Complete Supreme Court Quarterly Digest 2024- [January To March]

Abuse of Process of Law

Special Leave Petitions - Several matters, wherein the special leave petitions are filed either against the order seeking adjournment or the order issuing notices or grant/refusal of interim protections. Filing of such petitions not only wastes the time of the Court but it also puts unnecessary burden on the Courts and adds up to the pendency of matters before the Courts. Ranbir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 171

Acquittal

Appeal from acquittal – Principles of deciding – Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive i.e. inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary. Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge. If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed. If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal. If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts. In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court. (Para 36) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Reversing the order of acquittal into conviction – The High Court had erred in reversing the decision of acquittal, without arriving at any finding of illegality or perversity or error in the reasoning of the Trial Court. Setting aside an order of acquittal, which signifies a stronger presumption of innocence, on a mere change of opinion is not permissible. A low standard for turning an acquittal into conviction would be fraught with the danger of failure of justice. In reversing the order of acquittal, what is required is an illegality or perversity in order of trial court. (Para 34 & 39) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Administration of Justice

In the instant case, we find initiation of criminal proceedings before a forum which had no territorial jurisdiction by submitting incorrect facts and giving frivolous reasons to entertain such complaints. A closer look at the respondent's actions reveals more than just an inappropriate use of jurisdiction. The core issue of the dispute, which involves financial transactions and agreements, clearly places it in the realm of civil and commercial law. Yet, the respondent chose to pursue criminal charges in a quest to abuse the criminal justice system with a motive to seek personal vengeance rather than seeking true justice. This unnecessary turning of a civil matter into a criminal case not only overburdens the criminal justice system but also violates the principles of fairness and right conduct in legal matters. The apparent misuse of criminal proceedings in this case not only damages trust in our legal system but also sets a harmful precedent if not addressed. Dinesh Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : AIR 2024 SC 574

Unscrupulous litigants should not be allowed to go scot-free. They should be put to strict terms and conditions including costs. It is time to check with firmness such litigation initiated and laced with concealment, falsehood, and forum hunting. Even State actions or conduct of government servants being party to such malicious litigation should be seriously reprimanded. Dinesh Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : AIR 2024 SC 574

Vulnerable Witnesses Deposition Centres (VWDCs) - All the High Courts to take necessary steps for setting up of VWDCs in all districts. This exercise must be completed on or before 30 April 2024. (Para 2) Smruti Tukaram Badade v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 43

Administrative Law

While the primary duty of constitutional courts remains the control of power, including setting aside administrative actions that may be illegal or arbitrary, it must be acknowledged that such measures may not singularly address repercussions of abuse of power. It is equally incumbent upon the courts, as a secondary measure, to address the injurious consequences arising from arbitrary and illegal actions. This concomitant duty to take reasonable measures to restitute the injured is our overarching constitutional purpose. This is how we have read our constitutional text, and this is how we have built our precedents on the basis of our preambular objective to secure justice. (Para 19) Manoj Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 143 : AIR 2024 SC 1265 : (2024) 3 SCC 563

In public law proceedings, when it is realised that the prayer in the writ petition is unattainable due to passage of time, constitutional courts may not dismiss the writ proceedings on the ground of their perceived futility. In the life of litigation, passage of time can stand both as an ally and adversary. Our duty is to transcend the constraints of time and perform the primary duty of a constitutional court to control and regulate the exercise of power or arbitrary action. By taking the first step, the primary purpose and object of public law proceedings will be subserved. (Para 20) Manoj Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 143 : AIR 2024 SC 1265 : (2024) 3 SCC 563

Recruitment - Reserved Female Category - Non-Creamy Layer (NCL) - The Appellant i.e., a candidate who was scrupulously following the terms and conditions of the Impugned Advertisement was constrained to apply under the 'Open General Category' only on account of certain logistical limitations preventing her from obtaining a valid NCL Certificate. Held, the Appellant cannot be unfairly deprived of the benefit of female reservation merely on account of the Appellant's honesty and restraint which did not allow her to mark 'yes' against a column inquiring about a prospective candidates' status as a person belonging to the NCL, in the absence of the underlying supporting document. (Para 16 & 17) Priyanka Prakash Kulkarni v. Maharashtra Public Service Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 107

Adverse Possession

Declaration of title can be sought based on adverse possession. (Para 5) IDU v. Nizam Din, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 82

Tenants cannot claim adverse possession against their landlords since their possession is permissive in nature. (Para 9.4) Brij Narayan Shukla v. Sudesh Kumar @ Suresh Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : AIR 2024 SC 241 : (2024) 2 SCC 590

Advocate

Issue of delayed payment of fees to lawyers representing the State - Continual instances where Advocates are forced to resort to legal action to recover fees from the State may dissuade skilled Members of the Bar from representing the State. Hence, it is imperative to implement a fair and efficient policy ensuring prompt and timely payment of fees to Advocates representing the State. (Para 2) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Gopal K. Verma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 137

The High Court has imposed costs on the ground that the advocate had made an attempt to mislead the court. An advocate who appears before the court is first and foremost an officer of the court and is expected to discharge duties in that capacity. The advocate in this case is a junior at the Bar. Being a junior at the Bar is not an immunity from observing proper code of behaviour, particularly in dealing with the court. Soneshwar Deka v. Birsing Deka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Act, 1966

Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Act, 1966 (Andhra Pradesh) – Ghee as a product of livestock – The inclusion of “ghee” as a livestock product cannot be faulted merely because it is not directly obtained from milk, which is a product of livestock, it would still be a “product of a product of livestock”. 'Ghee' is derived out of 'milk' by undergoing a process, yet it still remains a product of livestock, for the purposes of the Act and payment of “market fee”. (Para 10) Sangam Milk Producer Company Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : AIR 2024 SC 1423

Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Act, 1966 (Andhra Pradesh) – Section 3 & 4 – Difference between the notification made under Section 3 of the Act and notification made subsequently under Section 4 of the Act – Notification under Section 3 is a onetime measure where the Government notifies an area where purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock can be made. Whereas under Section 4 the Govt. declares the 'notified market area' in respect of any notified product (products which have already been notified under section 3 of the Act). A draft notification and hearing of objections to the draft notification is mandatory under Section 3 but a prior hearing or prior publication of the draft notification is not a requirement under Section 4. The notification in question is a notification under Section 4, hence, no prior process was required to be followed as contemplated under Section 3 of the Act for working the scheme under Section 4 of the Act. Hence, the challenge to the notification has rightly been turned down. (Para 11) Sangam Milk Producer Company Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : AIR 2024 SC 1423

Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Act, 1966 (Andhra Pradesh) –Section 4(3) – Liability to pay market fee – Unjust enrichment – Section 4(3) empowers Market Committees to establish markets within the notified area, also directs that these Market Committees have to provide facilities in the markets for the purchase and sale of notified products. The appellants have availed the facility given by the Market Committee and hence they are liable to pay the fee. (Para 13) Sangam Milk Producer Company Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : AIR 2024 SC 1423

Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Act, 1966 (Andhra Pradesh) – Purpose – To consolidate and amend the laws regulating the purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock, along with establishment of markets in connection therewith. The aim was to secure effective and remunerative price of commodities by bringing producers and traders face to face thereby eliminating middlemen and do away with some other earlier unethical trade practices, which were exploiting agriculturists and farmers. (Para 2) Sangam Milk Producer Company Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : AIR 2024 SC 1423

Ancient Monuments

Notwithstanding any liberal recommendation on undertaking blasting operations nearer to the Chittorgarh Fort, keeping in perspective the continuous exposure of ancient monuments to peak particle velocity (PPV) arising from blasting, a radius of five kilometres from the compound wall of the Fort shall not be subjected to mining by blasting or use of explosives for mining of any minerals. In other words, the manual/mechanical mining operations permitted within a radius of five kilometres are allowed to be continued, subject to the lessees possessing a valid lease in accordance with law. (Para 24.3) Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Bhanwar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : AIR 2024 SC 833

The Chittorgarh Fort represents the quintessence of a tribute to nationalism, courage, medieval chivalry, and sacrifice exhibited between the seventh and the sixteenth centuries by several rulers, like the Mewar rulers of Sisodia, their kinsmen, women, and children. The Chittorgarh Fort has weathered and withstood many battles and has been a witness to the power and pride of the kings who occupied the Fort. The history is replete with brave, extraordinary and indomitable courage exhibited by the rulers and occupants of the Fort. The Chittorgarh Fort is a notified monument under the Ancient and Historical Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains (Declaration of National Importance) Act, 1951 and the Ancient Monuments Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958, and also a notified UNESCO World Heritage Site. The Fort attracts tourists from far and near for sightseeing and to look at the tall and strong structures on the hilltop of Chittorgarh, evidencing the grit and ability to withstand all adversities. Despite the passage of centuries, from the time of construction, the Chittorgarh Fort retains some significant, world-class structures, including the Vijay Stambh, Kirti Stambh, Padmini Palace, Kumbha Palace and Meera Mandir. The Fort's history and legacy make it a preferred destination for tourists. The serene hillock, which had less populated surroundings at one point, is subject to contemporaneous development, urbanisation, etc. (Para 1 & 2) Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Bhanwar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : AIR 2024 SC 833

The Chittorgarh Fort was constructed in the Mauryan period, and from time to time, the rulers of the kingdom rebuilt, expanded and continued the legacy inherited. The Report of CSIR-CBRI, Roorkee, deals with the impact on the Chittorgarh Fort from the explosives used in mining and the peak particle velocity (PPV) on the structures existing in and around the Fort. The Report also deals with the ancillary causes for the present state of affairs, i.e., footfall of tourists, the presence of monkeys and haphazard maintenance by the ASI and local authorities. We are of the view that the approach to preserving the monument must be multidimensional. With the passage of every year, the need to preserve monuments increases. The prohibition and regulation of blasting would address only one front of the problems identified in the Report. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that the Chittorgarh Fort, a heritage monument, must be maintained and preserved under all the circumstances. (Para 22) Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Bhanwar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : AIR 2024 SC 833

Anticipatory Bail

Custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating into the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also not be a ground to release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for the purpose of investigation. (Para 12) Ashok Kumar v. State of Union Territory Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 223

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

An award could be said to be against the public policy of India in, inter alia, the following circumstances: 1. When an award is, on its face, in patent violation of a statutory provision 2. When the arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal has failed to adopt a judicial approach in deciding the dispute. 3. When an award is in violation of the principles of natural justice. 4. When an award is unreasonable or perverse. 5. When an award is patently illegal, which would include an award in patent contravention of any substantive law of India or in patent breach of the 1996 Act. 6. When an award is contrary to the interest of India, or against justice or morality, in the sense that it shocks the conscience of the Court. (Para 27) S.V. Samudram v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : AIR 2024 SC 447 : (2024) 3 SCC 623

Sections 34 and 37 - Modification of Arbitral Award not allowed under Section 34. Court could have at best set aside the award and could not modify the same. (Para 32.8) S.V. Samudram v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : AIR 2024 SC 447 : (2024) 3 SCC 623

Sections 34 or 37 - Whether the courts have the power to modify the arbitral award ? Referred to a larger Bench. Gayatri Balasamy v. Isg Novasoft Technologies Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 149

Section 48 – Enforcement of foreign award in India challenged on grounds of arbitral bias – In India, courts must adopt an internationally recognized narrow standard of public policy, when dealing with the aspect of bias. Refusal of enforcement of foreign award should only be in a rare case where, non- adherence to International Standards is clearly demonstrable. Held, cannot infer bias or likelihood of bias of the Presiding Arbitrator, hence there is no violation of the public policy, which would render the foreign award unenforceable in India. The award debtors have failed to substantiate their allegation of bias, conflict of interest or the failure by the Presiding Arbitrator to render disclosure to the parties, as an objection to the enforcement of the award. Courts across the world have applied a higher threshold of bias to prevent enforcement of an Award than the standards set for ordinary judicial review. The award debtors have failed to meet the high threshold for refusal of enforcement of a foreign award under Section 48 of the Indian Arbitration Act. The decision given by the High Court for enforcement/execution of the foreign award stands approved. (Para 22, 25, 36, 42 & 43) Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. Hsbc Pi Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 267

Section 48 – Challenge of Arbitral bias raised at the enforcement stage – Held, challenge of arbitral bias is raised at the enforcement stage, must be discouraged by Courts to send out a clear message that Indian Courts would ensure enforcement of a foreign Award unless it is demonstrable that there is a clear violation of morality and justice. No setting aside challenge based on bias was raised before the Singapore Courts by the appellants within the limitation period. Since the objection of bias was not raised in appropriate proceedings it could not be raised at the post-award Stage. Held, the Award Debtors should have applied for setting aside of the Award before the Singapore Courts at the earliest point of time. (Para 27, 29 & 42) Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. Hsbc Pi Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 267

Section 78(5) – Arbitration clause – Two-Contract Case – When the parties enter into a contract, making a general reference to another contract, such general reference would not have the effect of incorporating the arbitration clause from the referred document into the contract between the parties. The arbitration clause from another contract can be incorporated into the contract only by a specific reference to arbitration clause. A reference to the document in the contract should be such that shows the intention to incorporate the arbitration clause from another document into the contract between the parties. The present case is a 'two-contract' case. Clause 7.0 of the L.O.I. which also forms part of the agreement specifically provides that the redressal of the dispute between the NBCC and the respondent shall 'only' be through civil courts having jurisdiction of Delhi alone. When there is a reference in the second contract to the terms and conditions of the first contract, the arbitration clause would not ipso facto be applicable to the second contract unless there is a specific mention/reference thereto. The present case is not a case of 'incorporation' but a case of 'reference' and a general reference would not have the effect of incorporating the arbitration clause. The learned single judge of the Delhi High Court has erred in allowing the appointed the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. (Para 10, 12, 13, 21 & 23) Nbcc (India) Ltd. v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 246

The Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to proceedings for appointment of arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("A&C Act"), and a Court may refuse to make a reference if the claims, on the date of commencement of arbitration proceedings, are ex-facie barred. (Para 50) Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : AIR 2024 SC 1347

The Parliament should consider bringing an amendment to the Act, 1996 prescribing a specific period of limitation within which a party may move the court for making an application for appointment of arbitrators under Section 11 of the Act, 1996. (Para 94) Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : AIR 2024 SC 1347

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007; Section 31 - The recruitment was not confined to the priority / reserved class rather it was open for general category also in case vacancies remain available. The Recruitment application(s) clearly establishes that the appellants have applied as a general category candidate(s) against the surplus seats/vacancies remaining unfilled after considering the priority/reserved quota for relatives of servicemen/ex-servicemen, etc. In a situation, when they have not claimed any enrollment/recruitment on the basis of relationship with servicemen/ex-servicemen, there was no occasion for them to submit any relationship certificate. The discharge/dismissal of the appellants from service is vitiated on grounds that they have actually not produced any relationship certificate for selection/recruitment as they never applied in the reserved category. The discharge/dismissal order of the appellants is certainly invalid for want of nonconsideration of the plea taken by the appellants. (Para 17, 24) No.2809759H Ex-Recruit Babanna Machched v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 102 : AIR 2024 SC 921

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007; Section 31 - It was not the case of the respondents ever that the vacancies on which the appellants have been enrolled/recruited were only for the alleged reserved category and not for general category. Subsequent improvement in defence and supplementing reasoning of discharge/dismissal which is not contained in the order impugned is not permissible in law. (Para 23) No.2809759H Ex-Recruit Babanna Machched v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 102 : AIR 2024 SC 921

Bail

An accused, while joining investigation as a condition for remaining enlarged on bail, is not expected to make self-incriminating statements under the threat that the State shall seek withdrawal of such interim protection. Bijender v State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 209

Bail condition restraining political activities violates fundamental rights, can't be imposed. Siba Shankar Das v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 259

Anticipatory bail cannot be granted merely because the accused is willing to pay an interim compensation. State of Jharkhand v. Md. Sufiyan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 54

Bail / Anticipatory Bail - Expeditious adjudication of bail matters - High Court's duty to ensure timely justice - Supreme Court's directive to High Court of Bombay - Constitutionality of Article 21 - Liberty of citizen paramount - Urgency in deciding bail applications emphasized. (Para 3 - 6) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159

Bail / Anticipatory Bail - Application for anticipatory bail was not decided for a period of more than four years. The Judges are not deciding the matter on merits but find an excuse to shunt the case on different grounds. Held, decide the matter pertaining to bail / anticipatory bail as expeditiously as possible. (Para 4 - 6) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159

Bail cannot be cancelled merely due to non-appearance of accused before court. Krishna Sharma v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Cancellation of Bail - Merely because the accused did not appear personally could not have been a ground for cancellation of bail. The parameters for grant of bail and cancellation of bail are totally different. The bail already granted may be cancelled, if it is found that the person who has been granted the benefit of bail has violated any of the conditions or misused the liberty by influencing the witnesses or tampering with the evidence. Krishna Sharma v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Delays in the disposal of bail applications - Need for expeditious delivery of judgments - Bail applications should ideally be disposed of within two weeks, and anticipatory bail applications within six weeks. Despite these guidelines, the Court noted persistent delays and directed all courts to strictly adhere to the issued directions. The High Courts were left with the discretion to devise mechanisms for monthly checks on pending cases. (Para 5 – 9) Rajanti Devi @ Rajanti Kumari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 50

Personal Liberty - When the petitioner applied for bail on merits and also on the ground that he had been incarcerated in jail for seven and a half years, the approach of the High Court in only permitting him to file an application for bail before the Trial Court/Sessions Court and not deciding the prayer for bail on merits, would amount to non-exercise of jurisdiction vested in it. The approach of the High Court was not in accordance with the sanctity that has been given to personal liberty in the catena of judgments. Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 78

Banking Law

A bank cannot be held responsible for illegal activities carried out by the borrower in mortgaged premises. Punjab National Bank v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 127

Rate of Interest on loan amount is a policy decision – The respondent No.1 being a NBFC and as a corporate body would be bound by its policies and procedures with regard to lending and recovery. In that regard, the applicability of the rate of interest to be charged is also a matter of policy and cannot be case-specific unless the individual agreement entered into between the parties indicate otherwise. (Para 10) Rajesh Monga v. Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : AIR 2024 SC 1305

Cash Transfer of Food Subsidy Rules, 2015

Cash Transfer of Food Subsidy Rules, 2015 – Object – To provide food subsidy in cash directly into the bank accounts of entitled households to purchase the entitled quantity of food grains from the open market. (Para 6) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

Caste / Religion

Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Denotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000; Section 3 & 4 - The Caste Certificate issued by the Competent Authority under Section 4 would be valid subject to the verification and grant of Validity Certificate by the Scrutiny Committee. The certificate attains finality only if it is authenticated with a Validity Certificate. (Para 5) Sudhir Vilas Kalel v. Bapu Rajaram Kalel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : AIR 2024 SC 1010 : (2024) 3 SCC 679

We see no reason for mentioning the caste/religion of any litigant either before this Court or the courts below. Such a practice is to be shunned and must be ceased forthwith. It is therefore deemed appropriate to pass a general order directing that henceforth the caste or religion of parties shall not be mentioned in the memo of parties of a petition/proceeding filed before this Court, irrespective of whether any such details have been furnished before the courts below. A direction is also issued to all the High Courts to ensure that the caste/religion of a litigant does not appear in the memo of parties in any petition/suit/proceeding filed before the High Court or the Subordinate Courts under their respective jurisdictions. The above directions shall be brought to the notice of the members of the Bar as well as the Registry for immediate compliance. A copy of this order shall be placed before the Registrar concerned for perusal and for circulation to the Registrar Generals of all the High Courts for strict compliance. (Para 11 & 12) Shama Sharma v. Kishan Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 62

Central Excise Act, 1944

Central Excise Act, 1944; Section 11B - It entitles any person claiming refund of any duty of excise and interest to make an application for refund of such duty and interest before the expiry of one year from the relevant date (prior to 12.05.2000, it was six months instead of one year). (Para 9.2) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645

Central Excise Act, 1944; Section 11BB - It provides for interest on delayed refund. It says that if any duty ordered to be refunded under sub-section (2) of Section 11B to any applicant is not refunded within three months from the date of receipt of the application under subsection (1) of that section, there shall be paid to such applicant interest at such rate not below five percent and not exceeding thirty percent per annum as for the time being fixed by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette. (Para 9.3) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645

Chartered Accountants Act, 1949

Chartered Accountants Act, 1949; Section 29A and 21A(4), Chartered Accountants (Procedure of Investigation of Professional and Other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007; Rule 9(3)(b) - Rule 9(3)(b) of subordinate legislation challenged as being ultra vires, on the ground that it exceeds the Rule making power under Section 29A(2)(c) of the parent Act. The power to make rules generally for carrying out the provisions of the Act is found in Section 29A(1). Section 29A(2) is only illustrative and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the general power of the Central Government to make rules under Section 29A(1). Even if specific topics are not explicitly listed in the statute, the formulation of rules can be justified if it falls within the general power conferred, provided it stays within the overall scope of the Act. The impugned Rule 9(3)(b) falls within the scope of the general delegation of power under Section 29A(1). Hence the Impugned Rule is not ultra vires the Parent Act. (Para 34 & 37) Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : AIR 2024 SC 1139

Principle of 'Generality vs Enumeration' - Where a statute confers particular powers without prejudice to the generality of a general power already conferred, the particular powers are only illustrative of the general power, and do not in any way restrict the general power. The illustrative list of subjects set out in Section 29A(2) cannot be read as exhaustive since the legislature has deployed the expression 'without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions' before enumerating the specific heads for exercising the rule-making power. (Para 32) Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : AIR 2024 SC 1139

Chartered Accountants (Procedure of Investigation of Professional and Other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007; Rule 9(3)(b) and The Chartered Accountants Act, 1949; Section 21A(4) and 29A - Rule 9(3)(b) of subordinate legislation challenged on the ground of being 'ultra vires' to Section 21A(4) of the parent Act. In cases where the Board disagrees with the opinion of the Director, under Section 21A(4) the Board may advise the Director to further investigate the matter. However, Rule 9(3) does not limit itself to directions for further investigation. It also enables the Board to straightaway proceed to act by itself or refer the matter to the Disciplinary Committee, depending on whether the alleged misconduct relates to the First Schedule or Second Schedule. The 'prima facie' opinion of the Director will become nothing but a final opinion if the Board will have no option except to direct the Director to further investigate the matter. The impugned Rule falls within the scope of the general delegation of power under Section 29A(1). (Para 19 & 37) Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : AIR 2024 SC 1139

Child Custody

Welfare of the child is of paramount consideration and will override any personal law or statute. The wishes/desire of the child who is capable of forming an opinion has to be considered by the court while deciding any matter of child custody. On interaction by the court with the child, it is found that the child is intelligent and capable of understanding her welfare and wishes to live with the Appellant. The welfare of the child lies with custody of the appellants. (Para 14, 16, 17 & 20) Shazia Aman Khan v. State of Orissa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 193 : AIR 2024 SC 1299

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Amendment in pleadings – No evidence could be led beyond pleadings – Specific amendment in the pleadings was sought by the plaintiffs with reference to oral partition but the same was rejected by the trial court. In such a situation, where no further challenge was made to the rejection, the plaint attained finality and evidence with reference to oral partition cannot be considered. The Trial Court had rightly ignored the plea taken in the replication by the plaintiffs regarding oral partition, as amendment sought to that effect had already been declined. What was not permitted to be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. The High Court committed a grave error in placing reliance upon the partition which was not even the pleaded case. (Para 14, 15 & 16) Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai v. Kumar Vamanrao @ Alok, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : AIR 2024 SC 1310

Order 5 Rule 25 - Original Side Rules; Order IV - Institution of ordinary suits and service of summons - Service where defendant resides out of India and has no agent - In the present case, the appellant had appeared before the High Court at the stage when leave to sue was sought by the respondent. Leave to sue was granted on 24 January 2020. It was over two years thereafter on 9 March 2022 that an advocate's notice was issued to the appellant. From the advocate's notice, it is evident that the requirement of the High Court OS Rules, which have been noted earlier, were not complied with. The Advocate's notice contained no annexures or documents. It is not evident from the suit number referred to in the notice whether it was the same plaint in respect of which leave to sue had been granted two years earlier. (Para 19) Trois Corporation HK Ltd v. National Ventures Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Order 8, Rules 3 & 5 – Specific admission and denial of the pleadings in the plaint – A general or evasive denial is not treated as sufficient. Rule 5 provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied in the written statement, shall be taken to be admitted by the defendant. In the written statement filed by the appellants, no specific para-wise reply was given. The failure of the defendant to give a para wise reply against the claim made by the plaintiff would make the allegations made in the plaint as admitted against the defendant. As there is no specific admission or denial with reference to the allegation in different paras, it becomes a roving inquiry for the Court to find out as to which line in some paragraph in the plaint is either admitted or denied in the written statement filed. (Para 15) Thangam v. Navamani Ammal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : AIR 2024 SC 1324

Order 8 Rule 10 - Mere failure or neglect of a defendant to file a written statement controverting the pleaded facts in the plaint, in all cases, may not entitle him to a judgment in his favour unless by adducing evidence he proves his case/claim. (Para 18) Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : AIR 2024 SC 602

Order 9 Rule 13 - The order of the High Court directing a deposit of 75% of the suit claim as a condition precedent for condoning the delay and for setting aside the ex parte decree was unwarranted. The ends of justice would have been met if an order of costs was imposed on the appellant as a condition precedent for condoning the delay and for setting aside the ex parte decree. Imposing a requirement of a deposit of 75% of the suit claim is disproportionate and would have to be set aside. (Para 20) Trois Corporation HK Ltd v. National Ventures Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Order 14 Rule 2 - The question of jurisdiction would assume importance even at the stage a court considers the question of grant of interim relief. Where interim relief is claimed in a suit before a civil court and the party to be affected by grant of such relief, or any other party to  the suit, raises a point of maintainability thereof or that it is barred by law and also contends on that basis that interim relief should not to be granted, grant of relief in whatever form, if at all, ought to be preceded by formation and recording of at least a prima facie satisfaction that the suit is maintainable or that it is not barred by law. Such a satisfaction resting on appreciation of the averments in the plaint, the application for interim relief and the written objection thereto, as well as the relevant law that is cited in support of the objection, would be a part of the court's reasoning of a prima facie case having been set up for interim relief, that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant and non-grant would cause irreparable harm and prejudice. It would be inappropriate for a court to abstain from recording its prima facie satisfaction on the question of maintainability, yet, proceed to grant protection pro tem on the assumption that the question of maintainability has to be decided as a preliminary issue under Rule 2 of Order XIV, CPC. That could amount to an improper exercise of power. If the court is of the opinion at the stage of hearing the application for interim relief that the suit is barred by law or is otherwise not maintainable, it cannot dismiss it without framing a preliminary issue after the written statement is filed but can most certainly assign such opinion for refusing interim relief. However, if an extraordinary situation arises where it could take time to decide the point of maintainability of the suit and non grant of protection pro tem pending such decision could lead to irreversible consequences, the court may proceed to make an appropriate order in the manner indicated above justifying the course of action it adopts. In other words, such an order may be passed, if at all required, to avoid irreparable harm or injury or undue hardship to the party claiming the relief and/or to ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous by reason of non-interference by the court. (Para 39) Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : AIR 2024 SC 602

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Delay in registration of FIR – The FIR suffers from a serious delay of three years which is totally unexplained. The unexplained inordinate delay in bringing allegations to the police's attention despite knowledge of previous inquiry, adds a layer of scepticism to the authenticity of the claims. Deepak Kumar Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2024 Cri LJ 1388 : (2024) 3 SCC 601

The Police Officer seems to be under an impression that the accused has to appear before him and prove his innocence. Such an approach cannot be countenanced. Md Tauhid v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 106

When there is a fixed term sentence and especially when the appeal is not likely to be heard before completing the entire period of sentence, normally suspension of sentence and bail should be granted. Atul @ Ashutosh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 93

Sections 61, 70, 204, 437 - An accused cannot be taken into custody when he voluntarily surrenders before the Court even though the Court which has taken cognizance of the chargesheet has not issued a summoning order against him. Bail application filed by such an accused, who voluntarily surrendered even in the absence of a summoning order, cannot be entertained. (Para 10) Souvik Bhattacharya v. Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata Zonal Office - II, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 122

Section 82(1) - An accused would not be entitled to pre-arrest bail if the non-bailable warrant and the proclamation under Section 82(1) Cr.P.C. is pending against him. (Para 5) Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : AIR 2024 SC 1600

Section 82 and 83 - Mere filing of an anticipatory bail application by the accused could not be treated as his appearance before the court which had initiated proceedings under Section 82/83 Cr.P.C. against the accused. (Para 20) Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : AIR 2024 SC 1600

Section 91 - Courts cannot issue processes under Section 91 Cr.P.C. to compel the production of things / documents based on the application made by the accused at the stage of framing of charges. The accused's entitlement to seek an order for the production of things or documents under Section 91 of Cr.P.C. would ordinarily not come till the stage of defence. (Para 6) State of Rajasthan v. Swarn Singh @ Baba, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 136

Section 125 - The approach of the State of taking the side of the husband in a maintenance case, to say the least, is very strange. In fact, the counsel, who appeared for the State, was under a duty and obligation to act as an officer of the Court and to assist the Court in arriving at a correct conclusion. (Para 7 & 8) Asiya Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 140

Section 156 (3) - An affidavit is necessary with the application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. - Directions in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 are mandatory. Ramesh Kumar Bung v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 213

Section 161 - If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. (Para 26) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164

Section 167 and 173 - Once from the material produced along with the chargesheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the chargesheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet or that the chargesheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. (Para 23) Central Bureau of Investigation v. Kapil Wadhawan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : AIR 2024 SC 905 : 2024 Cri LJ 1082

Section 172 – Diary of proceedings – Every police officer making an investigation under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. is required to enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary day by day. Sub-section (IA) of Section 172 requires that the statements of the witnesses recorded during the course of investigation under section 161 have to be inserted in the case diary; and sub-section (1B) of Section 172 requires that such diary shall be a volume and duly paginated. (Para 11) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

A case diary is maintained by an Investigating Officer during his investigation for the purpose of entering the day-to-day proceedings of the investigation. While doing so, the Investigating Officer should mandatorily record the necessary particulars gathered in the course of investigation with the relevant date, time and place. Under sub-section (1-A) and (1-B) of Section 172 of CrPC, the Investigating Officer has to mention, in his case diary, the statement of witnesses recorded during investigation with due pagination. Sub-section (1-A) and (1-B) were inserted by Act 5 of 2009 with effect from 31/12/2009. The object of these sub-sections is to facilitate a fair investigation since a statement made under Section 161 of CrPC is not expected to be signed as mandated by Section 162 of CrPC. (Para 20) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Section 172 (3) - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 and 161 - Whenever a case is made out either under Section 145 or under Section 161 of the Evidence Act, the benefit conferred thereunder along with the benefit of Section 172(3) of CrPC has to be extended to an accused. Thus, the accused has a right to cross-examine a police officer as to the recording made in the case diary whenever the police officer uses it to refresh his memory. Though Section 161 of the Evidence Act does not restrict itself to a case of refreshing memory by perusing a case diary alone, there is no exclusion for doing so. Similarly, in a case where the court uses a case diary for the purpose of contradicting a police officer, then an accused is entitled to peruse the said statement so recorded which is relevant, and cross-examine the police officer on that count. What is relevant in such a case is the process of using it for the purpose of contradiction and not the conclusion. To make the position clear, though Section 145 read with Section 161 of the Evidence Act deals with the right of a party including an accused, such a right is limited and restrictive when it is applied to Section 172 of CrPC. Suffice it is to state that the said right cannot be declined when the author of a case diary uses it to refresh his memory or the court uses it for the purpose of contradiction. Therefore, held that Section 145 and Section 161 of the Evidence Act on the one hand and Section 172(3) of CrPC on the other are to be read in consonance with each other, subject to the limited right conferred under sub-section (3) of Section 172 of CrPC. (Para 27) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Section 173 – Power of Magistrate to act on Police report – When such a Police Report concludes that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons, the Magistrate has three options: (i) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, (ii) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report, or (iii) he may disagree with the report and discharge the accused or drop the proceedings. If such Police Report concludes that no offence appears to have been committed, the Magistrate again has three options: (i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings, or (ii) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (iii) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156. (Para 14) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173 – Police report – It is an opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the concerned court that on the material collected during the course of investigation, an offence appears to have been committed by the particular person or persons, or that no offence appears to have been committed. (Para 13) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Mandatory requirements of police report – It is found that the investigating officers while submitting the chargesheet/Police Report do not comply with the requirements of the Section 173(2). Though the form of the report to be submitted under Section 173(2) has to be prescribed by the State Government and each State Government has its own Police Manual, the mandatory requirements required to be complied with by such officers in the Police Report/Chargesheet are laid down in Section 173. It is incumbent on the part of the Investigating Officer to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 173(2). Only the report forwarded by the police officer to the Magistrate under Section 173(2). can form the basis for the competent court for taking cognizance thereupon. A chargesheet is nothing but a final report of the police officer under Section 173(2) of. (Para 12 & 13) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Directions issued and particulars listed for compliance in a police report on completion of investigation – Report of police officer on the completion of investigation shall contain (i) A report in the form prescribed by the State Government stating- (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170 Cr.PC. (h) Whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under [sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB] or section 376E of the IPC. (ii) If upon the completion of investigation, there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the Police officer in charge shall clearly state in the Report about the compliance of Section 169 Cr.PC. (iii) When the report in respect of a case to which Section 170 Cr.PC. applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report, all the documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; and the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC. of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. (iv) In case of further investigation, the Police officer in charge shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and shall also comply with the details mentioned in the above sub para (i) to (iii). (Para 17) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Right to default bail on grounds of incomplete police report – Once from the material produced along with the chargesheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the chargesheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet or that the chargesheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. (Para 15) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(8) - Protest Petition - An application seeking further investigation can be treated as a protest petition if the application prima facie establishes the commission of the offences, and such an application can't be technically rejected because procedural recourse of filing a protest petition is not followed. Although the proper course for the complainant would have been to file a protest petition instead of filing it under Section 173(8) for further investigation, a petition should not be rejected merely because it is filed under the wrong caption. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Section 178 (8) - It would be impermissible under the law for a Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance of a supplementary charge-sheet submitted after further investigation if it doesn't contain any fresh oral or documentary evidence, would be impermissible under the law. While submitting the supplementary charge-sheet as a result of an order of further investigation under Section 178 (8) Cr.P.C., the Investigating Officer shall mention new evidence found to substantiate the conclusions drawn by him. Otherwise, such supplementary charge-sheet lacks investigative rigour and fails to satisfy the requisites of Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The provision for submitting a supplementary report infers that fresh oral or documentary evidence should be obtained rather than reevaluating or reassessing the material already collected and considered by the investigating agency while submitting the initial police report, known as the chargesheet under Section 173(2) CrPC. (Para 26 & 27) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 197 - Fabrication of records cannot be a part of the official duty of a public servant. (Para 25) Shadakshari V. State Of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Section 197 Cr.P.C. does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission of a public servant while in service. It is restricted to only those acts or omissions which are done by public servants in the discharge of official duties. (Para 23) Shadakshari V. State Of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Section 202 – Issue of summon – The Magistrate cannot issue the summons until there is satisfaction that the material was sufficient to pass the summoning order. The learned Magistrate being not satisfied that the material on the record of the complaint, was sufficient to pass the summoning order, had called for the police report under Section 202 of the Cr.PC. Once the Magistrate has called for the police report under Section 202 of the Cr.PC, then the magistrate couldn't issue summon unless the report is submitted by the police. The order issuing process has drastic consequences and requires application of mind. The learned Magistrate was not justified in passing the order to issue a summons. Shiv Jatia v. Gian Chand Malick, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : AIR 2024 SC 1186 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1360

Section 202 – Summons - A Magistrate, while issuing the summoning order, shall not act in a casual manner; rather they should be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused. The recording of the satisfaction of the Magistrate while issuing the summons should not be in a cryptic manner but only when a prima facie case is made out from the allegations. Detailed reasoning is not required from the Magistrate while issuing summons, but the Magistrate also needs to record satisfaction that there exists a sufficient ground for proceedings. (Para 18) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 202(1) – Postponement of issue of process – Section 202(1) was amended with effect from 23rd June 2006. The requirement of postponing the issue of the process is applicable only when one of the accused stays outside the jurisdiction of the court. The mandate of postponing the issue of the process introduced with effect from 23rd June 2006 was not applicable on the date of filing of the complaint in 2004. Shiv Jatia v. Gian Chand Malick, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : AIR 2024 SC 1186 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1360

Section 242(3) - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 138 – The general rule is that witnesses shall be examined in the order laid down in Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. An exception to this rule is Section 242(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 under which, in a warrant case, the learned Magistrate, by recording reasons, can permit cross-examination of a witness to be postponed till a particular witness or witnesses are examined. Held, recording only the examination-in-chief of 12 prosecution witnesses without recording cross-examination is contrary to the law. (Para 6 & 7) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261

Section 313 – It is only after the prosecution discharges its duty of proving the case beyond all reasonable doubt that the false explanation or non-explanation of the accused could be taken into consideration. (Para 21) Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 60 : AIR 2024 SC 695 : (2024) 3 SCC 481

Section 313 - Statement recorded u/s. 313 CrPC cannot form the sole basis of conviction. Mere omission to take a specific plea by accused when examined u/s 313 CrPC, is not enough to denude him of his right if the same can be made out otherwise. (Para 33) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164

Section 319 – Discretionary powers of High Court –The materials on record could not be said to have satisfied the threshold envisaged under Hardeep Singh v State of Punjab & Ors., i.e., more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. The High Court failed to appreciate that the discretionary powers under Section 319 of the CrPC ought to have been used sparingly where circumstances of the case so warrant. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence laid before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. (Para 7 & 10) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 319 - High Court overturned the Trial Court Order; and accordingly impleaded the Appellants' as accused person(s) in the Underlying Proceedings on the satisfaction of a prima-facie finding that the materials on record i.e., (i) vague allegations emanating from the underlying complaint; (ii) the Complainant's statement under Section 161 of the CrPC; and (iii) the Complainant's examination-in-chief, are sufficient to proceed against the Appellant(s). Held, the High Court failed to appreciate that the discretionary powers under Section 319 of the CrPC ought to have been used sparingly where circumstances of the case so warrant. The Trial Court Order was well reasoned and did not suffer from any perversity. Moreover, the materials on record could not be said to have satisfied the threshold i.e., more than a prima facie case, as exercised at the time of framing of charge but short of evidence that if left unrebutted would lead to conviction. (Para 9 & 10) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 357(1) - A victim of a crime cannot be treated merely as a prosecution witness. Section 357(1) of Cr.P.C. empowers the court to order that the fine amount recovered be given to any person as compensation who has suffered any loss or injury caused due to that offence. There may be times when the situation may demand that a substantive amount of compensation be paid to the victim and the convict may not be financially that strong to bear that burden. For such situations, Section 357A was therefore introduced in Criminal Procedure Code for this reason, where compensation to the victims may be paid out of State funds, as the State had the responsibility to protect the victim against the offence that had been committed against the victim of the crime. (Para 19) Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : AIR 2024 SC 271 : (2024) 3 SCC 125

Section 378 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 r/w. 2 & 3 - Delay that occurred in preferring an appeal against acquittal can be condoned under limitation act. Mohd Abaad Ali v. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 141 : AIR 2024 SC 1271 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1335

Section 391 – A party who was not diligent in producing evidence at the trial stage of a criminal case cannot seek to produce the same in appeal. The power to record additional evidence at the appellate stage should not be exercised in a routine and casual manner. Such a power shall only be exercised when non-recording of the evidence may lead to failure to justice. Power to record additional evidence under Section 391 CrPC should only be exercised when the party making such request was prevented from presenting the evidence in the trial despite due diligence being exercised or that the facts giving rise to such prayer came to light at a later stage during pendency of the appeal. (Para 9) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Section 432 - A consideration for remission must be by way of an application under Section 432 of the CrPC which has to be made by the convict or on his behalf. In the first instance whether there is compliance of Section 433A of the CrPC must be noted inasmuch as a person serving a life sentence cannot seek remission unless fourteen years of imprisonment has been completed. (Para 55 (b) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 432 - The application for remission under Section 432 of the CrPC could be only before the Government of the State within whose territorial jurisdiction the applicant was convicted (appropriate Government) and not before any other Government within whose territorial jurisdiction the applicant may have been transferred on conviction or where the offence has occurred. (Para 55 (a) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 432 - The guidelines under Section 432(2) with regard to the opinion to be sought from the Presiding Judge of the Court which had convicted the applicant must be complied with mandatorily. While doing so it is necessary to follow the requirements of the said Section which are highlighted, namely, (i) the opinion must state as to whether the application for remission should be granted or refused and for either of the said opinions, the reasons must be stated; (ii) the reasons must have a bearing on the facts and circumstances of the case; (iii) the opinion must have a nexus to the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists; (iv) the Presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, must also forward along with the statement of such opinion granting or refusing remission, a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists. (Para 55 (c) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 432 (2) - The Jail Advisory Committee which has to consider the application for remission may not have the District Judge as a Member inasmuch as the District Judge, being a Judicial Officer may coincidently be the very judge who may have to render an opinion independently in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 432 of the CrPC. (Para 55 (g) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 435 - State Government to act after consultation with Central Government in certain cases - Held, there has also to be consultation in accordance with Section 435 of the CrPC wherever the same is necessitated. (Para 55 (f) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 438 – Anticipatory bail granted on the condition is totally alien to the principles governing bail jurisprudence and is nothing short of perversity. State v. B. Ramu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 128

Section 438 – Pre-arrest/Anticipatory Bail – Grant of pre-arrest bail to a police officer facing allegations of manipulating the investigation so as to favour an accused would send out a wrong signal in society and would be against public interest. Presumptions and other considerations applicable to a layperson facing criminal charges may not carry the same weight while dealing with a police officer who is alleged to have abused his office. Considering the position held by the respondent, even if he was suspended from service, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and the evidence was sufficiently high. Bail order is liable to be set aside. (Para 9 & 10) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Section 438 – Pre-arrest/Anticipatory Bail – Court must record reasons for grant of Bail – An order of bail, bereft of any cogent reason, could not be sustained. Though grant of bail is discretionary, it calls for exercise of such discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. The High Court did not deem it necessary to record as to what weighed with it while granting pre-arrest bail to the respondent, hence, bail order is set aside. (Para 5, 6 & 7) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Section 438 – Bail / Anticipatory Bail – Considerations by Court while dealing with a bail petition – Similar considerations would apply even for grant of anticipatory bail – The nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case. (Para 7) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Sections 438 and 439 - Bail Applications - Applicants must include : details and copies of previous bail orders. Information on pending bail applications in any court, with a clear statement if none are pending. Bail applications in the same FIR should be heard by the same Judge, unless there are specific circumstances. The application indicates whether it is the first, second, or subsequent one for clarity. The court registry should attach a system-generated report on decided or pending bail applications for the specified crime case. This procedure applies to private complaints as well, with cases assigned specific numbers. The Investigating Officer or State Counsel should inform the court of relevant orders, and counsels must conduct themselves as officers of the Court. These suggestions aim to streamline proceedings and prevent anomalies in bail applications during ongoing trials or sentence suspension. (Para 20 & 21) Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : AIR 2024 SC 790

Section 439 (2) – Cancellation of Bail order - The exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge in cancelling the bail granted by another Single Judge of the same High Court, by examining the merits of the allegations, tantamounts to judicial impropriety/indiscipline. The application for cancellation of bail filed on merits as opposed to violation of the conditions of the bail order should have been placed before the same learned Single Judge who had granted bail to the accused. The act of reviewing the orders granting bail to the accused by another Single Judge is uncalled for and amounts to gross impropriety. (Para 10) Himanshu Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2024 Cri LJ 1482

Section 439 – Grounds for cancellation of bail - Bail granted to an accused can only be cancelled if the Court is satisfied that after being released on bail, (a) the accused has misused the liberty granted to him; (b) flouted the conditions of bail order; (c) that the bail was granted in ignorance of statutory provisions restricting the powers of the Court to grant bail; (d) or that the bail was procured by misrepresentation or fraud. None of these grounds existed while cancellation of bail granted by another bench. (Para 12) Himanshu Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2024 Cri LJ 1482

Section 482 and Constitution of India; Article 226 – Exercise of extraordinary power to quash proceedings – Such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Some instances where such power can be exercised is: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Held, present case would squarely fall under categories (1), (3) and (5) and even if the allegations made in the FIR and the material on which the prosecution relies, are taken at its face value, there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. (Para 17 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – The entire case of prosecution is based on unauthorizedly and illegally collected sample of meat. Hence, the High Court was right when it interfered by quashing the First Information Report. (Para 9) Joshine Antony v. Asifa Sultana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 195

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – Law with regard to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings - Discussed. (Para 9, 10 & 21) A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 197

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – Offence of Rape - A relationship may be consensual at the beginning but the same state may not remain so for all time to come. Whenever one of the partners show their unwillingness to continue with such relationship, the character of such relationship at it was when started will not continue to prevail. In the instant case, we do not think the relationship had remained consensual to justify quashing of the criminal complaint at the threshold. Rajkumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 214

Section 482 – Inherent power of court – High Court should have exercised power under Section 482 to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice. Although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature but are given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. (Para 5 & 6) Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Section 482 - High Court could not have stayed the investigations and restrained the investigating agencies from investigating cognizable offences as alleged in the FIRs and the Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR), particularly when the investigations were at a very nascent stage. The inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.PC do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whims or caprice. The statutory power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. In a way, by passing such orders of staying the investigations and restraining the investigating agencies from taking any coercive measure against the accused pending the petitions under Section 482 Cr.PC, the High Court has granted blanket orders restraining the arrest without the accused applying for the anticipatory bail under Section 438 of Cr.PC. (Para 20) Directorate of Enforcement v. Niraj Tyagi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : AIR 2024 SC 1161 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1306

Section 482 - Iudicial comity and judicial discipline demands that higher courts should follow the law. The extraordinary and inherent powers of the court do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whims and caprice. (Para 24) Directorate of Enforcement v. Niraj Tyagi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : AIR 2024 SC 1161 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1306

Section 482 - If the charge sheet is filed against the accused during the pendency of the petition for quashing of the FIR, the High Court is not restrained from exercising its inherent jurisdiction and could still examine if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on the basis of the F.I.R., charge sheet and other documents. Mamta Shailesh Chandra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 86

Section 482 - Allegations made by the complainant do not give rise to the offences for which the accused has been summoned for trial. A commercial dispute, which ought to have been resolved through the forum of Civil Court has been given criminal colour by lifting from the penal code certain words or phrases and implanting them in a criminal complaint. No case at all has been made out that would justify invoking the machinery of the Criminal Courts. The dispute, per se, is commercial in nature having no element of criminality. The Magistrate here failed to apply his mind in issuing summons and the High Court also failed to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the 1973 Code to prevent abuse of the power of the Criminal Court. (Para 18) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 482 - When the High Court was called upon to invoke power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a criminal case, it was incumbent upon the High Court to consider the question whether the allegations would constitute the offence(s) alleged against the person-accused. (Para 6) Rajaram Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 40

Commercial Courts Act, 2015

Commercial Courts Act, 2015; Section 2(1)(c)(vii) - Merely because the dispute is related to an immovable property wouldn't per se make it a commercial dispute unless the immovable property is 'actually used' exclusively in trade or commerce. S.P. Velayutham v. Emaar Mgf Land Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 179

Companies Act, 2013

Companies Act, 2013; Section 182 and Finance Act 2017; Section 154 – Constitution of India; Article 19(1)(a) – Constitutionality of Section 182(3) of Companies Act as amended by Section 154 of Finance Act – Non-disclosure of particulars of political contribution is violative of Right to Information – After amendment, Section 182(3) only requires the disclosure of the total amount contributed to political parties in a financial year. The deletion of the mandate of disclosing the particulars of contributions violates the right to information of the voter since they would not possess information about the political party to which the contribution was made which, is necessary to identify corruption and quid pro quo transactions in governance. Such information is also necessary for exercising an informed vote. The only purpose of amending Section 182(3) was to bring the provision in tune with the amendment under Section 29C of the RPA exempting disclosure requirements for contributions through electoral bonds. The amendment to Section 182(3) of the Companies Act serves no practical purpose as the Electoral Bond Scheme and relevant amendments to the RPA and the IT Act mandating non-disclosure of particulars on political contributions through electoral bonds is held unconstitutional. Hence, Section 182(3) as amended by the Finance Act 2017 is unconstitutional. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Companies Act, 2013; Section 182 – Finance Act 2017; Section 154 – Constitution of India; Article 14 – Unlimited corporate funding – Arbitrariness of Section 182 - Removal of restrictions on political contributions is arbitrary and violates Article 14 of the Constitution – Unlimited contribution by companies to political parties is antithetical to free and fair elections because it allows certain persons/companies (including shell companies) to influence the electoral process and policy making. This is violative of the principle of free and fair elections and political equality captured in the value of “one person one vote”. The ability of a company to influence the electoral process through political contributions is much higher when compared to that of an individual. Companies and individuals cannot be equated for the purpose of political contributions. Companies before the amendment to Section 182 could only contribute a certain percentage of the net aggregate profits and could be classified between loss-making companies and profit-making companies for the purpose of political contributions. The underlying principle of this distinction was that it is more plausible that loss-making companies will contribute to political parties with a quid pro quo and not for the purpose of income tax benefits. The amended provision does not recognize that the harm of contributions by lossmaking companies in the form of quid pro quo is much higher. Thus, the amendment to Section 182 is manifestly arbitrary for (a) treating political contributions by companies and individuals alike; (b) permitting the unregulated influence of companies in the governance and political process violating the principle of free and fair elections; and (c) treating contributions made by profit-making and loss-making companies to political parties alike. The observations means that the law must not treat companies and individual contributors alike because of the variance in the degree of harm on free and fair elections. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Compensatory Jurisprudence

Compensatory jurisprudence – Case of wrong medical diagnosis causing premature discharge from service –In case of premature discharge from service of armed forces, extreme caution and care in ensuring correct diagnoses was required. The Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) failed to observe that there is no medical literature to show that the appellant was suffering from AIDS defining illness. In spite of being aware of the adverse and pernicious impact on the appellant, respondents acted grossly careless and negligent. The appellant had submitted four diagnostic reports, showing that his CD4 cell count was above 300 cells/mm3, as opposed to the respondents' 2003 Guidelines defining an AIDS illness to be one where the CD4 cell count is below 200 cells/mm3. The Medical Board, arbitrarily, wrongly and rejected the appellant's prayer on flimsy and wrong grounds by applying the 1992 Guidelines. Held, the appellant's reinstatement in service is not an available option now and also that direction for grant of pension, cannot be considered an equitable restitution of what the appellant has suffered by reason of psychological, financial and physical trauma, hence monetary compensation on account of wrongful termination of services is awarded to the appellant. (Para 6, 7, 8, 9 & 23) Satyanand Singh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : AIR 2024 SC 1659

Constitution of India

Articles 14 and 51A - Appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers in the States - Submission that no such office is stipulated in the Constitution – Held, Appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers not unconstitutional. A Deputy Chief Minister is, first and foremost, a Minister in the Government of the State. The appellation of a Deputy Chief Minister does not breach the constitutional position. (Para 1) Public Political Party v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Article 13 – Scope of Judicial Review in matters of economic policy – Courts must adopt a less stringent form of judicial review while adjudicating challenges to legislation and executive action which relate to economic policy as compared to laws relating to civil rights such as the freedom of speech or the freedom of religion. The amendment to Section 31 of the RBI Act can be classified as a financial provision to the extent that it seeks to introduce a new form of a bearer banking instrument. However, any resemblance to an economic policy ends there. The amendments in question can be clubbed into two heads: first, provisions mandating non-disclosure of information on electoral financing; and second, provisions permitting unlimited corporate funding to political parties. Both these amendments relate to the electoral process. The Bonds were introduced only to curb black money in the electoral process, and protect informational privacy of financial contributors to political parties. The Union of India has itself classified the amendments as an “electoral reform”. Thus, the submission of the Union of India that the amendments deal with economic policy cannot be accepted. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Article 14 – Exemption of certain projects or activities from mandatory obtaining environment clearance – Unguided and blanket exemption, is, per se, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Item 6 grants exemption from the requirement of obtaining EC for “extraction or sourcing or borrowing of ordinary earth for linear projects, such as roads, pipelines, etc. Held, when an exception is sought to the requirement of obtaining EC, the exception must be specific. There is no specification about the quantum of ordinary earth, which can be extracted or the area which can be used to extract ordinary earth. “Linear projects” have not been defined making the term “linear projects” very vague. Even the amended item 6 continues to suffer from the same vice of arbitrariness, which Article 14 of the Constitution of India prohibits. The exemption granted without incorporating any safeguards is completely unguided and arbitrary and such blanket exemption completely defeats the very object of the EP Act. Hence, on account of the violation of Article 14, item 6 in the impugned notification, as well as the amended impugned notification, is struck down. (Para 25, 26 & 27) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252

Article 19(1) (a) & 21– Right to dissent – The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) and every individual must respect the right of others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against the decisions of the Government is an essential part of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner must be treated as a part of the right to lead a dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21, but the protest or dissent must be subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance with Article 19(2). Further, the police machinery must be enlightened on the concept of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and the extent of reasonable restraint on this freedom. The police machinery must be sensitised about the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. (Para 10 & 13) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208

Article 19(1)(a) – Infringement of the Right to information of the voter – The non-disclosure of information about electoral contributions under amendments introduced by the Finance Act 2017 and the Electoral Bond Scheme is violative of the right to information of the voter traceable to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The voters have a right to the disclosure of information which is “essential” for choosing the candidate for whom a vote should be cast. The information about funding to a political party is such an 'essential' information for a voter to exercise their freedom to vote in an effective manner. The right to information of the voter includes the right to information of financial contributions to a political party because of the influence of money in electoral politics (through electoral outcomes) and governmental decisions. Information about political funding would enable a voter to assess if there is a correlation between policy making and financial contributions. Anonymizing contributions through electoral bonds are violative of Article 19(1)(a). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) and Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 - Infringement of the right to information of the voters for the purposes of curbing black money – Proportionality standard applied – Least restrictive means stage –The Electoral Bond Scheme is not the only means for curbing black money in Electoral Finance. There are other alternatives which substantially fulfill the purpose and impact the right to information minimally when compared to the impact of electoral bonds on the right to information. The legal regime itself provides other alternatives to curb black money such as contributions through cheques, bank draft, electronic clearing system or electoral trusts. Hence, the Electoral Bond Scheme does not fulfill the least restrictive means test. Further, the right to information under Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted based on the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2). The purpose of curbing black money is not traceable to any of the grounds in Article 19(2). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Article 19(1)(a) and Indian Evidence act, 1872; Section 124 – Scope of right to information in the context of deciding the disclosure of evidence relating to affairs of the State – Conflict between public interest and private interest – Article 19(1)(a) has been held to guarantee the right to information to citizens. It is the role of citizens to hold the State accountable for its actions and inactions and they must possess information about State action for them to accomplish this role effectively. Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act stipulate that evidence which is relevant and material to proceedings need not be disclosed to the party if the disclosure would violate public interest. When such disclosure is denied on the ground that it would violate public interest, there is a conflict between private interest and public interest. There is a public interest in the impartial administration of justice which can only be secured by the disclosure of relevant and material documents. There is a close relationship between the right to information and open governance. Citizens have a duty to hold the government of the day accountable for their actions and inactions, and they can effectively fulfil this duty only if the government is open and not clothed in secrecy. The right to information has an instrumental exegesis, which recognizes the value of the right in facilitating the realization of democratic goals. But beyond that, the right to information has an intrinsic constitutional value; one that recognizes that it is not just a means to an end but an end in itself. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Article 20(1) – Article 20(1) does not prohibit this Court, to award a lesser punishment in a befitting case, when this Court is of the opinion that a lesser punishment may be awarded since the new law on the penal provision provides a lesser punishment i.e. lesser than what was actually applicable at the relevant time. The prohibition contained in Article 20 of the Constitution of India is on subjecting a person to a higher punishment than which was applicable for that crime at the time of the commission of the crime. There is no prohibition for this Court to impose a lesser punishment which is now applicable for the same crime. (Para 8) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Article 21 and 32 - Writ petition aggrieved by non-consideration and non-disposal of criminal appeal is not maintainable. If priority has not been given to the criminal appeal by the High Court for early hearing, for whatever reason, the same is also part of the judicial process and cannot be made amenable to a challenge in a writ petition under Article 32 citing breach of Article 21. A judicial decision rendered by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him does not infringe a Fundamental Right. If the petitioner wishes to be released on bail pending the criminal appeal, cannot invoke the writ remedy but has to take recourse to an application under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Para 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147

Article 21 and 47 – Right to food – Although the Constitution of India does not explicitly provide for Right to food, the fundamental Right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution does include Right to live with human dignity and right to food and other basic necessities. Article 47 of the Constitution also provides that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties. (Para 5) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the soul of the Constitution as the liberty of a citizen is of paramount importance. Not deciding the matter pertaining to liberty of a citizen expeditiously and shunting away the matter on one or the other ground would deprive the party of their precious right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 3) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159

Article 22(4) and Act, 1986; Section 9, 10, 11 & 12 - Advisory Board - Article 22(4) mandates that, any law pertaining to preventive detention must provide for constitution of an Advisory Board consisting of persons who have been or qualified to be appointed as judges of the High Court. It further vests the Advisory Board with the pivotal role of reviewing an order of detention within three-months by forming an opinion as to whether there is a sufficient cause for such detention or not, after consideration of all the material on record including representation if any, of the detenu. Under preventive detention legislations, Advisory Boards(s) are constitutional safeguards available to the detenu against an order of detention. Under the Act, 1986, Section 9 gives expression to this constitutional requirement, and provides for the constitution and composition of an Advisory Board for the purposes of the Act. Under section 10, any order of detention that has been made under the Act shall be placed before an Advisory Board thereunder within three-weeks from the date of its passing. As per Section 11, the Advisory Board must form an opinion and specify as to whether there is sufficient cause warranting the detention of the detenu. (Para 50, 52 & 53) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Article 32 – Quashing the order of detention – The Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction but may ascertain whether the subjective satisfaction is based on objective facts or influenced by any caprice, malice or irrelevant considerations or non-application of mind. (Para 43) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Article 32 – Writ of Habeas Corpus – 'Habeas Corpus' literally means 'have his body'. This is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective relief of immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention, whether in prison or in private custody. It is the duty of the Court to issue this writ to safeguard the freedom of the citizen against arbitrary and illegal detention. By the writ of habeas corpus, the Court can cause any person who is imprisoned to be brought before the Court and obtain knowledge of the reason why he is imprisoned and then either set him free then and there if there is no legal justification for the imprisonment, or see that he is brought speedily to trial. The writ may be addressed to any person whatsoever an official or a private individual who has another in his custody. (Para 29 & 30) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Article 32 - Writ or direction for expeditious disposal of Criminal Appeal - Held, the Supreme Court has no power of superintendence over the High Courts. There is no provision in Chapter-IV (titled The Union Judiciary) under Part-V (The Union) of the Constitution of India which, in terms similar to Article 227 of the Constitution (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court) under Chapter-V thereof, confers power of superintendence on the Supreme Court over the High Courts. In our constitutional scheme there is a clear division of jurisdiction between the two institutions and both the institutions need to have mutual respect for each other. Accepting the prayer of the petitioner and issuing any direction, as prayed, would amount to inappropriate exercise of discretionary jurisdiction showing disrespect to another constitutional court; hence, no such direction, as prayed by the petitioner, can be issued. That apart, assuming that an extraordinary case requires a nudge from Supreme Court for early hearing of a long pending criminal appeal, it is only a request that ought to be made to the High Court to such effect in appropriate proceedings, care being taken to ensure that the proceeding before Supreme Court is otherwise maintainable. (Para 1 - 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147

Article 136 – Interference under Article 136 is not warranted – The Supreme Court may exercise its power under Article 136 sparingly and only when exceptional circumstances exist which justify the exercise of its discretion. The court is not inclined under Article 136 of the Constitution to re-appreciate the findings of facts which have been arrived at by the High Court. The order of the High Court does not suffer from any error that would warrant the invocation of jurisdiction under Article 136. (Para 18 & 23) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 136 – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court – Discretion to interfere – In cases where there is no substantial question of law this court would not exercise its discretion. (Para 18) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230

Article 136 – Power to interfere in acquittal passed by High Court – Once the appellate court acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence as it existed before conviction by the Trial Court, stands restored. Court, while scrutinizing the evidence, will proceed with great circumspect and will not routinely interfere with an order of acquittal, save when the impeccable prosecution evidence nails the accused beyond any doubt. An intervention is warranted when the High Court's approach or reasoning is deemed perverse or when based on suspicion and surmises court rejects evidence or when the acquittal is primarily rooted in an exaggerated adherence to the rule of giving the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. Further circumstance for intervention arises when the acquittal would lead to a significant miscarriage of justice. An erroneous or perverse approach to the proven facts of a case and/or ignorance of some of the vital circumstances would amount to a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice. Supreme Court will be justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction to undo the injustice mete out to the victims of a crime. (Para 15, 17 & 18) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Article 136 – Wrongful denial of employment and regularization – Distinction between the two sets of workers – Artificial distinction asserted by appellant between two set of workers is unjustified. The appellant has failed to establish any distinction between the 19 workers who were regularized and the 13 workers who were left out. The tribunal came to the conclusion that the nature of the duties performed by the 13 workmen are perennial in nature and they hold the same status as the 19 regularized employees but were wrongly not made part of the settlement. There is no merit in the appeals filed by the appellant. (Para 20, 21 & 22) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230

Article 142 – Direction of Supreme Court for automatic vacation of interim stay due to lapse of time – The jurisdiction of Supreme Court under article 142 cannot be exercised to make judicial legislation. By a blanket direction in the exercise of power under Article 142, the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court of granting interim relief by limiting its jurisdiction to pass interim orders valid only for six months at a time. Putting such constraints on the power of the High Court will amount to making a dent on the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. Elementary principles of natural justice, mandate that an order vacating or modifying interim relief is to be passed only after hearing all the affected parties and order passed without hearing the beneficiary is against the basic tenets of justice. If an interim order is automatically vacated only because the High Court cannot hear the main case within the time limit, the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” will apply, i.e. no litigant should be allowed to suffer due to the fault of the Court. Further, automatic vacation on lapse of time gives an unfair advantage to the respondent in the case and adversely affects a litigant's right to the remedies under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Such orders virtually defeat the right of a litigant to seek and avail of statutory remedies such as revisions, appeals, and applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as well as the remedies under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Constitutional Courts may issue directions for the time-bound disposal of cases only in exceptional circumstances. (Para 16, 17, 24, 28 & 32) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Article 142 – Direction of Supreme court to dispose stay cases on a day-to-day basis – Such directions of the Supreme Court virtually amounts to judicial legislation. The High Courts cannot be expected to decide, on a priority basis or a day-to-day basis, only those cases in which a stay of proceedings has been granted while ignoring several other categories of cases that may require more priority to be given. Therefore, the issue of giving out-ofturn priority to certain cases should be best left to the concerned Courts. (Para 28, 30 & 32) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Article 142 – Power to ensure electoral democracy – The Court is duty-bound, to do complete justice to ensure that the process of electoral democracy is not allowed to be thwarted by subterfuges. The Court must step in exceptional situations to ensure that the basic mandate of electoral democracy at the local participatory level is preserved. The extraordinary situation of electoral misconduct by the presiding officer himself, justifies the invocation of the power of this Court under Article 142. (Para 37) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

Article 142 – Scope of powers of Supreme Court under Article 142 – The jurisdiction under Article 142 cannot be invoked to pass blanket orders setting at naught a very large number of interim orders lawfully passed by all the High Courts, and that too, without hearing the contesting parties. The jurisdiction under Article 142 can be invoked only to deal with extraordinary situations for doing complete justice between the parties before the Court. Although the Supreme Court under Article 142 can always issue procedural directions to other Courts, the right to be heard before an adverse order is passed is not a matter of procedure but a substantive right. Hence, Article 142 does not empower this Court to ignore the substantive rights of the litigants. Power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to defeat the principles of natural justice, which are an integral part of our jurisprudence. (Para 19 & 22) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Article 142 – Setting aside the Election Process – It would be inappropriate to set aside the election process in its entirety when the only infirmity which has been found is at the stage when the counting of votes was recorded by the Presiding Officer. Allowing the entire election process to be set aside would further compound the destruction of fundamental democratic principles which has taken place as a consequence of the conduct of the Presiding Officer. (Para 35) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

Article 142 doesn't empower Courts to ignore substantive rights of litigants - Issued guidelines on exercise of inherent powers. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Article 226 – Error of jurisdiction of High Court – The petitioner had expressly consented to the High Court to evaluate the entirety of the matter in its full perspective. As the petitioner has agreed to the evaluative action by the High Court, it cannot be concluded that the High Court has committed an error of jurisdiction. (Para 16 & 17) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 226 – Jurisdiction to interfere in administrative decisions – The judiciary must exercise restraint and avoid unnecessary intervention qua administrative decision(s) of the executive involving specialised expertise in the absence of any mala-fide and / or prejudice. The process of evaluation of an IAS officer, ought to have been left to the executive on account of it possessing the requisite expertise and mandate for the said task. The High Court entered into a specialised domain i.e., evaluating the competency of an IAS officer without the requisite domain expertise and administrative experience to conduct such an evaluation. The High Court ought not to have ventured into the said domain particularly when the Accepting Authority is yet to pronounce its decision qua the Underlying Representation. (Para 25, 27 & 28) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : AIR 2024 SC 1397

Article 226 - the High Court by way of the interim order could not have passed an order which had the effect of encroaching upon the areas reserved for the Legislature and the Executive. Our Constitution recognizes the independence of the three wings of the State, i.e. the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. No doubt that if the High Court found that the legislature concerned was not valid on account of any of the grounds available within the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it could set aside such a legislation. But by way of an interim order it could not have in effect stayed the operation of the said Statute. (Para 8 - 10) State of Uttar Pradesh v. In Re Constitution of Education Tribunals, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 71

Article 226 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 – Categories of cases wherein quashing power could be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice are: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are absurd and inherently improbable to reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is provision providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is mala fide. (Para 32) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Article 226(3) – Clause (3) will not apply when an interim order in a writ petition under Article 226 is passed after the service of a copy of the writ petition on all concerned parties and after giving them an opportunity of being heard. It applies only to ex-parte ad interim orders. It provides for an automatic vacation of interim relief only if the aggrieved party makes an application for vacating the interim relief and when the application for vacating stay is not heard within the time specified. (Para 26) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Article 229 - Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts - Article 229 (2) pertains only to the service conditions of 'officers and servants' of the High Courts and does not include Judges of the High Court (both sitting and retired judges). The Chief Justice does not have the power, under Article 229, to make rules pertaining to the post-retiral benefits payable to former Chief Justices and judges of the High Court. Therefore, the Rules proposed by the Chief Justice, in the present case, do not fall within the competence of the Chief Justice under Article 229. (Para 25) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

Article 229 (2) - The High Court did not have the power to direct the State Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High Court. The Chief Justice did not have the competence to frame the rules under Article 229 of the Constitution. Further, the High Court, acting on the judicial side, does not have the power to direct the Government to frame rules proposed by it on the administrative side. (Para 24 – 30) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

Article 285 - 'Enemy property' vested in the possession of the Union Government-appointed 'custodian', as per the Enemy Property Act, 1968, cannot be considered a property of the Union Government to claim the exemption from the municipal taxes under Article 285 (1) of the Constitution of India. (Para 22) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156

Article 300A - The expression person in Article 300-A covers not only a legal or juristic person but also a person who is not a citizen of India. The expression property is also of a wide scope and includes not only tangible or intangible property but also all rights, title and interest in a property. (Para 18) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156

Articles 341 and 342 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Insofar as a person claiming benefit having regard to his status as a Scheduled Tribe in a State, when he migrates to a Union Territory where a Presidential Order has not been issued at all insofar Scheduled Tribe is concerned, or even if such a Notification is issued, such an identical Scheduled Tribe does not find a place in such a Notification, the person cannot claim his status on the basis of his being noted as a Scheduled Tribe in the State of his origin. (Para 29) Chandigarh Housing Board v. Tarsem Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Articles 341 and 342 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Public notification of 'tribes or tribal communities' by the President of India, upon consultation with the Governor, is a sine qua non for deeming such tribes or tribal communities to be 'Scheduled Tribes' in relation to that State or Union Territory for the purposes of the Constitution. (Para 15) Chandigarh Housing Board v. Tarsem Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 139

Ad-interim order of stay – When a High Court grants a stay of the proceedings while issuing notice without giving an opportunity of being heard to the contesting parties, it is not an interim order, but it is an ad-interim order of stay. It can be converted into an interim order of stay only after an opportunity of being heard is granted on the prayer for interim relief to all the parties to the proceedings. Ad-interim orders, by their very nature, should be of a limited duration. (Para 14) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Bar association's resolution to not represent a party - Such a Resolution could not have been passed. Right to defend oneself is a Fundamental Right under Part III of the Constitution of India and further right to appear for a client is also a Fundamental Right being a part of carrying on one's profession as a lawyer. (Para 3) Rupashree H.R. v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Grounds on which interim order comes to an end – Can come to an end by disposal of the main case either on merits or for default or other reasons, by the High Court, in which the interim order has been passed or by a judicial order vacating interim relief, passed after hearing the contesting parties on the above stated grounds. (Para 16) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Guidelines issued to secure the fundamental rights and dignity of intimate partners, and members of the LGBTQ+ communities in illegal detention – Mandatory in nature – Habeas corpus petitions and petitions for protection must be given a priority in hearing and courts must avoid adjournments or delays in the disposal of the case; In evaluating the locus standi of a partner or friend, the court must not make a roving enquiry into the precise nature of the relationship between the appellant and the person; Effort must be to create an environment conducive for a free and un-coerced dialogue to ascertain the wishes of the corpus; The court must ensure that the corpus is produced before the court and given the opportunity to interact with the judges in-person in chambers to ensure the privacy and safety of the detained or missing person; The court must ensure that the wishes of the detained person is not unduly influenced by the Court, or the police, or the natal family during the course of the proceedings; Upon securing the environment and inviting the detained or missing person in chambers, the court must make active efforts to put the detained or missing person at ease; If a detained or missing person expresses their wish to not go back to the alleged detainer or the natal family, then the person must be released immediately without any further delay; Courts must grant an ad-interim protection while dealing with a petition for police protection by intimate partners on the grounds that they are a same sex, transgender, inter-faith or inter-caste couple to maintain their privacy and dignity; The Court must not adopt counselling or parental care as a means of changing the mind of the appellant, or the detained/missing person; The Judge during the interaction with the corpus to ascertain their views must not attempt to change or influence the admission of the sexual orientation or gender identity of the appellant or the corpus and Sexual orientation and gender identity fall in a core zone of privacy of an individual and no stigma or moral judgment must be imposed when dealing with cases involving parties from the LGBTQ+ community. (Para 16 & 17) Devu G. Nair v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 249

High Court's power to vacate or modify interim relief – The High Courts are always empowered to vacate or modify an order of interim relief passed after hearing the parties if (a) A litigant, after getting an order of stay, deliberately prolongs the proceedings either by seeking adjournments on unwarranted grounds or by remaining absent when the main case in which interim relief is granted is called out for hearing before the High Court with the object of taking undue advantage of the order of stay; (b) The High Court finds that the order of interim relief is granted as a result of either suppression or misrepresentation of material facts by the party in whose favour the interim order of stay has been made; and (c) The High Court finds that there is a material change in circumstances requiring interference with the interim order passed earlier. A long passage of time may bring about a material change in circumstances. These grounds are not exhaustive and there can be other valid grounds for vacating an order of stay. (Para 15) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Object of passing interim orders – An order of interim relief is usually granted in the aid of the final relief sought in the case. An occasion for passing an order of stay of proceeding arises as it is not possible for the High Court to take up the case for final hearing immediately. Further, to avoid the possibility of passing an order of remand, the grant of stay of proceedings is called for in many cases. (Para 13) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Parliamentary processes not taking place on the floor of the house are also covered by parliamentary privilege. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185

Position of the High Courts and its power of superintendence – Both the Supreme Court and the High Court are constitutional Courts. A High Court is constitutionally independent of the Supreme Court of India and is not judicially subordinate to the Supreme Court. (Para 23) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Quashing of proceedings – Held, tested on the touchstone of the principles stated in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., allowing continuance of the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR is gross abuse of process of law because the allegations as set out in the FIR do not disclose necessary ingredients of any cognizable offence. Hence, the impugned FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant are quashed and set aside. (Para 33) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Quashing of proceedings – The object of dispute, manifestly rife with mala fide intentions of only recovering the tainted money by coercion and threat of criminal proceedings. Such proceedings cannot be allowed to proceed further and exploit the time and resources of the law enforcement agency. The valuable time of the police is consumed in investigating disputes that seem more suited for civil resolution. The need for vigilance on the part of the police is paramount, and a discerning eye should be cast upon cases where unscrupulous conduct appears to eclipse the pursuit of justice. There is a need for a circumspect approach in discerning the genuine from the spurious and thus ensuring that the resources of the state are utilised for matters of true societal import. (Para 14 & 15) Deepak Kumar Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2024 Cri LJ 1388 : (2024) 3 SCC 601

Rajya Sabha's role is part of basic structure - Rajya Sabha elections protected by legislative privileges under Article 194. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701

Right to free and fair elections – It is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Elections at the local participatory level act as a microcosm of the larger democratic structure in the country. Local governments, such as municipal corporations, engage with issues that affect citizens' daily lives and act as a primary point of contact with representative democracy. The process of citizens electing councillors, who in turn, elect the Mayor, serves as a channel for ordinary citizens to ventilate their grievances through their representatives – both directly and indirectly elected. Ensuring a free and fair electoral process throughout this process, therefore, is imperative to maintain the legitimacy of and trust in representative democracy. (Para 36) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

Right to legal aid – When the examination-in-chief of a prosecution witness is being recorded, the presence of the Advocate for the accused is required, as the advocate has a right to object to a leading or irrelevant question being asked to the witness. The report of trial court records that the evidence of prosecution witnesses was recorded in the presence of the appellants, but their Advocate was not present as they had not engaged any Advocate. Held, after finding that the appellants-accused had not engaged any Advocate, the Trial Court ought to have provided a legal aid Advocate to the appellants accused so that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses could have been recorded in the presence of the Advocate representing the appellants-accused. Recording of evidence in this fashion is not justified even if the High Court had fixed a time-bound schedule for disposal of the case. The trial court could have always sought an extension of time from the High Court. (Para 5 & 6) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261

Scope of judicial review in matters of transfer – The scope of judicial review is only available when there is a clear violation of statutory provision or the transfer is persuaded by malafide. In absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegation are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. The impugned transfer order is not alleged to be malafide or violative of any prescribed statutory provision, hence, the interference made by the Division Bench setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the Single Judge is not justified. The Division Bench has committed an error in setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. (Para 12 & 13) Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 231

Scope of judicial review in policy matters – The Courts do not and cannot examine the correctness, suitability or appropriateness of a policy, nor are the courts advisors to the executive on the matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The Courts cannot direct the States to implement a particular policy or scheme on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, would be the subject of judicial review. The scope of judicial review in examining the policy matters is very limited. (Para 8) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

The proportionality standard - To determine if the violation of the fundamental right is justified – The proportionality standard is by nature curated to give prominence to the fundamental right and minimize the restriction on it. The measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage); The measure must be a suitable means for furthering the goal (suitability or rational connection stage); The measure must be least restrictive and equally effective (necessity stage); and The measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the right holder (balancing stage). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Consumer Law

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1) (m) and Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Maintainability of the complaint filed by Insured Company (registered under the Companies Act, 1956) before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission is in question – Whether 'company' is covered by the definition of 'person' under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986? – Held, the definition of 'person' as provided in the Act of 1986 is inclusive and not exhaustive. Consumer Protection Act being a beneficial legislation, a liberal interpretation has to be given to the statute. The very fact that in the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, a body corporate has been brought within the definition of 'person', by itself indicates that the legislature realized the incongruity in the unamended provision and has rectified the anomaly by including the word 'company' in the definition of 'person'. (Para 15) Kozyflex Mattresses Pvt. Ltd. v. SBI General Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 255

Observation made by the Consumer Commission that Apple India has the duty to trace stolen iPhone with the help of a unique identity number was unwarranted. Apple India Pvt Ltd v. Harish Chandra Mohanty, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Maintainability of contempt petition – Even consent terms incorporated in the Court's order when breached would give rise to allegations of contempt, but by mere filing of a civil suit asserting certain legal rights over the lands in question, it cannot be stated that the plaintiffs have breached the consent terms. Filing of the suit for asserting the rights of the plaintiffs/respondents could not be said to be amounting to contempt of the Court. Hence, no interference is warranted in the impugned order. (Para 10 & 25) Shah Enterprises v. Vaijayantiben Ranjitsingh Sawant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 224

Substantially the same cause of action – The cause of action for filing the Contempt Petition and the alleged cause of action for filing the complaint case was substantially the same. Taking cognizance in a substantially same complaint case, after the dismissal of the Contempt Petition by a detailed order is an abuse of the process of law. The first respondent did not challenge the dismissal of the Contempt Petition and came up with a complaint case. Further, though the Contempt Petition was already filed in 2016, the said fact has not been mentioned in the complaint filed by the first respondent in the year 2017. Hence, prosecution of the complaint was itself an abuse of the process of law and ought to be quashed. (Para 9 & 10) Murari Lal Chhari v. Munishwar Singh Tomar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : AIR 2024 SC 1437

Mere delay in complying with the order, unless there is a deliberate or wilful act on the part of the alleged contemnors would not attract the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. L.V. Subrahmanyam, IAS v. Registrar General, High Court of Judicature At Hyderabad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 104

An apology must evidence remorse with respect to the contemptuous acts and is not to be used as a weapon to purge the guilty of their offence. Further, an apology lacking in sincerity and not evidencing contriteness, cannot be accepted. (Para 22) Gulshan Bajwa v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 69 : AIR 2024 SC 1060

'Civil Contempt' - An act that violates a status quo order constitutes 'civil contempt'. When a party violates a status quo order, contempt proceedings must be initiated instead of merely vacating the interim order. (Para 16 & 17) Amit Kumar Das v. Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 73

Conviction of Advocate - The appellant's conduct before the High Court and for that matter, even before this Court, amounts to undermining the system of the law and interfering with the course of justice administration. The High Court observed a pattern in the behaviour of the appellant. He has had a habit of misbehaving with a Bench which is not agreeing with him. The misbehaviour goes to the extent of casting aspersions and threatening the Judges hearing the matters. The High Court correctly rejected the apology. (Para 21 & 22) Gulshan Bajwa v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 69 : AIR 2024 SC 1060

There is a need to maintain the dignity and reputation of judicial officers and to protect them from motivated, libellous and unfounded allegations. The High Court was correct in not accepting the apology tendered by the appellant since it was not bonafide and lacked sincerity, apart from being belated and a mere 'lip service'. (Para 17) Gulshan Bajwa v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 69 : AIR 2024 SC 1060

'Civil Contempt' and 'Criminal Contempt' - The Act makes a clear distinction between two types of contempt. 'Wilful disobedience' of a judgement, decree, direction, order, writ, or process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court amounts to 'civil contempt'. On the other hand, the threshold for 'criminal contempt' is higher and more stringent. It involves 'scandalising' or 'lowering' the authority of any court; prejudicing or interfering with judicial proceedings; or interfering with or obstructing the administration of justice. (Para 32) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

Criminal Contempt cannot be initiated against a party for availing legal remedies and raising a legal challenge to an order. (Para 31 – 37) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

The power of the High Courts to initiate contempt proceedings cannot be used to obstruct parties or their counsel from availing legal remedies. (Para 34) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on personal appearance of government officials in court proceedings framed by this Court in Para 45 of this Judgement must be followed by all courts across the country. All High Courts shall consider framing rules to regulate the appearance of Government officials in court, after taking into account the SOP. (Para 45) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

Section 14 - Summoning of Government Officials before Courts - The use of the power to summon the presence of government officials must not be used as a tool to pressurize the government, particularly, under the threat of contempt. (Para 38) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

Section 14 - Summoning of Government Officials before Courts - Law officers act as the primary point of contact between the courts and the government. Courts must refrain from summoning officials as the first resort. While the actions and decisions of public officials are subject to judicial review, summoning officials frequently without just cause is not permissible. Exercising restraint, avoiding unwarranted remarks against public officials, and recognizing the functions of law officers contribute to a fair and balanced judicial system. Courts across the country must foster an environment of respect and professionalism, duly considering the constitutional or professional mandate of law officers, who represent the government and its officials before the courts. Constantly summoning officials of the government instead of relying on the law officers representing the government, runs contrary to the scheme envisaged by the Constitution. (Para 41 & 44) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1

Contract

Contract Law - If there is a repugnancy between the earlier and later clauses of a deed, whereby a later clause destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, then the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant to the earlier clause and the earlier clause prevails. (Para 30) Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : AIR 2024 SC 1071

Contract Act, 1872

Section 182 - Distributor, not agent: independent contractor. Bharti Cellular Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 176

Novation – As it was not open to one of the parties, to unilaterally change the agreed terms and conditions, there was no novation in contract. Mere exchange of correspondence between the parties prior to expiry of the grace period, cannot be held against them by treating it as an act in acceptance of or acquiescence with the change impliedly suggested by the respondent-company. Hence, the action of the appellants in terminating the Agreement immediately after expiry of the grace period, by getting a legal notice issued, cannot be found fault with. (Para 19) Venkataraman Krishnamurthy v. Lodha Crown Buildmart Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : AIR 2024 SC 1218

Once the parties committed themselves to a written contract, whereby they reduced the terms and conditions agreed upon by them to writing, the same would be binding upon them. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) cannot rewrite the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties and apply its own subjective criteria to determine the course of action to be adopted by either of them. The right of election of the appellants to either continue or to terminate the Agreement within ninety days from the expiry of the grace period was absolute and it was not open to the NCDRC to apply its own standards. The NCDRC overstepped its power and jurisdiction in ignoring the binding covenants in the Agreement and in introducing its own logic and rationale to decide as to what the future course of action of the parties. (Para 15 & 22) Venkataraman Krishnamurthy v. Lodha Crown Buildmart Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : AIR 2024 SC 1218

Pre-contractual correspondence – As per English jurisprudence, pre-contractual correspondence loses its significance once the contract comes into existence. When the parties have signed the agreement, the terms agreed therein would bind the parties and the email exchanged between the parties prior to the agreement, cannot override the policy decisions. In order to contend that the appellant has been misled, the appellant ought to have raised such contention when the agreement was to be signed. Further, the appellant having repaid the loan amount with interest as per the terms of agreement cannot make out a grievance in hindsight and seek refund of the amount paid. No error has been committed so as to call for interference. (Para 13 & 14) Rajesh Monga v. Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : AIR 2024 SC 1305

Sections 37 and 40 - In the case of a personal obligation imposed on a person under the contract and on the demise of such person, his estate does not become liable and therefore, the legal representatives who represent the estate of a deceased would obviously not be liable and cannot be directed to discharge the contractual obligations of the deceased. (Para 27) Vinayak Purushottam Dube v. Jayashree Padamkar Bhat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 181

Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002

Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 – Effective Implementation – Machinery for Oversight and Grievance Redressal – Survey of Highways – Removal of unauthorized encroachments on highway land – Compliance with Amendments – Directions Issued. Gyan Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 164

Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992

Article 8 – Principle of Ecological Restitution – Article 8(f) requires the contracting parties to, as far as possible and as appropriate, to rehabilitate and restore the degraded ecosystems and promote the recovery of threatened species. The focus has to be on restoration of the ecosystem as close and similar as possible to the specific one that was damaged. The State, apart from preventing such acts in the future, should take immediate steps for restoration of the damage already done; undertake an exercise for determining the valuation of the damage done and recover it from the persons found responsible for causing such a damage. (Para 150, 156 & 158) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198

Corruption

Bribery not protected by legislative privileges - No immunity for MPs / MLAs taking bribes for vote/speech in legislature. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701

Corruption and bribery of members of the legislature erode the foundation of Indian parliamentary democracy. It is disruptive of the aspirations and deliberative ideals of the Constitution and creates a polity which deprives citizens of a responsible, responsive, and representative democracy. (Para 104) Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701

Offence of bribery not dependent on actual performance of act for which bribe is taken, mere acceptance of bribe enough. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701

The offence of bribery is complete the moment illegal gratification is accepted and is not dependent on the actual performance of the promise for which the bribe was sought. Offence is complete one mere acceptance of undue advantage. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701

Cow Slaughter

Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964 (Karnataka); Section 10 – Power of competent authority to enter and inspect – The power of the authorized person was confined to enter and inspect. As per the provisions, the assistant director had no power to seize any sample of meat. (Para 9) Joshine Antony v. Asifa Sultana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 195

Criminal Justice System

It is the bounden duty of every Court of law that injustice wherever visible must be hammered and the voice of a victim of the crime is dispassionately heard. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110

In recent years the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 96

Criminal Law

Appropriate sentence – Principle of proportionality – The aggravating and mitigating circumstances which the Court considers while deciding commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment, have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of compulsory imprisonment without remission, too. In the process of arriving at the number of years which the convict will have to undergo before which the remission powers could be invoked, some of the relevant factors that the courts bear in mind are:- (a) the number of deceased who are victims of that crime and their age and gender; (b) the nature of injuries including sexual assault if any; (c) the motive for which the offence was committed; (d) whether the offence was committed when the convict was on bail in another case; (e) the premeditated nature of the offence; (f) the relationship between the offender and the victim; (g) the abuse of trust if any; (h) the criminal antecedents; and whether the convict, if released, would be a menace to the society. Some of the positive factors have been, (1) age of the convict; (2) the probability of reformation of convict; (3) the convict not being a professional killer; (4) the socioeconomic condition of the accused; (5) the composition of the family of the accused and (6) conduct expressing remorse. The Court would be additionally justified in considering the conduct of the convict in jail; and the period already undergone to arrive at the number of years which the Court feels the convict should, serve as part of the sentence of life imprisonment and before which he cannot apply for remission. These are not exhaustive but illustrative and each case would depend on the facts and circumstances therein. No interference required for sentence of offences under Section 449 and Section 309. However, sentence under Section 302 is modified from 30 years imprisonment without remission to 25 years imprisonment without remission. (Para 57) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Framing of charge – Even a strong suspicion founded on material on record which is ground for presuming the existence of factual ingredients of an offence would justify the framing of charge against an accused person. (Para 43) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260

Quashing of Charge – Appellants have not made out a case for interference with the order on charge and the order of framing charge. The Court is only required to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of charge without blindly accepting the decision of the prosecution. (Para 43) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260

Power of constitutional courts to transfer case to CBI – The powers of the Supreme Court for directing further investigation regardless of the stage of investigation are extremely wide. This can be done even if the chargesheet has been submitted by the prosecuting agency. Held, unresolved crimes tend to erode public trust in institutions which have been established for maintaining law and order. In the present case the investigation has been ineffective is self-evident. Hence, this case needs to be handed over to CBI, for a proper investigation and also to remove any doubts in the minds of the appellants, and to bring the real culprits to justice. Case shall be transferred from SIT to the CBI. (Para 14 & 16) Awungshi Chirmayo v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 263

Standard of proof – Beyond reasonable doubt – Various lapses cumulatively affect the overall sanctity of the prosecution case, making it fall short of the threshold of beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution case stands shaken beyond a point to which no conviction resting thereupon can be said to be just in the eyes of law. (Para 47) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Custodial Death

It is a fact that, in ordinary circumstances, we ought not to invoke our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to invalidate an order granting bail to an accused. But this criteria, while dealing with the question of granting bail, would not apply in a case of custodial death, where police officials are arraigned as accused. Such alleged offences are of grave and serious nature. Ajay Kumar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 266

Custodial Violence

The High Court directs the Director General of Police to issue a circular for medical examination of persons brought to police stations for investigation, aiming to curb custodial violence. The State submitted that there cannot be an omnibus direction of this nature and that certain guidelines are required to be framed in that regard. The Supreme Court rejects State's plea to quash direction but permits State to formulate Standard Operating Procedure for guidance. (Para 1 - 7) State U.P v. Ramadhar Kashyap, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 148

Customs Act, 1962

Appeal – The transaction value in the bills of entry of the subsequent goods can be discarded if it is found that the importer has earlier brought/imported an identical goods or similar goods at a higher price from the same seller/exporter. Whether the previously imported goods identical or similar to the subsequently imported goods? – The court disbelieved the statement made by the appellant that the two goods aren't identical/similar to each other due to a little difference in the hardware and software functions in the disputed goods as compared to the earlier versions. In the order-in-original and in the impugned judgment of CESTAT on facts, it was found that Item nos. 1 and 3 were identical goods, and Item no. 2 was of similar goods. Detailed reasons have been recorded in the order-inoriginal as to why the transaction value of the imported goods has been discarded. Hence, there no error in the findings recorded by the CESTAT. (Para 8, 9 & 10) Global Technologies and Research v. Principal Commissioner of Customs, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 239

The Importer's Bill of Entry of subsequent imported goods can be discarded if the subsequent imported goods are undervalued to the previously imported identical or similar goods. (Para 8 - 10) Global Technologies and Research v. Principal Commissioner of Customs, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 239

Section 28AB, 71 & 72 – Applicability of custom duty – In 264 cases which were never placed inside the notified public bonded warehouse, custom duty is no applicable. Since the imported goods (264 cases) were never warehoused inside the notified public bonded warehouse but were unloaded outside the notified area but within the factory premises of the appellant and kept under a shed on permission granted by the Superintendent which permission was neither cancelled nor revoked, question of warehousing the goods covered by the 264 cases within the notified public bonded warehouse did not arise. As a corollary, the further question of improperly or unauthorisedly removing the 264 cases from the notified warehouse to outside the said area but within the factory premises of the appellant attracting Section 71 and the consequences following the same did not arise. Held, the demand raised by the respondent against the appellant as affirmed by the CESTAT qua the 264 cases including levy of customs duty and interest (under section 71 & 28AB) cannot be sustained. (Para 53, 58) Bisco v. Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : AIR 2024 SC 1638

Section 28AB, 71 & 72 – Applicability of custom duty – In respect of the missing 27 cases which were found neither inside nor outside the notified warehouse and for which no explanation was given by the Appellant, the CESTAT had correctly held that those 27 cases were improperly or unauthorisedly removed from the notified public bonded warehouse. The demand of customs duty and interest (under section 71 & 28AB) on the 27 cases has been sustained. (Para 54, 58) Bisco v. Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : AIR 2024 SC 1638

Section 129A(2) – Limitation – Powers of the Committee of Commissioners of Customs – If the said Committee is of the opinion that an order passed by the Appellate Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) under Section 128 or 128A of the Customs Act is not legal and proper, it can direct the appropriate officer to file an appeal before the CESTAT and there is no prescribed period of limitation for passing such an order but the authority must take action within a reasonable time. The review order passed after 10 months was held to be reasonable time considering the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in those days due to COVID-19. (Para 7) Global Technologies and Research v. Principal Commissioner of Customs, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 239

Section 27 - Deals with claim for refund of duty. As per subsection (1), any person claiming refund of any duty or interest paid by him or borne by him, may make an application in the prescribed form and manner, for such refund addressed to the designated authority before the expiry of one year from the date of payment of such duty or interest. Explanation below sub-section (1) clarifies that for the purpose of sub-section (1), the date of payment of duty or interest in relation to a person, other than an importer, shall be construed as the date of purchase of goods by such person. (Para 10) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645

Section 27 (2) - It says that if on the receipt of such application the designated authority is satisfied that the whole or any part of the duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty, paid by the applicant is refundable, he may make an order accordingly and the amount so determined shall be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund established under Section 12C of the Central Excise Act. However, as per the proviso, the amount of duty and interest so determined shall be paid to the applicant instead of being credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund if such amount is relatable, amongst others, to drawback of duty payable under Sections 74 and 75 of the Customs Act. (Para 10.1) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645

Section 27A - Provides for interest on delayed refund. It says that, if any duty ordered to be refunded under sub-section (2) of Section 27 to an applicant is not refunded within three months from the date of receipt of the application, there shall be paid to that applicant interest at such rate not below five percent and not exceeding thirty percent per annum as is for the time being fixed by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, on such duty from the date immediately after the expiry of three months from the date of receipt of such application till the date of refund of such duty. (Para 11) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645

Section 75A - Deals with interest on drawback. Sub-section (1) of Section 75A says that, where any drawback payable to a claimant under Section 74 or Section 75 is not paid within a period of one month (earlier it was two months and prior thereto it was three months) from the date of filing a claim for payment of such drawback, there shall be paid to that claimant in addition to the amount of drawback, interest at the rate fixed under Section 27A from the date after the expiry of the said period of one month till the date of payment of such drawback. (Para 12) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645

Dispute

Nature of dispute – Dispute between the parties was essentially of a civil nature – There is no criminal element and consequently the case is nothing but an abuse of the process. The complainant has not been able to establish that the appellants had intention to cheat right from the beginning. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case. Every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. (Para 4, 7, 8) Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Settlement of dispute between parties – The additional amount paid by the appellants pursuant to a settlement is primarily to bring a quietus to the dispute and to have peace and to avoid litigation. The mere fact that the appellants have paid an additional amount pursuant to the settlement, cannot be presumed as an act of cheating. The allegation that the complainant was coerced into a settlement, looks unlikely because there is no FIR or Complaint that the complainant was coerced into this settlement and the amount was duly accepted by the complainant. Further the complainant does not dispute that the additional amount paid by the appellants under the terms of the compromise deed. Hence, the dispute is settled. (Para 4) Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Doctrines

The doctrine of merger is a common law doctrine that is rooted in the idea of maintenance of the decorum of hierarchy of courts and tribunals. The doctrine is based on the simple reasoning that there cannot be, at the same time, more than one operative order governing the same subject matter. (Para 17) Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2024 SC 714 : (2024) 3 SCC 224

There is a doctrine of necessity where under given circumstances an action is required to be taken under compelling circumstances. In the present case, had the Working President not convened the meeting, the elections of the executive body would have been in limbo for an unreasonable amount of time. The convening of the meeting by the Working President upon the requests by the 16 surviving members was a “necessity” at the time. (Para 15 & 18) Adv. Babasaheb Wasade v. Manohar Gangadhar Muddeshwar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : AIR 2024 SC 768

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940

Sections 18A and 28 - Non-disclosure of the name of the manufacturer - The quantities of the 29 kinds of medicines recovered from the clinic run by the doctor were of small quantity. In such a situation, the non-disclosure of the name of the manufacturer/person from whom the said medicines were acquired cannot be said to endanger public interest (which obviously is the primary object of the prohibition in law) by allowing the circulation of such substances unauthorizedly. In the attending facts and circumstances, considering that the accused is a doctor, it was held that imposing a sentence of imprisonment would be unjustified, particularly when the intent to sell/distribute under Section 18(c) of the Act has been held unproven. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed, and the sentence of imprisonment was set aside; instead, a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- was imposed on the Appellant doctor. (Para 11 - 13) Palani v. Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 121

Proceedings under the Act initiated on the basis of the complaint of the Police Inspector is legally invalid. Accordingly, the cognizance order is found to be unjustified and is set aside. (Para 9) Rakesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 264

Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954

Rules, 1955; Section 3 (d) - Contempt of Court Proceedings – Violation of Undertaking – The Court restrained Patanjali Ayurved Limited from advertising products intended to cure diseases specified in relevant laws and cautioned against making statements against any system of medicine in the media, as previously undertaken. Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 229

Dying Declaration

Dying declaration can be the sole basis of the conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court. The Court is required to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where the Court is satisfied about the dying declaration being true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. There cannot be an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (Para 7) Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 199

Election

Chandigarh Municipal Corporation (Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations 1996; Regulation 6(10) – Regulation 6(10) stipulates the three eventualities when the ballot paper can be treated as invalid namely: (i) Where a member has voted for more than one candidate; (ii) Where a member places any mark on the paper by which he may be identified; and (iii) If the mark indicating the vote is placed on the ballot paper in such a manner as to make it doubtful over which candidate the vote has been cast. None of the above eventualities are fulfilled in the present case. In each of the eight ballots the vote was cast for one person, there is no mark on the ballot which would indicate that the person who cast the vote would be identified and the ballots left no manner of doubt about the candidate for whom the ballot was cast. Even if the mark which was placed by the Presiding Officer is taken into consideration, that mark does not create any doubt about the candidate in favour of whom the vote was cast. (Para 28) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

Chandigarh Municipal Corporation (Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations 1996; Regulation 6(1) – Regulation 6(1) requires the nomination of a councillor who is not a candidate at the election to preside over the meeting. This provision has been made to ensure that the person who acts as Presiding Officer would do so with objectivity. It is evident that the Presiding Officer in the present case has made a deliberate effort to deface the eight ballots evidently put his own mark on the bottom half of the ballots to create a ground for treating the ballot to have been invalidly cast. In doing so, the Presiding Officer has clearly acted beyond the terms of his remit under the statutory regulations. The Presiding Officer is guilty of a serious misdemeanour in doing what he did in his role and capacity as Presiding Officer. The result declared by the Presiding Officer is plainly contrary to law and shall stand quashed and set aside. (Para 31) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526

Electricity

The State Electricity Regulatory Commission has the power to reject the adoption of tariff if it is not aligned with market prices. While adopting the tariff, the Commission is bound to take into consideration the protection of consumer interest. Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. MB Power (Madhya Pradesh) Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 24

Enemy Property Act, 1968

Union of India cannot assume ownership of the enemy properties once the said property is vested in the Custodian. This is because, there is no transfer of ownership from the owner of the enemy property to the Custodian and consequently, there is no ownership rights transferred to the Union of India. Therefore, the enemy properties which vest in the Custodian are not Union properties. (Para 22) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156

Enforcement of Law

Power to court to enforce laws – It is not the function of the court to see the day-to-day enforcement of the law; that being the function of the Executive, but because of the non-functioning of the enforcement agencies, the courts out of necessity may pass orders directing the enforcement agencies to implement the law. (Para 77) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198

Environment

Fundamental right to a healthy environment – Sustainable development – All human beings have a fundamental right to a healthy environment, commensurate with their well-being, coupled with a corresponding duty of ensuring that resources are conserved and preserved in such a way that the present as well as future generations will be aware of them equally. (Para 77) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198

Order of closure of industry – The closure of the industry is a matter of last option and that an opportunity for remediation ought to be granted. The nature of the violations and severity of breach of environmental norms, left neither the statutory authorities nor the High Court with the option to take any other view. The TNPCB would be acting within the scope of its statutory powers while directing closure of plant, for the protection of the environment in accordance with law. (Para 21 & 24) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Polluter pays principle – Those who pollute or degrade the environment should bear the costs of mitigation and restoration. Economic activities should not come at the expense of environmental degradation or the health of the population. (Para 24) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Principle of Sustainable Development – The concept of intergenerational equity – The “present residents of the earth hold the earth in trust for future generations and at the same time the present generation is entitled to reap benefits from it.” The planet and its invaluable resources must be conscientiously conserved and responsibly managed for the use and enjoyment of future generations, emphasising the enduring obligation to safeguard the environmental heritage for the well-being of all. (Para 27) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Right to a clean environment – All persons have the right to breathe clean air, drink clean water, live a life free from disease and sickness, and for those who till the earth, have access to uncontaminated soil. These rights are not only recognized as essential components of human rights but are also enshrined in various international treaties and agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Paris Agreement. These rights must be protected and upheld by governments and institutions worldwide, recognizing that they are essential for sustainable progress. (Para 26 & 28) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; Section 3 (3) - Central Empowered Committee (CEC) - Effective functioning of environmental bodies is imperative for the protection, restitution, and development of the ecology. The court directed the CEC to adopt measures to promote institutional transparency, efficiency and accountability - Issued Guidelines. (Para 21 & 31) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Role of Constitutional Courts - The role of the constitutional courts is to ensure that such environmental bodies function vibrantly, and are assisted by robust infrastructure and human resources. The constitutional courts will monitor the functioning of these institutions so that the environment and ecology is not only protected but also enriched. (Para 32) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Town and Country Planning Act, 1977 (Himachal Pradesh) - The first order of NGT is liable to be set aside on the short ground that it has transgressed its limitations and attempted to encroach upon the field reserved for the delegatee to enact a piece of delegated legislation. When the TCP Act empowers the State Government and the Director to exercise the powers to enact a piece of delegated legislation, the NGT could not have imposed fetters on such powers and directed it to exercise its powers in a particular manner. (Para 70) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Yogendera Mohan Sengupta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 32

Town and Country Planning Act, 1977 (Himachal Pradesh) - The exercise of power for the preparation, finalization and approval of development plan is a power exercised by the delegatee for enacting a subordinate piece of legislation. (Para 61) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Yogendera Mohan Sengupta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 32

The National Green Tribunal (NGT) is not supposed to apply strict rigors of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when a citizen approaches with a grievance. Nabendu Kumar Bandyopadhyay v. Additional Chief Secretary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 29

The National Green Tribunal's recurrent engagement in unilateral decision making, provisioning ex post facto review hearing and routinely dismissing it has regrettably become a prevailing norm. In its zealous quest for justice, the Tribunal must tread carefully to avoid the oversight of propriety. The practice of ex parte orders and the imposition of damages amounting to crores of rupees, have proven to be a counterproductive force in the broader mission of environmental safeguarding. It is imperative for the Tribunal to infuse a renewed sense of procedural integrity, ensuring that its actions resonate with a harmonious balance between justice and due process. Only then can it reclaim its standing as a beacon of environmental protection, where well-intentioned endeavors are not simply washed away. (Para 4 & 5) Veena Gupta v. Central Pollution Control Board, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 97

The Union of India should formulate a policy of phasing out heavy-duty diesel vehicles and replacing them with BS VI vehicles. Container Corporation of India Ltd. v. Ajay Khera, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 31

Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986

Rule 5(3) and Constitution of India; Article 21 – Procedure of inviting objections to the draft Environmental clearance (EC) notification – Held, before the issue of the second EC notification, the procedure of inviting objections to the draft notification was followed, and the objections were considered. Hence, there is no reason to dispense with the requirement of inviting objections before publishing the impugned notification. Article 21 guarantees a right to live in a pollution-free environment and therefore, the participation of the citizens is very important by allowing them to raise objections to the proposed notification. Hence, their participation cannot be prevented by casually exercising the power under sub-rule (4) of Rule 5. (Para 22) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252

Rule 5(4) – Requirement of public notice for modifying EC notifications can be dispensed with in 'public interest' – The Central Government for modifying EC notifications came to the conclusion that in the public interest, the requirement of prior publication of notice was required to be dispensed with. The document recording the satisfaction of the competent authority about the existence of public interest and the nature of the public interest ought to have been produced by the Ministry. As no such document was produced it can be concluded that the drastic decision to invoke Rule 5(4) was made without any application of the mind. Hence, the decision-making process has been vitiated. Therefore, the inclusion of item 6 of the substituted Appendix-IX will have to be held illegal. (Para 23 & 24) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 – Object – The object of the EP Act is to provide for the protection and improvement of the environment. Object of mandatory requirement of obtaining environmental clearance notification for projects was to minimize the damage to environment while implementing projects. (Para 9 & 25) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252

Eviction

Eviction - illegal demolition of premises with the support of the local police - Imposed a cost amounting to Rs. 6 lakhs on six police personnel for conspiring and illegally detaining tenants, coercing them to sign documents against their will, and demolishing the premises in question without any order from a competent court. (Para 9) Shatrughna Atmaram Patil v. Vinod Dodhu Chaudhary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Evidence

Appreciation of Evidence – The High Court fails to appreciate evidence in a thorough manner and merely relied on a limited set of facts to arrive at a finding. In an appeal, as much as in a trial, appreciation of evidence essentially requires a holistic view and not a myopic view. Appreciation of evidence requires sifting and weighing of material facts against each other and a conclusion of guilt could be arrived at only when the entire set of facts, lined together, points towards the only conclusion of guilt. Appreciation of partial evidence is no appreciation at all, and is bound to lead to absurd results. (Para 35) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

As soon as an accused or suspected person comes into the hands of a police officer, he is no longer at liberty and is under a check, and is, therefore, in “custody” within the meaning of Sections 25 to 27 of the Evidence Act. (Para 28) Erumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Ballistic expert - It is not that in each and every case where the death of the victim is due to gunshot injury that the opinion of the ballistic expert should be obtained and the expert be examined. When there is direct eye witness account which is found to be credible, omission to obtain ballistic report and non-examination of ballistic expert may not be fatal to the prosecution case but if the evidence tendered including that of eyewitnesses do not inspire confidence or suffer from glaring inconsistencies coupled with omission to examine material witnesses, the omission to seek ballistic opinion and examination of the ballistic expert may be fatal to the prosecution case. (Para 29) Ram Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Burden of Proof – The threshold of the 'burden of proof' required to be discharged, when challenging a particular charge as an “illegal charge”, is only on the preponderance of probabilities, upon which the onus will shift on the authorities to establish how the particular charge is valid. Railways failed to establish that 444 kms was the correct chargeable distance, hence, it was declared that the said computation was illegal. (Para 121) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256

Circumstantial evidence – Chain of circumstances – The circumstances set out are by themselves consistent with the sole hypothesis that the accused and the accused alone is the perpetrator of these murders which were most foul. Held, the circumstances presented in evidence in this case meets the ingredients that are required to be established. Hence, no reason to interfere with the concurrent conviction recorded by the trial Court and the High Court against the appellant. (Para 15) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Circumstantial evidence – Entire case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. The principles concerning circumstantial evidence are referred to as the “Panchsheel” principles. Essentially, circumstantial evidence comes into picture when there is absence of direct evidence. For proving a case on the basis of circumstantial evidence, it must be established that the chain of circumstances is complete and is consistent with the only conclusion of guilt. The chain of circumstantial evidence is essentially meant to enable the court in drawing an inference and the task of fixing criminal liability on the strength of an inference must be approached with abundant caution. The circumstances sought to be proved by the prosecution are inconsistent and the inconsistencies are unexplained by the prosecution. Drawing an inference of guilt on the basis of inconsistent circumstantial evidence would result into failure of justice. The evidence on record fails the test for the acceptability of circumstantial evidence. (Para 27) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Circumstantial evidence – In absence of direct evidence, case essentially falls back on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution has failed to complete the chain of circumstances. The circumstances are far from conclusive and a conclusion of guilt could not be drawn from them. To sustain a conviction, the Court must form the view that the accused “must have” committed the offence, and not “may have”. (Para 37 & 38) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Circumstantial evidence – Panchsheel or the five principles essential to be kept in mind while convicting an accused in a case based on circumstantial evidence: - (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established, (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. (Para 14) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Conclusive Evidence – The accused persons had sought to place reliance on income tax returns and income tax assessment orders. Held, income tax returns and orders may be admissible as evidence but are not themselves conclusive proof of lawful source of income under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and that independent evidence to corroborate the same would be required. The probative value of value of the Orders of the Income Tax Authorities, including the Order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the subsequent Assessment Orders, would depend on the nature of the information furnished and findings recorded in the order, and would not ipso facto either conclusively prove or disprove a charge. The High Court has rightly not discharged the appellants based on the Orders of the Income Tax Authorities. (Para 29 & 32) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260

Conviction on sole evidence of victim – Conviction undoubtedly can be recorded on the sole evidence of a victim of crime; however, it must undergo a strict scrutiny through the well settled legal principles. (Para 22) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Court has to strike a balance between testimonies of Injured Witness & Interested Witness. The evidence of an injured witness is considered to be on a higher pedestal than that of a witness simpliciter. (Para 28 & 34) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Credibility of testimony of the victim in matters involving sexual offences –The statement of the prosecutrix ought to be consistent from the beginning to the end (minor inconsistences excepted), from the initial statement to the oral testimony, without creating any doubt qua the prosecution's case. The Court can rely on the victim as a “sterling witness” without further corroboration, but the quality and credibility must be exceptionally high. While a victim's testimony is usually enough for sexual offence cases, an unreliable or insufficient account from the prosecutrix, marked by identified flaws and gaps, casts serious doubt with regard to the veracity of the prosecution version and could make it difficult for a conviction to be recorded. Considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident and allows the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. Material contradictions apparent in the depositions of prosecution witnesses, including the victim, significantly undermine the credibility of the prosecution version. Enough missing links present to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused. (Para 15, 16, 17 & 22) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Delay in filing the FIR and delay in examination of prosecution witness – The delay therefore renders the circumstances questionable. Hence, it cannot be said that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing its case against the two accused persons beyond reasonable doubt warranting a conviction under Section 302 IPC. (Para 42) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Extra judicial confession – It is considered as a weak type of evidence and is generally used as a corroborative link to lend credibility to the other evidence on record. An extra judicial confession must be accepted with great care and caution. If it is not supported by other evidence on record, it fails to inspire confidence and in such a case, it shall not be treated as a strong piece of evidence for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion of guilt. The prosecution must establish that a confession was indeed made by the accused, that it was voluntary in nature and that the contents of the confession were true. The standard required for proving an extra judicial confession to the satisfaction of the Court is on the higher side and these essential ingredients must be established beyond any reasonable doubt. The standard becomes even higher when the entire case of the prosecution necessarily rests on the extra judicial confession. (Para 14) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142

illiterate witness - Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses. It cannot be subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry and much emphasis ought not to be given to imprecise details that may have been brought out in the evidence. The evidence of a rustic/illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition. (Para 27) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164

illiterate witness - However, the testimony of an illiterate witness suffers not merely from technical imperfections, there are glaring omissions and improvements that have been brought out in the cross-examination, which cannot be attributed to the illiteracy of the individual deposition. If there were minor contradictions and inconsistencies, that could have been ignored since the recollection of exact details as to location and time can be attributed to the lack of literacy. (Para 28) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164

Incidental witnesses – The incident, which transpired partly within the confines of the house and extended slightly beyond the deceased's premises, the family members and close relatives naturally become the witnesses. These individuals cannot be considered incidental witnesses; instead, they emerge as the most natural witnesses. (Para 29) Thoti Manohar v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) SCC 7 723; referred. State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Independent witness – No independent witnesses were examined – The non-examination of independent witnesses would not be fatal to a case set up by the prosecution but if witnesses examined are found to be 'interested' then, the examination of independent witnesses would assume importance. It is hard to conceive how the Trial Court concluded that despite being the first cousin of D-1 and himself a person injured in the incident, PW-1 was not an interested witness. Further, considering categorical statement that “the wine shop is in the main road” and “the wine shop would be crowded always” the joining of independent witnesses ought not to have been a difficult task but, yet, it remained unachieved. (Para 31) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Injured Witness - The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable evidence in a criminal Trial. (Para 11) Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : AIR 2024 SC 271 : (2024) 3 SCC 125

Insufficiency of evidence – Sufficiency of the materials on record - Ordinarily the court should not get into or look into the sufficiency of the materials on record on the basis of which the requisite subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the Detaining Authority. However, if the facts of the case are such that the court is required to go into such issues, it may be done. The detention of the detenue is only relied upon on his confessional statement before the police and there is no test identification parade carried out by the police. There is nothing to indicate that the nefarious activities of the detenu created an atmosphere of panic and fear in the minds of the people of the concerned locality. Held, it is a case of and it prima facie, appears that the detenu might have been picked up by the police on suspicion and then relied upon his confessional statement before the police. (Para 33) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Interested witness – Where a testimony is duly explained and inspires confidence, the Court is not expected to reject the testimony of an interested witness. However, when the testimony is full of contradictions and fails to match evenly with the supporting evidence the Court is bound to sift and weigh the evidence to test its true weight and credibility. (Para 33) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Ocular Evidence - No doubt, they are members of the family and may be interested persons but their testimony cannot be discarded simply for the reason that they are family members in the scenario of the case that the incident took place inside the house of the deceased Shivanna, where there could not have been any other eyewitnesses other than the family members. The evidence of the aforesaid two eyewitnesses could not be shaken in the cross-examination. (Para 16) Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : AIR 2024 SC 1056 : (2024) 3 SCC 475

Ocular evidence is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused even if it unmatches with the doctor's expert evidence-Undoubtedly, only one kind of weapon i.e. chopper was used in committing the crime and, therefore, the evidence of the doctor may not be matching with that of the prosecution, but again, the ocular evidence of PW-3 and PW-4 is sufficient enough to prove that only chopper was used as a weapon of crime. In the light of the said evidence of the two eyewitnesses, the suggestion or opinion of the doctor cannot prevail as the opinion based upon probability is weak evidence in comparison to the ocular evidence of eyewitnesses. (Para 21) Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : AIR 2024 SC 1056 : (2024) 3 SCC 475

Offence of sexual harassment in a public place, as opposed to one committed within the confines of a room or a house, or even in a public place but away from the view of the public, stands on different premise. If any doubt arises in the Court's mind regarding the veracity of the victim's version, the Court may, at its discretion, seek corroboration from other witnesses who directly observed the incident or from other attending circumstances to unearth the truth. (Para 18) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Power of the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence – There is no inhibition on the High Court to re-appreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. However, such power is a qualified power. For re-appreciating evidence, the court must consider, whether the Trial Court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence or whether the finding of the Trial Court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact or whether the view taken by the Trial Court is a fairly possible view. (Para 25) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115

Presumption of constitutionality – The presumption of constitutionality is based on two premises. First, it is based on democratic accountability, that is, legislators are elected representatives who are aware of the needs of the citizens and are best placed to frame policies to resolve them. Second, legislators are privy to information necessary for policy making which the Courts as an adjudicating authority are not. The presumption of constitutionality is rebutted when a prima facie case of violation of a fundamental right is established, upon which the onus would shift to the State to justify the infringement. The broad argument of the petitioners that the presumption of constitutionality should not apply to a specific class of statutes, that is, laws which deal with electoral processes cannot be accepted. Courts cannot carve out an exception to the evidentiary principle which is available to the legislature based on the democratic legitimacy which it enjoys. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Presumption of innocence – The presumption is in favour of accused, unless proven guilty – The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretized when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. (Para 24) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Principles of circumstantial evidence – The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. (Para 37) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Re-appreciation of evidence – Reverse an order of acquittal - The Trial Court had appreciated the entire evidence in a comprehensive sense and the High Court reversed the view without arriving at any finding of perversity or illegality in the order of the Trial Court. The High Court, in exercise of appellate powers, may re-appreciate the entire evidence, however reversal of an order of acquittal is not to be based on mere existence of a different view or a mere difference of opinion. To reverse an order of acquittal in appeal, it is essential to arrive at a finding that the order of the Trial Court was perverse or illegal; or that the Trial Court did not fully appreciate the evidence on record; or that the view of the Trial Court was not a possible view. The High Court took a cursory view of the matter and merely arrived at a different conclusion on a re-appreciation of evidence. (Para 25) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Reasonable doubt – Minor inconsistencies could not be construed as reasonable doubts for ordering acquittal. A reasonable doubt is essentially a serious doubt which renders the possibility of guilt as highly doubtful. The inconsistencies in the case of the prosecution are not minor inconsistencies and the prosecution has miserably failed to establish a coherent chain of circumstances. The present case does not fall in the category of a light-hearted acquittal. (Para 29) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Two-views theory – When the appreciation of evidence results into two equally plausible views, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution and reinforces the presumption of innocence of accused. When two views are possible, following the one in favour of innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. It is also settled that if the view of the Trial Court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by re-appreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eyes of law. (Para 26) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Witness who was shown in the prosecution list but not examined by prosecution can be summoned as a defence witness. (Para 3 & 4) Sunder Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 98

Evidence Act, 1872

Section 9 – Test Identification parade – Identification of the appellant by witness is quite doubtful as no proper identification parade has been conducted. Witness clearly states that he has identified the accused persons out of two people shown by the police. In the absence of proper identification parade being conducted, the identification for the first time in the Court cannot be said to be free from doubt. (Para 6 & 7) Jafar v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 238

Sections 17 and 18 – Admission is a conscious and deliberate act and not something that could be inferred. An admission could be a positive act of acknowledgement or confession. To constitute an admission, one of the requirements is a voluntary acknowledgement through a statement of the existence of certain facts during the judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, which conclude as true or valid the allegations made in the proceedings or in the notice. The formal act of acknowledgement during the proceedings waives or dispenses with the production of evidence by the contesting party. The admission concedes, for the purpose of litigation, the proposition of fact claimed by the opponents as true. An admission is also the best evidence the opposite party can rely upon, and though inconclusive, is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous by the other side. (Para 13.1) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Section 18 – A statement made by a person is not only evidence against the person but is also evidence against those who claim through him. Section 18 of the Act lays down the conditions and the requirements satisfied for applying to a statement as an admission. (Para 14) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Section 18 – Admission by party to proceeding or his agent - Section 18 of the Act deals with: (i) admission by a party to a proceeding, (ii) his agent, (iii) by a suitor in a representative character, (iv) statements made by a party in trusted subject matter, (v) statements made by a person from whom interest is derived. The qualifying circumstances to merit as admission are subject to satisfying the requirements. (Para 13.2 & 13.3) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Section 25 – Confession before a police office – Confession of an accused recorded by a Police Officer is not admissible in evidence as the same is hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. (Para 23) Mohammed Khalid v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Section 27 - Four conditions to invoke Section 27 - First condition imposed and necessary for bringing the section into operation is the discovery of a fact which should be a relevant fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of such a fact must be deposed to. A fact already known to the police will fall foul and not meet this condition. The third is that at the time of receipt of the information, the accused must be in police custody. Lastly, it is only so much of information which relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered resulting in recovery of a physical object which is admissible. Rest of the information is to be excluded. The word 'distinctly' is used to limit and define the scope of the information and means 'directly', 'indubitably', 'strictly' or 'unmistakably'. Only that part of the information which is clear, immediate and a proximate cause of discovery is admissible. (Para 22) Erumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Section 27 - The expression “custody” under Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody. It includes any kind of restriction, restraint or even surveillance by the police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police. (Para 25) Erumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Section 27 of the Evidence Act is frequently used by the police, and the courts must be vigilant about its application to ensure credibility of evidence, as the provision is vulnerable to abuse. However, this does not mean that in every case invocation of Section 27 of the Evidence Act must be seen with suspicion and is to be discarded as perfunctory and unworthy of credence. (Para 24) Erumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Section 65B – Admissibility of electronic record – Certificate to prove electronic evidence – The call records were discarded by the High Court as there was no certification under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The Investigating Officer, was not aware of the procedure to be followed for obtaining a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The State Government must ensure that the Police Officers are imparted proper training on this aspect. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168

Section 73 - Certified copy of a document issued by a Bank is itself admissible under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 without any formal proof thereof. Hence, in an appropriate case, the certified copy of the specimen signature maintained by the Bank can be procured with a request to the Court to compare the same with the signature appearing on the cheque by exercising powers under Section 73 of the Act. (Para 15) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Section 90 – Presumption for 30 years old documents – If the document is more than 30 years old and is being produced from proper custody, a presumption is available to the effect that signatures and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting and in case a document is executed or attested, the same was executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. This does not lead to a presumption that recitals therein are correct. (Para 17) Tehsildar, Urban Improvement Trust v. Ganga Bai Menariya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Section 106 – Burden of proof – When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its duty. However, in exceptional cases where it could be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish the facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused, the burden will be on the accused since he could prove as to what transpired in such scenario, without difficulty or inconvenience. In this case, when an offence like multiple murders is committed inside a house in secrecy, the initial burden has to be discharged by the prosecution and once the prosecution successfully discharged the burden cast upon it, the burden did shift upon the appellant being the only other person inside the four corners of the house to offer a cogent and plausible explanation as to how the offences came to be committed. The appellant has miserably failed to prove. (Para 12) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Section 113A – Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married women – The words 'may presume' makes the presumption discretionary. Before the presumption under Section 113A is raised, the prosecution must show (1) that her husband or relatives subjected her to cruelty and (2) that the married woman committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage. The presumption would not be automatically applied on the mere fact that the deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act may be raised, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561

Section 145 and 161 - Accused has a right to cross-examine a police officer as to the recording made in the case diary whenever the police officer uses it to refresh his memory. Similarly, in a case where the court uses a case diary for the purpose of contradicting a police officer, then an accused is entitled to peruse the said statement so recorded which is relevant, and cross-examine the police officer on that count. Although the accused or his agents have no right to seek production of the case diaries as per Section 172(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whenever the police officer uses it to refresh his memory, the accused will get a right to access it for the purpose of cross-examination. (Para 22, 26 & 27) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Section 145 and 161 - When a police officer uses a case diary for refreshing his memory, an accused automatically gets a right to peruse that part of the prior statement as recorded in the police officer's diary by taking recourse to Section 145 or Section 161, as the case may be, of the Evidence Act. (Para 26) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Section 145 and 161 - While it is the responsibility and duty of the Investigating Officer to make a due recording in his case diary, there is no corresponding right under subsection (3) of Section 172 of CrPC for accused to seek production of such diaries, or to peruse them, except in a case where they are used by a police officer maintaining them to refresh his memory, or in a case where the court uses them for the purpose of contradicting the police officer. In such a case, the provision of Section 145 or Section 161, as the case may be, of the Evidence Act, shall apply. (Para 22) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Fair Opportunity

Neither arbitrariness nor malice found in the decision of the appellant-Board – The appellant-Board initially tried to purchase cardamom by issuing tenders and calling for bids, however due to failure of bidders to qualify the appropriate quality, the Board authorised the Chief Executive Officer to procure cardamom from local sources. Further, notice to purchase cardamom was published on the notice board and after price negotiations, respondent no. 2 was given supply orders after quoting the lowest rates. Hence, the decision of the appellant Board is legal, fair and transparent. There is neither arbitrariness nor malice in the decision of the appellant-Board as all the prospective bidders were given a fair chance. (Para 22) Travancore Devaswom Board v. Ayyappa Spices, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 207

Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006

If a case is registered against an accused for food adulteration under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), then by virtue of the overriding effect of Section 89 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (“FSSA”), the proceedings under IPC cannot be continued against the accused. There cannot be simultaneous prosecution under the IPC and FSSA because by virtue of Section 89 of FSSA, Section 59 of FSSA would override the provisions of Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC. Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160

Section 3 (zz) and (zx) - “unsafe food” - the concept of unsafe food is more comprehensive than the concept of adulterated food. Unsafe food means an article of food whose nature, substance or quality is so affected as to render it injurious to health. Substandard food cannot be unsafe food. By adding a substance directly or as an ingredient which is not permitted makes an article of food unsafe food. The presence of any harmful substance in the article of food makes it unsafe food. Therefore, if any adulterant is added to an article of food, which renders the article of food injurious to health, the food article becomes unsafe food. (Para 9 - 11) Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160

Section 273 of the IPC applies when a person sells or, offers or exposes for sale any article of food or drink which has been rendered noxious or has become unfit for food or drink. Section 273 incorporates requirements of knowledge or reasonable belief that the food or drink sold or offered for sale is noxious. Section 59 of the FSSA does not require the presence of intention as contemplated by Section 272 of the IPC. Under Section 59 of the FSSA, a person commits an offence who, whether by himself or by any person on his behalf, manufactures for sale or stores or sells or distributes any article of food for human consumption which is unsafe. So, the offence under Section 59 of the FSSA is made out even if there is an absence of intention as provided in Section 272 of the IPC. (Para 18) Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160

The prosecution under IPC can't be continued because Section 89 of FSSA provides an overriding effect to the provisions of the FSSA over any other law in so far as the law applies to the aspects of food in the field covered by the FSSA. Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160

The title of the section indeed indicates that the intention is to give an overriding effect to the FSSA over all 'food related laws'. However, in the main Section, there is no such restriction confined to 'food related laws', and it is provided that provisions of the FSSA shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. So, the Section indicates that an overriding effect is given to the provisions of the FSSA over any other law. (Para 20) Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160

When the offences under Section 272 and 273 of the IPC are made out, even the offence under Section 59 of the FSSA will be attracted. In fact, the offence under Section 59 of the FSSA is more stringent. (Para 20) Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160

Forest

Forest Conservation Act, 1980 - The existing criteria for identification of private forests in the State of Goa are adequate and valid, hence, they require no alteration. (Para 69) Goa Foundation v. State of Goa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 61

States/UTs must follow the definition of 'forest' given by Godavarman Judgment till forests are identified as per 2023 rules. Ashok Kumar Sharma IFS (Retd) v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 170

Interim Order restricting zoos / safaris within forests will operate only till final Judgment of coordinate Bench. Ashok Kumar Sharma IFS (Retd) v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 170

Goonda Act

Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (Act 1986); Section 2(g) – Preventive detention is challenged – Difference between 'law and order' and 'public order' – In order to pass an order of detention under the Act 1986 against any person, the Detaining Authority must be satisfied that he is a “GOONDA” within the meaning of Section 2(g) and to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it necessary that he is preventively detained. Held, mere registration of the two FIRs for the alleged offences of robbery etc. could not have been made the basis to preventively detaining the appellant herein on the assumption that he is a “GOONDA”. What has been alleged against the detenu could have raised the problems relating to 'law and order' but it is difficult to say that they impinged on 'public order'. Further held, to bring the activities of a person within the expression of “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” the activities must be of such a nature that the ordinary laws cannot deal with them or prevent subversive activities affecting society. The true distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Inability on the part of the state's police machinery to tackle the law and order situation should not be an excuse to invoke the jurisdiction of preventive detention. (Para 20, 31, 32) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986; Section 2(a) –The Explanation to Section 2(a) provides that a person shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” when such person is a “GOONDA” and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 'Public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in Section 2(a) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. (Para 23) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610

Act 1986; Section 3(2) – Subjective satisfaction of detaining authority – The Detaining Authority should take into consideration only relevant and vital material to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction. There is an implicit duty to apply mind to the pertinent and proximate matters and eschew those which are irrelevant & remote. If the detaining authority does not consider relevant circumstances or considers wholly unnecessary, immaterial and irrelevant circumstances, then such subjective satisfaction would be vitiated. The satisfaction cannot be inferred by mere statement in the order that “it was necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”. To arrive at a proper satisfaction, the detaining authority must examine (i) the material adduced against the prospective detenu to satisfy itself whether his conduct or antecedent(s) reflect that he has been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and, (ii) whether it is likely that the said person would act in a manner prejudicial to the public order in near future unless he is prevented from doing so by passing an order of detention. Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986; Section 2(a) –The Explanation to Section 2(a) provides that a person shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” when such person is a “GOONDA” and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 'Public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in Section 2(a) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. (Para 23) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986 – Object – To prevent crime and to protect the society from the anti-social elements and dangerous characters by placing them under detention for such a duration as would disable them from resorting to undesirable criminal activities. The provisions of the Act are intended to deal with habitual criminals, dangerous and desperate outlaws, who are so hardened and incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of the penal laws and the mortal/moral fear of punishment for crime are not sufficient deterrence for them. (Para 19) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986 – Invocation of Section 3 of the 1986 Act is not justified as mere involvement in a sexual offence, including one under Section 376D, by itself will not be sufficient to invoke Section 3 of the 1986 Act. This is for the reason that the 5 offence must be integrally connected 'with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order'. It is not decipherable from the order of Detaining Authority coupled with the grounds of detention, or from the Confirmation Order dated 09.08.2023, how the offence is connected to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. (Para 7) Vaddi Lakshmi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 254

Guardianship

Habeas Corpus - There is no legal right of an elder sister to exercise guardianship over her sister except when there is an order from a Court of competent jurisdiction. Rita Dwivedi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 124

Habeas Corpus

Habeas corpus - 25 year old woman detained by her parents - The matter had been adjourned by the High Court on 14 occasions and thereafter postponed for 2025, exhibiting "a total lack of sensitivity" on the part of the court, that too in a habeas corpus matter. When the question of liberty of a person is involved even a day's delay counts. The detenu was a highly qualified, mature woman with an understanding of what was right and what was wrong for her. In any case, a major girl cannot be compelled to do something against her wishes. K v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 52

Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Admission of the common ancestor to treat the children born out of a void marriage as his legitimate children would be also considered as evidence against his legitimate child, who is claiming through the common ancestor. (Para 16) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Children born out of a void and voidable marriage shall be considered as legitimate children and be treated as an extended family of the common ancestor for the purpose of deciding a valid share in the property of the common ancestor. (Para 17) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Once the common ancestor has admittedly considered the children born of void and voidable marriage as his legitimate children, then such children would be entitled to the same share as the successors in the property of the common ancestor as that of children born out of a valid marriage. (Para 16) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Information Technology Act, 2000

Section 67 – Criminalises the publication and transmission of obscene material in electronic form, covers material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it. (Para 7.1) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Section 67A – The facts of the present case certainly do not attract Section 67A as the complainant's grievance is about excessive usage of vulgar expletives, swear words, and profanities. There is no allegation of any 'sexually explicit act or conduct' in the complaint and as such, Section 67A does not get attracted. Section 67A criminalises publication, transmission, causing to publish or transmit – in electronic form – any material that contains sexually explicit act or conduct. Though the three expressions “explicit”, “act”, and “conduct” are open-textured and are capable of encompassing wide meaning, the phrase may have to be seen in the context of 'obscenity' as provided in Section 67. (Para 46 & 47) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Income Tax Act, 1961

Sections 147 & 148 - For the purposes of tax assessment, an assessee's obligation is limited to making a "full and true" disclosure of all "material" or primary facts, and thereafter, the burden shifts on the assessing officer. If a return is defective, it is upto the officer that he intimate the assessee in order that defects may be cured. But if the officer fails to do so, the return cannot be called defective. (Para 43) Mangalam Publications v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 55 : AIR 2024 SC 813

Section 194H - the assessees would not be under a legal obligation to deduct tax at source on the income/profit component in the payments received by the distributors / franchisees from the third parties/customers, or while selling/transferring the pre-paid coupons or starter-kits to the distributors. (Para 42) Bharti Cellular Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 176

Injunction

Suit simpliciter for permanent injunction – A suit simpliciter for injunction is not maintainable as the title of the property of the plaintiff/respondent was disputed by the appellants/defendants. In such a situation it is required for the respondent/plaintiff to prove the title of the property while praying for injunction. The plaintiff failed to establish their title on the land. (Para 21) Tehsildar, Urban Improvement Trust v. Ganga Bai Menariya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Pointing out the ambiguities or lack of specific details or data, post acceptance of the resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors, should be rejected, except in an egregious case were data and facts are fudged or concealed. Absence or ambiguity of details and particulars should put the parties to caution, and it is for them to ascertain details, and exercise discretion to submit or not submit resolution plan. (Para 15) Deccan Value Investors L.P. v. Dinkar Venkatasubramanian, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 265

Records of corporate debtor, who are in financial distress, may suffer from data asymmetry, debatable or even wrong data. Thus, the provision for transactional audit etc, but this takes time and is not necessary before information memorandum7 or virtual data room is set up. Financial experts being aware, do tread with caution. Information memorandum is not to be tested applying “the true picture of risk” obligation, albeit as observed by the NCLAT the resolution professional's obligation to provide information has to be understood on “best effort” basis. (Para 16) Deccan Value Investors L.P. v. Dinkar Venkatasubramanian, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 265

Resolution plans are not prepared and submitted by lay persons. They are submitted after the financial statements and data are examined by domain and financial experts, who scan, appraise evaluate the material as available for its usefulness, with caution and scepticism. Inadequacies and paltriness of data are accounted and chronicled for valuations and the risk involved. It is rather strange to argue that the superspecialists and financial experts were gullible and misunderstood the details, figures or data. The assumption is that the resolution applicant would submit the revival/resolution plan specifying the monetary amount and other obligations, after in-depth analysis of the fiscal and commercial viability of the corporate debtor. (Para 15) Deccan Value Investors L.P. v. Dinkar Venkatasubramanian, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 265

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 - Statutory set off or insolvency set off is not applicable to Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings. Regulation 29 of the Liquidation Regulations which provides for mutual dealing and set off, does not apply to Part II of the IBC which deals with CIRP. Bharti Airtel v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 11

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 - The principle of Set-off recognizes the right of a debtor to adjust the smaller claim owed to him against the larger claim payable to his creditor. There are two exceptions to the application of statutory or insolvency set off to CIRP proceedings. First being, when a party is entitled to contractual set-off, on the date which is effective before or on the date of commencement of CIRP. Secondly, in cases of 'equitable set-off' when the claim and counter claim in the form of set-off are linked and connected on account of one or more transactions that can be treated as one. (Para 3 – 10) Bharti Airtel v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 11

Section 30(2)(b) does not support the plea of insolvency set-off, since the provision deals with the amounts to be paid to creditors and not amount payable by creditors to Corporate Debtor. Further, the specific legislative mandate given in Chapter II Part II of IBC, the provisions of IBC relating to CIRP do not recognize the principle of insolvency set-off. The Court would not extend it by implication, when the legislature has not accepted applicability of mutual set-off at the initial stage, that is, the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process stage. Bharti Airtel v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 11

Section 53(1) is referred to in Section 30(2)(b)(ii) with the purpose and objective that the dissenting financial creditor is not denied the amount which is payable to it being equal to the amount of value of the security interest. The entire Section 53 is not made applicable. (Para 43) DBS Bank Ltd. Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 6

The IBC is an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals in a time bound manner for maximisation of value of assets of such persons, to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interest of stakeholders, etc. The IBC codifies the law of insolvency and bankruptcy. The IBC is a complete code in itself, except where it refers and permits application of the provisions of other enactments. (Para 27) Bharti Airtel v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 11

Section 14 - The imposition of moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC has no effect on the execution of a decree against the Directors or Officers of the Company (Corporate Debtor), which is undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under IBC. The protection of moratorium under Section 14 of IBC is only available to the Company and not to its Directors or Officers, thus the execution of decree can be done against them even during moratorium. (Para 11) Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association (Regd.) v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 63

Section 30(2)(b)(ii) - Whether a dissenting financial creditor is to be paid the minimum value of its security interest? – The issue referred to a Larger Bench. (Para 49) DBS Bank Ltd. Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 6

Section 53 - The dissenting financial creditor cannot object to the resolution plan, but can object to the distribution of the proceeds under the resolution plan, when the proceeds are less than what the dissenting financial creditor would be entitled to in terms of Section 53(1) if the corporate debtor had gone into liquidation. This is the statutory option or choice given by law to the dissenting financial creditor. The option/choice should be respected. (Para 45) DBS Bank Ltd. Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 6

Section 24 (3) (c) - Notice of COC meeting needs to be served on operational creditor having more than 10% dues. (Para 54) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Ordinarily feasibility and viability of a resolution plan is best decided by the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”), however when the resolution plan envisages the use of asset/land not owned by the Corporate Debtor but by a third party, which is a statutory body, bound by its own rules and regulations having statutory flavor, then there has to be a closer examination of the plan's feasibility. (Para 54) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 111

The Adjudicating Authority (“AA”) i.e., NCLT under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) has the power to recall its order approving the resolution plan if the resolution plan is not submitted as per the mandate of the Code. (Para 52) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 111

The claim submitted by the Resolution Applicant (“RA”) under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) cannot be rejected/overlooked merely on the fact that the claim submitted appears to be in a different form other than the form in which the claim needs to be submitted. (Para 54) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 111

When charge is created, resolution applicant to be placed as secured creditor in the plan. (Para 54) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Insurance Policy

Date of issuance of the policy would be the relevant date for all the purposes and not the date of proposal or the date of issuance of the receipt. (Para 15) Reliance Life Insurance Company Ltd v. Jaya Wadhwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 19

The date of proposal cannot be treated to be the date of policy until and unless on the date of proposal, initial deposit as also the issuance of policy happens on the same date where, for example, the premium is paid in cash then, immediately, the policy could be issued. Merely, tendering a cheque may not be enough as till such time the cheque is encashed, the contract would not become effective. The drawer of the cheque may, at any time, after issuing, stop its payment or there may not be enough funds in the account of which the cheque is issued and there could be many other reasons for which the cheque could be returned without being encashed. (Para 11) Reliance Life Insurance Company Ltd v. Jaya Wadhwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 19

Interim Order

Interim order of trial court not violated – Interim order restraining defendants No.1 to 4 from alienating the property was passed by the Trial Court on 31.05.1999 and on that date, defendant No. 7 was not party to the suit as he was impleaded only on 02.01.2001. There is no order passed by the Trial Court thereafter directing that the interim order was further extended qua the newly impleaded defendant also, hence it cannot be said to be a case of wilful violation of the order passed by the Trial Court. (Para 22) Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai v. Kumar Vamanrao @ Alok, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 194

Interim Relief

Interim Relief – Test for grant of interim injunction – The three-fold test is establishing (i) a prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience and (iii) irreparable loss or harm. This three-fold test must not be applied mechanically, to the detriment of the other party and in the case of injunctions against journalistic pieces, often to the detriment of the public. While granting interim relief, the court must provide detailed reasons and analyze how the three-fold test is satisfied. Merely recording that a prima facie case exists, that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant of injunction and that an irreparable injury would be caused, would not amount to an application of mind to the facts of the case. The three-fold test cannot merely be recorded as a mantra without looking into the facts on the basis of which an injunction has been sought. (Para 5 & 13) Bloomberg Television v. Zee Entertainment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 258

Interim Relief – Interim injunction against publication of journalists – The grant of a pre-trial injunction against the publication of an article may have severe ramifications on the right to freedom of speech of the author and the public's right to know. Courts should not grant ex-parte injunctions except in exceptional cases. In all other cases, injunctions against the publication of material should be granted only after a fullfledged trial is conducted or in exceptional cases, after the respondent is given a chance to make their submissions. An additional consideration of balancing the fundamental right to free speech with the right to reputation and privacy must be borne in mind. (Para 7 & 9) Bloomberg Television v. Zee Entertainment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 258

Power of appellate court to interfere in interim injunction – The grant of an interim injunction is an exercise of discretionary power and the appellate court will usually not interfere with the grant of interim relief. However, appellate courts must interfere if the discretion has been exercised “arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or where the court has ignored settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The grant of an ex parte interim injunction by way of an unreasoned order, definitely falls within the above formulation, necessitating interference by the High Court. (Para 12) Bloomberg Television v. Zee Entertainment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 258

Internet Shutdown

The Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir agreed before the Supreme Court to publish the orders passed by the review committees regarding internet shutdown in the region, except for the internal deliberations. Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 173

Interpretation of Statutes

Interpretation of statutes – In interpreting a statute or a rule, the court must bear in mind that the legislature does not intend what is unreasonable or impossible. The expression reasonable means rational, according to the dictate of reason and not excessive or immoderate. If a rule leads to an absurdity or manifest injustice from any adherence to it, the court can step in. A statute or a rule ordinarily should be most agreeable to convenience, reason and as far as possible to do justice to all. A law/rule should be beneficial in the sense that it should suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. (Para 80) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256

The courts should not give a hypertechnical interpretation to the clause(s) that would nullify the effect of the corrigendum/instructions. (Para 18) Priyanka Prakash Kulkarni v. Maharashtra Public Service Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 107

If a plain reading of a clause fulfills the object and purpose of the statute, then the rule of 'Reading Down' the clause would not be applied just because the clause imposes harsher consequences. Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85

The rule of 'reading down' the provision should not be applied at the first instance but should always be the last resort, i.e., only when the court finds that a particular provision, if for its plain meaning, cannot be saved from invalidation. Thus, by restricting or reading it down, the court makes it workable to salvage and save the provision from invalidation. (Para 99) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

“Reading Down” a provision is one of the many methods the court may turn to when it finds that a particular provision, if for its plain meaning, cannot be saved from invalidation. So, by restricting or reading it down, the court makes it workable to salvage and save the provision from invalidation. The rule of “Reading Down” is only for the limited purpose of making a provision workable and its objective achievable.” (Para 99) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

Investigation

The power to transfer an investigation is exercised in extraordinary situations. (Para 32) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

Judiciary

Judicial Impropriety - Judgment released after retirement - A judge retaining the case file after demitting office is a gross impropriety - Remitted the appeal to the High Court for fresh consideration. State through CBI v. Naresh Prasad Agarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 133

Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 (Jharkhand); Rule 14, 18 and 21, Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Regulation, 2017 – “No change in the rule midway” - The High Court administration is seeking to deviate from the Rules guiding the selection process itself - Rule 14, empowers the High Court administration in specific cases to reassess the suitability and eligibility of a candidate and not to take a blanket decision for making departure from the selection criteria specified in the 2001 Rules. Precluding a candidate from appointment is in violation of the recruitment rules without there being a finding on such candidate's unsuitability, such an action would fail the Article 14 test and shall be held to be arbitrary. If the High Court is permitted to alter the selection criteria after the performance of individual candidates is assessed, that would constitute alteration of the laid down Rules. The reasoning behind the Full Court Resolution of (securing 50 per cent marks in aggregate) is that better candidates ought to be found, is different from a candidate excluded from the appointment process being found to be unsuitable. This deviation from Statutory Rules is impermissible. (Para 20 & 24) Sushil Kumar Pandey v. High Court of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 109

Due weightage must be given to protect the purity of the judicial process, particularly when departure from the usual process of assignment of case by the Chief Justice is noticed. As is rightly said, justice should not only be done but seen to have been done. The fairness and the transparency in the functioning of the courts must be discernible to all stakeholders in the justice delivery system. Thiru. K.K.S.S.R. Ramachandran v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 91

Judges are not comparable with the administrative executive. They discharge sovereign state functions and just like the Council of Ministers or the political executive and their service is different from the secretarial staff or the administrative executive which carries out the decisions of the political executive, judges are distinct from judicial staff, and are thus comparable with the political executive and legislature. It would be wholly inappropriate to equate judicial service with the service of other officers of the State. The functions, duties, restrictions and restraints operating during and after service are entirely distinct for members of the judicial service. Consequently, the plea of equivalence has been consistently rejected in the judgments of this Court. We affirmatively do so again. (Para 18) All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25

Judicial service is an integral and significant component of the functions of the State and contributes to the constitutional obligation to sustain the rule of law. Judicial service is distinct in its characteristics and in terms of the responsibilities which are cast upon the officers of the District Judiciary to render objective dispensation of justice to citizens. The State is duty bound to ensure that the conditions of service, both during the tenure of office and after retirement, are commensurate with the need to maintain dignified working conditions for serving judicial officers and in the post-retirement emoluments made available to former members of the judicial service. Members of the district judiciary are the first point of engagement for citizens who are confronted with the need for dispute resolution. The conditions in which judicial officers across the country are required to work are arduous. The work of a judicial officer is not confined merely to the working hours rendered in the course of judicial duties in the court. Every judicial officer is required to work both before and after the court working hours. The judicial work of each day requires preparation before cases are called out. A judicial officer continues to work on cases which may have been dealt with in court, in terms of preparing the judgment and attending to other administrative aspects of the judicial record. That apart, members of the district judiciary have wide ranging administrative functions which take place beyond working hours, especially on week-ends including the discharge of numerous duties in relation to prison establishments, juvenile justice institutions, legal service camps and in general, work associated with the Legal Services Act 1987. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25

Registry – The Supreme Court expressed displeasure at members of the Registry staff for violating a judicial order regarding the listing of the matters on Regular list. Commander N. Rajesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 49

The High Courts shall constitute a committee named 'Committee for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary' to oversee the implementation. The composition of the committee shall be: (i) Two Judges of the High Court to be nominated by the Chief Justice of which one should be a Judge who has previously served as a member of the district judiciary; (ii) The Law Secretary/Legal Remembrancer; (iii) The Registrar General of the High Court who shall serve as an ex officio Secretary of the Committee; and (iv) A retired judicial officer in the cadre of District Judge to be nominated by the Chief Justice who shall act as a nodal officer for the day to day redressal of grievances. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25

The state governments pay the arrears to judges in terms of enhanced pay scales as per the recommendations of the Second National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC). All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25

The work of a Judge cannot be assessed solely in terms of their duties during court working hours. The State is under an affirmative obligation to ensure dignified conditions of work for its judicial officers and it cannot raise the defense of an increase in financial burden or expenditure. Judicial officers spend the largest part of their working life in service of the institution. The nature of the office often renders the incumbent incapacitated in availing of opportunities for legal work which may otherwise be available to a member of the Bar. That furnishes an additional reason why post-retirement, it is necessary for the State to ensure that judicial officers are able to live in conditions of human dignity. It needs to be emphasized that providing for judges, both during their tenure and upon retirement, is correlated with the independence of the judiciary. Judicial independence, which is necessary to preserve the faith and confidence of common citizens in the rule of law, can be ensured and enhanced only so long as judges are able to lead their life with a sense of financial dignity. The conditions of service while a judge is in service must ensure a dignified existence. The post-retirement conditions of service have a crucial bearing on the dignity and independence of the office of a judge and how it is perceived by the society. If the service of the judiciary is to be a viable career option so as to attract talent, conditions of service, both for working and retired officers, must offer security and dignity. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25

In the current case, the High Court's judgment from the initial round dated 30.03.1990, noted that the disputed property included 8 cents of land, not just the building structure on it. As per the Doctrine of Merger, the judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court from the first round of litigation are absorbed into the High Court's judgment dated 30.03.1990. This 1990 judgment should be regarded as the conclusive and binding order from the initial litigation. Following the principles of judicial discipline, lower or subordinate Courts do not have the authority to contradict the decisions of higher Courts. In the current case, the Trial Court and the High Court, in the second round of litigation, violated this judicial discipline by adopting a position contrary to the High Court's final judgment dated 30.03.1990, from the first round of litigation. (Para 20) Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2024 SC 714 : (2024) 3 SCC 224

The rule of 'Judicial Discipline and Propriety' and the Doctrine of precedents has a merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their actions. The Constitution benches of this court have time and again reiterated the rules emerging from Judicial Discipline. Accordingly, when a decision of a coordinate Bench of same High court is brought to the notice of the bench, it is to be respected and is binding subject to right of the bench of such co-equal quorum to take a different view and refer the question to a larger bench. It is the only course of action open to a bench of co-equal strength, when faced with the previous decision taken by a bench with same strength. (Para 1) Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2024 SC 714 : (2024) 3 SCC 224

Judicial Review

Courts do not and cannot act as appellate authorities examining the correctness, suitability, and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors to expert regulatory agencies on matters of policy which they are entitled to formulate. (Para 17 (a)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

The scope of judicial review, when examining a policy framed by a specialized regulator, is to scrutinize whether it (i) violates the fundamental rights of the citizens; (ii) is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution; (iii) is opposed to a statutory provision; or (iv) is manifestly arbitrary. The legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review, (Para 17 (b)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

When technical questions arise – particularly in the domain of economic or financial matters – and experts in the field have expressed their views and such views are duly considered by the statutory regulator, the resultant policies or subordinate legislative framework ought not to be interfered with. (Para 17 (c)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

Juvenile Justice Act, 1986

Section 2 (h) and 21 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302 and 201 r/w. 34 – Murder - Issue of juvenility was raised in Appeal - On the date on which the incident constituting the offence took place, the age of the appellant was less than 18 years. The 2000 JJ Act was admittedly not in force when the incident occurred. Therefore, the case will be governed by the 1986 JJ Act. Under clause (h) of Section 2 of the 1986 JJ Act, a 'juvenile' has been defined to mean a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. Thus, on the date of occurrence of the offence, the appellant was a juvenile. As per Section 22(1) of the 1986 JJ Act, there was a prohibition on sentencing a juvenile to undergo imprisonment. As the appellant has undergone incarceration for a period of more than eight years, no purpose will be served by sending the appellant before the Juvenile Justice Board. Pramila v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 57

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

Section 15(1) & 19(1) – The procedure provided under Sections 15 and 19 has been held to be mandatory by this Court in the case of Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh. Held, there has been a flagrant violation of the mandatory requirements of Sections 15 and 19 of the JJ Act. Neither was the charge sheet against the accused appellant filed before the Board nor was any preliminary assessment conducted by the Board under Section 15, so as to find out whether the accused appellant was required to be tried as an adult. In absence of a preliminary assessment being conducted by the Board under Section 15, and without an order being passed by the Board under Section 15(1) read with Section 18(3), it was impermissible for the trial Court to have accepted the charge sheet and to have proceeded with the trial of the accused. All the proceedings taken against the accused appellant are vitiated as being in total violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed under the JJ Act. (Para 37 & 38) Thirumoorthy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 262

Section 15(1), 18(3) & 19(1) – Section 15(1) provides that in case where a heinous offence/s (defined under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act) are alleged to have been committed by a child who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he committed the offence. Section 18(3) provides that where the Board after preliminary assessment under Section 15 opines that there is a need for the said child to be tried as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences. By virtue of Section 19(1), the Children's Court, upon receiving such report of preliminary assessment undertaken by the Board under Section 15 may further decide as to whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult or not. (Para 32, 33 & 34) Thirumoorthy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 262

Section 94(2) – Mode for determination of age – In the order of priorities, the date of birth certificate from the school stands at the highest pedestal in determination of age. The ossification test has been kept at the last rung to be considered, only in the absence of both certificate from school and birth certificate issued by a Corporation/Municipal Authority/Panchayat. Opinion of medical board that estimation of age based on X-ray examination becomes uncertain after 25 years is accepted. (Para 19 & 20) Vinod Katara v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : AIR 2024 SC 1430

Labour Law

Respondent, a part-time labourer, reinstated by Labour Court in 2001. State repeatedly litigated against implementation of the Labour Court award, harassing respondent for 22 years. Frivolous Special Leave Petition dismissed; respondent awarded costs of Rs.10,00,000. State of Rajasthan v. Gopal Bijawat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Land Law

Land Revenue Code; Section 36A and Registration Act, 2008; Section 17 – Restriction in conveyance of land by tribal in favour of non-tribal – Under Section 36A, restriction is only in case of transfer by way of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or otherwise and there is no bar for a tribal to enter into an agreement to sell and seeking advance sale consideration. Previous sanction is to be taken before conveyance could be made and conveyance by way of sale would take place only at the time of registration of a sale deed in accordance with Section 17 of the Registration Act, 2008. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225

The tenant holding possession of the Watan property under the Maharashtra Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, on the 'Tiller's Day', which is not subjected to payment of land revenue to the State Government, would be entitled to exercise their right of statutory purchase for purchasing the tenanted Watan property under the Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Offices) Act, 1962. Baban Balaji More v. Babaji Hari Shelar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 234

Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 - Limitation period of one year for filing of suit for preemption — Held, the issue regarding limitation for filing of the suit is misconceived and it was not raised by the appellants before the lower Appellate Court or the High Court. (Para 18) Jagmohan v. Badri Nath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : AIR 2024 SC 900 : (2024) 3 SCC 588

The bar of limitation cannot be obviated or circumvented by taking recourse of proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution when a statutory appeal is available. Gopal Krishnan MS v. Ravindra Beleyur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 5

Liquor Shop

The restrictions which were introduced by this Court in K Balu, (2017) 2 SCC 281 were in the context of national and State highways. As clarified subsequently, where the area in question falls within municipal or local limits, the distance requirements which are spelt out in the applicable Rules or Regulations would have to be complied with. (Para 16) Alankar Wines Pvt. Ltd. v. Human Rights and Consumer Protection Societies, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 89

Medical

Medical Admissions - Supreme Court permits three doctors to resign from their NEET super specialty seats to enroll in Institutes of National Importance (INI). The vacant seats resulting from the resignation will be included in the mop-up round. Vandeep Singh Basra v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 72

Medical Admissions - Restrictions imposed on resignation from NEET seats - the Supreme Court approved a proposal brought forth by Union of India to allow only those candidates to resign who had joined Institutes of National Importance (INIs) post counselling. The proposal given was reasonable and balanced the interests of meritorious students with concern of medical institutions where seats would fall vacant if upgradation is permitted. (Para 4) Vandeep Singh Basra v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 81

Medical Negligence

Medical Negligence - The Supreme Court directs the doctor to pay Rs. 2.5 lakh to the patient who lost vision in one eye. P.C. Jain v. Dr. R.P. Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Mere reliance on medical literature would not be sufficient to exonerate the Hospital from its duty of ensuring that the Head of the Department, Anaesthesia ought to have inserted the Double Lumen Tube. Instead, he was not available and the task was delegated to a trainee anaesthetist. Awarded Rs. 10 lakhs compensation. J. Douglas Luiz v. Manipal Hospital, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 132

Evidentiary value of expert opinion – In cases of deficiency of medical services, duty of care does not end with surgery – Findings of the DCDRC that there were lapses in duty of care by Respondent vis a vis both pre-operative and post-operative standards for conducting a traumatic cataract surgery is affirmed. Further, the expert opinion establishes a nexus between the lapses in post-operative care and the development of loss of vision after the operation. Despite the presence of evidence pointing towards negligence of the Respondents, both the forums (SCDRC and the NCDRC) failed to consider it and have mechanically and exclusively relied on the Medical Council report which did not delve into the nuances of pre-operative and post-operative care. While the report of the Medical Council can be relevant for determining deficiency of service before a consumer forum, it cannot be determinative, especially when it contradicts the evidentiary findings made by a consumer forum. In such circumstances, the appellate forum is tasked with the duty of undertaking a more thorough examination of the evidence on record. (Para 12, 13, 14 & 15) Najrul Seikh v. Dr. Sumit Banerjee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 219

Medical Termination Act, 1971

Section 3(2)(b)(i) r/w (3) and 5 - Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003; Rule 3B - Petitioner is having pregnancy of over 32 weeks by now, it is not advisable to accept her prayer as prayed for. (Para 5) R. v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 92

Mines and Minerals

The immutable geology of the area has limestone formation of the Vindhyan age, and as per geological study and assessment, the limestone is located in Nimbahera city. The mineral reserve of this stone occurs between Nimbahera shales and Suket shales. The limestone is a valuable mineral resource from the perspective of the State exchequer and is a material or a raw material used in more than one sense. The State Government granted prospective mining leases of small, medium and large areas in and around the hillock and the surrounding areas of the Chittorgarh Fort to individuals/industrial houses. The exploitation of minerals available in the surrounding area by the lessees to the State Government, particularly in an unscientific manner or disproportionate exploitation of minerals in hard and rude mining activities, was seen as a threat to the existential utility of the Chittorgarh Fort and the structures. (Para 3 & 4) Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Bhanwar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : AIR 2024 SC 833

The Supreme Court directed a survey of Karnataka mines for which rehabilitation and reclamation plans are not in place. Samaj Parivartana Samudaya v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 268

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Motor accident compensation – Assessment of compensation on the basis of income of deceased – The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for assessment of just and fair compensation. Assessment of compensation cannot be done with mathematical precision. The assessment of income of the deceased by the High Court was done on a very conservative basis. Considering the material placed on record, income of the deceased deserves to be re-assessed as it is established that he was multi-tasking and was not engaged in a 9.00 to 5.00 P.M. job. Considering the age of deceased at the time of accident as 52 years, the applicable multiplier for computation of compensation would be 11 times the sum of total dependency, as per the judgment of this Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121, approved by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680. (Para 14 & 15) Vethambal v. Oriental Insurance Company, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : AIR 2024 SC 1377

Is deemed transfer of motor insurance policy on sale of vehicle applicable only to third party risks ? The Supreme Court refers to a larger bench. Jaswinder Singh v. New India Assurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 190

Section 161 - Compensation of Victims of Hit and Run Motor Accidents Scheme, 2022 - If the Police conclude that it is a case of hit and run accident, the Police must inform the victim or the legal representatives of the victim, as the case may be, about the availability of the Scheme. (Para 6) S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : AIR 2024 SC 583

Section 166 - Compassionate Assistance to Dependents of Deceased Government Employees, Rules, 2006 (Haryana) - The family of a deceased in a motor accident cannot seek "double benefits". If the family has received benefits from the State Government on account of the death of the deceased, then such benefits are liable to be deducted from the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act. There cannot be a duplication in payments or a windfall owing to a misfortune. On the death of the person in harness, owing to a road traffic accident the dependents of a deceased cannot be doubly benefited as opposed to those who are dependents of a deceased who dies owing to illness or any other reason under the Rules formulated by the Haryana Government. (Para 6) Krishna v. Tek Chand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 116

Section 166 - Homemaker's deemed income cannot be less than minimum wages notified for daily wager. The role of a homemaker is as important as that of a family member whose income is tangible as a source of livelihood for the family. The activities performed by a home-maker, if counted one by one, there will hardly be any doubt that the contribution of a home-maker is of a high order and invaluable. In fact, it is difficult to assess such a contribution in monetary terms. (Para 8) Arvind Kumar Pandey v. Girish Pandey, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 152

Murder Trial

Merely on the basis of suspicion, conviction would not be tenable. (Para 20) Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 60 : AIR 2024 SC 695 : (2024) 3 SCC 481

Only on the sole circumstance of recovery of a blood-stained weapon, it cannot be said that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 19) Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 60 : AIR 2024 SC 695 : (2024) 3 SCC 481

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Section 52A – Safe custody of sample packets – Proceedings required to be followed as per Section 52A of the NDPS Act, by the investigating officer of preparing an inventory and obtaining samples in presence of the jurisdictional magistrate is not followed. Due to lack of proper procedure followed, the FSL report is held to be nothing but a waste paper and cannot be read in evidence. Glaring loopholes in the prosecution case give rise to an inescapable inference that the prosecution has failed to prove the required link evidence to satisfy the Court regarding the safe custody of the sample packets from the time of the seizure till the same reached the Forensic Science laboratory (FSL). (Para 21 & 22) Mohammed Khalid v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Section 67 - Confession statements are not admissible evidence. The authorities / officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau must comply and abide by the judgment in Toofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. Sharik Khan v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 216

Section 37 – Bail to the accused charged in connection with offence involving commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance – In case of recovery of huge quantities of narcotic substance, the Courts should be slow in granting even regular bail to the accused, more so when the accused is alleged to be having criminal antecedents. The Court would have to mandatorily record the satisfaction in terms of the rider contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act that there are grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The High Court not only omitted to record any such satisfaction, but has rather completely ignored the factum of recovery of narcotic substance, multiple times the commercial quantity. The impugned order is cryptic and perverse on the face of the record and cannot be sustained. Thus, the same is quashed and set aside. State v. B. Ramu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 128

National Food Security Act, 2013

There being a systematic legal framework provided under the NFSA for the implementation of the schemes and programmes for providing food and nutritional security, no direction is required to implement the concept of Community Kitchens as prayed for by the petitioners in the instant petition. It is open for the States/UTs to explore such alternative welfare schemes as may be permissible under the NFSA. (Para 7 & 9) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

Object - To provide for food and nutritional security in human life cycle approach, by ensuring access to adequate quantity of quality food at affordable prices to people to live a life with dignity and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. With the enactment of the NFSA there was a paradigm shift in the approach to food security from “welfare to rights based approach.” (Para 6) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

Natural Justice

Principles of Natural justice – Opportunity of being heard – The insured claims that the copies of the surveyor's report and the investigators' report were not provided timely and thus, the insured-appellant did not get proper opportunity to rebut the same. Held, the ends of justice require that the insured-appellant should have been provided proper opportunity to file its rebuttal/objections to the affidavit/reports submitted by the insurer-respondent before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and consequently, the complaint should be reconsidered on merits after providing such opportunity to the appellant. The appellant shall be permitted to file its rebuttal/rejoinder affidavit before the National Commission and shall be reheard and decided on merits afresh. (Para 17, 18 & 19) Kozyflex Mattresses Pvt. Ltd. v. SBI General Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 255

NEET

The issue of fixing cut-off dates pertains to the policy domain. Hence, it would be appropriate if the petitioners are permitted to submit a representation to the Union of India. Aditya Dubey v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 154

Students of open schools recognized by Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) and State Education Boards eligible for NEET exam. Medical Council of India v. Anshul Aggarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 189

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Director of the company not responsible for its day-to-day affairs cannot be held liable for dishonor of cheque. (Para 10) Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 237

Section 143A - Mere filing of the cheque dishonor complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act would not grant a right to a complainant to seek interim compensation under Section 143A (1) of the N.I. Act, as the power of the court to grant interim compensation, isn't mandatory but discretionary and needs to be decided after prima facie evaluating the merits of the case. (Para 14) Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 235

Section 118 r/w. 139 - Even if a blank cheque leaf is voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused towards some payment would attract the presumption under Section 139 of the Act and in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of the debt, the presumption would hold good. (Para 5) K. Ramesh v. K. Kothandaraman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Section 118 r/w. 139 - Accused has signed the cheque. The only dispute is with regard to the age of the ink used in making the signature on the cheque and the age of the signature and contents of the cheque. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence. (Para 5 & 6) K. Ramesh v. K. Kothandaraman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Sections 138 and 141 - The Director of the company wouldn't be held liable for the dishonor of a cheque issued by the company pursuant to the retirement of the Director unless some credible evidence is brought on record proving the guilt of the director. The director could be held liable for the dishonor of the cheque after his retirement only when it is proved that any act of a company is proved to have been done with the connivance or consent or may be attributable to a director. (Para 10) Rajesh Viren Shah v. Redington (India) Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : AIR 2024 SC 1047

Section 118(e) and 138 - If the accused is disputing the signature on the cheque, then the certified copies of the signatures from the bank could be summoned from the bank to compare the same with the signature appearing on the cheque. The indorsements on a cheque carry a presumption of genuineness as per Section 118(e) of the Act. Hence, it is incumbent upon the accused to lead evidence to rebut the presumption of genuineness of signatures. (Para 16) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Section 118(e) and 138 - The accused had not taken any efforts to disprove his signature at the trial stage. No question was put to the witness from the bank regarding the genuineness of the signature. Also, the cheque was returned not on the grounds of any discrepancy in the signatures. If at all, the accused was desirous of proving that the signatures as appearing on the cheque issued from his account were not genuine, then he could have procured a certified copy of his specimen signatures from the Bank and a request could have been made to summon the concerned Bank official in defence for giving evidence regarding the genuineness or otherwise of the signature on the cheque. (Para 16) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Section 138 - Accused persons filed an undertaking based on a settlement. Since the amount agreed was not paid, the interim protection, granted via suspension of sentence and bail, was withdrawn. Appeal dismissed with cost of Rs 5 lakhs and directed to surrender within a period of four weeks. Satish P. Bhatt v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 16

Section 138 - Once the settlement has been arrived at and the complainant has signed the deed accepting a particular amount in full and final settlement of the default amount and the fine amount awarded by the Trial Court, the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act need to be quashed. (Para 4) Ghanshyam Gautam v. Usha Rani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 23

Section 138 - Question regarding the time-barred nature of an underlying debt or liability in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is a mixed question of law and fact which ought not to be decided by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. (Para 7) Atamjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 76

Panchayat

Maharashtra Temporary Extension of Period for Submitting Validity Certificate (for certain elections to Village Panchayats, Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis) Act, 2023; Section 3(1) and 3(2) (b) - Section 3 provides an extended time to submit Validity Certificate within a period of twelve months from the date of commencement of this Act. The idea was that such elected candidates ought not to be deprived merely because of non-issuance of Validity Certificates when the applications are long pending before the scrutiny committee. Rejection of application by the scrutiny committee under Section 3(2)(b) would dis-entitle Appellant 1 from the benefit of Section 3. Rejection will also include cases in which applications are rejected on account of defaults committed by the applicants themselves. The application of appellant 1 was rejected by the scrutiny committee. Since there was no valid application filed by appellant before the nomination to the Scrutiny Committee, the protective umbrella of Section 3 does not apply to the appellant. (Para 40) Sudhir Vilas Kalel v. Bapu Rajaram Kalel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : AIR 2024 SC 1010 : (2024) 3 SCC 679

Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959; Section 10-1A provides, every person desirous of contesting election to a membership in the reserved category, shall submit alongwith the Nomination paper & Caste Certificate, a 'Validity Certificate' issued by the Scrutiny Committee. If such person fails to produce the Validity Certificate within a period of twelve months from the date on which he is declared elected, his election shall be deemed to have been terminated retrospectively and he shall be disqualified for being a member. In violation of producing the validity certificate, the Appellant No.1 stood automatically disqualified as a Member with retrospective effect from the date of his election. (Para 36) Sudhir Vilas Kalel v. Bapu Rajaram Kalel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : AIR 2024 SC 1010 : (2024) 3 SCC 679

Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958; Section 35 - Validity of No-Confidence motion. A Motion of No Confidence is to be carried by not less than three-fourth of the total number of members who are entitled, to 'sit' and 'vote 'at any meeting. Held, the 3/4th member requirement for coming up with a no-confidence motion was fulfilled as appellant 1 has ceased to be a member because of automatic disqualification. (Para 42 & 43) Sudhir Vilas Kalel v. Bapu Rajaram Kalel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : AIR 2024 SC 1010 : (2024) 3 SCC 679

Passport

Passports Act, 1967; Section 12(b) - As discernible from the language of the provision, what must be established is that the accused knowingly furnished false information or suppressed material information with the intent of obtaining a passport or travel document. In the present case, it is crucial to consider that the alleged forgery of signatures on the passport application was inconclusive. Moreover, the cognizance of such like offence can be taken only at the instance of the Prescribed Authority. No complaint to that effect has been disclosed against the Appellants. This Court, therefore, will exercise caution before invoking such severe offences and penalties solely on the basis of conjectures and surmises. Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Penal Code, 1860

Section 34 & 120B – Since the foundational facts essential for constituting the substantive offences under Sections 153A and 504 IPC are not available from the admitted allegations of prosecution, the allegations qua the subsidiary offences under Sections 34 and 120B IPC would also be non est. (Para 30) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 149 - If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence-A plain reading of the provision abundantly makes clear that an overt act of some of the accused persons of an unlawful assembly with the common object to kill the deceased Shivanna and to cause grievous hurt to the other family members is enough to rope in all of them for an offence under Section 302 IPC in aid with Section 149 IPC. (Para 20) Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : AIR 2024 SC 1056 : (2024) 3 SCC 475

Section 153A – For applying Section 153A IPC, the presence of two or more groups or communities is essential. Held, in the present case, no such groups or communities were referred to in the news article. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence. (Para 29) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 153-A (1) (a) & Section 153-A (1) (b) and Constitution of India; Article 19(1) (a) – Freedom to criticise decisions of the government – Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, under which, every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the action of abrogation of Article 370 or every other decision of the State. If every criticism or protest of the actions of the State is to be held as an offence under Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature of the Constitution of India, will not survive. The appellant intended to criticise the action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and did not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community. Describing the day the abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of protest and anguish. The effect of the words used by the appellant will have to be judged from the standards of reasonable women and men. Merely because a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will not be sufficient to attract Section 153-A (1) (a) of the IPC. Further, every citizen has the right to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their respective independence days. It cannot be said that such acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed only because the person belongs to a particular religion. WhatsApp status of the appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among various groups. Thus, continuation of the prosecution under Section 153-A of the IPC will be a gross abuse of the process of law. (Para 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Obscenity – Profanity is not per se obscene – Vulgarity and profanities do not per se amount to obscenity. While a person may find vulgar and expletive-filled language to be distasteful, unpalatable, uncivil, and improper, that by itself is not sufficient to be 'obscene'. The specific material which the High Court found to be obscene, was “foul, indecent and profane” language and nothing more. The High Court has equated profanities and vulgarity with obscenity, without undertaking a proper or detailed analysis into how such language, by itself, could be sexual, lascivious, prurient, or depraving and corrupting. (Para 35) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Standard to determine obscenity – 'Community standard test' – The Supreme Court in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal markedly moved away from the Hicklin test to the “community standard test”. The standard of determination is that of an ordinary common person and not a hypersensitive person such as an adolescent's or child's mind, who is susceptible to influences. The High Court has incorrectly used the standard of “impressionable minds” to gauge the effect of the material and has therefore erred in applying the test for obscenity correctly. (Para 7. 1 & 39) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Objective consideration while assessing whether the material is obscene – The court must consider the work as a whole and then the specific portions that have been alleged to be obscene in the context of the whole work to arrive at its conclusion. The High Court has taken the meaning of the language in its literal sense, outside the context in which such expletives have been spoken. While the literal meaning of the terms used may be sexual in nature and they may refer to sexual acts, their usage does not arouse sexual feelings or lust in any viewer of ordinary prudence and common sense. Rather, the common usage of these words is reflective of emotions of anger, rage, frustration, grief, or perhaps excitement. By taking the literal meaning of these words, the High Court failed to consider the specific material (profane language) in the context of the larger web-series and by the standard of an “ordinary man of common sense and prudence”. Neither did the creator of the web-series intend for the language to be taken in its literal sense nor is that the impact on a reasonable viewer who will watch the material. Therefore, there is a clear error in the legal approach adopted by the High Court in analysing and examining the material to determine obscenity. (Para 36 & 37) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Section 292 – Obscene material – Section 292 defines 'obscene' as a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object that is lascivious, appeals to the prurient interest, or has such effect, if taken as a whole, that tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, see or hear the matter contained in it. The provision criminalises the sale, distribution, public exhibition, circulation, import, export, etc of obscene material. The provision excludes such material when the publication is justified as being for public good on the ground that it is in the interest of science, art, literature, or learning or other objects of general concern; such material is kept or used for bona fide religious purposes; it is sculptured, engraved, painted or represented on or in ancient monuments and temples. (Para 12) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Section 299, 302 & 304 Part II – The act of celebratory firing during marriage ceremonies is an unfortunate practice – In the absence of any evidence on record to suggest that the Appellant aimed at and / or pointed at the large crowd whilst engaging in such celebratory firing; or there existed any prior enmity between the Deceased and the Appellant, the act cannot be punishable under Section 302 IPC. On grounds that (i) there was no previous enmity between the Deceased; (ii) no intention may be attributed to the Appellant as may be culled out from the record to cause death of the Deceased; and (iii) person carrying a gun with live cartridges has knowledge that firing the gun in presence of several people is an act likely to cause death, the Appellant is guilty of commission of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 IPC i.e., punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant under Section 302 IPC is liable to set aside. (Para 13, 14 & 15) Shahid Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : AIR 2024 SC 1319 : 2024 Cri LJ 1579

Section 302 – Acquittal order reversed in conviction – Reason assigned by High Court to discard evidence of complainant (PW2) and his daughter (PW3) is untenable. Complainant narrated the entire occurrence on a call made to the Police Control Room within ten minutes of the occurrence, hence, the court fails to find any meeting of the minds in such few minutes so as to create a false narrative only to implicate Gurpreet Singh. The presence of Gursewak Singh at the time of occurrence, his prompt reporting of the crime, and the swift action taken by the police immediately upon receipt of the said report, have cumulatively and unequivocally established the prosecution case beyond any doubt. On the contrary, the prosecution has successfully established that accused had been nursing a grudge against the deceased, hence, the attribution of motive by the prosecution stands proved. The reasons assigned by the High Court while granting acquittal are totally perverse and as a result of misreading of the evidence on record. Hence, it warrants interference by Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136. (Para 28, 30, 31, 33) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Section 302 & 34 – Co-accused –There is also not an iota of evidence to suggest that other respondents had any meeting with Accused and/or they had conspired with him for the execution of the crime. As there is no specific motive attributed, benefit of doubt can be extended to them. There is no convincing explanation to implicate them as co­accused. (Para 35) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Section 302 r/w 34 – Murder - Benefit of Doubt - An appellate court should give the benefit of doubt to the accused persons if the evidence on record indicates the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that a plausible view, different from the one expressed by the courts below can be taken. (Para 17) Jitendra Kumar Mishra @ Jittu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : (2024) 2 SCC 666

Section 302 r/w. 34 – Murder - Circumstantial Evidence - When the prosecution case is solely based on the circumstantial evidence, then the courts must be vigilant while examining the facts proving the circumstantial evidence i.e., it must be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should be free from doubts, improbabilities and inconsistencies. (Para 29 & 30) Pradeep Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : AIR 2024 SC 518 : (2024) 3 SCC 324

Section 302, 304 (Part II) and 34 - The prosecution has failed to establish common intention of Accused 3 to commit murder of deceased. Held, merely based on the presence of Accused 3 near the scene of offence and his family relations with the other accused, common intention cannot be established. That the trial court and the High Court have mechanically drawn inference against Accused 3 under Section 34. Further, participation of Accused 3 in assault is confirmed. Appeal of Accused 3 is allowed by altering the conviction under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II of IPC due to lack of evidence of common intention to murder. (Para 31) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050

Sections 302 and 316 - From every available evidence, which was placed by the prosecution, it is a case where a sudden fight took place between the husband and wife. The deceased at that time was carrying a pregnancy of nine months and it was the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased that resulted in the fire and the subsequent burn injuries and the ultimate death of the deceased. This act at the hands of the appellant will be covered under the fourth exception given under Section 300 of the IPC, i.e., “Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner”. The act of the appellant is not premeditated, but is a result of sudden fight and quarrel in the heat of passion. Therefore, we convert the findings of Section 302 to that of 304 Part-II, as we are of the opinion that though the appellant had knowledge that such an act can result in the death of the deceased, but there was no intention to kill the deceased. Therefore, this is an offence which would come under Part-II not under Part-I of Section 304 of the IPC. (Para 20 & 21) Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 215

Section 304 Part II is in two parts. The section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations: Firstly, if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is the “intention”. Secondly, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is “knowledge”. (Para 28) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050

Sections 304A and 338 - Fire Accident - Trekking Expedition - Persons who were part of the trekking expedition died owing to a forest fire which is an instance of vis major. No negligence could have been attributed to the trek organiser who only facilitated the organization of the trekking expedition. The organizers and even the members of the trekking expedition were totally unaware of the forest fire as such. Accidentally they were engulfed in the forest fire and they died by sheer accident and not owing to any negligence or any criminal intent attributable to the trek organiser. The trek organiser had no role whatsoever in causing the death of the trekkers who died due to a forest fire which is a natural cause. Peter Van Geit v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 83

Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Apprehensions expressed in the suicide note, by no stretch of imagination, can be considered sufficient to attribute to the appellant, an act or omission constituting the elements of abetment to commit suicide. The necessary ingredients of the offence of abetment to commit suicide are not made out from the chargesheet and hence allowing prosecution of the appellant is grossly illegal. (Para 21 & 23) Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : AIR 2024 SC 1405 : (2024) 3 SCC 665 : 2024 Cri LJ 1461

Section 306 – Abetment of Suicide – The basic ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC are suicidal death and abetment thereof. Oral evidence of witnesses does not disclose any form of incessant cruelty or harassment on the part of the husband which would in ordinary circumstances drag the wife to commit suicide as if she was left with no other alternative. Mere demand of money from the wife or her parents for running a business would not constitute cruelty or harassment. In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide. Mere harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetting the commission of suicide. The court should look for cogent and convincing proof of the act of incitement to the commission of suicide and such an offending action should be proximate to the time of occurrence. In the absence of any cogent evidence of harassment or cruelty, an accused cannot be held guilty for the offence under Section 306 of IPC by raising presumption under Section 113A. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561

Section 306 - Before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative to put an end to her life. It must be borne in mind that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable. (Para 36) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - In order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. (Para 39) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - Human mind is an enigma. There can be myriad reasons for a man or a woman to commit or attempt to commit suicide: it may be a case of failure to achieve academic excellence, oppressive environment in college or hostel, particularly for students belonging to the marginalized sections, joblessness, financial difficulties, disappointment in love or marriage, acute or chronic ailments, depression, so on and so forth. Therefore, it may not always be the case that someone has to abet commission of suicide. Circumstances surrounding the deceased in which he finds himself are relevant. (Para 47) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that the victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. (Para 40) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - Where the accused by his act or omission or by his continued course of conduct creates a situation that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide, then instigation may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. (Para 34) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Sections 306 and 417 - Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 2002 (Tamil Nadu); Section 4 - Broken relationships and heartbreaks are part of everyday life. Merely advising a partner to marry as per the advice of parents would not attract the penal provisions of abetment to suicide. There must be direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The accused must be shown to have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain acts to facilitate the commission of suicide. Where the words uttered are casual in nature and which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarreling people, and nothing serious is expected to follow from the same, the same would not amount to abetment of suicide. In order to constitute 'instigation', it must be shown that the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. The words uttered by the accused must be suggestive of the consequence. (Para 10 - 12 & 16) Prabhu v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 112

Sections 341, 323 and 302 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 200, 203 and 227 – Discharge - The version of PW-1 is that the accused repeatedly kicked on chest with a stick. In the post-mortem, no injury was found on the chest or any other part of the body of the deceased. The expert testimony of the doctor who performed the autopsy of the deceased cannot be completely ignored while deciding the guilt of an accused. Therefore, taking the evidence of the witnesses as it is, there was no material to proceed against the accused in the private complaint. (Para 11 & 12) Ramalingam v. N. Viswanathan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : AIR 2024 SC 757

Section 361 & 363 – Kidnapping from lawful guardianship – 'Kidnapping' within the meaning of Section 361 of IPC was established by the prosecution. Held, there was no reason for the father of the victim to falsely implicate the appellants and tutor the child to depose against them. Hence, the accused is convicted for the lesser offence of kidnapping defined by Section 361 of IPC, which is punishable under Section 363 of IPC. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168

Section 364A – Kidnapping for ransom - Ingredients – There should be a kidnapping or abduction of any person or a person should be kept in detention after such kidnapping or abduction. If the said act is coupled with a threat to cause death or hurt to such person, an offence under Section 364A is attracted. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168

Section 364A – Kidnapping for ransom not established – Mere Demand For Ransom without a threat to death or hurt would not Amount to offence under Section 364A. The ingredients of Section 364A of IPC were not proved by the prosecution in as much as the prosecution failed to lead cogent evidence to establish the second part of Section 364A about the threats given by the accused to cause death or hurt to such person. Only if the threats given to the parents or the close relatives of the kidnapped person by the accused was established, then a case could be made out that there was a reasonable apprehension that the person kidnapped may be put to death or hurt may be caused to him. Conviction of the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 364A of IPC is set aside. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168

Section 364A - Kidnapping for Ransom - The necessary ingredients which the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, before the Court are not only an act of kidnapping or abduction but thereafter the demand of ransom, coupled with the threat to life of a person who has been kidnapped or abducted, must be there. (Para 14) Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : AIR 2024 SC 271 : (2024) 3 SCC 125

Section 375 – “Consent” of a woman – To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. Held, the allegations in the FIR so also in the restatement made before the Dy. S.P., do not, on their face, indicate that the promise by accused was false or that the complainant engaged in the sexual relationship on the basis of such false promise. No error has been committed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court by holding that permitting further proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. (Para 11, 15 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242

Section 375 - If it is established that from the inception, the consent by the victim is a result of a false promise to marry, there will be no consent, and in such a case, the offence of rape will be made out. (Para 7) Sheikh Arif v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : AIR 2024 SC 710

Sections 376, 417 and 420 - Accused is a police officer. The allegation of undue influence and/or unintended favour towards him by the Investigating Officer cannot be brushed aside lightly. The appellant in her application has stated that: (i) respondent no.2 was already married to M and was, thus, disqualified to perform the second marriage; (ii) he being a Government officer, his second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage would have been a misconduct under the Conduct Rules; and (iii) that the first chargesheet itself suggested that the appellant and respondent no.2 had been living together and were in physical relationship. If that is so, the Investigating Agency ought to have further probed as to whether they have been cohabitating pursuant to the so-called marriage performed on 13.09.2012 and/or it was merely a consensual live-in relationship. Similarly, the Investigating Officer does not appear to have taken any pains to visit the hospital/medical clinics to verify whether the appellant underwent abortion twice. We are not sure whether the statements of the persons living in the neighbourhood were recorded or not to find out whether the appellant and respondent no.2 had been living together as husband and wife. All these facts will have a material bearing on the determination by the Trial Court as to whether a prima facie case under Sections 376, 417 and 420 of IPC is made out or not. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Sections 376 / 506 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Rape - Lodging a case after 34 years and that too on the basis of a bald statement that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of commission of offence, could itself be a ground to quash the proceedings. No explanation whatsoever is given in the FIR as to why the prosecutrix was keeping silent for a long period of 34 years. The material on record shows that the relationship was consensual, in as much as the son who is born out of the said relationship has been treated by the accused as his son and all the facilities, including cash money, have been provided to him. Rajaram Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 40

Sections 376 and 506 – Rape - False promise of marriage - The relationship between the accused and the victim was a consensual relationship which culminated in the marriage. In the legal notice issued on behalf of the victim, the factum of marriage was admitted and the victim has been described as the wife of the accused. Therefore, on the face of it, the allegation that the physical relationship was maintained due to false promise of marriage is without basis, as their relationship led to the solemnization of marriage. Therefore, this is a case where the allegations made in the FIR were such that on the basis of the statements, no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Hence, a case was made out for quashing the FIR. (Para 9) Ajeet Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : AIR 2024 SC 257 : (2024) 2 SCC 422

Section 376 AB - Punishment for rape on woman under twelve years of age - In the instant case, the petitioner-convict was aged 40 years on the date of occurrence and the victim was then only a girl, aged 7 years. Thus, the position is that he used a lass aged 7 years to satisfy his lust. For that the petitioner-convict took the victim to a temple, unmindful of the holiness of the place, disrobed her and himself and then committed the crime. We have no hesitation to hold that the fact he had not done it brutally will not make its commission non-barbaric. (Para 10) Bhaggi @ Bhagirath @ Naran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 87 : AIR 2024 SC 938

Section 405 - Criminal Breach of Trust - Commercial disputes over variation of rate cannot per se give rise to an offence under Section 405 of the 1860 Code without presence of any aggravating factor leading to the substantiation of its ingredients. (Para 14) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 406, 409, 420, 457, 380 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; S. 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 319 - Demand of money for extending benefits during custody - Application filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. against the police officials - All the witnesses have equivocally narrated the incidents that took place at different places regarding threats, demand of huge sum of money, torture etc. - According to them, the amount was being demanded for the following benefits to be extended: (i) firstly, not to physically torture; (ii) not to ask for further police remand; (iii) to help get bail; and (iv) to give good treatment during custody. Held, there appears to be prima facie evidence on record to make it a triable case as against the police officials. (Para 8 - 14) Gurdev Singh Bhalla v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : (2024) 3 SCC 142

Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B - On a reading of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, we do not find that the offences aforestated is made out at all. We do not find any criminal breach of trust nor any cheating by impersonation. There is also no cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, nor has any documents referred to any forgery or security or any forgery for the purpose of cheating. There is no reference to any document which has been forged so as to be used as a genuine document and much less is as there any criminal conspiracy which can be imputed to the appellants herein in the absence of any offence being made out vis-a-vis the aforesaid Sections. (Para 17) Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 96

Sections 406 and 506 - The ingredients to allege the offence are neither stated nor can be inferred from the averments. A prayer is made to the police for recovery of money from the appellants. The police is to investigate the allegations which discloses a criminal act. Police does not have the power and authority to recover money or act as a civil court for recovery of money. Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 150

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - Ingredients to constitute the offence - Discussed. (Para 11 - 13) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - For attracting the provisions of Section 420 of IPC, it must be shown that the FIR / complaint discloses: (i) the deception of any person; (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person; and (iii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement. (Para 13) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - The dishonest inducement is the sine qua non to attract the provisions of Sections 415 and 420 of IPC. (Para 20) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 417 - Mere non-performance of marriage by accused at booked marriage hall does not constitute commission of offense of cheating. (Para 8) Raju Krishna Shedbalkar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 158

Section 420 - It must also be understood that a statement of fact is deemed 'deceitful' when it is false and is knowingly or recklessly made with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another person, resulting in damage or loss. 'Cheating' therefore, generally involves a preceding deceitful act that dishonestly induces a person to deliver any property or any part of a valuable security, prompting the induced person to undertake the said act, which they would not have done but for the inducement. (Para 12) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 420 - The act of the wife to forge the sign of husband to seek the passport for minor child to travel abroad doesn't amount to cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, due to the absence of a deceitful act that resulted in a loss or damage of property to a husband. Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 420 - The term 'property' employed in Section 420 IPC has a well defined connotation. Every species of valuable right or interest that is subject to ownership and has an exchangeable value – is ordinarily understood as 'property'. It also describes one's exclusive right to possess, use and dispose of a thing. The IPC itself defines the term 'moveable property' as, “intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.” Whereas immoveable property is generally understood to mean land, benefits arising out of land and things attached or permanently fastened to the earth. (Para 13) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 420 - While prosecuting a person for the offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, it is to be seen whether the deceitful act of cheating was coupled with an inducement leading to the parting of any property by the complainant. To constitute an offence of cheating, merely committing a deceitful act is not sufficient unless the deceitful act dishonestly induced a person to deliver any property or any part of a valuable security, thereby resulting in loss or damage to the person. (Para 10 - 20) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 323, 504 and 506 - Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 2(b)(i) and 3(1) - “Gang” - Meaning of - the person alleged to be the member of the gang should be found indulging in anti-social activities which would be covered under the offences punishable under Chapters XVI, or XVII or XXII IPC. For framing a charge for the offence under the Gangsters Act and for continuing the prosecution of the accused under the above provisions, the prosecution would be required to clearly state that the accused are being prosecuted for any one or more offences covered by anti-social activities as defined under Section 2(b). (Para 12 & 13) Farhana v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 131 : AIR 2024 SC 1158

Sections 468 and 471 - Forgery - There are two primary components that need to be fulfilled in order to establish the offence of 'forgery', namely: (i) that the accused has fabricated an instrument; and (ii) it was done with the intention that the forged document would be used for the purpose of cheating. Simply put, the offence of forgery requires the preparation of a false document with the dishonest intention of causing damage or injury. (Para 22) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Sections 499 and 500 - Petitioner described all Gujarati people as “thugs”. It is true that every prosecution for defamation cannot be quashed on the ground that the offending allegations have been withdrawn. After the petitioner has explained the context in which he made the statements and after withdrawal of those statements, in the facts of the case, it is unjust to continue the prosecution. No purpose will be served by continuing the prosecution. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of the case, this is a fit case to quash the complaint. (Para 8 - 10) Tejashwi Prasad Yadav v. Hareshbhai Pranshankar Mehta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : AIR 2024 SC 1026

Section 500 - A criminal defamation case was filed against the owner of a newspaper for an article published against an advocate. The Magistrate rejected the complaint, stating that the news article in question was published in good faith and in the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Magistrate's view cannot be termed as "illegal or unjustified," and therefore, there is no justification for interference by the Sessions Court or the High Court. (Para 8 & 9) Sanjay Upadhya v. Anand Dubey, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 67

Section 504 – This offence can be invoked when the insult of a person provokes him to break public peace or to commit any other offence. Held, there is no such allegation in the FIR that owing to the alleged offensive post attributable to the appellant, the complainant was provoked to such an extent that he could indulge in disturbing the public peace or commit any other offence. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence. (Para 30) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 506 - Criminal Intimidation - The allegation of criminal intimidation against the accused is made in the complaint statements, no particulars thereof have been given. Both in the complaint petition and the initial deposition of one of the witnesses, there is only reproduction of part of the statutory provision giving rise to the offence of criminal intimidation. This would constitute a mere bald allegation, short of any particulars as regards to the manner in which threat was conveyed. (Para 17) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Commutation of Sentence - The lack of cogent evidence to prove that Accused 3 shared a common intention to commit murder is an important factor to commute a sentence from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC. (Para 29) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050

Quashing of FIR – A court must exercise its jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal complaint when the allegations made therein, taken prima facie, do not disclose the commission of any offence. (Para 48) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Right of Private Defence – The law provides that the person claiming such a right bears the onus to prove the legitimacy of the actions done in furtherance thereof and it is not for the Court to presume the presence of such circumstances or the truth in such a plea being taken. (Para 19) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Setting a person on fire is an act of extreme cruelty and would fall under Section 302 IPC. Naresh v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 37

Subjective test of Intention - A person intends a consequence when he (1) foresees that it will happen if the given series of acts or omissions continue, and (2) desires it to happen. The most serious level of culpability, justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is achieved when both these components are actually present in the accused's mind. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561

The fact remains that both the star witnesses of the prosecution are disbelieved in the trial by clearly stating that their statements are contradictory, the facts are twisted and improvements are made. For trial under Section 302 IPC, if a witness is branded as untrustworthy having allegedly twisted the facts and made contrary statements, it is not safe to impose conviction on the basis of a statement made by such witness. When there is an effort to falsely implicate one accused person, statements made by such an eyewitness cannot be relied upon without strong corroboration. Moreover, there is material on record proving previous enmity between the parties. State of Haryana v. Mohd. Yunus, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 36 : AIR 2024 SC 597 :: (2024) 3 SCC 180

Police Act, 1861

The information disclosing the commission of the cognizable offence needs to be recorded as a First Information Report (FIR) in the form of a book and not in the General Diary maintained by the Police. (Para 28) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Police Manual

Pertinently, there is no discernible conflict or contradiction between the definitions of 'Reporting Authority' and 'Reviewing Authority' in the 1970 Rules, post 1987, and in the 2007 Rules. The clear import of these definitions is that such authorities must be from within the same service or department. Invocation of the doctrine of harmonious construction vis-à-vis these definitions, therefore, does not arise. Given the clear intent of the 1970 Rules/2007 Rules that the reporting, reviewing and accepting authorities should be from within the same service or department, the question is whether breach of such requirement can be permitted in the State of Assam under Rule 63(iii) of the Manual. State of Assam v. Binod Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : AIR 2024 SC 760 : (2024) 3 SCC 611

Possession

Panchayat (General) Rules, 1961 (Rajasthan); Rule 266 – Only in certain specified situation, the land could be transferred by way of sale on private negotiation, namely, where any person has a plausible claim of title to the land and auction may not fetch reasonable price or it may not be the convenient mode for disposal of land or where such a course is regarded by the Panchayat necessary for advancement of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other Backward Classes. Another situation envisaged is where the person is in possession of land for more than 20 years but less than 42 years. Nothing was produced on record to show that the due process required for leasing out/sale of the land in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs by private negotiation was followed. Gram Panchayat from whom the land was taken was not impleaded as party to admit or deny the allegations made by the respondents/plaintiffs in the plaint. The alleged lease deed/sale deed has been issued in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs is clearly violative of Rule 266. (Para 29) Tehsildar, Urban Improvement Trust v. Ganga Bai Menariya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Practice and Procedure

A technicality like the caption of the application/petition could not be an impediment to consider the substance thereof. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Roster notified by the Chief Justice is not an empty formality. All Judges are bound by the same. No Bench can hear a case, unless as per the prevailing roster, the particular case is assigned to the Bench or that the case is specially assigned to the Bench by the Chief Justice. (Para 8) Directorate of Enforcement v. Bablu Sonkar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 123

It will be appropriate if the Registry of this Court stops referring to the Trial Courts as 'Lower Courts'. Even the record of the Trial Court should not be referred to as Lower Court Record (LCR). Instead, it should be referred to as the Trial Court Record (TCR). The Registrar (Judicial) to take a note of this order. Sakhawat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 103

The Registry should call for the soft copies of the records of the High Court and the Trial Court immediately after leave to appeal is granted in a petition challenging orders of conviction/acquittal. Mijai Molla @ Mijanur Molla v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 105

Pre-emption

Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab); Section 16, 8(2) and 3(3) - 'Land' and 'Immovable property' are two different terms. As per Section 3(3), immovable property is more than the land on which certain construction has been made. Notification dated 08.10.1985 limits its application for taking away the right of pre-emption only with reference to sale of 'land' falling in the areas of any municipality. In the present case, it is sale of immovable property, which is more than the land as a rolling mill had already been set up on the land. Held, notification is not applicable to property in dispute. (Para 17) Jagmohan v. Badri Nath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : AIR 2024 SC 900 : (2024) 3 SCC 588

Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab); Section 8(2) - Notification issued in exercise of powers under Section 8(2) enables the State Government to exclude any transaction of sale of any land or property for exercise of right of pre-emption. Notification exempts right of pre-emption in respect of sale of land falling in the area of municipalities in Haryana. (Para 8) Jagmohan v. Badri Nath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : AIR 2024 SC 900 : (2024) 3 SCC 588

Preconception and Pre­-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation & Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994

Section 20(1) & (2) – The appropriate authority on being satisfied that there was a breach of provisions of PC&PNDT Act or the Rules may, after issuing notice and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard, without prejudice to any criminal action against the licensed entity, suspend its registration for such period as it may think fit or cancel the same as the case maybe. The order of suspension was passed on 25.10.2010 without any notice or affording any opportunity of hearing as per Section 20(2). The order dated 25.10.2010 also does not qualify the requirements of Section 20(3). (Para 18) District Appropriate Authority v. Jashmina Dilip Devda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 202

Section 20(3) – Suspension of registration of license – Power of suspension under Section 20(3) of PC&PNDT Act can only be exercised when the appropriate authority forms an opinion with reasons in writing, that it is necessary or expedient in public interest to suspend the registration of licensed entity. It is incumbent on the authority to form an opinion for reasons to be recorded in writing to indicate the said public interest. Such power can be exercised without issuing notice under Section 20(1). The power of sub­section (3) is intermittent and in addition to the power of sub­section (2) but it may be exercised sparingly, in exceptional circumstances in public interest. Suspension order dated 29.12.2010 does not contain reasons as required to form an opinion that it is necessitated or expedient in public interest to exercise such power. The order of suspension does not qualify the requirements of Section 20(3), is not justified and has rightly been set aside. (Para 16, 17& 18) District Appropriate Authority v. Jashmina Dilip Devda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 202

Section 20(3) – Duration of suspension order – The power of suspension, if any exercised, by the appropriate authority deeming it necessary or expedient in public interest for the reasons so specified, it should be for interim period and not for an inordinate duration. (Para 17) District Appropriate Authority v. Jashmina Dilip Devda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 202

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 19 - Sanction - The Sessions Court could not have acquitted the accused only on the ground of alleged invalid sanction, without recording its findings on all the issues involved. (Para 8) P.I. Babu v. C.B.I., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 56

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A - Interpretation of - Split Verdict - Referred to Larger Bench. Nara Chandrababu Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 41

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

Section 2(ix) (k) and Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; Rule 32(c) & (f) – Misbranded food – The packets taken from shop/godown of the appellants by the food inspector were misbranded as defined under Section 2(ix) (k) of the Act, as they were not labelled in accordance with the requirements of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. (Para 7) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; Rule 32(c) & (f) and Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; Section 52 – Reduction of sentence as per current law applicable – Sentence of imprisonment and fine converted to only fine – The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, repealed by the introduction of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, wherein Section 52 provides a maximum penalty of Rs.3,00,000/- for misbranded food and no provision for imprisonment. When an amendment is beneficial to the accused it can be applied even to cases pending in Courts where such a provision did not exist at the time of the commission of offence. (Para 9) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

A very strange and unusual Writ Petitions have been filed by the State against the Directorate of Enforcement under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, before the High Court seeking relief, which would indirectly stall or delay the inquiry/investigation. The Writ Petitions filed, at the instance of the State Government, challenging summons issued to the District Collectors prima facie appears to be thoroughly misconceived, and the impugned order passed by the High Court also being under utter misconception of law. Directorate of Enforcement v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 172

Once cognizance of a complaint filed under Section 44 is taken by the Special Court under the PMLA Act, the power to arrest vesting under Section 19 of the PMLA Act cannot be exercised. Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 191

Section 45 - The appellants have miserably failed to satisfy that there are reasonable grounds for believing that they are not guilty of the alleged offences. On the contrary, there is sufficient material collected by the respondent-ED to show that they are prima facie guilty of the alleged offences. (Para 30) Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : AIR 2024 SC 1576

Preventive Detention

In a case where a detenue receives the ground of detention in the language known to him which contains a clear statement over his right to make a representation, there is no need for informing verbally once again. Sarfaraz Alam v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : AIR 2024 SC 407 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 755 : (2024) 3 SCC 347

Difference between preventive and punitive detention – The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. An order of preventive detention, may be made before or during prosecution, with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. (Para 25) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Mere involvement in sexual offence not sufficient : Supreme Court quashes Preventive Detention Order. Vaddi Lakshmi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 254

Prisoner

Guidelines and standard operating procedure for implementation of the scheme for support to poor prisoners. Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 151

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

'One day trial' in POCSO case - Supreme Court affirms High Court Order for fresh trial after setting aside conviction. Bablu Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 203

Property Law

Plea of adverse possession – Ingredients to prove the plea of adverse possession: - (a) The plaintiff must plead and prove that he was claiming possession adverse to the true owner; (b) The plaintiff must plead and establish that the factum of his long and continuous possession was known to the true owner; (c) The plaintiff must also plead and establish when he came into possession; and (d) The plaintiff must establish that his possession was open and undisturbed. It is a settled law that by pleading adverse possession, a party seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner, and therefore, there is no equity in his favour. The plea is based on continuous wrongful possession for a period of more than 12 years. Therefore, the facts constituting the ingredients of adverse possession must be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff. (Para 12) M. Radheshyamlal v. V. Sandhya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 245

Plea of adverse possession – When a party claims adverse possession, Firstly, he must know who the actual owner of the property is. Secondly, he must plead that he was in open and uninterrupted possession for more than 12 years to the original owner's knowledge. It is not pleaded that even before the year 1947, the plaintiff or his father were in hostile possession to the knowledge of the original owner. Therefore, there is no proper foundation for the plea of adverse possession in the plaint. Further, the plaintiff could not establish that his adverse possession commenced from a particular date. In a complaint filed to police one year before the institution of the suit the plaintiff asserted that he was in possession of the suit property for 35 years before filing the complaint. In the plaint, the plaintiff claimed to have been in possession since 1950. The plaintiff's own complaint defeats the case made out in the plaint. The plaintiff failed to prove his adverse possession. (Para 13, 15 & 16) M. Radheshyamlal v. V. Sandhya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 245

Public Service

Selection Process - Whether the error committed in the application form, which was uploaded is a material error or a trivial error and was the State justified in declaring the candidate as having failed on account of the same? Held, the candidate has participated in the selection process and cleared all the stages successfully. The error in the application is trivial which did not play any part in the selection process. The State was not justified in making a mountain out of this molehill. (Para 19) Vashist Narayan Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : AIR 2024 SC 248

Public Trust Doctrine

The aesthetic use and the pristine glory of the natural resources, the environment and the ecosystems of our country cannot be permitted to be eroded for private, commercial or any other use unless the courts find it necessary, in good faith, for the public good and in public interest to encroach upon the said resources. (Para 138) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198

The state holds natural resources in trust for the benefit of the public, ensuring that the common resources necessary for the well-being of the populace are protected against exploitation or degradation. It is important to balance economic interests with environmental and public welfare concerns. While the industry has played a role in economic growth, the health and welfare of the residents of the area is a matter of utmost concern and the State Government is responsible for preserving and protecting these concerns. (Para 25) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Railways Act, 1989

Section 106(3) – Applicability of Section 106(3) – Whether the present case is one of 'Overcharge' or 'Illegal Charge'? – Primary challenge is to the chargeable distance of 444 km in itself. The case of the respondent company is not that it has paid anything in excess of what was at the time of booking of the consignment required by law, rather, the respondent's case is that the charge which was required to be paid by the law as prevailing at the time of booking of the consignment was wrong. Held, as the same was admittedly charged as per the prevailing law and not due to any misapplication or mistake i.e., as per the old local distance table, this clearly is not a case of overcharge and would not fall within the four corners of Section 106(3) of the Act, 1989. Further held, the chargeable distance of 444 km was illegal. No infirmity with the impugned judgement and order passed by the High Court. The freight had been paid as per the notified chargeable distance which was later found to be incorrect, it was a case of “illegal charge” and not that of “overcharge”. (Para 105 & 107) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : AIR 2024 SC 1820

Section 106 and Railways Act, 1890; Section 78B – Scope of Section 106(3) – Section 106 deals with notice for claim of compensation and refund of overcharge. Under Section 106(3) a statutory time-period of 6-months has been provided for making a notice of claim for a refund of an 'overcharge' and if the notice of claim is not made within the stipulated period, then the claim becomes time-barred. The rigours of Section 106(3) of the Act, 1989 will only be applicable where the claim is for a refund of an 'overcharge'. (Para 59) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : AIR 2024 SC 1820

Section 106(3) – Condition for Notice for Claim for Refund of Overcharge is: Claim must be for refund of an 'Overcharge', Overcharge must have been paid to the Railway Administration in respect of the goods carried by the railway, notice must be issued within 6-months from the date of payment or delivery of goods for which overcharge was paid, and Notice must be served to the concerned railway administration to whom the overcharge was paid. (Para 43) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : AIR 2024 SC 1820

Difference between 'overcharge' and 'illegal charge' – An 'overcharge' is any sum charged in excess or more than what was payable as per law. Whereas, for an illegal charge, the sum must not have been payable by law. An Overcharge is effectively concerned with the error in the quantum of what was or should be payable, whereas an illegal charge is solely concerned with whether a particular thing was payable by the law / in conformity with the law or not. (Para 60, 70 & 74) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : AIR 2024 SC 1820

Recruitment

Power of court to interfere in recruitment process – Courts should be cautious and slow in dealing with recruitment process adopted by the recruitment agency. Merely because a recruitment agency is not in a position to satisfy the Court, a relief cannot be extended to a deprived candidate, as it will have a cascading effect on the entire recruitment process. The courts are duty bound to take into consideration the relevant orders, rules and enactments before finally deciding the case. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc. Recruitment made in favour of respondent 2 is restored. (Para 14) Telangana Residential Educational Institutions Recruitment Board v. Saluvadi Sumalatha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : AIR 2024 SC 1434

Process of recruitment – Ratio of seats – 30% of the posts meant for both locals and non-locals have to be mandatorily filled up first before going for the remaining 70%. Government notification stated that all Departments are directed to maintain 70% of reservation in direct Recruitment to Locals maintaining the 30:70 ratio. The High Court fell into an error in not only adopting a wrong ratio but also fixing 70% first. (Para 13) Telangana Residential Educational Institutions Recruitment Board v. Saluvadi Sumalatha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : AIR 2024 SC 1434

Order of cancellation of selection – On grounds of non-disclosure of any criminal antecedent in recruitment – Non-disclosure, could not be deemed fatal. The order of cancellation is neither fair nor reasonable. Broad-brushing every non-disclosure as a disqualification, will be unjust and the same will tantamount to being completely oblivious to the ground realities obtaining in this great, vast and diverse country. Each case will depend on the facts and circumstances that prevail thereon, and the court will have to take a holistic view, based on objective criteria, with the available precedents serving as a guide. It can never be a one size fits all scenario. (Para 30) Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 155

Character verification procedure challenged – The order of cancellation does not follow the mandate prescribed in Clause 4 of the Form of verification of character. Instead of considering whether the appellant was suitable for appointment, the Appointing Authority has mechanically held his selection was irregular and illegal because the appellant had furnished an affidavit with incorrect facts. (Para 29) Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 155

Determination of nature of relief – Essentials to be looked into by the court while adjudging suitability of the candidate for the office – The nature of the office, the timing and nature of the criminal case; the overall consideration of the judgement of acquittal; the nature of the query in the application / verification form; the contents of the character verification reports; the socio economic strata of the individual applying; the other antecedents of the candidate; the nature of consideration and the contents of the cancellation / termination order are some of the crucial aspects which should enter the judicial verdict in adjudging suitability and in determining the nature of relief to be ordered. (Para 28) Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 155

Registration Act, 1908

Section 47 - A registered sale deed operates from the date of execution when the entire consideration is paid. Changes made in a sale deed by one party unilaterally, after the registration of the deed and without the knowledge of the other party, have to be ignored. (Para 11) Kanwar Raj Singh v Gejo, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2024 SC 238 : (2024) 2 SCC 416

Remission

A woman deserves respect howsoever high or low she may be otherwise considered in society or to whatever faith she may follow or any creed she may belong to. Can heinous crimes, inter alia, against women permit remission of the convicts by a reduction in their sentence and by granting them liberty? These are the issues which arise in these writ petitions. (Para 1) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

If a criminal is curable, he ought to be improved by education and other suitable arts, and then set free again as a better citizen and less of a burden to the state. This postulate lies at the heart of the policy of remission. In addition, there are also competing interests involved– the rights of the victim and the victim's family to justice vis-a-vis a convict's claim to a second chance by way of remission or reduction of his sentence for reformation. (Para 1) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Reasons for grant or refusal of remission should be clearly delineated in the order by passing a speaking order. (Para 55 (h) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Remission: Scope & Ambit - Discussed. (Para 22 - 39) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

The factors that govern the grant of remission namely: i. Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large? ii. Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime? iii. Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime? iv. Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more? v. Socio-economic condition of the convict's family. (Para 48) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

The question regarding maintainability of a PIL challenging orders of remission is kept open to be considered in any other appropriate case. (Para 27) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

The policy of remission applicable would therefore be the Policy of the State which is the appropriate Government and which has the jurisdiction to consider that application. The policy of remission applicable at the time of the conviction could apply and only if for any reason, the said policy cannot be made applicable a more benevolent policy, if in vogue, could apply. (Para 55 (d) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

When an application for remission is granted under the provisions of the Constitution, the following among other tests may apply to consider its legality by way of judicial review of the same. (i) that the order has been passed without application of mind; (ii) that the order is mala fide; (iii) that the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations; (iv) that relevant materials have been kept out of consideration; (v) that the order suffers from arbitrariness. (Para 55 (i) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

While considering an application for remission, there cannot be any abuse of discretion. In this regard, it is necessary to bear in mind the following aspects as mentioned in Laxman Naskar v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 2 SCC 595, namely, - (i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large? (ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime? (iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime? (iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more? (v) Socio-economic condition of the convict's family. (Para 55 (e) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Rent Control

Rent Control Act, 1999 (Maharashtra); Section 16(1)(k) - Eviction of a tenant cannot be ordered merely based on a demolition notice issued by the Municipal body. The Court has to examine the "immediate urgency" of the need for demolition. (Para 13) Baitulla Ismail Shaikh v. Khatija Ismail Panhalkar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : AIR 2024 SC 846

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

Though, the Right to Property is no more a Fundamental Right, still it is recognized as a Constitutional Right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Depriving a citizen of his Constitutional Right to use the land for 20 years and then showing graciousness by paying the compensation and beating drums that the State has been gracious is unacceptable. The state is not doing charity by paying compensation to the citizens for acquisition of land. (Para 25 & 26) Sudha Bhalla @ Sudha Punchi v. Rakesh Kumar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 167

Sale

Ownership over property can't be claimed when a sale deed is executed by a person having no title. Savitri Bai v. Savitri Bai, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : AIR 2024 SC 1193

Sale agreement with minor void, not enforceable in law. Krishnaveni v. M.A. Shagul Hameed, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 165

SARFAESI Act

Principle underlying Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 - that the compensation payable due to a breach of contract is limited to the losses suffered by the other party due to the breach - did not apply to an auction purchase under the SARFAESI Act. (Para 68) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

The SARFAESI Act is a special legislation with an overriding effect on the general law more particularly the Indian Contract Act, 1872. (Para 68) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

The underlying principle envisaged under Section(s) 73 & 74 of the 1872 Act which is a general law will have no application, when it comes to the SARFAESI Act more particularly the forfeiture of earnest-money deposit which has been statutorily provided under Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules as a consequence of the auction purchaser's failure to deposit the balance amount. (Para 68) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002; Rule 9 (5) - Consequence of forfeiture of 25% of the deposit under Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules is a legal consequence that has been statutorily provided in the event of default in payment of the balance amount. The consequence envisaged under Rule 9(5) follows irrespective of whether a subsequent sale takes place at a higher price or not, and this forfeiture is not subject to any recovery already made or to the extent of the debt owed. In such cases, no extent of equity can either substitute or dilute the statutory consequence of forfeiture of 25% of deposit under Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules. (Para 111) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002; Rule 9 (5) - Entire earnest money deposited by an auction purchaser would be forfeited as per Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules on the failure to deposit the remaining amount within the stipulated period. (Para 68) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002; Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules puts a mandatory requirement on the successful auction purchaser to deposit a 25% amount after the sale is confirmed by the secured creditor in favor of the auction purchaser. Moreover, the Rule makes it clear that in default of payment of the remaining 75% amount by the auction purchaser within the period mentioned in Rule 9(4) i.e., 15 days, the deposit shall be forfeited by the secured creditor and the auction purchaser would not be entitled to receive the 25% deposited earnest money. Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002; Rule 9 (5) - Secured creditor's right to forfeit the earnest deposit amount by the auction purchaser doesn't arise due to loss or damage suffered due to a breach of contract but under a statutory requirement mentioned under SARFAESI Rules. (Para 111) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

SEBI

SEBI's wide powers, coupled with its expertise and robust information gathering mechanism, lend a high level of credibility to its decisions as a regulatory, adjudicatory and prosecuting agency. (Para 17 (d)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

The Court must be mindful of the public interest that guides the functioning of SEBI and refrain from substituting its own wisdom in place of the actions of SEBI. (Para 17 (e)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

The power of the Court to enter the regulatory domain of SEBI in framing delegated legislation is limited. The court must refrain from substituting its own wisdom over the regulatory policies of SEBI. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy framed by a specialized regulator is to scrutinise whether it violates fundamental rights, any provision of the Constitution, any statutory provision or is manifestly arbitrary. (Para 67 (a)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989

Section 3(1)(xi) - Conviction for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act 1989 cannot be sustained if the act of outraging the modesty of a woman was not committed on the ground of caste. (Para 8 & 11) Dashrath Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 66

Section 3(2)(v) – It is nowhere the case of the prosecution that the offence committed upon the deceased was on the basis of his caste. From the admitted allegations of the prosecution, the necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are not made out. Prosecution for the offence is ex facie illegal and unwarranted. (Para 16 & 18) Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : AIR 2024 SC 1405 : (2024) 3 SCC 665 : 2024 Cri LJ 1461

Service Law

Consumer Protection (Qualification for Appointment, Method of Recruitment, Procedure for Appointment, Term of Office, Resignation and Removal of the President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules 2020 - No written test would be either feasible or practicable for the appointment of the President of the SCDRC for which a former Judge of the High Court is eligible for appointment. Hence, insofar as appointments to the post of President of the SCDRC are concerned, we direct that the requirement of holding a written examination and viva voce in the terms as envisaged shall stand relaxed for the present. At the same time, it is clarified that the appointments to the office of President of the SCDRC shall be made in consultation with and subject to the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court. (Para 4) Ganeshkumar Rajeshwarrao Selukar v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 236

It is not open for an employer to change the qualifications prescribed in the advertisement midstream, during the course of the ongoing selection process. Any such action would be hit by the vice of arbitrariness as it would tantamount to denial of an opportunity to those candidates who are eligible in terms of the advertisement but would stand disqualified on the basis of a change in the eligibility criteria after the same is announced by the employer. (Para 8) Anil Kishore Pandit v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 233

PAR Rules; Rule 5(1) – Mandatory nature of timelines – Outcome of contravention of timelines prescribed under the schedule in view of Rule 5(1) of the PAR Rules – The previous performance appraisal report(s) of Respondent were admittedly beyond the timelines prescribed under the Schedule, however within the period prescribed under Rule 5(1) of the PAR Rules. The High Court observed that the timelines prescribed under the Schedule were not water-tight and in fact, were flexible. Admittedly, the Accepting Authority has met the timelines prescribed under Rule 5(1) of the PAR Rules and accordingly, there is no reason to expunge the remarks and overall grades awarded to Respondent by the Accepting Authority on the PAR on account of a contravention of the timelines prescribed under the Schedule. (Para 19, 20 & 21) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : AIR 2024 SC 1397

Reduction of grade by accepting authority challenged on grounds of prejudice – Contention of prejudice caused cannot be accepted on account of the fact that Respondent was awarded an overall grade '9' which undisputedly forms a part of the 'outstanding' grade i.e., the highest category awarded to an IAS officer. There can be no qualm that the said overall grade is more than sufficient for the purposes of empanelment / promotion vis-à-vis Respondent. (Para 24) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : AIR 2024 SC 1397

Validity of transfer order – Absence of malafide intention – Even if transfer order was made on the recommendation of an MLA, that by itself would not vitiate the transfer order. It is the duty of the representatives of the people in the legislature to express the grievances of the people and if there is any complaint against an official the State Government is certainly within its jurisdiction to transfer such an employee. (Para 9.3) Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 231

Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 (Rajasthan); Rule 24(4) which provides that no candidate shall be eligible for appointment to the service who has more than two children on or after 01.06.2002 is non-discriminatory and does not violate the Constitution. Ramji Lal Jat v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 175

Central Industrial Security Forces (CISF) Rules, 2010; Rule 61 - Free Accommodation - All CISF personnel entitled to House Rent Allowance (HRA) if they are not provided accommodation. Union of India v. Paramisivan M., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 134

Military Nursing Service - Terminating women officer on ground of marriage - Such rule was exfacie manifestly arbitrary, as terminating employment because the woman has got married is a coarse case of gender discrimination and inequality. Acceptance of such patriarchal rule undermines human dignity, right to non-discrimination and fair treatment. Laws and regulations based on gender-based bias are constitutionally impermissible. Rules making marriage of women employees and their domestic involvement a ground for disentitlement would be unconstitutional. Union of India v. Ex. Lt. Selina John, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 135

Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2022 (Gujarat); Rule 25 - Qualifying service of a government employee - Qualifying service for the purpose of calculating terminal benefits / pensionary benefits under the Pension Rules would include prior services rendered by such person under inter alia the Central Government provided that (i) the employment of such person under the Central Government encompassed an underlying pension scheme; and (ii) such person came to be absorbed by the State Government. The Appellant has most certainly, 'implicitly' been absorbed by the State Government i.e., the Appellants' participation in the selection process was prefaced by an NOC from the Central Government; and subsequently was followed by the tender of a technical resignation to the Central Government upon securing employment with the State Government. The interpretation sought to limit the benefit of Rule 25(ix) only to such person(s) who may have 'explicitly' been absorbed by the State Government is narrow and restrictive. (Para 14 & 18) Vinod Kanjibhai Bhagora v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 108

Constitution of India – Special leave Petition against order of High Court – To set aside impugned termination order – Class-IV employee, when in financial hardship, may represent directly to the superior but that by itself cannot amount to major misconduct for which punishment of termination from service should be imposed. It is trite law that ordinarily the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer should not be interfered by the appellate authority or by the writ court. However, when the finding of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer is based on perverse finding the same can always be interfered. Termination from service order is liable to be set aside. Chatrapal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : AIR 2024 SC 948

Pension – Objective - Pension is earned by a government servant in lieu of tireless service rendered by him / her during the course of their employment; and often is an important consideration for person(s) seeking government employment. The raison d'etre qua the grant of pension by the State Government would inextricably be linked to a concentrated effort by the State Government to enable its former employee(s) to tide over the vagaries and vicissitudes associated with old age vide a pension scheme. (Para 10) Vinod Kanjibhai Bhagora v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 108

Pension – Delegated Beneficial legislation - Pension scheme(s) floated by the State Government form a part of delegated beneficial legislation; and ought to be interpreted widely subject to such interpretation not running contrary to the express provisions of the Pension Rules. (Para 17) Vinod Kanjibhai Bhagora v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 108

The state government is entitled to do the recovery of entitlements received by the officer as the entitlement so received were granted pursuant to the order dated 4th August 2011 issued by the Principal Secretary that was not consistent with the orders issued by the Government orders of the Finance Department. Dr. Balbir Singh Bhandari v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : AIR 2024 SC 701

Stoppage of Salary - While the State sanctioned two vacancies, the school went ahead and recruited three. The State has no proof of commission of any malpractice by the teachers. The State approved their appointments, and the approval order till date has not been cancelled. The appointments have not been terminated. No action has been taken against the school and the school continues to receive the aid. Held, the teachers were not at fault and the State could not have abruptly stopped their salaries. (Para 22 & 34) Radhey Shyam Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 9 : AIR 2024 SC 260

Society

Societies Registration Act, 1860; Section 15 - Such members in default of membership fee would not be entitled to vote and would not be counted as members of the Society. If they were not entitled to vote and they were not to be counted as members, there would be no illegality or for that matter any prejudice being caused by not issuing any notice as the same would be an exercise in futility. (Para 22) Adv. Babasaheb Wasade v. Manohar Gangadhar Muddeshwar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : AIR 2024 SC 768

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 20 – Specific Performance – The grant of decree for specific performance is always discretionary and depends on the conduct of the person. Considering the plaintiffs' conduct of making false and/or incorrect statements in the plaint, which were very material, we hold that the plaintiffs are disentitled to relief of specific performance. The relief of specific performance is an equitable relief, hence a person who seeks equity must do equity. (Para 9 & 14) Major Gen. Darshan Singh v. Brij Bhushan Chaudhary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 182 : AIR 2024 SC 1330 : (2024) 3 SCC 489

Land Revenue Code; Section 36A – Specific performance of agreement to sell –The stage of taking previous sanction under Section 36A of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1959 had not arisen in the present case, for the reason that the defendant did not come forward to execute the sale deed. Courts could not have declined to grant the decree for specific performance on the basis of non-compliance of Section 36A inasmuch as the considerations under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 only had to be made for the purpose of adjudicating the suit between the parties. As the plaintiff has performed his part of the agreement as required under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief specific performance of the agreement to sell. On grant of the decree of specific performance, the appellant-plaintiff shall proceed under Section 36A of Act of 1959 before seeking conveyance of the subject land in his favour in case the defendant is a tribal. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225

Where there is no reason to decline a decree for specific performance, the Courts ought to grant the same rather than give an alternative relief. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225

Section 34 - A suit for declaration of title without seeking recovery of possession is not maintainable when the plaintiff is not in possession. In this regard, a plaint could be amended at any suit stage, even at the second appellate stage. (Para 33) Vasantha v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 117

The person who claims adverse possession must show the following: (a) on what date he came into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party; (d) how long his possession has continued; and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. (Para 20) Vasantha v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 117

When a contract stipulates a specific time frame within which the consideration needs to be paid by the 'buyer' to execute the 'agreement to sale' by the 'seller', then the buyer must strictly adhere to such condition, otherwise, the 'buyer' can not avail a remedy of specific performance of the sale deed. Alagammal v. Ganesan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 27 : AIR 2024 SC 683 : (2024) 3 SCC 232

Stay

Applications to vacate interim reliefs can't be kept pending for long' - Issued guidelines to High Court's on granting and vacating interim stay. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

High Courts and Supreme Courts should refrain from fixing time-bound schedules for case disposal in other courts ordinarily. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

No automatic vacation of stay orders of High Courts on civil and criminal trials - Overruled Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Suit for Possession

Identification of Property - Suit for possession has to describe the property in question with accuracy and all details of measurement and boundaries. This was completely lacking. A suit for possession with respect to such a property would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of its identifiability. (Para 23) Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2024 SC 714 : (2024) 3 SCC 224

Supreme Court Rules, 2013

Curative Petitions - Registry shouldn't exercise judicial function, can't refuse curative petition saying review was dismissed in open court. Brahmaputra Concrete Pipe Industries v. Assam State Electricity Board, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Miscellaneous application – The maintainability of Post-Disposal miscellaneous applications “for clarification, modification or recall – Miscellaneous application seeking clarification of the order passed by the court couldn't be entertained after the disposal of the matter. Post disposal application for modification and clarification of the order of disposal shall lie only in rare cases, where the order passed by this Court is executory in nature and the directions of the Court may become impossible to be implemented because of subsequent events or developments. The factual background of this Application does not fit into that description. The attempt in the present miscellaneous application is clearly to seek a substantive modification of the judgment of this Court. Such an attempt is not permissible in a miscellaneous application which was described in the course of hearing as an application for clarification. By taking out a Miscellaneous Application, the applicant cannot ask for reliefs which were not granted in the main judgment itself. There is a growing tendency of indirectly seeking review of the orders of this Court by filing applications either seeking modifications or clarifications of the orders passed by this Court. Such applications are a total abuse of process of law. Multiple attempts to reopen a judgment of the Court should not be permitted. (Para 11 & 20) Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 241

Order LV Rule 6 – Under Order LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, the Supreme Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. Order LV Rule 6 cannot be inverted to bypass the provisions for review in Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The maintainability of the present application cannot be explained by invoking the inherent power of this Court either. The applicant has not applied for review of the main judgment. In the contempt action, it failed to establish any willful disobedience of the main judgment and order on account of non-payment of LPS. Now the applicant cannot continue to hitchhike on the same judgment by relying on the inherent power or jurisdiction of this Court. The miscellaneous application is an abuse of the process. (Para 12 & 13) Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 241

Order XII Rule 3 - A post disposal application for modification and clarification of the order of disposal shall lie only in rare cases, where the order passed by this Court is executory in nature and the directions of the Court may become impossible to be implemented because of subsequent events or developments. (Para 20) Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 241

Tax

Condonation of Delay - Taxpayer is entitled to hearing on the merits, if appeals were dismissed by the High Court due to a delay in filing the paper-book. Herbicides India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 44

The hiring of motor vehicles/cranes from a contractor is a service and would not attract Sales Tax or Value Added Tax (VAT) assuming the transaction to be sale of goods. The transfer of right to use the goods not only includes possession but also control over goods by the user. If the control over the goods remains with the contractor during the hire period, then it cannot be termed as sale of goods and only service tax can be levied. K.P. Mozika v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : AIR 2024 SC 667

Theory of Restitutive Relief

Theory of restitutive relief – In case the Court is of the opinion that no relief of admission can be granted to such a candidate in the very academic year and wherever it finds that the action of the authorities has been arbitrary and in breach of the rules and regulations or the prospectus affecting the rights of the students and that a candidate is found to be meritorious and such candidate/student has approached the court at the earliest and without any delay, the court can mould the relief and direct the admission to be granted to such a candidate in the next academic year in the case if it is found that the management was at fault and wrongly denied the admission to the meritorious candidate. Held, it would neither be desirable nor justifiable to grant admission to the appellant in the on-going session of the MBBS(UG) course. However, considering the fact that the writ petition came to be filed before the High without any delay, the appellant is entitled to restoration of his seat in the first year of MBBS(UG) course in the same college in the next session. (Para 27) Vansh Prakash Dolas v. Ministry of Education & The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : AIR 2024 SC 1924

Tribunal

Jurisdiction of Tribunal – Tribunal was justified in giving its award on the reference made by the central government. Central Government invoked the power of reference to refer the matter to the Tribunal to adjudicate the interest of all the 32 workers. The Tribunal was naturally bound by the reference to consider the claim of all the 32 workers. Hence, despite the fact that there was a settlement with respect to some of the workmen, the Tribunal was tasked to examine the entire reference and give independent findings on the issue. (Para 16 & 17) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Section 43D(2)(b) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 167(2) - Default Bail - Terrorism cases should not to be taken lightly. (Para 13) State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 10

Section 43D(5) and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439 – Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act modifies the application of the general bail provisions in respect of offences punishable under Chapter IV and Chapter VI of the UAP Act. Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the 'final report' or 'Case Diary', the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied, that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence). The restrictions, on granting of bail in section 43D(5) are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The 'exercise' of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D(5) - 'shall not be released', in contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC - 'may be released', suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule. (Para 17, 18 & 20) Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : AIR 2024 SC 952

University

Revaluation - The appellant filed a suit against the University seeking compensation of Rs. 10 Lakhs for reevaluating copies of subjects not applied for, resulting in a reduction of total marks. The trial court granted damages of Rs. 4 Lakhs, but the High Court set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court, upon examination, found the High Court's observations untenable and restored the damages awarded by the trial court. Vyjyanti Mehra v. Himachal Pradesh University, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 51

Wildlife Protection Act, 1972

Section 33(a) & 38V(4) – Tiger Safari permissible in buffer zone – Although it will not be permissible to establish a 'Tiger Safari' in a core or critical tiger habitat area without obtaining the prior approval of the National Board, such an activity would be permissible in the buffer or peripheral area. (Para 101) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198

NTCA guidelines 2012, 2016 & 2019 and Wildlife Protection Act, 1972; Chapter IVB – Validity and purpose of the guidelines – NTCA issued Guidelines in 2012, 2016 & 2019 for establishment of 'Tiger Safaris' in the buffer and fringe areas of tiger reserves. There is no infirmity in the 2012 & 2016 Guidelines for establishing the 'Tiger Safaris' in the buffer and fringe areas and emphasizing on the rehabilitation of injured tigers (after suitable treatment), conflict tigers, and orphaned tiger cubs which are unfit for rewilding and release into the wild. However, the 2019 Guidelines, departing from the aforesaid purpose, provide for sourcing of animals from zoos in the Tiger Safaris which is contrary to the purpose of Tiger Conservation. Similarly, as per the 2019 guidelines, vesting of final authority for selection in the CZA and not in the NTCA, is not in tune with the emphasis on tiger conservation as provided under Chapter IVB of the WLP Act. Since undertaking of establishment of such a 'Tiger Safari' would be basically for the 'in-situ' conservation and protection of the tiger, it is the NTCA that shall have the final authority. A 'safari' can be established only for the purposes specified in clause 9 of the 2016 Guidelines and not as per the 2019 Guidelines. (Para 100 & 103) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198

NTCA Guidelines, 2016; Clause 10 – Location of Tiger Safari – Clause 10 requires recommendations of the Committee comprising of the members from NTCA, CZA, Forest Department of concerned State, an experienced tiger biologist/scientist/conservationist, and a representative, nominated by the Chief Wildlife Warden of the concerned State. Technically there is non-compliance with the requirement of clause 10 as such committee was not constituted for the purpose of determining the location of the 'Tiger Safari' at Pakhrau. However, since most of the authorities mentioned therein have participated in the decision and the concerned authorities, who have expertise in the matter, have approved establishment of 'Tiger Safari' at Pakhrau, the decision requires no interference. Held, the provisions of the 2016 Guidelines are scrupulously followed. (Para 111 & 112) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198

Will

Genuineness of Will – On grounds of alleged ill-health of the testator – From the evidence recorded, the testator was found to be in good senses and capable of understanding his welfare to take correct decisions. The testator was conscious of the fact that he had a wife and a minor child whose interest had been taken care of by leaving part of the property for them. The Will was not surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Further, it cannot be concluded that the testator was not in a position to make a 'Will'. (Para 13) Thangam v. Navamani Ammal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : AIR 2024 SC 1324

Words and Phrases

When the words 'barbaric' and 'brutal' are used simultaneously they are not to take the character of synonyms, but to take distinctive meanings. (Para 10) Bhaggi @ Bhagirath @ Naran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 87 : AIR 2024 SC 938

Writ Petition

Lack of proper procedure – The writ petition filed claiming title on the disputed plot of land was taken up by the High Court in hot haste and was allowed without issuing formal notice to all the respondents. Further, the State authorities were not given proper opportunity of filing a counter and the standing counsel was instructed to appear without any formal notice being issued and was given a single day's opportunity to present the factual report. Impugned order passed by the High Court suffers from patent illegality, perversity and in sheer violation of principles of natural justice. (Para 16 & 18) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226

Maintainability of Writ Petition – Judicial review is restrained in matters of public tenders – Constitutional courts should exercise caution while interfering in contractual and tender matters, disguised as public interest litigations. The respondent no. 1, being an interested party could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. The prayer made in writ petition, makes it clear that the real grievance of respondent no 1 is about the grant of contract in favour of another bidder. The High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petition on behalf of an interested person who sought to convert a judicial review proceeding for enhancing personal gain. (Para 19 & 21) Travancore Devaswom Board v. Ayyappa Spices, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 207

Writ Petition – Validity of clause 4.8.1 of the NEET UG-2023 Information Brochure – Classification has no nexus to the object sought – Clause 4.8 of the Information Brochure provides an exception/relaxation for claiming seat in the Maharashtra State quota to Children of employees of Government of India or its Undertaking who have passed SSC and/or HSC or equivalent examination from the recognized institutions situated outside the State of Maharashtra. However, this clause imposes a rider that such employee of Government of India or its Undertaking being the parent of the candidate seeking admission in the course under the State quota “must have been transferred from outside the State of Maharashtra at a place of work, located in the State of Maharashtra and also must have reported for duty and must be working as on the last date of document verification at a place located in the State of Maharashtra”. Proviso to Clause 4.8 was relied upon by the respondents while cancelling the admission granted to the appellant in CAP1. Held, the place of posting is not within the control of the employee or the candidate. Thus, the distinction drawn by the clause between two categories of employees in the Government of India services (i) those posted in Maharashtra and (ii) those posted outside Maharashtra has no nexus with the intent and purpose of the guidelines/rules and hence the same deserves to be read down to such extent. The condition creates a stipulation which would be impossible for the candidate or his parent to fulfill. Held, the candidate(s) who are born in Maharashtra and whose parents are also domicile of the State of Maharashtra and are employees of the Government of India or its Undertaking, such candidate(s) would be entitled to a seat under the Maharashtra State quota irrespective of the place of posting of the parent(s) because the place of deployment would not be under the control of the candidate or his parents. (Para 15 & 21) Vansh Prakash Dolas v. Ministry of Education & The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : AIR 2024 SC 1924

Writ petition was manifestly tainted on account of concealment of material facts. Factum of filing of two earlier writ petitions with similar prayers was concealed by respondent while filing the present writ petition. (Para 14 & 16) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226