Supreme Court Annual Digest 2024: Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the summons issued to the respondent merely on the premise that the respondent was discharged in the predicate offence. The permissibility of continuing proceedings under the PMLA, despite the discharge in the predicate offence. Held, the issuance of summons cannot be quashed solely because the respondent has been discharged in the predicate offence. The question of whether the respondent can be arrayed as an accused in the PMLA proceedings is to be addressed at a subsequent stage. The respondent retains the right to challenge his potential arraignment as an accused under the PMLA by raising all relevant contentions, including reliance on the quashing of the predicate offence. The Court clarified that the present matter pertains only to the issuance of summons and does not preclude the respondent from raising objections during later stages of the proceedings. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and allowed the appellant to proceed pursuant to the summons. The respondent, however, was directed not to be arrested, provided he continues to cooperate with the investigation. Director, Enforcement Directorate v. Vilelie Khamo, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1045

Whether the observations made by the Special Court regarding the conduct of the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and its Public Prosecutors require clarification - Held, Public Prosecutors must act fairly and in accordance with binding precedents but may oppose bail petitions if the ED is not at fault for trial delays. The ED or its Director cannot dictate the conduct of Public Prosecutors beyond providing case-specific facts. The Special Court's observations (Paragraph 7.20 of its order) were clarified to ensure Public Prosecutors retain independence in their duties as officers of the court. Masih Zeeshan Haider v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 992

Propriety of granting bail under PMLA - Consideration of prolonged pre-trial detention and its impact on personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Assessment of the risk of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses - The appellant, a Member of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly and former State Education Minister, was implicated in a recruitment scam involving corruption and money laundering. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED) initiated investigations based on allegations of corrupt practices in the recruitment of teachers and staff, leading to the arrest of the appellant. Substantial cash and incriminating documents were recovered from the appellant's associate's premises. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the appellant's prolonged incarceration and health issues, balanced these considerations against the gravity of the allegations and the risk of evidence tampering. The Court directed that the trial court expedite proceedings, particularly the examination of key witnesses. The appellant be released on bail subject to conditions ensuring cooperation and non-interference with the trial process. The appellant shall not hold any public office during the pendency of the trial. This judgment emphasizes the principle of personal liberty under Article 21, while also underscoring the importance of preventing interference in judicial processes in cases involving serious allegations of corruption and money laundering. Partha Chatterjee v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 987

Section 65 makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to all proceedings under the PMLA, provided the same are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in the PMLA. The words 'All other proceedings' include a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA. Held, considering the object of Section 197(1) of the CrPC, its applicability cannot be excluded unless there is any provision in the PMLA which is inconsistent with Section 197(1). Therefore, the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC are applicable to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA. Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 940

Section 71 - Overriding Effect - While Section 71 of the PMLA provides overriding authority, it does not negate the procedural requirements of prior sanction for prosecution under CrPC when acts are integrally connected to official duties. Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 940

Undertrial Prisoners - The Court applied the provisions of Section 479(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), in conjunction with Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, regarding the detention of undertrial prisoners. The Court observed that the appellant had not been convicted for any offense in the past and had undergone detention for a period exceeding one-third of the maximum imprisonment for the alleged offense under the Customs Act, 1862. The Court held that the first proviso to Section 479(1) of the BNSS applied, entitling the appellant to be released on bail. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was directed to be produced before the Special Court within one week for bail. The Special Court was instructed to release the appellant on appropriate terms, ensuring cooperation with the courts for the early disposal of the case, including both the scheduled offense and the offense under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act (PMLA). Badshah Majid Malik v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 835

Section 4 - Bail – Scheduled Offence – Prolonged Incarceration - The appellants had been in custody for 2 years and 1 year 9 months, respectively. Initially, an FIR under various sections of the IPC was registered, but no scheduled offence under PMLA was present at the time of filing the charge-sheet. Subsequently, Section 384 IPC was added, but its validity as a scheduled offence was in question. Whether the appellants were entitled to bail under Section 4 of the PMLA Act, considering the absence of a valid scheduled offence at the time of filing the PMLA complaint and the prolonged incarceration. Held, the Supreme Court granted bail to the appellants, observing that at the time of filing the PMLA complaint, there was no scheduled offence under the Act. The addition of Section 384 IPC later did not retrospectively validate the absence of a scheduled offence at the relevant time. Continued incarceration of the appellants violated their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Laxmikant Tiwari v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 787

Higher thresholds for granting bail in stringent penal statutes like the PMLA, UAPA, and NDPS Act cannot be a tool to keep an accused incarcerated without trial. V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 750 : AIR 2024 SC 4760

Provisions of PMLA will prevail over Cr.P.C. in relation to the summoning of a person. Abhishek Banerjee v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : AIR 2024 SC 439 : 2024 Cri LJ 4193 : (2024) 9 SCC 22

Section 50 - Overriding Effect over Cr.P.C. – Summons to Witnesses and Accused Persons – Validity and Compliance - The provisions of the PMLA override those of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), as explicitly provided under Sections 65 and 71 of the PMLA. The PMLA constitutes a self-contained code governing all matters related to the prevention of money laundering, including attachment, confiscation of proceeds of crime, and inquiry/investigation leading to prosecution. Section 50 of the PMLA empowers the designated authorities to summon any person for evidence or production of documents during the inquiry process, which is deemed a judicial proceeding under Section 50(4) of the Act. The inquiry conducted under Section 50 is distinct from a criminal investigation under Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C., and the safeguards applicable under Section 160/161 Cr.P.C. do not extend to such proceedings. Consequently, Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects against self-incrimination, is not attracted at the stage of issuing summons unless the person is formally arrested. The statements recorded under Section 50 are admissible evidence, unlike statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., which are limited in evidentiary value. The procedural safeguards under the PMLA, including the issuance of summons in the prescribed format as per Rule 11 of the 2005 Rules, are sufficient and enforceable. In the instant case, summons issued by the Directorate of Enforcement were held valid, and the appellants' failure to comply with the summons led to proceedings under Section 63 PMLA read with Section 174 IPC. The Court rejected the appellants' challenges, emphasizing the overriding nature of PMLA and the validity of Section 50 proceedings. Appeals dismissed; summons under Section 50 PMLA upheld. Abhishek Banerjee v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : AIR 2024 SC 439 : 2024 Cri LJ 4193 : (2024) 9 SCC 22

Section 197(1) of CrPC, which provides that prior sanction from the government is required to prosecute public servants and judges for offences alleged while discharge of public duties, will apply to cases under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 670

Here the accused is lodged in jail for a considerable period and there is little possibility of trial reaching finality in the near future. The liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution does not get abrogated even for special statutes where the threshold twin bar is provided and such statutes, in our opinion, cannot carve out an exception to the principle of bail being the rule and jail being the exception. The cardinal principle of bail being the rule and jail being the exception will be entirely defeated if the petitioner is kept in custody as an under-trial for such a long duration. This is particularly glaring since in the event of conviction, the maximum sentence prescribed is only 7 years for the offence of money laundering. (Para 12) Vijay Nair v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 644

Section 45 - Scope of Inquiry - In assessing bail applications under Section 45 of the PMLA, the Court need not delve deeply into the merits of the case. The inquiry is limited to determining whether there are "reasonable grounds for believing" that the accused is guilty, based on the material collected during the investigation. This does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt, but rather an assessment of the broad probabilities of the case. Thus, Section 45 requires the Court to assess the genuineness of the case against the accused, but not to conclusively determine guilt at this stage. (Para 13) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286 : 2024 Cri LJ 4018 : (2024) 9 SCC 787

Section 50 - When an accused is in custody under PMLA irrespective of the case for which he is under custody, any statement under Section 50 PMLA to the same Investigating Agency is inadmissible against the maker. The reason being that the person in custody pursuant to the proceeding investigated by the same Investigating Agency is not a person who can be considered as one operating with a free mind. It will be extremely unsafe to render such statements admissible against the maker, as such a course of action would be contrary to all canons of fair play and justice. (Para 32) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286 : 2024 Cri LJ 4018 : (2024) 9 SCC 787

Section 50 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 30 - Enforcement Directorate cannot start with a statement of a co-accused to implicate the accused. An incriminating statement of a co-accused would not amount to substantive evidence. (Para 37) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286 : 2024 Cri LJ 4018 : (2024) 9 SCC 787

Section 24 - Foundational Facts and Legal Presumption of involvement in money laundering - Held, this presumption only arises once three basic facts are established by the prosecution: (i) the commission of a scheduled offence, (ii) the property in question being derived from the criminal activity, and (iii) the involvement of the accused in any process or activity related to the proceeds of crime. Once these foundational facts are established, a legal presumption arises that the proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering. However, the presumption is rebuttable, and the accused has the opportunity to disprove their involvement by presenting evidence within their personal knowledge. This presumption is not conclusive, and the accused must be given a fair opportunity to rebut it through cross-examination, presenting evidence, or under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provision, therefore, balances the burden of proof between the prosecution and the accused, ensuring that the presumption under Section 24(a) of the PMLA is neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional. (Para 14) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286 : 2024 Cri LJ 4018 : (2024) 9 SCC 787

Section 24 - Significance of the Counter to Bail Application under PMLA - The counter must establish a cogent case by demonstrating the three foundational facts required under Section 24 of the Act: (i) the commission of a scheduled offence, (ii) the derivation of proceeds of crime from that offence, and (iii) the accused's involvement in any process or activity related to those proceeds. Only after these foundational facts are prima facie established does the presumption under Section 24 arise, shifting the burden to the accused to rebut the same. The counter affidavit must crystallize the material relied upon, thereby assisting the court in making an informed decision at the bail stage under Section 45 of PMLA. It enables the court to assess whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty, aligning with the framework laid down in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 633. (Para 15) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286 : 2024 Cri LJ 4018 : (2024) 9 SCC 787

Section 45 – Bail - Interpretation and Application - Court must balance the statutory twin conditions required for bail with the fundamental principle that "bail is the rule and jail is the exception." Even in cases under PMLA, the overarching principle of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution prevails, ensuring that statutory conditions for bail should not override constitutional safeguards. Thus, courts should be guided by the higher constitutional mandate of speedy trial and personal liberty, especially where prolonged incarceration occurs without the conclusion of trial. (Para 11) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286 : 2024 Cri LJ 4018 : (2024) 9 SCC 787

Section 45 (1) - Proviso to Section 45(1) of PMLA extends special treatment to women, regardless of their social status or qualifications. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : AIR 2024 SC 4247

Section 45 (1) - Refusal to grant bail - The appellant, a political figure, sought bail after being charged with offenses related to money laundering. The appellant contended that since the investigation was complete and the charge sheet had been filed, her continued custody was unnecessary. Additionally, it was argued that the appellant, being a woman, was entitled to special treatment under the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA, as affirmed in Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563. Held, detailed discussions on the merits of the case should be avoided at the bail stage to prevent prejudice during trial. The Court rejected the High Court's reasoning, which had denied the benefit of the proviso to Section 45(1) based on the appellant's educational qualifications and social standing, finding that the lower court misinterpreted the provision as applicable only to "vulnerable women." The Supreme Court reiterated that the statutory provision mandates special treatment for women, and such benefit should not be denied unless specific reasons are provided. The Court set aside the High Court's order, granted bail to the appellant, and imposed conditions to prevent tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : AIR 2024 SC 4247

Continued custody is unnecessary once investigation and charge sheet are complete. Bail granted under the principle that prolonged pre-trial incarceration should not amount to punishment without trial. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : AIR 2024 SC 4247

No assertion in ED complaint that scheduled offences generated proceeds of crime - grants bail. Bhagwan Bhagat v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 576

In order to avail the right to fair trial, the accused cannot be denied the right to have inspection of the documents including the “un-relied upon documents. Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : AIR 2024 SC 4053

Section 45 – Bail - In cases where there has been a delay in trial and the accused has spent a long period in custody, right to bail shall be read into Section 439 Cr.P.C. and Section 45 PMLA. The same will however depend on the nature of allegations, as well. Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : AIR 2024 SC 4053

ED can't arrest after court takes cognizance' : Supreme Court grants anticipatory bail to Odisha officer in money laundering case. Bijay Ketan Sahoo v. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 532

Supreme Court relaxes Section 45 PMLA conditions, grants bail citing long custody and time needed to complete trial. Ramkripal Meena v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 527

The Supreme Court grants bail to money laundering accused considering age and custody period. Humayun Suleman Merchant v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 521

Section 45 gives primacy to the opinion of the Directorate of Enforcement (DoE) when it comes to grant of bail. DoE should act uniformly, consistent in conduct, confirming one rule for all. (Para 79) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

Arvind Kejriwal is an elected leader and the Chief Minister of Delhi, a post holding importance and influence. We have also referred to the allegations. While we do not give any direction, since we are doubtful whether the court can direct an elected leader to step down or not function as the Chief Minister or as a Minister, we leave it to Arvind Kejriwal to take a call. Larger Bench, if deemed appropriate, can frame question(s) and decide the conditions that can be imposed by the court in such cases. (Para 86) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

Section 19 - Power to arrest under Section 19(1) is not for the purpose of investigation. Arrest can and should wait, and the power in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act can be exercised only when the material with the designated officer enables them to form an opinion, by recording reasons in writing that the arrestee is guilty. (Para 41) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

Section 19 - (a) Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” is a separate ground to challenge the order of arrest passed in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act? (b) Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” refers to the satisfaction of formal parameters to arrest and take a person into custody, or it relates to other personal grounds and reasons regarding necessity to arrest a person in the facts and circumstances of the said case? (c) If questions (a) and (b) are answered in the affirmative, what are the parameters and facts that are to be taken into consideration by the court while examining the question of “need and necessity to arrest”? Questions referred to the larger bench. (Para 84) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

In the facts of this case, the appellant will complete 3½ years of incarceration on 26th May, 2024. Thus, he will complete half of the prescribed sentence. In this case, obviously the trial has not started, as the charge has not been framed. This Court has held that Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "CRPC") will apply even to a case under the PMLA. But the Court can still deny the relief owing to the ground such as where the trial was delayed at the instance of the accused. As stated earlier, here there is no occasion for the appellant to cause the delay in trial, as even charge has not been framed. Moreover, there is no other circumstance brought on record which will compel us to deny the benefit of Section 436A of the CRPC to the appellant. Ajay Ajit Peter Kerkar v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 400

Once a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA is filed, it will be governed by Sections 200 to 205 of the CrPC as none of the said provisions are inconsistent with any of the provisions of the PMLA. (Para 23 (a)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512 : (2024) 7 SCC 61 : 2024 Cri LJ 2705

If the accused was not arrested by the ED till filing of the complaint, while taking cognizance on a complaint under Section 44(1)(b), as a normal rule, the Court should issue a summons to the accused and not a warrant. Even in a case where the accused is on bail, a summons must be issued. (Para 23 (b)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512 : (2024) 7 SCC 61 : 2024 Cri LJ 2705

After a summons is issued under Section 204 of the CrPC on taking cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA on a complaint, if the accused appears before the Special Court pursuant to the summons, he shall not be treated as if he is in custody. Therefore, it is not necessary for him to apply for bail. However, the Special Court can direct the accused to furnish bond in terms of Section 88 of the CrPC. (Para 23 (c)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512 : (2024) 7 SCC 61 : 2024 Cri LJ 2705

In a case where the accused appears pursuant to a summons before the Special Court, on a sufficient cause being shown, the Special Court can grant exemption from personal appearance to the accused by exercising power under Section 205 of the CrPC. (Para 23 (d)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512 : (2024) 7 SCC 61 : 2024 Cri LJ 2705

If the accused does not appear after a summons is served or does not appear on a subsequent date, the Special Court will be well within its powers to issue a warrant in terms of Section 70 of the CrPC. Initially, the Special Court should issue a bailable warrant. If it is not possible to effect service of the bailable warrant, then the recourse can be taken to issue a nonbailable warrant. (Para 23 (e)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512 : (2024) 7 SCC 61 : 2024 Cri LJ 2705

A bond furnished according to Section 88 is only an undertaking by an accused who is not in custody to appear before the Court on the date fixed. Thus, an order accepting bonds under Section 88 from the accused does not amount to a grant of bail;. (Para 23 (f), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512 : (2024) 7 SCC 61 : 2024 Cri LJ 2705

In a case where the accused has furnished bonds under Section 88 of the CrPC, if he fails to appear on subsequent dates, the Special Court has the powers under Section 89 read with Sections 70 of the CrPC to issue a warrant directing that the accused shall be arrested and produced before the Special Court; If such a warrant is issued, it will always be open for the accused to apply for cancellation of the warrant by giving an undertaking to the Special Court to appear before the said Court on all the dates fixed by it. While cancelling the warrant, the Court can always take an undertaking from the accused to appear before the Court on every date unless appearance is specifically exempted. When the ED has not taken the custody of the accused during the investigation, usually, the Special Court will exercise the power of cancellation of the warrant without insisting on taking the accused in custody provided an undertaking is furnished by the accused to appear regularly before the Court. When the Special Court deals with an application for cancellation of a warrant, the Special Court is not dealing with an application for bail. Hence, Section 45(1) will have no application to such an application. (Para 23 (g). Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512 : (2024) 7 SCC 61 : 2024 Cri LJ 2705

When an accused appears pursuant to a summons, the Special Court is empowered to take bonds under Section 88 of the CrPC in a given case. However, it is not mandatory in every case to direct furnishing of bonds. However, if a warrant of arrest has been issued on account of nonappearance or proceedings under Section 82 and/or Section 83 of the CrPC have been issued against an accused, he cannot be let off by taking a bond under Section 88 of the CrPC, and the accused will have to apply for cancellation of the warrant. (Para 23 (h), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512 : (2024) 7 SCC 61 : 2024 Cri LJ 2705

After cognizance is taken of the offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA based on a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b), the ED and its officers are powerless to exercise power under Section 19 to arrest a person shown as an accused in the complaint. (Para 23 (i), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512 : (2024) 7 SCC 61 : 2024 Cri LJ 2705

If the ED wants custody of the accused who appears after service of summons for conducting further investigation in the same offence, the ED will have to seek custody of the accused by applying to the Special Court. After hearing the accused, the Special Court must pass an order on the application by recording brief reasons. While hearing such an application, the Court may permit custody only if it is satisfied that custodial interrogation at that stage is required, even though the accused was never arrested under Section 19. However, when the ED wants to conduct a further investigation concerning the same offence, it may arrest a person not shown as an accused in the complaint already filed under Section 44(1)(b), provided the requirements of Section 19 are fulfilled. (Para 23 (j), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512 : (2024) 7 SCC 61 : 2024 Cri LJ 2705

Section 19(1) – Interpretation of the phrase 'inform him of the grounds for such arrest' – Held, the provision regarding the communication of the grounds of arrest to a person arrested contained in Section 43B(1) of the UAPA is verbatim the same as that in Section 19(1) of the PMLA – It is a statutory mandate requiring the arresting officer to inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested under Section 43B(1) of the UAPA at the earliest. Both the provisions find their source in the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is the same in both the statutes. Hence, applying the golden rules of interpretation, the provisions which lay down a very important constitutional safeguard to a person arrested on charges of committing an offence either under the PMLA or under the UAPA, have to be uniformly construed and applied. (Para 17, 18, 22 & 34) Prabir Purkayastha v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : AIR 2024 SC 2967 : 2024 Cri LJ 2450 : (2024) 8 SCC 254

Section 2(1) (y), 2(1) (u) & 3 and Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 203 & 204 – Schedule offence – In absence of scheduled offence, there cannot be any proceeds of crime within the meaning Section 2(1) (u) of the PMLA. Proceeds of crime means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property. Existence of the proceeds of crime is a condition precedent for the applicability of Section 3 of the PMLA. If there are no proceeds of crime, the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is not made out. Hence, there is no need of the Special Court to apply its mind in accordance with Section 203 r.w 204 of the Cr.PC to find out whether a prima facie case is made out or not. (Para 4, 6 & 7) Yash Tuteja v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 310 : (2024) 8 SCC 465

Section 45 - The appellants have miserably failed to satisfy that there are reasonable grounds for believing that they are not guilty of the alleged offences. On the contrary, there is sufficient material collected by the respondent-ED to show that they are prima facie guilty of the alleged offences. (Para 30) Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : AIR 2024 SC 1576 : (2024) 6 SCC 715

Once cognizance of a complaint filed under Section 44 is taken by the Special Court under the PMLA Act, the power to arrest vesting under Section 19 of the PMLA Act cannot be exercised. Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 191: AIR 2024 SC 2512

A very strange and unusual Writ Petitions have been filed by the State against the Directorate of Enforcement under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, before the High Court seeking relief, which would indirectly stall or delay the inquiry/investigation. The Writ Petitions filed, at the instance of the State Government, challenging summons issued to the District Collectors prima facie appears to be thoroughly misconceived, and the impugned order passed by the High Court also being under utter misconception of law. Directorate of Enforcement v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 172