Meghalaya High Court Refuses To Interfere With The Governor's Summon To Garo Hills ADC To Take Up No-Confidence Motion

Stressing upon the need to urgently conduct a floor test, Justice H.S. Thangkhiew observed:

"It has to be kept in mind that the District Council as constituted under the Sixth Schedule is a democratic legislative institution apart from other functions, wherein members are elected, and to prove majority or strength in the house in such institutions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a number of decisions has consistently held that in the event of conflicting alliances or claims, a floor test can be directed to avoid uncertainty and to ensure smooth running of a democratic institution which would in turn ensure stability."

Contentions:

The petitioner contended that as per the scheme of the Rules at Rule 71, the procedure for calling of a no-confidence motion is laid out. A no-confidence motion can be set in motion after presentation of a written notice of the motion before the commencement of the sitting of the day, and if the Chairman is of the opinion that the motion is in order shall proceed accordingly. Then it took the Court to Rule 36 of the Rules which provides for the summoning of the District Council and submits that though Rule 36(5) vests vast discretionary power upon the Governor to summon a meeting of the District Council at any time he deems fit, this will not mean that the same can be done mechanically without any subjective satisfaction being arrived at before the decision. There is no inherent power vested in the Governor, to direct for taking up of a no-confidence motion in the manner as has been done, bypassing the provisions of Rule 36 which provides that on receipt of a requisition signed by not less than two thirds of the members of a District Council ("MDCs"), the Chairman shall summon a special meeting of the Council.

On the other side, the Advocate General submitted that, a plain reading of Rule 36(5) shows that the Governor is vested with the power, that notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules, he can summon a meeting of the District Council at any time he deems fit. The session that has been summoned, is all part and parcel of a fair and transparent process that has been necessitated by the situation on the ground and a delay in the said process might have adverse effects. He further submits that the no-confidence motion, which will be a floor test is in the best interest of a democratic institution and possibly the most effective mechanism to settle the respective claims of the parties. He accused the petitioner of attempting to stall the democratic process.

Judgment:

After considering the rival contentions, the Court noted that Rule 71 has prescribed the manner in which a motion of no-confidence is to be initiated and it is also stipulates that the same applies and is conducted when the house is in session. In the present case, the house is not in session and as such it cannot be said that the Chairman has abused his powers in calling or requesting for an emergency session. Rule 71, therefore, cannot be said to have been breached.

The Court then rejected the contention of the petitioner that the Chairman could not have acted on the notice of no-confidence, since the house was not in session and the requisition is by less than two thirds of the MDCs. Further, it held that Rule 36(5) has vested the Governor with vast discretionary power in summoning a meeting of the District Council. This provision has been resorted to by way of impugned notice, it appears, due to the written notice of the fifteen MDCs and the request of the Chairman.

Furthermore, it was strongly contended by the petitioner that the powers under Rule 36(5) of the Rules cannot be resorted to for the purpose of summoning the house to vote on a no-confidence motion. The Court observed that though this argument has weightage, but the same cannot be used in the instant case:

"In the present case, a requisition has been made by fifteen members and the request has been acceded to by the Governor in exercise of powers under Rule 36(5). To interrupt this process may result in delaying the floor test which may further result in other consequences and circumstances. This will therefore be against the democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution."

While citing the observations made by the Apex Court on the importance of conducting timely floor tests in Shiv Sena & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 809 and Shivraj Singh Chouhan & Ors. v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly & Ors., (2020) SCC Online SC 363, the Court concluded that there are no reasons to interfere or cause any delay in holding the no-confidence motion as the entire process, notwithstanding any other consideration, is part and parcel of a democratic process which strengthens democratic values.

Case Title: Benedic R. Marak v. State of Meghalaya & Ors.

Case No.: WP(C). No. 15 of 2022

Date of Judgment: 28 January 2022

Coram: Justice H.S. Thangkhiew

Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 1

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