Husband's Repeated Taunts, Comparisons With Other Women Qualify As Mental Cruelty: Kerala High Court

The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized in January 2019 and the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed within 10 months from the marriage. A decree of dissolution of marriage was granted by the lower court under section 10(vii) of the Indian Divorce Act i.e., non-consummation of marriage.

Aggrieved by this decree, an appeal was filed by the husband alleging that the court below had erroneously concluded that the marriage has not been consummated and so granted the petitioner-wife a decree of dissolution under Section 10(vii) of the Act.

Counsel appearing for the respondent-husband, Advocates Thushara James and Amal Darshan, contended that the point framed itself is incorrect, because, unless the petitioner pleads and proves willful abstinence/refusal by the respondent to consummate the marriage, she cannot succeed. However, the court below never went into the said aspect. Further, it was submitted that in the petition originally filed, the petitioner never had a case of non-consummation of marriage. It was also pointed out that there are no sufficient pleadings to establish the grounds under section 10(vii) of the Act.

However, it was submitted by the counsel appearing for the petitioner, Advocates K.P. Sreeja and M. B. Sandeep, that the omission of the incorporation of the ground under Section 10(vii) in the petition initially filed was an inadvertent mistake on the part of the counsel. Further, the counsel contended that necessary pleadings have been brought in by way of the amendment carried out, which amended pleadings contain the necessary ingredients to make out a case under Section 10(vii) of the Act. 

The petitioner had also challenged the findings of the lower court rejecting the ground of cruelty raised under Section 10(x) of the Act. The petitioner contended that under Order XLI Rule 24 and Rule 33 give ample power to this Court to "resettle the issues and determine the case for meeting the ends of justice" and the Court sided with the contention raised by the petitioner.

In the petition, the petitioner had referred to instances of physical cruelty as well as mental cruelty. It was alleged that the respondent, a man of short temper, was a person who gets easily provoked. He used to pick quarrels with the petitioner even on trivial matters. When he loses his temper, he turns violent and physically assaults his family members. Yet another allegation against the respondent was that he was always in the habit of belittling and humiliating the petitioner by comparing her with other women.

The Court while answering the question as to whether the conduct of the respondent amounts to cruelty, referred to a number of Apex Court decisions and observed that it is difficult to give a comprehensive definition of cruelty, as it changes according to the changes and advancement of social concepts and standards of living.

"Continuous ill-treatment, cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference on the part of the husband, and an assertion on the part of the husband that the wife is unchaste, are all factors which lead to mental or legal cruelty." 

Reliance was placed on Shoba Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, in which the concept of cruelty was examined in the context of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court observed that cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment and then as to the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse.

It has been further held that the cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life, the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions and their culture and human values to which they attach importance. The Court, therefore, observed that since each case has to be decided on its own merits, it would be better to place less reliance upon precedents.

 A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. Judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import their own notions of life. It would also be better there  is less reliance upon precedents.

The Court further observed that to constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner's spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear of married life".

The conduct, taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law, opined the Court. 

Furthermore, it was observed by the Court that physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act.

"Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party and in the present case from the pleadings and testimonies adduced before the Court, the Court observed that the petitioner cannot be expected to put up with the demeaning attitude and behaviour of the respondent towards her."

However, the Bench added that there may be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Ins uch cases, the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse does not have to be enquired into or considered; cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted.

"The absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. Intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment."

Since the matrimonial bond between the parties seemed beyond repair and the marriage between the parties was only in name and the marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest and interest of all concerned lies in the recognition of the fact, the Court opined that to keep the sham is obviously conducive to immorality and potentially more prejudicial to the public interest than a dissolution of the marriage bond.

Thereby, the Court dismissed the appeal but modified the decree granted by the Lower Court for dissolution of marriage as one under Section 10(x) of the Act.