Supreme Court Weekly Digest With Subject /Statute Wise Index [May 11 to 20]

Citations 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 391 to 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Withdrawal of arbitrator – An Arbitrator always has the option to withdraw for any reason. Therefore, he can withdraw because of the parties' non­cooperation in the proceedings. But in such a case, his mandate will be terminated, not the arbitral proceedings. (Para 13) Dani Wooltex Corporation v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 405

Section 25 – Termination of arbitral proceedings – The learned Arbitrator is bound to terminate the proceedings on grounds of failure of the claimant to file his statement of claim in accordance with Section 23, in view of Section 25(a). If the respondent to the proceedings fails to file a statement of defence in accordance with Section 23, in the light of Section 25(b), the learned Arbitrator is bound to proceed further with the arbitral proceedings. Even if the claimant, after filing a statement of claim, fails to appear at an oral hearing or fails to produce documentary evidence, the learned Arbitrator is expected to continue the proceedings as provided in Section 25(c). Held, The fact that clause (c) of Section 25 enables the Arbitral Tribunal to proceed in the absence of the claimant shows the legislature's intention that the claimant's failure to appear after filing the claim cannot be a ground to say that the proceedings have become unnecessary or impossible. (Para 10, 12 & 15) Dani Wooltex Corporation v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 405

Section 32 – Grounds for termination of arbitral proceedings – Section 32 provides for the termination of the arbitral proceedings in the following contingencies: a. On making final arbitral award; b. On the Claimant withdrawing his claim as under Section 32(2)(a); c. Parties agreeing on termination of arbitral proceedings as under Section 32(2)(b); or d. When the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible for any other reason, as under Section 32(2)(c). Held, Section 32(2)(c) can be invoked for reasons other than those mentioned in Section 32(2)(a) & 32(2)(b). Under Section 32(2)(c), mere existence of a reason for terminating the proceedings is not sufficient and reason must be such that the continuation of the proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible. Further held, if, after filing a claim, the claimant fails to appear at an oral hearing or fails to produce documentary evidence, it cannot be said that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary and the learned Arbitrator can proceed with the arbitral proceedings. (Para 14 & 15) Dani Wooltex Corporation v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 405

Section 32(2)(c) - Termination of arbitration proceedings on grounds that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible – Abandonment by the claimant of his claim makes the arbitral proceedings unnecessary. Mere absence in proceedings or failure to participate does not, per se, amount to abandonment. Only if the established conduct of a claimant is such that it leads only to one conclusion that the claimant has given up, his/her claim can an inference of abandonment be drawn. Held, there is no material on record to conclude that claimant had abandoned its claim. The finding of the learned Arbitrator that there was abandonment of the claim is not based on any documentary or oral evidence on record. Hence, the finding is entirely illegal. (Para 16 & 20) Dani Wooltex Corporation v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 405

Section 32(2)(c) - Termination of arbitration proceedings on grounds that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible – Abandonment by the claimant of his claim makes the arbitral proceedings unnecessary. Only because a claimant, after filing his statement of claim, does not move the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for the hearing, the failure of the claimant, per se, will not amount to the abandonment of the claim. Held, the failure of the claimant to request the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for hearing, per se, is no ground to conclude that the proceedings have become unnecessary. (Para 21) Dani Wooltex Corporation v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 405

Bail

In the matters relating to liberty of a citizen every single day counts. Keeping the matter for regular bail pending for a period of almost 11 months deprives the petitioner of his valuable right of liberty. Amandeep Singh Dhall v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 399

Chartered Accountants Act, 1949

The Supreme Court upheld a rule issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) barring Chartered Accountants from accepting more than the "specified number of tax audit assignments" (at present, the upper limit is set at 60) in a financial year. The rule (para 6.0 of Chapter VI of the Council Guidelines No. 1-CA(7)/02/2008 dt. 08/08/2008 and the subsequent amendments) are not violative of the fundamental right to practise profession guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The clause will be deemed to be effective from 01.04.2024 and quashed the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the members for violation of the clause. The ICAI will be at liberty to enhance the number of audits that a CA can undertake. Shaji Paulose v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 397

Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) - Role of the ICAI - ICAI has, over time, received recognition as a premier accounting body domestically and globally for maintaining the highest standards. The ICAI has also played a significant role in ensuring the dynamism of the CA course and the credibility of the examination. We commend that the ICAI must be committed towards the convergence of accounting and ethical standards with international standards. The true test, however, lies in enforcement of these standards. (Para 48) Shaji Paulose v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 397

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Order XXXIII and Order XLIV – Suits by indigent persons and appeals by indigent persons – These provisions “exemplify the cherished principle that lack of monetary capability does not preclude a person from knocking on the doors of the Court to seek vindication of his rights.” (Para 11) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414

Order XLIV, Rule 3(2) – Inquiry as to whether applicant is an indigent person – No further inquiry would be required in respect of a person who was allowed to sue or appeal as an indigent person if they make an affidavit to the effect that they have not ceased to be an indigent unless the Government pleader objects or disputes such claim in which case an inquiry shall be held by the Appellate Court or under the orders thereof. Held, the statutory requirement under the C.P.C., was not met. Hence, the impugned order is set aside. (Para 18) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414

Order XLIV, Rule 1 – Appeal filed as an indigent person – The grounds on which the claimants application to file appeal as an indigent person was rejected, that the claimant had received compensation by way of the Award of the Tribunal, and therefore, she was not indigent is incorrect. Held, this observation cannot be accepted as the claimant had received no money at that point of time. So even though she had been awarded a sum, her indigency was not extinguished thereby. Hence, the impugned order is set aside. (Para 15) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Enhancement of sentence – Held, enhancement in sentence is not justified nearly 35 years after the incident. (Para 14) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 403

Code of Criminal Procedure SVT., 1989 – Retrospective application of Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973 – Held, CrPC, 1973 will apply to Jammu and Kashmir only with effect from 31.10.2019, the date when the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019 came into effect. CrPC, 1973 would govern the field only from the appointed day and consequently the CrPC, 1989 stands repealed. (Para 30 & 31) National Investigation Agency v. Owais Amin @ Cherry, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 389

Code of Criminal Procedure SVT., 1989; Section 196 & 196A – Under section 196, a jurisdictional court shall take cognizance only upon a complaint made by the order of, or under the authority from the Government, or a District Magistrate, or such other officer as empowered by the Government for the aforesaid purpose. The compliance under section 196 mandatory, failing which a Court cannot take cognizance. Section 196A only deals with specified classes of criminal conspiracy. Section 196-A(1) speaks of the object of the conspiracy qua an illegal act other than an offence, a legal act by illegal means, or an offence to which Section 196 applies. For taking cognizance of such an offence, a complaint can only be made either by an order of the Government, or under its authority, or by an officer empowered by it. In the case of Section 196-A, cognizance of a complaint can be taken by a Court only after satisfying itself of the due compliance of Section 196-A(1) with respect to competence of the authority. Though Sections 196 and 196-A seem to be similar insofar as the authority competent to convey a complaint is concerned, under Section 196 a District Magistrate can lodge it by himself, whereas, the same provision is not available under Section 196-A. Hence, Section 196-A of CrPC, 1989 is pari materia to Section 196A. Held, the appellant may comply with the mandate of Section 196-A by seeking appropriate authorization or empowerment as the case may be. If such a compliance is duly made, then the Trial Court shall undertake the exercise of taking cognizance, and proceed further with the trial in accordance with law. (Para 15, 16 & 17) National Investigation Agency v. Owais Amin @ Cherry, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 389

Section 156(3) – Magistrate empowered to order investigation – Held, the Trial Court after having been prima facie satisfied, had exercised its judicial discretion directing investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC Further held, such order being just, legal and proper, the High Court should not have interfered with the same, more particularly while exercising limited powers under Section 482 of CrPC. (Para 10) Sas Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 412

Section 156(3) & 190 – Magistrate power to take cognizance – When the Magistrate in exercise of his judicial discretion directs investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. It is only when the Magistrate after applying his mind prefers to follow the procedure under Chapter XV of CrPC by resorting to Section 200, he can be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. (Para 8) Sas Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 412

Section 313 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872– Admissibility of statement of accused under Section 313(1) as evidence – Section 313(4) of the Cr.PC provides that the answers given by the accused in his examination under Section 313(1) of the Cr.PC may be taken into consideration in the trial. But the conviction cannot be based solely on the statements made by an accused under Section 313(1) but in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution. (Para 6) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 403

Section 313 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Cross-examination of the prosecutrix – The case of accused made out in statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC was that they was in a physical relationship with the victim and were paying money to the victim for maintaining a sexual relationship was not put to the prosecutrix in cross-examination. Held, while appreciating the evidence adduced by the prosecution, answers given by the accused in the examination under Section 313(1), that they maintained a physical relationship with the prosecutrix by paying her money can be considered. In the cross-examination, the case put to the prosecutrix was that she had voluntarily accompanied the accused and there was no suggestion given by the accused that the sexual intercourse with the consent of the prosecutrix. Further held, the evidence of the prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief that the accused committed sexual intercourse with her has not been shaken. Conviction granted by the High Court is upheld. (Para 10 & 12) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 403

Section 439 – Considerations for setting aside Bail order – Considerations include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. (Para 28) Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 392

Section 439 – Parameters for granting Bail – The parameters are: nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. Further, at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused, ought to be avoided. Suffice it is to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused. (Para 26 & 28) Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 392

Section 439 (1) – Power of cancellation of Bail – It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. Held, the respondents do not deserve the concession of bail. Hence, the bail orders are quashed and set aside. (Para 27 & 35) Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 392

Constitution of India

Article 142 and Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 354D & 506 – Power of court exercised to quash conviction of accused – Held, the offences under Section 354D IPC and Section 506 IPC are personal to the complainant and the accused, and the fact that the appellant and the complainant have married each other during the pendency of the appeal gives rise to a reasonable belief that both were involved in some kind of relationship even when the offences alleged were said to have been committed. Hence, on grounds that the accused and the complainant married each other and the affirmation of the conviction of accused would have the disastrous consequence on the matrimonial relationship of the accused with the complainant, the appellant is acquitted of the charges. (Para 7, 9 & 11) Dasari Srikanth v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 391

Corruption

The contention that the commitments by a political party in its manifesto, which eventually lead to direct or indirect financial help to the public at large, will also amount to corrupt practice by a candidate of that party, is too far-fetched and cannot be accepted. Shashanka J. Sreedhara v. B.Z. Zameer Ahmed Khan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 410

Electricity

Electricity Act, 2003; Section 14(b) and Electricity Licence (Additional Requirements of Capital Adequacy, Creditworthiness and Code of Conduct) Rules, 2005; Rule 3 and Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution Licence) Regulations, 2013; Regulation 12 – Whether a deemed distribution licensee is conditional upon the appellant satisfying the requirements of section 14 of the Electricity Act which provides for compliance with additional requirements like capital adequacy? – Held, application of Regulation 12 does not extend to applicants who are otherwise deemed licensees. The interpretation of regulation 12 as requiring additional capital infusion for an applicant for acceptance of a deemed licensee status appears to be at odds with the language and intent of the 2013 Regulations. Hence, Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission (TSERC) in interpreting regulation 12 that it applies to a person who is a deemed licensee, has aimed to achieve indirectly what it could not directly. Regulation 12 does not apply to a deemed licensee because the primary legislation, the Electricity Act, under section 14(b), confers deemed licensee status upon Special Economic Zone (SEZ) developers without imposing any specific conditions and the 2013 Regulations make a clear distinction between an applicant seeking a licence [as defined under regulation 2(d)] and a deemed distribution licensee seeking recognition as such [as defined under regulation 2(h)]. Regulation 12 pertains solely to regular distribution licensees as defined under regulation 2(h), not to deemed licensees. Therefore, the recognition of the status of a deemed distribution licensee cannot hinge on compliance with rule 3(2) of the 2005 Rules read with regulation 12 of the 2013 Regulations. (Para 26, 29 & 34) Sundew Properties Ltd. v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 393

Electricity Act, 2003; Section 181 – Power on the State Commissions to make Regulations – Such regulations must be consistent with the provisions of the primary enactment and the rules framed thereunder generally. (Para 33) Sundew Properties Ltd. v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 393

Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution Licence) Regulations, 2013 (Andhra Pradesh); Regulation 49 – Regulation 49, situated within Chapter-4 [General Conditions of Distribution Licence] of the 2013 Regulations, specifies that “these general conditions shall apply to distribution licensees and to all deemed distribution licensees”. A straightforward reading reveals that the term 'general conditions' in regulation 49 pertains exclusively to the general conditions outlined in Chapter-4. Held, TSERC's reliance on regulation 49 to enforce the applicability of regulation 12 appears to be flawed and by no stretch of imagination could the scope of this provision be widened so as to include within its ambit regulation 12, which forms part of Chapter-3 [Procedure for Grant of Distribution Licence] of the 2013 Regulations. (Para 36) Sundew Properties Ltd. v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 393

Eviction

While upholding the demolition drive of the Lucknow Development Authority (LDA) against unauthorized constructions in the Akbarnagar area of Lucknow city, the Supreme Court clarified that no slum dweller should be evicted without being given alternative accommodation. Shakeel Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 398

Evidence

Credibility of Evidence – Held, the surveyor's report is a credible evidence and the court may rely on it until a more reliable evidence is brought on record. (Para 23) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 409

Evidence Act, 1872

Section 32(1) – Dying Declaration – Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. Once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration. However, before accepting such a dying declaration, court must be satisfied that it was rendered voluntarily, it is consistent and credible and that it is devoid of any tutoring. Held, the contents of the dying declaration have been proved by prosecution witnesses. Certain inconsistencies in evidence of witness may take place due to the time gap of 5 years from the date of incident to the date of evidence given. Further held, though there are inconsistencies and improvements in the version of the prosecution witnesses, there is however convergence with the core of the narration of the deceased made in the dying declaration and the medical history recorded by the doctor. Hence, dying declaration is accepted as a valid piece of evidence and it clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. (Para 24, 25 & 35) Rajendra Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 406

Industrial Establishment

Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 (Tamil Nadu); Section 3 – Workmen eligible for permanent status under Section 3 of the Act – Applicability of the Act – Held, both requirements, of the establishment being covered under the definition of industrial establishment as provided and that of the employee having uninterruptedly continued in service for 480 days or more for 24 months, having been met. Held, the Act would apply to the parties to dispute. Further held, there is no reason to disturb the finding of the Inspector of Labour which concluded that the members of the respondent-Union be given permanent employment. When an issue stands already decided then putting those who enjoy an order in their favour, once more of having to re-establish their claim, would be unjustified. Hence, the order of Inspector of Labour be complied with. (Para 27 & 28) Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Ltd. v. Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Employees Welfare Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 402

Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 (Tamil Nadu); Section 7 – Applicability of Act – Exemption of establishments and their workmen engaged exclusively in the construction of buildings and the like or other construction work be it structural, mechanical, or electrical. Held, the construction to be undertaken by the Corporation, is only one of the many activities to be undertaken by it. Hence, it would not allow the Corporation to wash its hands off the responsibilities or obligations under the Act. (Para 23 & 24) Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Ltd. v. Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Employees Welfare Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 402

Insurance Contract

Contract of Indemnity – Insurance contract – Insurance is a contract of indemnification, being a contract for a specific purpose, which is to cover defined losses. Essentially, the insurer cannot be asked to cover a loss that is not mentioned. (Para 16) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 409

Insurance contract – Exclusion clause of Insurance contract – Exclusion clauses in insurance contracts are interpreted strictly and against the insurer as they have the effect of completely exempting the insurer of its liabilities. Such a clause cannot be interpreted so that it conflicts with the main intention of the insurance. (Para 17) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 409

Insurance contract – Burden of proof for an exclusionary – The burden of proving the applicability of an exclusionary clause lies on the insurer. It is the duty of the insurer to plead and lead cogent evidence to establish the application of such a clause. The evidence must unequivocally establish that the event sought to be excluded is specifically covered by the exclusionary clause. (Para 17) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 409

Interpretation of Statutes

Concept of reading up and reading down – Held, if a law is unclear about whether it applies to certain types of businesses, a court may choose to read down the statute to only include those businesses explicitly mentioned in the text. On the other hand, reading up involves interpreting a statute broadly, extending its scope or application beyond what is expressly stated in the text. Reading up is a concept that is invoked with great caution within our legal framework because it can lead to judicial activism or judicial overreach, where courts expand the reach of laws beyond what the legislature intended. The practice of reading up a provision can only be justified when it aligns with legislative intent, maintains the fundamental character of the law, and ensures that the resulting interpretation remains consistent with the original context to which the law applies. This holds especially true for subordinate legislation, which require greater scrutiny in this regard. Reading up a provision of subordinate legislation in a manner that it militates against the primary legislation is not permissible. (Para 30 & 32) Sundew Properties Ltd. v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 393

Limitation

Plea of limitation – Held, even if the plea of limitation is not set up as a defence, the Court has to dismiss the suit if it is barred by limitation. (Para 16) Shivraj Reddy v. S. Raghuraj Reddy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 411

Suit of specific performance preferred on the last date of limitation – Every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring time limits stipulated in the agreement. The courts will also frown upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. Held, the suit having been preferred after a long delay, the plaintiff is not entitled for specific performance. (Para 16 & 18) Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 407

The period of limitation for filing a suit for rendition of account is three years from the date of dissolution. Held, the firm dissolved in year 1984 by virtue of death of the partner and the suit came to be filed in the year 1996 which was not within a period of three years hence, time-barred, Further held, the learned Single Judge was justified in rejecting the suit on grounds of being barred by limitation. (Para 20) Shivraj Reddy v. S. Raghuraj Reddy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 411

Motor Vehicle Act, 1988

Section 173 – Appeal – A person dissatisfied with the amount of compensation received can file an appeal. (Para 12) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414

Muslim Law

Can muslim women claim equality in succession ? Can Will be executed for the entire property as per Mohammedan law? Supreme Court to decide. Tarsem v. Dharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 396

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985

Section 63 – Order of confiscation and auction of article is challenged – The court cannot order confiscation of an article until the expiry of one month from the date of seizure or without hearing any person who may claim any right thereto. Held, the appellant is the registered owner of the article and has a right to be heard by the court before the final order of confiscation is passed and the seized vehicle is put to auction. Hence, the order passed by the trial court to the extent it orders confiscation and auction of the dumper is set aside. (Para 13, 14 & 15) Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 395

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 138 – Maintainability of suit – Criminal law can be set in motion by anyone, even by a stranger or legal heir. A complaint under Section 138, preferred by the Power of Attorney Holder is held maintainable and also that such Power of Attorney Holder can depose as complainant. (Para 11) Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 407

Partnership Act, 1932

Section 42(c) – Dissolution of partnership on death of partner – Partnership would stand dissolved automatically on the death of the partner unless and until there was a contract between the remaining partners of the firm to the contrary. Held, there is no such averment by the respondents. Hence, the business activities even if carried on by the remaining partners of the firm, would be deemed to be carried in their individual capacity. (Para 17, 19) S. Shivraj Reddy v. S. Raghuraj Reddy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 411

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

In the facts of this case, the appellant will complete 3½ years of incarceration on 26th May, 2024. Thus, he will complete half of the prescribed sentence. In this case, obviously the trial has not started, as the charge has not been framed. This Court has held that Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "CRPC") will apply even to a case under the PMLA. But the Court can still deny the relief owing to the ground such as where the trial was delayed at the instance of the accused. As stated earlier, here there is no occasion for the appellant to cause the delay in trial, as even charge has not been framed. Moreover, there is no other circumstance brought on record which will compel us to deny the benefit of Section 436A of the CRPC to the appellant. Ajay Ajit Peter Kerkar v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 400

Property Law

Mesne profits become payable on continuation of possession after 'expiry' of lease – A tenant who once entered the property in question lawfully, continues in possession after his right to do so stands extinguished, is liable to compensate the landlord for such time period after the right of occupancy expires. The effect of the words 'determination', 'expiry', 'forfeiture' and 'termination' would, subject to the facts applicable, be similar, i.e., when any of these three words are applied to a lease, the rights of the lessee/tenant stand extinguished and mesne profit would be payable. Held, the very purpose for which a property is rented out, is to ensure that the landlord by way of the property is able to secure some income. If the income remains static over a long period of time, then such a landlord would be within his rights, subject of course, to the agreement with their tenant, to be aggrieved by the same. Hence, deposit of the amount claimed by the petitioner-applicant is must to ensure complete justice inter se the parties. (Para 19, 20 & 21) Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar Huf v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 413

Tenant at sufferance – Such a tenant is a person who enters upon a land by lawful title, but continues in possession after the title has ended without statutory authority and without obtaining consent of the person then entitled. (Para 16.2) Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar Huf v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 413

Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

To punish a person for casteist insults under SC / ST Act, comments have to be made within public view. Priti Agarwalla v. State of GNCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Shops and Establishments

Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 (Tamil Nadu); Section 2(3) & 2(6) – Industrial establishment – For an establishment to be covered under the definition of establishment under the 1947 Act, unless it is one of those specifically mentioned, it must satisfy being a commercial establishment. For any establishment to be commercial, it has to be established that the activities undertaken by it are for making some monetary gain. (Para 19 & 21) Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Ltd. v. Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Employees Welfare Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 402

Special Economic Zones Act, 2005

Section 49(1)(b) and Electricity Act, 2003; Section 14(b) – Deemed to be a distribution licensee – The Ministry of Commerce & Industry (MoCI), vide the 2010 Notification has specified that the 'developer' of the SEZ shall be deemed to be a 'distribution licensee' under the provisions of the Electricity Act. The proviso inserted vide the 2010 Notification, in section 14(b) of the Electricity Act, Provided that the Developer of a SEZ shall be deemed to be a licensee with effect from the date of notification of such SPZ – Held, the proviso to section 14(b) of the Electricity Act is to confer upon an entity like the appellant a status which is otherwise available in accordance with the Electricity Act. With this inclusion it is evident that a SEZ developer is deemed to be a distribution licensee. Once the appellant is a (deemed) distribution licensee, certain benefits and/or privileges do enure in its favour. Accordingly, if CSS is payable by a distribution licensee, the deemed distribution licensee is equally liable to pay the same. (Para 13 & 14, 20) Sundew Properties Ltd. v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 393

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 12 – Admissibility of deposition of a Power of Attorney Holder – Power of Attorney Holder cannot depose for principal in respect of matters of which only principal can have personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is liable to be cross-examined – It is necessary for the plaintiff to step into the witness box and depose the said fact and subject himself to cross-examination on that issue. Held, the plaintiff/appellant has failed to enter into the witness box and subject himself to cross-examination, he has not been able to prove the prerequisites of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. (Para 9, 12 & 13) Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 407

Stay

Can there be a blanket stay on money decree? Shekhawati Art and Exports v. United India Insurance Company Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 408

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1957

This Court has often interpreted the counter terrorism enactments to strike a balance between the civil liberties of the accused, human rights of the victims and compelling interest of the state. It cannot be denied that National security is always of paramount importance and any act in aid to any terrorist act – violent or non-violent is liable to be restricted. The UAPA is one of such Acts which has been enacted to provide for effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations, and to deal with terrorist activities, as also to impose reasonable restrictions on the civil liberties of the persons in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India. (Para 23) Union of India v. Barakathullah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 404

Virtual Hearing

Litigants should be allowed to appear virtually if the court thinks their presence is required. Basudha Chakraborty v. Neeta Chakraborty, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 401