Delay Occurred In Filing Appeal Against Acquittal Under S.378 CrPC Can Be Condoned Under Limitation Act: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that the delay that occurred in preferring an appeal against the acquittal can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Concurring with the decision of the High Court, the Bench Comprising Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and P.B. Varale observed that if there is a delay in filing an appeal against the acquittal of the accused then the delay can be condoned under the Limitation Act, 1963.

“The benefit of Section 5 read with Sections 2 and 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can therefore be availed in an appeal against acquittal. There is no force in the contentions raised by the appellants as regards the non-application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the present case and the appeal is therefore dismissed.”, the Judgment authored by Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia observed.

The court also observed that although the limitation period in preferring an appeal is mentioned under Section 378 of Cr.P.C., the said provision doesn't contain any exclusionary provision to exclude the application of the Limitation Act.

Background

The appellant-accused was acquitted by the Trial Court for the offence under the Customs Act of 1962.

Against the acquittal, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (“DRI”) filed an appeal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court accompanied by an application of condonation of delay since the appeal was belated by 72 days. The delay condonation application was allowed by the Delhi High Court.

The appellant-accused then filed a recall application before the High Court seeking recall of its order whereby it allowed the delay condonation application of the DRI. However, the recall application was dismissed.

It is against the dismissal of the recall application that the appellant-accused preferred a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court.

Arguments Made by the Parties

The appellant-accused contended that the High Court could not have allowed the delay condonation application as the delay occurred in filing the appeal against the acquittal cannot be condoned under the Limitation Act. It submitted that Section 378 of Cr.P.C. is a self-contained code within itself prescribing the limitation period in filing an appeal against the acquittal, therefore, the special law such as the Limitation Act would have no application while preferring an appeal against the acquittal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C.

The appellant-accused relied on the Supreme Court Judgment of Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh to contend that the court has no power to relax a limitation period to condone the delay that occurred in preferring an appeal against the acquittal.

On the contrary, it was argued by the Respondent-DRI that the delay occurred in preferring an appeal against the acquittal can be condoned by the court under the Limitation Act. It submitted that Section 378 of Cr.P.C. doesn't exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, hence the delay can be condoned.

Supreme Court's Observation

After hearing the arguments canvassed by the parties, the Supreme Court is not inclined to accept the submissions made by the appellant-accused.

The court said that the reliance of Kaushalya Rani by the appellant would not help the appellant, as the Kaushalya Rani case dealt with the old Cr.P.C. and old Limitation Act, 1908, where the provisions are differently worded than that of 1973 Cr.P.C. and 1963 Limitation Act.

The Supreme Court's observation was based on the ratio laid down by itself in the case of Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, where the Supreme Court distinguished the ratio laid down in Kaushalya Rani.

The court noted that the Mangu Ram while dealing with a similar problem of limitation distinguished Kaushalya Rani as Kaushalya Rani was dealing with the old Criminal Procedure Code,1898, and the old Limitation Act, 1908, where provisions were differently worded. Whereas, Mangu Ram dealt with the existing Cr.P.C. and the Limitation Act, 1963.

“Under Section 378 of the new CrPC read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 though a limitation is prescribed, yet Section 29(2) of 1963 Act, does not exclude the application of Section 5.”, the court said.

Further, the court explained the difference between the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the filing of an appeal against the acquittal.

“In both the Limitation Acts, i.e. Limitation Act of 1908 and the present Limitation Act of 1963, the provision of extension of time of limitation is given in Section 5 of the two Acts. Whereas 1908 Act specifically states that Section 5 will not apply when the period of limitation is given in special Acts, the 1963 Act makes Section 5 applicable even in the special laws when a period of limitation is prescribed, unless it is expressly excluded by such special law.”, the court noted while explaining the difference between the old and new Limitation Act.

In Mangu Ram, the Supreme Court while distinguishing Kaushalya Rani observed that:

“Section 29, sub-section (2), clause (b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 specifically excluded the applicability of Section 5, while Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in clear and unambiguous terms, provides for the applicability of Section 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Rani case can, therefore, have no application in cases governed by the Limitation Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by reason of Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.”

“Since under the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29, sub-section (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law, if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation.”, the court said in Mangu Ram.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court in Mangu Ram held that where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 would be available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-section (4) of Section 417, the application would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it.

Thus, finding no force in submissions made by the appellant-accused, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

The stay given by the Supreme Court on the impugned order of the High Court also stands vacated, and direction was made to the Registry of High Court to apprise the Delhi High Court to continue the proceedings in light of the aforesaid observations.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Vijay Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Chetan Manchanda, Adv. Mr. Md. Shahid Anwar, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR Mrs. Priyanka Das, Adv. Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, Adv. Mrs. Merusagar Samantaray, Adv. Mr. Ishaan Sharma, Adv.

Case Details: MOHD ABAAD ALI & ANR. VERSUS DIRECTORATE OF REVENUE PROSECUTION INTELLIGENCE | Crl.A. No. 001056 / 2024

Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 141

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