Revenue Records Won't Confer Title; In Title Suit, Plaintiff Can't Succeed By Merely Pointing Out Lacunae In Defendant's Title : Supreme Court

Reiterating that revenue records are not documents of title, the Supreme Court held that mere mutation of revenue records would not divest the real title-owners of a land of their right, title and interest in the land.

Referring to a catena of precedens, the Court observed that "mutation in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any presumptive value on title. All it does is entitle the person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the land revenue in question".

Mutation entry does not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the person and the mutation entry in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose, the Court explained.

The Court further held that merely pointing out the lacunae in the opposite party's title would not suffice. The Court explained that having instituted the suit for declaration, the burden of proof rested on the shoulders of the party, who filed the suit, to reasonably establish the probability of better title.

"In a dispute with respect to determination of title, merely pointing out the lacunae in the defendant's title would not suffice. Having instituted the suit for declaration, the burden of proof rested on the shoulders of the plaintiff to reasonably establish the probability of better title, which the plaintiff in the present case, has manifestly failed to do."

The Bench, comprising Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Dipankar Datta, did agree that in the instant case the plaintiff/ present respondent was only expected to prove his title to a high degree of probability and not beyond reasonable doubt. However, having led in evidence only revenue documents which are essentially fiscal in nature, it was held that the plaintiff has been unable to assert his case to a high degree of probability.

Further, the Court also held that the Trial Court erred in giving its verdict in favour of plaintiff. Though the first appellate court overturned the findings of the Trial Court however, the High Court, in second appeal preferred by the plaintiff, restored the order of the Trial Court.

Dissatisfied with the same, the Top Court after placing its reliance upon the decision rendered in Gurdev Kaur vs. Kaki, reiterated that a second appellate court is not expected to conduct a “third trial on facts” or be “one more dice in the gamble.”

“The decision rendered by the first appellate court, not being in violation of the settled position of law, ought not to have been interfered with. With utmost respect to the High Court, we are constrained to observe that the question framed by it could be regarded as one of law, if it all, but did not merit the label of a substantial question of law so as to warrant interference with the first appellate decree under section 100 of the CPC.,” held the Court.

Factual Background

The dispute revolves around a piece of land. As per the plaintiff, a certain portion of the same land was sold by one K. Shamaiah, plaintiff's predecessor in-interest, to the vendor of the plaintiff. This, in turn was conveyed by the vendor to the plaintiff.

The turning point was the enactment of the Mysore (Personal & Miscellaneous) Inam Abolition Act, 1954 (Act), for abolition of Inams in the State of Mysore. As per the Act, all rights, title and interests in the land, hitherto vested in the Inamdars, ceased and came to be vested absolutely in the State of Mysore. However, the Act provided for an opportunity to the Inamdars to make an application under section 9 (Lands and buildings to vest in the Inamdar) of the Act to register as an occupant of the land.

Subsequently, the plaintiff's vendor applied under section 9A (Other Tenants of Inamdar) of the Act and sought occupancy rights before the Special Deputy Commissioner of Inams. The origin of the controversy is the interpretation of the Commissioner's order. While it was the plaintiff's claim that the order was passed favouring the vendor thus, making plaintiff the lawful owner. However, the defendant, also the present appellant, refuted this claim and argued that the order instead granted occupancy rights, under Section 9 of the Act, in favour of his predecessor-in-interest, i.e., K. Srinivasa Murty, the Inamdar. It is from him that the defendant purchased a certain portion of the land.

Thus, the Sale deeds were thereafter executed for the same parcel of land by both sides. This resulted in filing of the instant suit. The High Court, in second appeal preferred by the plaintiff, interpreted the Commissioner's order to be in favour of the plaintiff's vendor. This resulted in the present appeal.

Supreme Court's Analysis and Observations

The Court thereafter went on to examine sections 9 and 9A of the Act. Upon examining, the Court concluded that it is only a tenant or an Inamdar, who could have applied for occupancy rights. Apart from this, with regard to provision 9A it was observed:

“…. a tenant is afforded an opportunity for the same under section 9A of the Act subject to the condition that he was a tenant in respect of the subject land immediately prior to the date of vesting.”

Commissioner's order

In an application filed by the plaintiff's vendor, the commissioner rejected the claim on the basis that claimants were not tenants at the time of vesting.

Thus, after drawing these observations the top court stated: “This, in our view, can have only one possible meaning, that the claim of the plaintiff's vendor for occupancy right as a tenant was rejected , and that of the defendant's predecessor-in-interest was acknowledged.”

In this respect, the Court reiterated the settled law that a vendor cannot transfer a title to the vendee better than he himself possesses, the principle arising from the maxim nemo dat quod non habet, i.e., “no one can confer a better title than what he himself has”. In the present case, the plaintiff's vendor having been denied the right of title in the land by the Commissioner's order, could not have conveyed the same to her vendee., the court explained.

Further, the reliance placed on the other revenue entries containing the name of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's vendor to argue that the Commissioner's order vested the plaintiff's vendor with occupancy rights, and it is only in accordance with such order did the revenue authorities enter the plaintiff's vendor's name in the records, did not find favour with the Court.

“It is trite law that revenue records are not documents of title.,” the Court held.

 “Therefore, the multitude of revenue documents put to use to argue that the plaintiff was cultivating the suit property would not adequately meet the demands of proof made by law.,” the Court concluded.

Before parting, the Court also expressed its dissatisfaction with the High Court's judgment wherein it interpreted the Commissioner's order within the framework of the revenue records. The Court explained the same further by stating:

“An attempt ought to have been made by the High Court to harmoniously read the Commissioner's order with the provisions of the Act and to interpret the same so as to render it in consonance with the law, the failure of which leads to the inescapable conclusion that the same is indefensible.”

In view of the same, the Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court.

Case Title: P. KISHORE KUMAR v. VITTAL K. PATKAR., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7210 OF 2011

Citation : 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 999

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