, directing penal prosecution is not in conformity with the mandate of law. (Para 13. 2, 13. 3, 13.4, 14.4 & 17) State of GNCT of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar @ Prashant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 422

Section 4(1) – Ingredients for taking cognizance of an offence punishable for the negligence of duty by a public servant – The provision has the following facets: i. Firstly, section 4(1) is meant to operate against a public servant, and the threshold requirement is that the public servant shall not be a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe; ii. Secondly, such a public servant willfully neglects his duties, as mandated under the Act of 1989 and the Rules of 1995. (Para 13) State of GNCT of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar @ Prashant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 422

Section 4(2) – Duties for performance by a public servant – Section 4(2) uses the word 'include' which is a phrase of extension and not of restrictive connotations. The word 'include' is not equivalent to 'mean'. The words and phrases in sub-section (2) must be construed as comprehending not only such acts as they signify according to their natural import but also those which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. (Para 13.1 & 13.2) State of GNCT of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar @ Prashant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 422

Section 4(2) – Object of a proviso – The main function of a proviso is to put a qualification and to attach a condition to the main provision. It indicates the exceptions to the provision but may aid in explaining what is meant to be conveyed by its part. A proviso is enacted to modify the immediately preceding language. (Para 13.4) State of GNCT of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar @ Prashant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 422

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Section 2(1) (d) & 43D (2) and Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 167(2) – Power to extend remand beyond 90 days – Under section 43D power is given to 'the court' to extend and authorise detention of the accused beyond a period of 90 days. As per section 2(1) (d), 'The court' would mean jurisdiction of a normal criminal Court and also includes a Special Court constituted under Section 11 or Section 22 of the NIA Act. Hence, the Chief Judge cum City Sessions Court had the jurisdiction to pass the order of extension of detention beyond 90 days. Held, the jurisdictional Magistrate would be clothed with the jurisdiction to deal with the remand of the accused albeit for a period of 90 days only under Section 167(2) of CrPC, because for authorising remand beyond 90 days, an express order of the Sessions Court or the Special Court, as the case may be, would be required by virtue of Section 43D (2) of UAPA. Hence, order of extension of remand by Chief Metropolitan Magistrate beyond the period of 90 days, was illegal. (Para 33, 35, 36, 37) State of West Bengal v. Jayeeta Das, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : AIR 2024 SC 2161

Section 15 & 16 of the 1967 Act –Terrorist act – Section 15(1) refers to certain acts which would constitute a terrorist act. To qualify for being a terrorist act, an act must be done with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security or sovereignty of India or such act must be accompanied with an intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country. In sub-clauses (a), (b), and (c) of section 15(1), the law stipulates the manner of commission of the acts to come within the ambit of the expression “terrorist act” under the 1967 legislation. Held, prima facie commission or attempt to commit any terrorist act by the appellant not found. (Para 30) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 17 – Funding terrorist act – Held, no corroboration of the allegation that the appellant has funded any terrorist act or has received any money for that purpose. No prima facie case made out. (Para 31) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 18 – Conspiracy or attempt to commit, advocate, abet, advice, incite or facilitate commission or any terrorist act. Held, mere participation in some meetings and attempt to encourage women to join the struggle for new democratic revolution, prima facie, do not reveal the commission of an offence under Section 18 of the 1967 Act. (Para 32) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 20 & 38 – Membership of terrorist organisation – Mere meeting of accused individuals or being connected with them through any medium cannot implicate one in Chapter VI offences under of the 1967 Act, in the absence of any further evidence of being associated with a terrorist organisation. The offence under Section 20 not made out. (Para 34 & 35) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 43D (5) – Bail – Long period of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail restricting provision of Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act. Taking cognizance of the composite effect of delay in framing charge, period of detention undergone by the accused, the nature of allegations against her vis-à-vis the materials available before this Court at this stage in addition to her age and medical condition, she ought not to be denied the privilege of being enlarged on bail pending further process. (Para 36 & 41) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 43D(2)(b) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 167(2) - Default Bail - Terrorism cases should not to be taken lightly. (Para 13) State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : AIR 2024 SC 244 : (2024) 2 SCC 632

Section 43D(5) and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439 – Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act modifies the application of the general bail provisions in respect of offences punishable under Chapter IV and Chapter VI of the UAP Act. Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the 'final report' or 'Case Diary', the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied, that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence). The restrictions, on granting of bail in section 43D(5) are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The 'exercise' of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D(5) - 'shall not be released', in contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC - 'may be released', suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule. (Para 17, 18 & 20) Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : AIR 2024 SC 952

Section 43B(1) and Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002; Section 19(1) – Interpretation of the phrase 'inform him of the grounds for such arrest' – Held, the provision regarding the communication of the grounds of arrest to a person arrested contained in Section 43B(1) of the UAPA is verbatim the same as that in Section 19(1) of the PMLA – It is a statutory mandate requiring the arresting officer to inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested under Section 43B(1) of the UAPA at the earliest. Both the provisions find their source in the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is the same in both the statutes. Hence, applying the golden rules of interpretation, the provisions which lay down a very important constitutional safeguard to a person arrested on charges of committing an offence either under the PMLA or under the UAPA, have to be uniformly construed and applied. (Para 17, 18, 22 & 34) Prabir Purkayastha v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 376

Section 43D(5) – Bail order challenged – Rejection of bail on grounds that accusations against the respondents are prima facie true – The Court at the stage of considering the bail applications of the respondents-accused is merely required to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the respondents in the commission of the alleged offences. Held, there is sufficient material to believe that the accusations against the respondents-accused are prima facie true and that the mandate contained in the proviso to Section 43(D)(5) would be applicable for not releasing the respondents on bail. The Supreme Court should be slow in interfering with the order when the bail has been granted by the High Court, however if such order of granting bail is found to be illegal and perverse, it must be set aside. The High Court has committed gross error in not considering the material/evidence in its right and proper perspective that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the respondents are prima facie true. Hence, the impugned order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. (Para 16, 17, 18, 22 & 24) Union of India v. Barakathullah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 404