Article 227 Confers Supervisory Jurisdiction, High Court Cannot Consider Such Submissions That Were Not Raised Before Court Below: Delhi HC

The Delhi High Court has reiterated that Article 227 of the Indian Constitution does not confer appellate jurisdiction on the High Court. An implicit corollary is that the manner of exercise of its jurisdiction by the court or forum below cannot be gauged on the basis of submissions which were never advanced before it.

A single judge bench of Justice Hari Shankar observed that the power conferred on the High Court by Article 227 is a power of superintendence and not a power of judicial review.

Briefly, the facts of the case are that the respondent was seeking eviction of the petitioner from certain premises under clauses (d) and (h) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The tenanted premises were allotted to the grandfather of the respondent by the Ministry of Rehabilitation in 1954. He inducted the now deceased husband of the petitioner as a tenant in the first floor of the premises. After the original allottee of the premises expired, one of the co-owners, who had succeeded to the ownership of the tenanted premises, terminated the tenancy of the petitioner. The petitioner thus moved to one of their eight immovable properties acquired by them in 1972. The respondent came into ownership of the tenanted premises by way of Conveyance Deed in 2011 issued by the Land and Development Office.

Alleging that electricity to the tenanted premises stood disconnected with from 2003, and that the petitioner was, even otherwise, residing at different premises which the petitioner had succeeded ownership to, the respondent, sought eviction of the petitioner under Section 14(1)(d) and Section 14(1)(h) of the DRC Act. The eviction petition came to be allowed by the Additional Rent Controller under Section 14(1)(d) as well as Section 14(1)(h) of the DRC Act in 2020. The petitioner appealed to the Rent Controller, however her appeal was dismissed. The petitioner thus invoked jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioner's case was argued on three grounds. First, that the Eviction Petition was barred by time. Second, that the alternate properties possessed by petitioner's now deceased husband, on the basis of which Section 14(1)(h) of the DRC Act had been invoked by the respondent, had been acquired by him prior to the petitioner succeeding to his estate and could not, therefore, be regarded as a residence acquired by the petitioner on the basis of which an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(h)) could be maintained. Third, that the RCT erred in holding that the petitioner had failed to prove that she had been residing in the tenanted premises for a period of six months prior to the filing of the eviction petition.

Regarding the first contention, the petitioners submitted that that Article 67 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in the present case, under which a suit by a landlord to recover possession from the tenant is required to be filed within twelve years of determination of the tenancy. However, to a query from the Court as to whether the eviction petition filed by the respondent could be regarded as a suit by the respondent to recover possession from the petitioner, reliance was placed on Prakash H. Jain v Marie Fernandes and Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (dead) through LRs by the RCT. In these cases, it was held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply to a proceeding before the Rent Controller, as the Rent Controller was not a civil court. In the present case, the court found that the respondent had acquired ownership over the tenanted premises only in 2011, through the Conveyance Deed executed by the L&DO. The eviction petition was instituted in 2014. Thus, the eviction petition was not held to be barred by time.

The court further held that the grounds raised in the second contention were never urged either before the ARC or before the RCT. The court opined that in the present case, it was exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which does not confer appellate jurisdiction. It further noted that–

"The court is only required to examine whether the authority which has passed the impugned order has, in doing so, exposed itself to supervisory correction. The power conferred on the High Court by Article 227 is a power of superintendence and not a power of judicial review. An implicit corollary is that the manner of exercise of its jurisdiction by the court or forum below cannot be gauged on the basis of submissions which were never advanced before it. In my considered opinion, therefore, a submission which was never advanced by the petitioner before the court or forum whose order is assailed under Article 227, cannot be raised before the High Court either."

Regarding the third contention, the petitioner had submitted several communications between the petitioner and BSES Yamuna Power Ltd., in or around 2014, to contend that the petitioner was residing in the tenanted premises within a span of six months prior to the institution of the eviction petition and that, therefore, the finding, to the contrary, of the learned RCT, was incorrect. Here, the RCT has, appreciating the evidence before him, arrived at a conclusion that there was no evidence that the petitioner was residing at the tenanted premises. The court found no case for interference in the same.

Accordingly, the petition was dismissed in limine.

CASE TITLE: KUSHAL ANAND v. MANDHIR SACHDEVA

Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Del) 703

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