Supreme Court Monthly Digest- October 2024 With Statute And Subject Wise Index

Advocate

Supreme Court deprecates practice of litigant engaging new lawyer to reargue case after court expressed dissatisfaction on merits. Pintu Madanmohan Mondal v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 850

Airport Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act 2008

The Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of appeals filed by Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) assailing orders of the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) under the AERA Act 2008 relating to tariff imposition on certain services. Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India v. Delhi International Airport, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 812

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Section 11 - Arbitration Clause in Public Premises Disputes – Applicability of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 vis-à-vis the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Jurisdiction of the High Court - Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by Central Warehousing Corporation, upholding the High Court's decision to refer the dispute to arbitration. The Court rejected the appellant's contention that the Public Premises Act, 1971, overrides the Arbitration Act, holding that the dispute arose from the terms of the agreement, including the right of renewal and the revision of storage charges, thus falling squarely within the arbitration clause of the contract. Central Warehousing Corporation v. Sidhartha Tiles and Sanitary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 822

Section 11 - Whether the Public Premises Act, 1971, overrides the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Whether the High Court erred in appointing an arbitrator - The Court noted that the dispute concerned contractual obligations under an arbitration clause in the lease agreement dated 26.09.2012, valid until 11.09.2015, with issues arising prior to the lease's expiration. The Public Premises Act, 1971, pertains to eviction of unauthorised occupants and does not preclude arbitration for contractual disputes during the lease period. Relying on SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 489, the Court reaffirmed that the referral court's inquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Appeal dismissed with costs of ₹50,000. Arbitration proceedings to resume, and award to be delivered expeditiously. Central Warehousing Corporation v. Sidhartha Tiles and Sanitary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 822

Section 31(7)(b) - Post-award interest - Legal Principles: (i) Section 31(7)(a) allows party autonomy regarding pre-award interest. (ii) Section 31(7)(b) mandates post-award interest unless expressly varied by the award, not by contract. (iii) Contractual clauses restricting interest do not apply to post-award interest under statutory provisions. R.P. Garg v. Chief General Manager, Telecom Department, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 794

Section 31(7)(b) - Post-award interest - Validity of a contractual clause prohibiting interest in light of statutory provisions - The appellant entered into a contract with the Telecom Department for trenching and laying underground cables. Disputes over non-payment of bills led to arbitration. The Arbitrator awarded the claim but denied post-award interest citing a contractual clause. The District Court granted 18% post-award interest, but the High Court reversed this decision based on the contract clause. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, post-award interest is a statutory right that cannot be overridden by a contract. The clause in the contract prohibiting interest was inapplicable to the post-award period. The Court restored the District Court's decision granting 18% interest from the award date until realization. Appeal allowed. R.P. Garg v. Chief General Manager, Telecom Department, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 794

Arrest

The Supreme Court has directed the police to follow guidelines issued in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2014 INSC 463 and Amanatullah Khan v. The Commissioner of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 351 to ensure that members of Denotified Tribes are not subjected to arbitrary arrest. Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771

Bail

Bail condition that accused shall furnish bail bonds 6 months after passing of order can't be imposed. Nanhak Manjhi v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 845

Delay in Trial — Absence of Criminal Antecedents — Judicial Directions on Expedited Trials - The appellants sought bail after being incarcerated for 2 years and 9 months with significant delays in the trial. Of the 72 originally listed witnesses, only 3 had been examined, and the list was subsequently reduced to 22-24 witnesses. The High Court denied bail, emphasizing the need for expedited trial disposal. The trend of High Courts directing trial courts to conclude trial within a set time frame instead of granting bail, without considering the trial courts' case backlogs is impermissible. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, criticizing High Court orders that pressure trial courts to expedite proceedings contrary to High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177. In the absence of criminal antecedents, prolonged incarceration and delays justified granting bail. Rup Bahadur Magar @ Sanki@ Rabin v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 793

The condition imposed by the High Court requiring the accused to arrange accommodation and reside in Delhi till the conclusion of the trial is unreasonable and cannot be considered a valid bail condition. Akbal Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 829

Transfer of investigation to CBI while rejecting bail - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal against the High Court's order, which transferred the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) while rejecting the bail application of the appellants. The Court held that such a transfer of investigation was improper during bail proceedings. Considering the post-mortem report and testimony of the medical officer (PW-3), along with the absence of criminal antecedents as per the State's affidavit, the Court found merit in granting bail. The High Court's direction for a de-novo investigation by CBI was set aside. The appellants were directed to be produced before the Trial Court within one week and granted bail on appropriate conditions until the conclusion of the trial. Appeal allowed. Abhishek v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 830

Benami

Constitutional validity of provisions in the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, as amended by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016 - Applicability of the 2016 Amendment Act retrospectively or prospectively - Held, the Court recalled its judgment dated August 23, 2022, which declared Section 3(2) of the 1988 Act unconstitutional for being arbitrary and violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution. Section 5 of the 1988 Act was also declared unconstitutional for being arbitrary. The 2016 Act, being substantive, cannot apply retrospectively for forfeiture provisions under Section 5. The constitutional challenge cannot be adjudicated without a proper lis between the parties. The review petition is allowed, recalling the judgment dated August 23, 2022. Civil Appeal No. 5783 of 2022 is restored for fresh adjudication by a new Bench. Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 851

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

Section 479 - BNSS provision capping maximum undertrial term applies to PMLA. Badshah Majid Malik v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 835

Section 479 - The Supreme Court, in the ongoing case concerning inhuman conditions in Indian prisons, addresses the issue of overcrowding and undertrial prisoners. It highlights that over 4 lakh undertrials constitute more than 75% of the incarcerated population, many of whom face prolonged detention despite being presumed innocent. The Court emphasizes the application of Section 479 BNSS, which allows for the release of undertrials who have served one-third or one-half of the maximum sentence for their respective offenses. The Court directs the implementation of Section 479 by urging state authorities to identify eligible undertrials and process their release, with a focus on easing jail overcrowding. Further, the Undertrial Review Committees (UTRC) in each district are tasked with actively coordinating the identification and release of undertrials. The Court also instructs that reports be filed by the Chief Secretaries of all states and union territories, ensuring proactive and effective steps towards reducing overcrowding and improving conditions for undertrials. In Re-Inhuman Conditions In 1382 Prisons, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 836

Sexual offences against men, trans persons and animals - The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking the incorporation of provisions similar to Section 377 IPC in the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita. The petitioner requested the invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution to address the alleged lacuna in the law. The Court, however, held that the power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to define acts as offences, as such matters fall within the domain of Parliament. The petition was dismissed, with the Court suggesting that the petitioner may approach the Union Government for redress if a lacuna in the law is perceived. Pooja Sharma v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 834

Caste

More than 75 years since independence, we have not been able to eradicate the evil of caste discrimination. We need to have a national vision for justice and equality, which involves all citizens. (Para 228) Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

Sections 17(5)(c), 17(5)(d), and 16(4) - Constitutional Validity of - Interpretation of "Plant or Machinery" under Section 17(5)(d) - Classification of Immovable Property as "Plant" - Functionality Test - The constitutional validity of the aforementioned provisions was upheld; no challenge was established - The term “plant or machinery” in Section 17(5)(d) is distinct from “plant and machinery” defined in the Explanation to Section 17 - Whether a mall, warehouse, or building qualifies as "plant" depends on the functionality test and the facts of each case. If the construction of the immovable property is essential for the registered person's business (e.g., leasing or renting under Schedule II clauses (2) and (5)), it may be considered a "plant" and thereby excluded from the restrictions in Section 17(5)(d) - The applicability of the functionality test requires a case-specific determination of whether the construction is integral to the business activity. Writ petitions remanded to the High Court to determine whether, based on facts, the shopping mall qualifies as "plant" under Section 17(5)(d) of the CGST Act. Chief Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 774

Citizenship Act, 1955

Section 5, 8, and 9 - Interpretation of Statutes – Plain language rule – No equitable interpretation permitted – Exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 – Applicability - The Indian Citizenship Act, 1955 must be interpreted using the plain and ordinary meaning of its provisions, particularly Sections 5, 8, and 9. The statute's language is clear, leaving no scope for liberal or equitable interpretation in granting Indian citizenship to foreign nationals. The High Court erroneously concluded that the applicant had resumed Indian citizenship under Section 8(2). The Supreme Court clarified that the applicant could seek citizenship under Section 5(1)(f) if he met the residency requirement of 12 months preceding the application or by invoking Section 5(1A) for relaxation of this period. The Court refused to invoke its extraordinary powers under Article 142, emphasizing the need for caution in granting citizenship through such powers. Consequently, the High Court's decision was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. Union of India v. Pranav Srinivasan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 816

Section 6A - Constitutional validity of - Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord - Upheld. In Re: Section 6A Citizenship Act 1955, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 808

Section 8, and 9 - The Court clarified that when a person acquires a foreign citizenship, the cessation of Indian citizenship happens by operation of law by virtue of Section 9 of the Citizenship Act. Hence, such cessation of citizenship cannot be regarded as voluntary. Therefore, children of such persons cannot seek to resume Indian citizenship under Section 8(2) of the Citizenship Act. As per Section 8(2), children of persons who have voluntarily renounced Indian citizenship can seek Indian citizenship within one year of attaining majority. The Court interpreted that this option is not available for children of those who acquired foreign citizenship. The Court also clarified that a person who was born outside India after the commencement of the Constitution cannot seek citizenship under Article 8 of the Constitution on the ground that his grandparents were born in the undivided India. The Court held that allowing such an interpretation would lead to "absurd results", as foreign nationals born long after the independence, by claiming that their grandparents were born in the undivided India. Union of India v. Pranav Srinivasan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 816

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 47 and Order XXI Rule 58 and 97 - Procedural irregularity cannot defeat substantive right - Supreme Court sets aside High Court order dismissing objections to decree due to misapplication of provisions. Joginder Singh v. Dr. Virinderjit Singh Gill, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 838

Order XII Rule 6 - Unless there is a clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional admission, courts should not exercise their discretion under the Rule because judgment on admissions is without a trial which may even preclude a party to challenge the matter on merits in the court of appeal. Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 790

Order XXI - Execution of Decree - Limitation Period - Whether the limitation period for execution of a decree is governed by the date of the final decree or the date of its engrossment on stamp paper. The Court reaffirmed that the limitation for executing a decree begins from the date of the final decree, not its engrossment on stamp paper. Citing Chiranji Lal v. Hari Das, (2005) 10 SCC 746 the Court emphasized that furnishing stamp paper is a procedural step and cannot suspend the limitation period, which is crucial to prevent undue delays in execution proceedings. Renjith K.G. v. Sheeba, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 798

Order XXI Rule 99 and Rule 101 - Pendente Lite Transferee's Rights - Whether a pendente lite transferee can resist the execution of a decree - A pendente lite transferee, though not a party to the suit, can invoke Order XXI Rule 99 to assert independent rights after dispossession. This includes the right to seek adjudication of claims under Order XXI Rule 101 without a separate suit. The court reiterated that such transferees are entitled to protect their interests despite their knowledge of ongoing litigation, referencing Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 457. The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the High Court correctly allowed the pendente lite transferee to challenge the execution based on limitation and remanded the matter for fresh consideration by the trial court. Renjith K.G. v. Sheeba, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 798

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

A mere delay in forwarding the FIR to the jurisdictional magistrate would not be fatal to the prosecution's case unless it is shown by the accused that the delay had caused prejudice to his case. Rama Devi v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 776

Adulteration in Prasadam - Devotee Sentiments - Special Investigation Team - Allegations of adulteration in ghee used for preparation of prasadam (Tirupati Laddu). The matter was deemed sensitive as it had the potential to hurt the sentiments of millions of devotees globally. The Court directed the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT). The SIT will function under the supervision of the Director of CBI. The Court clarified that this order was not reflective of any doubts on the integrity of the SIT earlier constituted by the State Government but was intended to maintain public confidence. Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 778

Murder – Motive and Evidence – Sole Eyewitness Testimony – Death Penalty Mitigation – Inter-caste Marriage and Societal Pressure - The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his pregnant daughter under Sections 302, 316, and 364 IPC. The motive, rooted in societal ostracism due to her inter-caste marriage, was corroborated by the testimonies of PW-1 (wife), PW-2 (complainant), and PW-3 (mother-in-law of the deceased). Despite minor discrepancies, the Court held that these did not undermine the prosecution's case. The Court rejected the appellant's plea of a financial dispute with PW-2 and noted that the appellant failed to provide corroborative evidence. The testimony of PW-6 (medical expert) confirmed that death was due to ligature strangulation, supporting the prosecution's case. On the issue of sentencing, the Court considered mitigating factors, including the appellant's impoverished background, absence of criminal antecedents, mental and physical health issues, and satisfactory prison conduct. Citing the doctrine of "rarest of rare" cases, the Court commuted the death penalty to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment without remission, emphasizing the possibility of reformation. Appeal partly allowed. Eknath Kisan Kumbharkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 848

Police to take possession of immovable property reflects total lawlessness. Under no circumstances, can the police be allowed to interfere with the possession of immovable property, as such action does not bear sanction by any provision of law. Ramratan @ Ramswaroop v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 846

Sections 235, 353 and 354 - Applicability of - Judgment and Sentence - Whether a successor judge is required to re-hear the case on conviction after the transfer of the presiding officer who pronounced the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision that a successor judge is not obligated to re-hear the case on the point of conviction once the judgment has been pronounced by the predecessor judge. The Court affirmed that the appellant can only be heard on the quantum of sentence under Section 235(2) of the Cr.P.C., not on the conviction already finalized under Section 235(1). The judgment of conviction delivered by the predecessor judge was legally valid and binding. The trial court became functus officio regarding the conviction, leaving only the quantum of sentence to be determined by the successor judge. Harshad Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 800

Section 294 - Admissibility of Evidence without Formal Proof - Fair Trial Doctrine - High Court's Error in Remanding - The case arises from the brutal murder of the appellant's parents on April 22, 1998, allegedly by four accused. The Trial Court convicted the accused based on evidence, including formally admitted documents under Section 294 CrPC. The High Court remanded the case for retrial from the stage of cross-examination of a key witness (PW2), citing procedural irregularities due to the defense counsel's admission of prosecution documents without cross-examination. Held, Once documents are admitted under Section 294 CrPC, further formal proof is unnecessary unless the court requires it, thereby preventing unnecessary delays under the guise of fair trial violations. Documents whose genuineness is admitted by the defense can be read as substantive evidence without formal proof. The Court found that the High Court erroneously interpreted procedural fairness by equating admitted documentary evidence with a denial of fair trial. The remand order was held unnecessary since the defense repeatedly admitted the documents' genuineness over several years. Appeals allowed; the High Court's order was set aside. Shyam Narayan Ram v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 821

Section 319 - Whether an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. must be decided solely on the basis of the examination-in-chief without awaiting cross-examination. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court Order that directed the trial court to decide an application under Section 319 CrPC based on the examination-in-chief alone. The Court held that there is no mandatory requirement to decide the application before cross-examination. The Trial Court retains discretion in this regard, and a refusal to appear for cross-examination by prosecution witnesses cannot justify delaying the trial. The Court clarified that the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 permits reliance on examination-in-chief for a prima facie finding under Section 319 CrPC but does not mandate that cross-examination be bypassed. The Trial Court was correct in rejecting the application for lack of admissible evidence and acquitting the accused under Section 232 CrPC. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the Trial Court's order acquitting the accused was restored. Asim Akhtar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 814

Section 357 and 389 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 120B, 419, 420 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) – Whether the suspension of the substantive sentence by the High Court extended to the sentence of fine imposed on the respondent. Whether the respondent could avoid imprisonment for default of fine payment despite partial compliance. Held, a fine is a distinct form of punishment under Section 53 of the IPC, and its suspension is within the ambit of Section 389 CrPC. The High Court's order suspending the respondent's sentence implicitly covered the fine, given the substantial embezzlement allegations. However, to balance justice and ensure compliance, the Court modified the suspension to be conditional upon the deposit of ₹15,00,000. The Court clarified that a sentence of fine is as significant as imprisonment, and its suspension should be assessed case-wise, considering the accused's rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Imposing an impossible financial condition for suspension could undermine the right to appeal. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ashok Sirpal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 840

Section 389 - Suspension of sentence cannot be denied merely because another trial is pending against the accused. Jitendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 782

Section 432 - Remission of Sentence – Principles and Procedure – Right to Consideration - Reasonableness of Conditions - Cognizable Offences and Breach of Conditions - Cancellation of Remission - Natural Justice – Judicial Review - Government's Power to Grant Remission - Held, under Section 432(1) of the CrPC and Section 473(1) of the BNSS, the appropriate Government may remit a convict's sentence wholly or partially, either unconditionally or subject to reasonable conditions. A convict has no inherent right to remission but is entitled to a fair consideration of their case in accordance with the law and applicable policy. Conditions imposed must be reasonable. Arbitrary conditions violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The cancellation of remission impacts the convict's liberty and requires adherence to natural justice. A show cause notice specifying grounds must be served, allowing the convict to respond and be heard before a reasoned order is passed. Convicts can challenge remission cancellations through remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution. Registration of a cognizable offence is not sufficient grounds for cancellation. Each case must be assessed on its facts, and only serious breaches supported by substantive evidence justify cancellation under Section 432(3) of the CrPC or Section 473(3) of the BNSS. Minor breaches are insufficient. Mafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 819

Section 439 - The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing unreasonable conditions while granting bail, including the demolition of a wall at the appellants' expense and the transfer of possession of disputed property to the complainant. The Court emphasized that conditions imposed under Sections 437(3) and 439 of the CrPC must be reasonable and directly related to securing the accused's presence during trial. The Court underscored that courts should not interfere in civil disputes while adjudicating bail applications, reaffirming that bail proceedings are not meant to resolve property disputes. Ramratan @ Ramswaroop v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 846

Section 482 - A petition under Section 482 CrPC does not become infructuous upon the submission of a charge sheet; however, the Court must consider the investigation's outcome before quashing proceedings. Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 797

Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Criminal cases of a predominantly civil character can be quashed if resolved amicably by the parties. Jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC should be exercised to prevent abuse of process and secure justice. When the likelihood of conviction is remote and continuation of proceedings causes undue prejudice, quashing is justified. K. Bharthi Devi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 775

Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Predominantly Civil Nature of Dispute – Settlement Between Parties – In cases where the possibility of conviction is remote, continuing criminal proceedings would cause undue prejudice and oppression to the accused. In this case, the dispute involved a loan transaction between the accused and the bank, which was resolved through settlement, including payment under a One-Time Settlement (OTS) scheme. The Court noted that the criminal proceedings predominantly had a civil character, and there was no specific role attributed to the appellants, who were the spouses of the main accused. The Court held that the High Court erred in not exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the criminal proceedings. Consequently, the criminal proceedings against the appellants were quashed, and the appeal was allowed. K. Bharthi Devi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 775

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR and criminal proceedings under Sections 406 and 420 IPC - Applicability of Section 482 CrPC in cases involving allegations of criminal breach of trust and cheating - Evaluation of materials collected during investigation - Held, the High Court erred in quashing the FIR without examining the materials collected during the investigation. FIR quashing should consider the police report under Section 173(2) CrPC. Allegations reflecting dishonest conduct or potential misappropriation require investigation rather than premature quashing. Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 797

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Whether the High Court erred in quashing the FIR and subsequent proceedings without considering the materials collected during the investigation. Whether allegations in the FIR disclosed prima facie commission of cognizable offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC. Held, the High Court must examine materials collected during the investigation before deciding on quashing petitions under Section 482 CrPC. At the stage of quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the court must take allegations in the FIR and investigation materials at face value to determine if a prima facie case is made out. FIR need not be an exhaustive document detailing all imputations; it is sufficient if it discloses the gravamen of a cognizable offence. Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 797

Constitution

Article 14 - Manifest Arbitrariness – Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017 struck down – Protection of heritage institutions – Scope of judicial review – Legislative purpose and reasonableness - Held, the Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017 was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it was enacted on a manifestly arbitrary basis. The reasoning that the establishment of Khalsa University would shadow and damage the heritage and pristine glory of Khalsa College, a significant icon of Khalsa heritage established in 1892, was found to be non-existent. The Khalsa College was neither part of the Khalsa University nor adversely affected by its establishment. The Court noted specific undertakings and evidence that safeguarded the distinct identity and heritage of Khalsa College. Consequently, the Repeal Act was deemed unconstitutional, and the Khalsa University Act, 2016, was restored. Khalsa University v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 773

Article 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 - Caste-based Discrimination in Prisons – Removal of Caste References - Model Prison Manual 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act 2023 – Immediate deletion of the “caste” column and related references in prisoners' registers - The impugned provisions of the prison manuals and rules were declared unconstitutional - Issued comprehensive directions aimed at addressing caste-based discrimination in prisons and ensuring compliance across all States and Union Territories. Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771

Article 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 - Caste-based Discrimination in Prisons – Rejects view that caste-based segregation of prisoners will prevent violence - It is the responsibility of the prison administration to maintain discipline inside the prison without resorting to extreme measures that promote caste-based segregation. (Para 167) Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771

Article 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 - Caste-based Discrimination in Prisons – Separate but equal' philosophy has no place in constitution - Adopting the logic accepted by the High Court is similar to the argument which was given in the United States to legalize race-based segregation: separate but equal. Such a philosophy has no place under the Indian Constitution. Even if there is rivalry between individuals of two groups, it does not require segregating the groups permanently. Discipline cannot be secured at the altar of violation of fundamental rights and correctional needs of inmates. The prison authorities ought to be able to tackle perceived threats to discipline by means that are not rights-effacing and inherently discriminatory. (Para 167) Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771

Article 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 - Caste-based Discrimination in Prisons – the differentia between inmates that distinguishes on the basis of “habit”, “custom”, “superior mode of living”, and “natural tendency to escape”, etc. is unconstitutionally vague and indeterminate. These terms and phrases do not serve as an intelligible differentia, that can be used to demarcate one class of prisoners from the other. These terms have resultantly been used to target individuals from marginalized castes and denotified tribes. (Para 168) Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771

Article 15 - Colonial rulers imported caste-based allocation of work to prisons due to pressure from oppressor castes. Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771

Article 15 - End caste-based allotment of work to prisoners, delete caste columns in prison registers - Guidelines for the prevention of segregation and division of labour solely on the basis of the caste of the prisoners in Prisons - Struck down the provisions of the Prison Manuals of several States as per which jobs were assigned to prisons based on their castes - Assigning cleaning and sweeping to the marginalised castes and assigning cooking to higher-caste prisoners is nothing but a direct caste discrimination and a violation of Article 15. Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771

Article 15 (1) - The tendency to treat members of denotified tribes as habitual to crime or having bad character reinforces a stereotype, which excludes them from meaningful participation in social life. When such stereotypes become a part of the legal framework, they legitimize discrimination against these communities. Members of the denotified tribes have faced the brunt of colonial caste-based undertones of discriminating against them, and the prison Manuals are reaffirming the same discrimination. (Para 175) Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771

Article 17 - No social group born as 'scavenger class'; notion that some occupations are 'degrading' is an aspect of untouchability. Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771

Article 29 and 226 - Right to Separate Language Channel – Petition sought mandamus for setting up a dedicated Sindhi language channel on Doordarshan under Article 226. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no constitutional obligation on Doordarshan to establish a separate channel for the Sindhi-speaking population under Article 29 of the Constitution. The feasibility of a separate Sindhi channel had been thoroughly evaluated, considering factors like viewership and costs, and the decision to deny it was deemed reasonable and non-arbitrary. The Court clarified that the relief was confined to the plea for a separate channel and did not include any broader relief. Special Leave Petition dismissed. Sindhi Sangat v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 833

Retrospective Application of Statutes – Requirement of Clear Legislative Intention - Rights accrued under an old Act cannot be extinguished with the enforcement of the new Act unless a retrospective effect was given to the New Act. Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 790

Contract

Judicial Review in Government Contracts – Principles and Application - The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles governing judicial intervention in matters of government contracts, emphasizing that courts do not act as appellate bodies but review the decision-making process to ensure it is free from arbitrariness, mala fides, and bias, and aligns with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 779

Judicial Restraint - Courts exercise restraint in reviewing administrative actions concerning contract awards, focusing on whether the process was transparent, fair, and reasonable rather than assessing the merits of the decision. Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 779

Grounds for Interference - Judicial interference is warranted only if: (i) The decision-making process is tainted by mala fides, arbitrariness, or favoritism. (ii) The decision is so irrational that no reasonable authority could have reached it. (iii) Public interest is compromised. Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 779

Government's Freedom of Contract - While the government enjoys the autonomy to enter contracts, its decisions must withstand the test of fairness, equality, and public interest, particularly in infrastructure and mega-project tenders. Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 779

Impugned Decision Set Aside - The Court invalidated the rejection of the appellant's technical bid and the selection of the respondent as the successful bidder, finding the process grossly arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14. A fresh tender process was ordered to ensure adherence to constitutional and legal norms. Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 779

Government instrumentalities must uphold constitutional guarantees of fairness, equality, and non-arbitrariness in tender processes, especially in large-scale public projects, to safeguard public interest and ensure compliance with Article 14. Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 779

Section 11 - Sale to minor - Since a sale cannot be said to be a contract, therefore, the requirement of Section 11 becomes redundant in cases where the sale is made to the minor. Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 796

Date of Birth

In the case of conflicting documents, the School Leaving Certificate, which had statutory recognition, should take precedence over the Aadhar Card as proof of age. Aadhar Card could not be regarded as conclusive proof of date of birth. Saroj v. Iffco-Tokio General Insurance, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 837

Discrimination

Gender Discrimination - Rural women empowerment - Elected representatives - Government land encroachment - Disqualification of Sarpanch - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the appellant, an elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, challenging her disqualification based on allegations of residing in a house constructed on government land - Held, The disqualification was grounded on unverified and baseless allegations raised by private respondents, reflecting gender bias and resistance to female leadership in rural governance - Government authorities, including the Collector and Divisional Commissioner, acted mechanically without a thorough fact-finding process, while the High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition on technical grounds - The Court underscored the disproportionate nature of the disqualification and the systemic challenges faced by women elected under reservation quotas. It emphasized the need for sensitivity in addressing issues affecting women in public office to foster gender parity and empowerment. The impugned orders disqualifying the appellant were set aside. The appellant was reinstated as Sarpanch to serve her full tenure. The Court called for a more conscientious approach by authorities in handling similar disputes. Manisha Ravindra Panpatil v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 783

Electricity Act, 2003

Section 108 - State Electricity Regulatory Commissions are not bound by the directions of Central / State Government's. Kerala State Electricity Board v. Jhabua Power, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 799

Education

College Admission - Judicial Propriety – Compliance with Apex Court Orders - The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of High Courts passing interim orders permitting colleges to participate in admission processes, despite prior specific orders of the Apex Court staying such practices. Interim orders allowing participation in admissions were held to potentially prejudice students if the writ petition ultimately failed, necessitating caution in granting such relief. The Supreme Court clarified that it had not examined the merits of the matter and left the same to be decided by the High Court. Appeals allowed; impugned orders set aside; cases remitted for fresh consideration. National Commission for Indian System of Medicine v. Veena Vadini Ayurved College and Hospital, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 780

Evidence

In this case, the Court emphasized the necessity of proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, distinguishing between "may be proved" and "must be proved." The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of a hammer, blood-stained clothes, and CCTV footage. However, the Court found significant flaws in the evidence: the hammer's recovery from a public canal raised doubts about its integrity, the recovery of blood-stained clothes was inconclusive due to possible tampering, and the identification of recovered jewelry was unsubstantiated. The Court reaffirmed that strong suspicion cannot replace proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the judgments of both the trial court and the High Court were quashed, and the appellant was acquitted. Vishwajeet Kerba Masalkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 809

Section 106 - Accused has duty to offer explanations when offence was committed within privacy of their house. Uma v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 843

When the conviction was based on the deceased's oral dying declaration to a close relative, the courts must exercise due caution in believing the testimony of the close relative to convict the accused. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 844

Income Tax Act, 1961

Applicability of Ashish Agarwal Directions - The directions issued in Ashish Agarwal v. Union of India, (2023) 1 SCC 617 apply to all reassessment notices issued under the old regime between 1 April 2021 and 30 June 2021. Union of India v Rajeev Bansal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 772

Deemed Stay on Show Cause Notices - The period during which show cause notices were deemed stayed runs from the issuance of the deemed notices (1 April 2021 – 30 June 2021) until the supply of relevant information by assessing officers and two weeks allowed to assessees for responding. Union of India v Rajeev Bansal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 772

Reassessment Notices – Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) - Application of TOLA Provisions – Scope and Limitations - The Income Tax Act must be read alongside the substituted provisions introduced after 1 April 2021 - TOLA applies to the Income Tax Act if any action or proceeding under the substituted provisions required completion between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021. Union of India v Rajeev Bansal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 772

Section 28 - Securities held by banks - Tax treatment of broken period interest - Revenue vs. Capital expenditure - The Supreme Court held that securities categorized as Available for Sale (AFS) and Held for Trading (HFT) are to be treated as stock-in-trade, and interest accrued on these securities constitutes business income under Section 28 of the Income Tax Act. Broken period interest paid on such securities is deductible as revenue expenditure. However, securities classified as Held to Maturity (HTM) can either be considered stock-in-trade or investments, depending on the facts of each case. If held till maturity without transfer and valued at cost or face value, they may be treated as investments, making broken period interest non-deductible. The Court reinstated the Tribunal's decision that broken period interest is revenue expenditure for banks holding securities as stock-in-trade. High Court judgments contradicting this view, particularly in reliance on Vijaya Bank Ltd., were set aside. Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 817

Section 149 - Override of - Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) - Section 3(1) of TOLA overrides Section 149 of the Income Tax Act only to relax the time limits for issuing reassessment notices under Section 148. Union of India v Rajeev Bansal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 772

Section 151 - Extension of Time - Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) - Under the new regime, if the three-year time limit from the end of an assessment year falls between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021, the specified authority under Section 151(i) has until 30 June 2021 to grant approval. Under the old regime, if the four-year time limit falls within the same period, the specified authority under Section 151(2) has until 31 March 2021 to grant approval. Union of India v Rajeev Bansal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 772

Time-Barred Notices - Any reassessment notices issued beyond the surviving time limit under the Income Tax Act read with Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) are time-barred and invalid. Union of India v Rajeev Bansal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 772

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Section 2(s) - Employee in supervisory capacity, drawing wages exceeding 10k per month not 'workman'. Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd v. Lenin Kumar Ray, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 841

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Consolidation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Processes (CIRP) - Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution - The Committee of Creditors (CoC) of KSK Mahanadi Power Company Limited, undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), challenged a High Court Order which deferred the CIRP. The High Court passed this direction while declining to consolidate the CIRP of KSK Mahanadi with two other entities. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court lacked justification to defer the CIRP after refusing consolidation. The Court emphasized that such directions breached the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, as Article 226 jurisdiction cannot be invoked to override the insolvency framework. The impugned High Court order deferring the CIRP was set aside. CoC of KSK Mahanadi Power Company Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 815

'Inherent powers' cannot be used to subvert legal provisions, which exhaustively provide for a procedure. To permit the NCLAT to circumvent this detailed procedure by invoking its inherent powers under Rule 11 would run contrary to the carefully crafted procedure for withdrawal. In the Impugned Judgement, the NCLAT does not provide any reasons for deviating from this procedure or the urgency to approve the settlement without following the procedure. Glas Trust Company Llc v. Byju Raveendran, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 826

Limitation – Acknowledgment of Debt in Balance Sheets and One Time Settlement (OTS) - Whether the acknowledgment of debt in the financial statements of the Corporate Debtor extends the limitation period under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Whether the absence of a specific mention of the creditor's name in the balance sheet affects the acknowledgment of debt. The appeal arose from the admission of a Section 7 application under the IBC to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against the Corporate Debtor by UCO Bank. The Corporate Debtor's account was declared a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on 05.11.2014, and subsequent CIRP initiation in 2019 was challenged on the grounds of limitation and competency of the applicant. Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and NCLAT held that the debt acknowledgment in balance sheets for FY 2017 and 2019 and the OTS proposal constituted valid acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, extending the limitation period. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the lower authorities, holding that balance sheets, even without specific creditor names, and OTS proposals amount to acknowledgment of debt, thus extending the limitation period. Acknowledgment of debt in financial statements, even without explicit mention of the creditor, qualifies under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, extending the limitation for filing CIRP applications. Additionally, OTS proposals imply subsisting liabilities and confirm jural relationships. The appeal was dismissed. The Court reaffirmed that financial records and OTS proposals are sufficient for acknowledging debt under the IBC, thereby extending the limitation period. Vidyasagar Prasad v. Uco Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 825

Interpretation of Statutes

Statutes are presumed to apply prospectively unless explicit legislative intent for retrospective operation is evident. Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 790

Judiciary

Courts must rely on truthful, written submissions from parties to ensure fair adjudication and maintain the integrity of the judicial process. Oral instructions can lead to factual errors and misrepresentations, compromising justice and eroding public trust. Government representatives appearing before courts must present accurate, written instructions from competent authorities. Courts are advised to impose costs on officials responsible for any misrepresentations, particularly from government authorities. K.C. Kaushik v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 831

Expunging of adverse judicial remarks against an advocate - The Supreme Court set aside interim orders passed by the High Court to the extent they contained adverse remarks against the appellant, a practicing advocate. The Court held that the remarks were unwarranted and unjustified. Citing its earlier decision in Neeraj Garg v. Sarita Rani, (2021) 9 SCC 92, the Court disapproved of the proclivity of the concerned High Court judge in making unnecessary remarks against advocates, emphasizing that such remarks could affect professional reputations without sufficient justification. Appeals allowed; remarks expunged. Siddhartha Singh v. Assistant Collector First Class/Sub Divisional Magistrate, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 785

Inappropriate Comments - Appropriateness of the remarks made by a High Court judge during judicial proceedings. The remarks, captured via live-streamed court proceedings, were widely circulated on social media. Implications of live-streaming judicial proceedings on judicial accountability and conduct. Measures to uphold the dignity and perception of the judiciary. In Re: Remarks by High Court Judge during Court Proceedings, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 777

Live-streaming of court proceedings enhances access to justice and transparency but requires heightened sensitivity from judges, lawyers, and litigants regarding their conduct. Judges must avoid casual remarks that may reflect personal bias or prejudice, particularly those related to gender or community, as these impact public trust in the judiciary. Judicial impartiality demands awareness of one's predispositions to ensure fairness in decision-making. In Re: Remarks by High Court Judge during Court Proceedings, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 777

Judicial Conduct – Delay in Pronouncement of Judgments – Ante-dating of Orders - Judicial discipline requires prompt delivery of reasoned judgments and emphasized that delays undermine litigants' rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Reasons should follow promptly after the pronouncement of the operative part to avoid suspicion and uphold judicial integrity. Judges were reminded of the three options for delivering judgments: (i) dictation in open court, (ii) reserving for a later date, or (iii) issuing the operative part with reasons to follow within a strict timeline. Any delay beyond five days must be avoided to maintain trust in the judiciary. While recognizing human fallibility and the workload on judges, the Court stressed the importance of judicial propriety and integrity in safeguarding the justice system's credibility. Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 820

The Supreme Court sets aside the High Court judgment which was signed and uploaded after the judge's retirement. State v. S. Murali Mohan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 788

Validity of judicial conduct inquiries initiated against a Sub-Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate based on an order rendered without considering complete case records - Procedural irregularities in the High Court's early listing and adjudication of the matter without affording adequate opportunity to the appellant's counsel. Held, the Supreme Court found that the High Court's order was rendered without reviewing the sealed case records. The disciplinary proceedings initiated on the basis of the said legally invalid order were deemed improper. The Court quashed the High Court's orders to their original status. The Chief Justice of the High Court was directed to ensure early hearing of the restored petitions. K. Cheriya Koya v. Mohammed Nazer M.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 789

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

Plea of juvenility can be filed even after the judgment and order of conviction and sentence granted against a person has attained finality. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramji Lal Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 791

Land Acquisition

Compensation Assessment – Reliance on Highest Sale Exemplar – Developmental Deduction Range – Judicial Precedents Considered – Appeals Allowed - Held, there is no bar to take into account the sale of smaller pieces of land as an exemplar for determining the fair and just land acquisition compensation. In determining compensation for acquired land, the court identified significant disparity among sale exemplars ranging from ₹16,94,000 to ₹1,81,33,867 per acre. Despite objections, the court chose to rely on the highest exemplar (Ex. P5) due to its proximity and similarity to the acquired agricultural land. Deductions for development were assessed between 46% and 50% to account for the disparity in land size and strategic location advantages. Even applying the highest deduction, the compensation exceeded the Land Acquisition Collector's (LAC) determination, affirming its fairness. The High Court's reduction of valuation was found erroneous, and the Reference Court's award was restored. The court ordered payment of the compensation with statutory benefits within eight weeks. Appeals allowed. High Court judgment set aside. Compensation by the Reference Court restored. Horrmal v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 818

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987

The court issued comprehensive directions aimed at strengthening the functioning and accessibility of legal aid services across various levels. The National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), State Legal Services Authorities (SLSAs), and District Legal Services Authorities (DLSAs) are tasked with ensuring efficient implementation and periodic review of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for legal aid services, particularly for prisoners and undertrial detainees. Key measures include enhanced monitoring of Prison Legal Aid Clinics (PLACs), updating statistical data to address shortcomings, promoting the Legal Aid Defence Counsel System, and increasing public awareness through campaigns in local languages, public signage, and community-based initiatives like street plays. Further, the court directed regular interaction with Jail Visiting Lawyers and Para Legal Volunteers, continuing legal education, and improving access to legal resources. High Courts are encouraged to append coversheets to judgments, informing convicts about free legal aid for higher remedies and display similar information on their websites. The Union and State Governments are urged to cooperate with Legal Services Authorities for effective implementation. NALSA retains the liberty to seek further directions as needed to achieve these objectives. The court expressed appreciation for the contributions of the Amicus Curiae and counsel in this matter. Suhas Chakma v Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 828

Legislation

Though a legislation affecting a single entity or a single undertaking or a single person would be permissible in law, it must be on the basis of reasonable classification having nexus with the object to be achieved. There should be a reasonable differentia on the basis of which a person, entity or undertaking is sought to be singled out from the rest of the group. Further, if a legislation affecting a single person, entity or undertaking is being enacted, there should be special circumstances requiring such an enactment. Such special circumstances should be gathered from the material taken into consideration by the competent legislature and shall include the Parliamentary/Legislative Debates. (Para 48) Khalsa University v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 773

Liquor

States have the power to regulate 'denatured spirit or industrial alcohol'. State of U.P. v. Lalta Prasad Vaish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 832

Motor Accident

Amount of compensation claimed is not a bar for the Tribunal and the High Court to award more than what is claimed, provided it is found to be just and reasonable. It is the duty of the Court to assess fair compensation. Rough calculation made by the claimant is not a bar or the upper limit. (Para 20, Referred : Meena Devi vs. Nunu Chand Mahto, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 841) Chandramani Nanda v. Sarat Chandra Swain, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 803

In motor accident claim cases, the courts must apply the principle of preponderance of probability and cannot apply the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Sajeena Ikhbal v. Mini Babu George, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 810

Penal Code, 1860

Section 302, 307 r/w. 34 - Murder of a political leader - Conviction, Life Sentence of Ex-MLA and another - The court upheld the life imprisonment sentence imposed by the trial court, along with additional rigorous imprisonment for five years under Section 307, both accompanied by fines. Default imprisonment of six months was added in case of non-payment of fines. The appellants were directed to surrender within two weeks, failing which the authorities were instructed to ensure their detention. Regarding A1, A2, A3, A6 and A9, the charge of conspiracy was not substantiated due to the absence of direct ocular evidence. Their acquittal was upheld, granting them the benefit of the doubt. The appeals were partially allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside in part as per the directions issued. Rama Devi v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 776

Section 302 and 391 - Dacoity and Murder - Conviction and sentencing in a case involving circumstantial evidence and alleged contradictions in witness testimonies - Imposition of the death penalty under the "rarest of rare" doctrine - Held, the Supreme Court set aside the death sentence of a watchman convicted for the dacoity and murder of his employers to life imprisonment and upheld the conviction of the appellants, finding no infirmity in the judgments of the Trial Court and High Court regarding guilt. The Trial Court's decision not to impose capital punishment was justified as the case did not fall under the "rarest of rare" category. The High Court's interference in this regard was unwarranted. Shivkumar Ramsundar Saket v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 784

Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide – To constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC, the act of the accused must amount to direct and alarming incitement or encouragement, leaving the deceased with no option but to commit suicide. Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786

Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide – Two broad categories of incitement were identified: 1. Sentimental or Physical Relationships – Where close personal ties, such as familial or intimate relations, may lead to psychological imbalance due to disputes or unmet expectations, triggering suicidal tendencies. 2. Official Relationships – Where the accused holds an official capacity, and the harassment or dereliction of duties may push the deceased to take extreme steps. Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786

Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide – Judicial Approach to Trial and Evidence - The Court emphasized the need to evaluate the accused's intention behind their acts and whether the allegations prima facie reveal a deliberate incitement to suicide. Courts must avoid unwarranted prosecutions based solely on the fact of suicide, without adequate linkage to the accused's actions. Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786

Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide – In the present case, the High Court's approach was deemed flawed as it failed to assess whether the accused created an unbearable situation leading the deceased to see suicide as the only recourse. There was exploitation of the deceased's emotional vulnerability or reputational harm causing psychological distress. The Supreme Court quashed the proceedings against the appellants, holding that no prima facie case for abetment of suicide was made out, and continuing the prosecution would amount to abuse of the legal process. Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786

Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide – When can official superiors be liable for abetment of suicide of employee - Explained. (Para 21) Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786

Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide – The Courts should know how to apply the correct principles of law governing abetment of suicide to the facts on record. It is the inability on the part of the courts to understand and apply the correct principles of law to the cases of abetment of suicide, which leads to unnecessary prosecutions. (Para 22) Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786

Section 353 - Shouting and threatening someone does not amount to committing an offence of assault. K. Dhananjay v. Cabinet Secretary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 847

Section 376 and 313 - Allegation of rape on false promise to marry – Long-term consensual relationship – Held, mere refusal to marry after a long consensual relationship cannot constitute rape. FIR, filed after a five-year delay, lacked a prima facie case of consent under misconception. The investigation under Section 313 IPC found no evidence of forced abortion, and thus no sufficient grounds existed for further proceedings under Section 376 IPC. FIR quashed. Lalu Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 805

Section 406, 409, and 462 - Quashing of FIR – Absence of Mens Rea and Essential Ingredients – Sections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 206, 217, 406, 409, 420, and 462 IPC – Juristic Person – Inducement and Entrustment of Property – Inapplicability of Offences - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the FIR registered against officials of the appellant-bank. It held that for an offence under Section 420 IPC, the FIR must show fraudulent or dishonest inducement with mens rea, which was absent in this case. Furthermore, since the appellant-bank, being a juristic person, cannot possess mens rea, Sections 406, 409, and 462 IPC were also inapplicable due to the absence of entrustment or misappropriation of property. Similarly, Sections 206, 217, and 201 IPC require mens rea, which was not established. The Court relied on Bhajan Lal principles and found the FIR fell under categories (2) and (3) warranting quashing. Continuation of proceedings would cause undue hardship to the bank. Appeal allowed; FIR and High Court order quashed. Hdfc Bank v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 823

Section 406 and 420 - Failure to pay rent coupled with false assurances may indicate dishonest intent and warrant investigation for criminal breach of trust. Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 797

Section 498A - Acquittal - Lack of Evidence - Over-implication in dowry-related cases - Burden of proof for cruelty - The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court for cruelty under Section 498-A IPC based on allegations of dowry harassment against the deceased. The High Court confirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence to time already served. The Supreme Court found no specific evidence connecting the appellant to the alleged cruelty. The general allegations were insufficient to prove guilt. The Court highlighted the risk of over-implication in dowry-related cases, emphasizing the need for careful scrutiny of evidence. The conviction under Section 498-A IPC was deemed perverse and unsustainable due to the absence of concrete evidence. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the trial court. Yashodeep Bisanrao Vadode v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 842

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Section 13(2) r/w. 13(1)(d) - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 420, 468, 471, 120-B - Criminal Appeal – Discharge of Accused – The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a charge sheet against multiple accused, including former Chairman and Managing Director of the Central Bank of India, alleging criminal conspiracy and misconduct in sanctioning a credit facility. The High Court discharged the respondent, leading to this appeal. Whether the High Court erred in discharging the respondent at the stage of framing of charges. Whether mere suspicion due to expedited loan sanctioning justifies framing charges under conspiracy and corruption laws. Held, the Court found no evidence linking the respondent to criminal conspiracy or personal gain from the transactions. The loan sanction followed internal bank procedures, including Loan Advisory and Management Committee approvals. Mere suspicion due to the speed of sanctioning is insufficient for framing charges. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's discharge of the respondent while clarifying that observations in this judgment shall not affect the trial of other accused. Appeal dismissed. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Srinivas D. Sridhar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 804

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Section 4 - Bail – Scheduled Offence – Prolonged Incarceration - The appellants had been in custody for 2 years and 1 year 9 months, respectively. Initially, an FIR under various sections of the IPC was registered, but no scheduled offence under PMLA was present at the time of filing the charge-sheet. Subsequently, Section 384 IPC was added, but its validity as a scheduled offence was in question. Whether the appellants were entitled to bail under Section 4 of the PMLA Act, considering the absence of a valid scheduled offence at the time of filing the PMLA complaint and the prolonged incarceration. Held, the Supreme Court granted bail to the appellants, observing that at the time of filing the PMLA complaint, there was no scheduled offence under the Act. The addition of Section 384 IPC later did not retrospectively validate the absence of a scheduled offence at the relevant time. Continued incarceration of the appellants violated their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Laxmikant Tiwari v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 787

Undertrial Prisoners - The Court applied the provisions of Section 479(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), in conjunction with Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, regarding the detention of undertrial prisoners. The Court observed that the appellant had not been convicted for any offense in the past and had undergone detention for a period exceeding one-third of the maximum imprisonment for the alleged offense under the Customs Act, 1862. The Court held that the first proviso to Section 479(1) of the BNSS applied, entitling the appellant to be released on bail. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was directed to be produced before the Special Court within one week for bail. The Special Court was instructed to release the appellant on appropriate terms, ensuring cooperation with the courts for the early disposal of the case, including both the scheduled offense and the offense under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act (PMLA). Badshah Majid Malik v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 835

Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006

This Act is a social legislation which requires a collective effort of all stakeholders for its success emphasising the need for community-driven strategies and more focus on prevention than prosecution. The preventive strategies should therefore be tailored to address the root causes of child marriage, such as poverty, gender inequality, lack of education, and entrenched cultural practices. The Court issued a set of guidelines to "prioritise prevention before protection and protection before penalisation. Society for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 811

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002

Rule 9 (4) & (5) - Auction Sale - Cancellation of - Principles of Natural Justice - Whether the auction conducted by the Bank could be unilaterally cancelled due to non-payment of the balance sale consideration within the prescribed period, despite the bidders' readiness and willingness to pay, and whether such cancellation violated the principles of natural justice. Held, there was no default by the auction purchasers in depositing the balance amount as the delay was attributable to the Bank's refusal to accept payment due to external advisories. Rule 9(4) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, permits extension of time for payment with written consent, which was implied through the Bank's conduct. The Bank's unilateral cancellation without notice violated the principles of natural justice. Payment deadlines for auction purchasers are extendable with written consent; defaults occur only when there is non-payment within the agreed period. Cancellation of an auction sale without notice or hearing is per se illegal. The Bank's cancellation of the auction was unlawful, and the sale certificate must be issued upon deposit of the balance amount within four weeks. Appeals dismissed. IDBI Bank Ltd. v. Ramswaroop Daliya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 807

Service

Disciplinary proceedings in the Armed Forces and proportionality of punishment - Vindictive actions by superior officers and protection of personnel rights - Award of compensation for harassment and long-drawn litigation - Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by a former Air Force personnel, seeking compensation for wrongful disciplinary action by his superior, leading to mental harassment and prolonged litigation. The Court affirmed that the Armed Forces Tribunal rightly set aside the admonition order, recognizing the disproportionate and vindictive actions of the respondent officer in handling a minor disciplinary issue. The appellant's initial unblemished service record and the disproportionate punishment inflicted were taken into account. The Court awarded ₹1,00,000 as compensation for the undue distress caused, emphasizing the need for maintaining proportionality in disciplinary measures and protecting the dignity of personnel. The institution's failure to intervene appropriately was also criticized. S.P. Pandey v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 824

Pay disparity between Artificers and non-technical Chief Petty Officers in the Indian Navy - Equivalence of ranks and grade pay under the 6th Central Pay Commission recommendations - Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant challenging the Armed Forces Tribunal's decision regarding the disparity in grade pay for Artificers in the Indian Navy. Artificers of Class III, II, and I, while considered equivalent in seniority to Chief Petty Officers (non-technical), are not entitled to the same grade pay since they are subordinate to Chief Artificers. The rank of Chief Artificer is a promotional post for Artificers of Classes III to I, and Artificers III to I cannot be directly promoted to the Master Chief Artificer rank. The differentiation in grade pay, where Artificers III to I receive ₹3,400 (between Artificer IV's ₹2,800 and Chief Artificer's ₹4,200), is neither illegal nor arbitrary. The Court found no merit in the appellant's claim of discrimination and upheld the Tribunal's decision that the classification of grade pay was justified based on rank and command hierarchy. Appeals dismissed. Manish Kumar Rai v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 849

Recruitment and Appointment – Equal Treatment of Similarly Situated Candidates – Judgment in Rem and Judgment in Personam – The main issue was the legality of the OBC reservation, which was applied retroactively through a notification issued after the recruitment process had commenced. The petitioners argued that this change infringed upon their rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as the original recruitment notice did not include any reference to OBC reservations. The High Court set aside the selection made on 242 seats of OBC finding the retroactive application of the OBC reservation as illegal because proper opportunity was not served to all the candidates belonging to the OBC category to apply for the said posts. Held, changing the rules of the selection process mid-way would undermine the fairness of the selection process as it would deny equality of opportunity to other candidates eligible to be recruited in the OBC category. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision which annulled the selection of 242 candidates for Primary Teacher positions in the OBC category due to procedural flaws. The State should draw up a fresh selection list following the High Court's judgment limiting appointments to the originally stated 1,423 vacancies. The Supreme Court emphasized the principle of equitable treatment for all similarly situated candidates following a recruitment process initiated in 2006. The Court observed that judgments declaring law, such as the High Court's decision on 06.10.2015, should be treated as judgments in rem, benefiting all candidates, irrespective of their involvement in litigation. The revised select list must be prepared strictly based on merit, with appointments confined to the originally notified 1,423 vacancies. The Court held that excluding candidates who did not litigate would violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as the prolonged recruitment process disadvantaged many. However, those appointed in 2011 and not listed in the revised merit list may face job displacement, with the government retaining discretion over their continued service. No arrears of salary were granted, but notional appointments from 09.12.2011 were recognized for superannuation benefits. The appeals filed by the State of Manipur were dismissed, and the recruitment process was ordered to conclude within specified timelines. Khunjamayum Bimoti Devi v. State of Manipur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 792

Recruitment Process - Final Select List - Impermissibility of Rule Change Post-Selection - despite the preparation of the Final Select List which signals the conclusion of the appointment process, the State Government seeks to scrap the entire process and undertake a fresh appointment process under the New Rules - this amounts to effectively changing the rules of the game after the game was played which is impermissible and deprives the candidates of their legitimate right of consideration under the previous Rules. (Para 26) Shashi Bhushan Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 781

Transfer - Whether employees who challenge transfer orders but fail to join their transferred posts are entitled to salary for the period of unauthorized absence. Whether the employer is obligated to regularize the period of absence once transfer orders are set aside. Held, the Court reiterated that transfer is an exigency of service, and employees cannot refuse to join their transferred post while litigating the transfer order. Absence without sanctioned leave leads to forfeiture of salary unless interim orders protect the employee. Tamil Nadu Agricultural University v. R. Agila, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 801

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 16 (c) - Readiness and Willingness for Specific Performance - A plaintiff seeking specific performance must demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness to fulfill their contractual obligations throughout the legal proceedings. Mere averments of readiness and willingness are insufficient; concrete evidence, including the availability of funds and proactive measures, must be presented. Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agarwalla, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 813

Section 16 (c) - Readiness and Willingness for Specific Performance - Trial Court correctly found that the plaintiffs failed to ensure the participation of Defendant Nos. 6 to 8, as mandated by the agreement, and showed a lack of diligence by relying solely on other parties to secure their involvement. Their failure to communicate with the absent defendants and to arrange timely payment indicated complacency and lack of urgency. Contrarily, the High Court's summary conclusion that the plaintiffs were ready and willing lacked a thorough examination of their conduct and evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with the Trial Court's findings, holding that the plaintiffs' inaction and failure to meet the agreement's essential terms negated their claim for specific performance. The High Court's oversight in addressing this critical aspect led to its erroneous decision, ultimately warranting the denial of equitable relief to the plaintiffs. Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agarwalla, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 813

Section 16 (c) - Readiness and Willingness for Specific Performance - Validity of Sale Agreements and Agent Authority under General Power of Attorney - The Supreme Court examined the enforceability of a sale agreement involving multiple co-owners and the validity of the General Power of Attorney (GPA) executed in 1982 by Defendant Nos. 6 to 8. The Trial Court found the GPA unregistered, outdated, and effectively revoked by a subsequent registered partition deed in 1988, which delineated individual ownership rights and limited Defendant No. 1's authority to rent collection. Furthermore, the agreement dated 06.06.1993 did not reference the GPA or suggest that Defendant No. 1 acted on behalf of the co-owners. The High Court, however, upheld the GPA's validity, concluding that the absence of an explicit reference to it did not invalidate Defendant No. 1's authority. The Supreme Court rejected this view, emphasizing that any agent's authority must be clear and subsisting at the time of the transaction. Given the implied revocation of the GPA by the 1988 partition deed and the lack of evidence that Defendant No. 1 had authority to bind his sisters in 1993, the agreement was deemed unenforceable. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were aware of the necessity for Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 to personally consent to the sale. Their failure to secure such consent rendered the agreement incomplete and unenforceable. Thus, specific performance was denied, as the plaintiffs could not claim any right over the shares of Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 based on the flawed agreement. Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agarwalla, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 813

Section 16 (c) - Readiness and Willingness for Specific Performance - When the plaintiff seeks specific performance of the agreement to sell a property (being jointly owned by multiple persons), then the onus is on the plaintiff to ensure that all necessary consents and participations are secured to prove his readiness and willingness towards the performance of the contract. Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agarwalla, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 813

Section 20 (applicable to this case as it predates the 2018 amendment) - Discretionary Nature of Specific Performance and Protection of Bona Fide Purchasers - The court reiterated that granting specific performance is discretionary and must be guided by equitable principles. The court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is legally permissible, particularly when justice and fairness would be compromised. In this case, the plaintiffs sought specific performance of a sale agreement dated 06.06.1993, which was incomplete and lacked the consent of co-owners, particularly Defendant Nos. 6 to 8. Despite this, the property was sold to the appellants on 27.09.1993, who acted as bona fide purchasers for value. The court noted that enforcing the agreement would unjustly prejudice these purchasers and disrupt a sale that had been neither contested nor challenged by the plaintiffs at the time of the suit. Furthermore, the plaintiffs' failure to fulfill essential contractual obligations and secure necessary consents underscored their lack of diligence. Given the availability of adequate monetary compensation and the significant lapse in asserting their rights, the court found it inequitable to grant specific performance. The appeal was allowed, reinstating the Trial Court's decision to dismiss the suit. The appellants were directed to refund ₹10,00,000 to the plaintiffs, covering earnest money and associated costs, affirming that monetary compensation was a sufficient remedy in this case. Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agarwalla, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 813

Tax

'Royalty' imposed by the Municipal Corporation on the advertising companies for putting up hoardings/advertisements could not be termed as 'tax'. Patna Municipal Corporation v. Tribro Ad Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 806

Service Tax – Credit card - Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) – Interchange Fee – Section 65(33a) of the Finance Act, 1994 – Double Taxation – Liability of Issuing and Acquiring Banks - Held, card issuing bank is not liable to separately pay service tax on the interchange fee when the said tax already stands paid on the MDR. Service tax is not separately payable on the interchange fee as the MDR subsumes the acquiring bank fee, interchange fee, and platform fee. The MDR, charged at the first instance by the acquiring bank, constitutes a single unified service and is liable for service tax in its entirety. The bifurcation of MDR for service tax purposes is unnecessary, as it complicates the collection and increases the risk of double taxation, contrary to legislative intent. Since service tax on the entire MDR has been paid, there is no loss of revenue, and additional liability on the interchange fee would lead to double taxation. Reference and appeals disposed of, affirming that service tax has been adequately paid on the MDR without separate liability for the interchange fee. Commissioner of GST & Central Excise v. Citibank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 827

Tenancy

Heritable Tenancy Rights – West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 - The High Court erred in interpreting the 1997 Act as having retrospective application to heritable tenancy rights originating before its enactment. The court ruled that in the absence of clear and unambiguous language in the 1997 Act demonstrating legislative intent for retrospective effect, the appellants' tenancy, inherited in 1970, remains intact. Consequently, the tenancy did not terminate in 2006. The impugned orders of the Single Judge and Division Bench are set aside, and the appeals are allowed. Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 790

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Adverse Possession - the period of limitation to prove title by adverse possession would commence from the date of the defendant's possession becoming adverse and not from when the plaintiff acquires the right of ownership. Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 796

If in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief of recovery of possession is also sought, then the limitation period for filing the suit would be governed by the limitation period prescribed for filing a suit for recovery of possession (i.e., 12 years as per Article 65 of Limitation Act) and not the one prescribed for seeking declaration of title (i.e., 3 years as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act). N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 839

Section 52 - Specific Performance – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Applicability of - Cross-Objection - Requirement - Whether the doctrine of lis pendens applies to a sale deed executed during the pendency of a suit for specific performance - Whether the First Appellate Court could examine findings against the plaintiff without a cross-objection from the defendants. Held, the Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of lis pendens applies to transactions executed during the pendency of a suit. Once a transaction is found to be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, then the defences of being a bona fide purchaser and lack of notice regarding the sale agreement are not available. The First Appellate Court erred in recording a finding of collusion in the absence of a cross-appeal or cross-objection by the defendants. Relying on Banarsi v. Ram Phal, (2003) 9 SCC 606, it was emphasized that in cases where a partial decree is accepted without challenge, adverse findings against the decree-holder cannot be raised without a cross-objection. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decree for specific performance and overruling the concurrent judgments of the Trial and First Appellate Courts. Appeal dismissed. Shingara Singh v. Diljith Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 795

Section 54 - Sale to minor - There's no bar to transfer immovable property in favour of a minor by way of a sale deed. The minor can become the transferee/owner by way of a sale deed and the conditions stipulated under Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (persons competent to contract) would not come in the way of challenging the minor's capacity to contract because a sale can't be termed as a contract. Once the property is transferred to a person being a minor, then on attaining majority, he would be competent to transfer the said property to any other person. The transfer made by the person upon attaining majority cannot be challenged just because he happened to be a minor when the property was transferred to him. Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 796

Section 126 - Gift deed could not be revoked ordinarily, especially when no right of revocation is reserved in the deed. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 839

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

The Supreme Court declared as bad in law the judgment of the High Court which held that an accused can be granted bail under the UAPA if he does not present any "clear and present danger" to the society. The High Court judgment, which granted bail to journalist also held that lowering of India's global reputation cannot be held to be a terrorist act within the meaning of Section 15 of the UAPA. The Court noted submissions that the High Court's reliance on Schenck v. United States, (249 US 47 (1919) : 1919 SCC Online US SC 62) was per incuriam in light of Indian precedents having rejected the application of the doctrine of “clear and present danger”. (Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884; State of Madras v. V.G. Row, [(1952) 1 SCC 410 and Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 234). While declaring the High Court judgment to be per incuriam and directing that it should not be cited as a precedent, the Court however did not interfere with the bail granted to Fahad Shah. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Peerzada Shah Fahad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 802