Offence Of Extortion Not Made Out In Absence Of Delivery Of Property: Chhattisgarh High Court

The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that to make out a case of 'extortion' punishable under Section 384 IPC, the prosecution must prove that on account of being put in fear of injury, the victim voluntarily delivered any particular property to the accused.

Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas remarked that if there were no delivery of property, then the most essential ingredient for constituting the offence of 'extortion' would not be available. He further remarked that if a person voluntarily delivers any property without any fear of injury, then also an offence of 'extortion' cannot be said to have been committed.

It said,

"what is necessary for constituting an offence of 'extortion' is that the prosecution must prove that on account of being put in fear of injury, the victim was voluntarily delivered any particular property to the man putting him into fear. If there was no delivery of property, then the most important ingredient for constituting the offence of 'extortion' would not be available."

Background

The petitioner, an advocate by profession, had moved the High Court challenging the registration of an FIR against him under Sections 384 and 388 of the Indian Penal Code. He claimed that this was a cross-FIR lodged against him after he levelled corruption allegations against certain government officials in connection with the Nal-Jal Scheme.

The Petitioner alleged that the impugned FIR was registered without conducting any preliminary enquiry. He also claimed to have been threatened by the respondents to compromise and withdraw his complaint.

Advocate Roop Naik and Sanjeev Sahu, on behalf of the petitioners, relied on the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal (1992), praying to quash the ongoing criminal proceedings against the petitioner. They argued that the petitioner was not present at the alleged place of incident as he was arguing a matter before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

It was further pointed out that there is nothing on record to show that the respondents have delivered any valuable property to the petitioner to make out an offence under Section 384 of the Indian Penal Code.

On behalf of the respondents, it was argued that prima facie, the offence for extortion is made out in reference to several judicial precedents. On the petitioner's alibi, it was argued that the Court cannot examine his defense of not being present at the alleged place of incident.

Referring to Sudha Tripathi v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019), it was argued that prima facie to establish the offence under Section 384 of IPC, the accused should perpetuate the offence by extortion.

Findings

On reading Section 383 of the IPC, which defines the offence, the Court found out that the following ingredients are necessary to make out the offence of extortion: (i) the accused must put any person in fear of injury to that person or any other person; (ii) the putting of a person in such fear must be intentional; (iii) the accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into valuable security; (iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly.

Having perused the provision, the Court noted,

"On a careful consideration of the above definitions and ingredients what appears is that if someone puts the others intentionally in fear to any injury and thereby, dishonestly induces that person who has been put into fear to deliver to the person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed or which may be converted into valuable security shall be liable to be punished for 'extortion.'"

The Court referred to R.S Nayak v. A.N. Antulay & Anr (1986), where it has been held as under,

"Before a person can be said to put any person to fear of any injury to that person, it must appear that he has held out some threat to do or omit to do what he is legally bound to do in the future. If all that a man does is to promise to do a thing which he is not legally bound to do and says that if money is not paid to him; he would not do that thing, such act would not amount to an offence of extortion."

Relying on the Sudha Tripathi case, the Court observed that the offence under Section 384 of IPC was quashed because no valuable asset was delivered because of threat and pressure created by the accused.

Drawing comparison, the Court noted that the respondents in the instant case had not delivered any valuable asset to the petitioner; thus, an offence under Section 384 is not made out.

The Court observed,

"From bare perusal of the FIR, it can be very visualized that if we take the face value of the allegation made in the complaint, then also it can be very well seen that no offence under Section 388 of IPC is made out as respondent No.5 in his complaint has nowhere stated that based on extortion made by the petitioner, respondent No.5 was put in fear of an accusation by the petitioner, or he committed or attempted to commit any offence punishable with death and has delivered any valuable assets to the petitioner"

It was held that when a prima facie case under Section 383 is not made out, then the offence under Section 388 of the IPC cannot be made out because unless and until the ingredient of extortion is established, then only the alleged offence, prima facie, is said to have been committed by the petitioner.

The Court quashed the FIR, noting that when a prima facie case is not made out by the petitioner, the initiation of a criminal proceeding is nothing but an abuse of the process of law.

Case Title: Shatrughan Singh Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. 

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