Condonation Of Delay In The NIA Act: A Tale Beyond 90 Days

Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 provides the specific provision for condoning delay.

The general principle underlying the condonation of delay is that courts have discretionary power to extend the time limit in cases where the delay was due to genuine and valid reasons. The courts examine each case on its merits and consider factors such as the explanation for the delay, the sufficiency of the cause shown, the absence of negligence, and the potential prejudice caused to the other party.

The Supreme Court in Sita Ram v. State of U.P. held that the right of appeal is a matter of substance, and not of procedure and is paramount. The Court observed, “Appeal is a remedial right and if the remedy is reduced to a husk by procedural excess, the right became a casualty. That cannot be.”

Condonation of Delay reflects the aspects of the substantive due process laid down in the landmark case of Maneka Gandhi. It ensures that no injustice is meted out on the grounds of procedural irregularity and technicalities.

The condonation of delay serves as a pivotal mechanism to safeguard the fundamental tenets of access to justice and to avert the denial of relief based solely on procedural delays. It stands as a staunch guardian of the principles of fairness, equity, and the sacrosanct right to be heard

However, this can only be asked as a matter of discretion and not as a matter of 'right', since the applicant has failed to abide by the specific contours of law. It is only the liberal and wide jurisdiction that allows for a delay in appeal to be condoned. It is justified to allow the right to appeal of a person when the following conditions arise- that the person who files the lawsuit or appeal may be imprisoned, ill, illiterate, a member of a minority with minimal money, or a pardanashin woman. This is also allowed when the party is a government servant as a government servant does not get an incentive to fulfill the task. Thus, a certain amount of flexibility is permitted in such cases. Further, certain miscellaneous grounds are allowed, for example, when there is a delay in fetching copies, an error in court, etc.

The Case against the Extension of Limitation Period Beyond 90 Days

With an overburdened judiciary, what becomes necessary is to minimize unnecessary litigation and close the doors that open floodgates to frivolous listings. The general law of limitation is one such tool that protects only the diligent and vigilant people but not the indolent. The limitations applied by Section 21(5) of the NIA Act must be read with the same intention, only allowing a strict interpretation of the provision. The said Section in the proviso precisely states a limitation of ninety days for an appeal to be made. Here, there would be no applicability of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, a stance that was taken in the case of Nasir Ahmad v National Investigating Agency. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides that Sections 4 to 24 shall only be applied to the extent to which they are not excluded by a specific law. Allowing for condonation of delay has been provided in Section 5of the Limitation Act which falls in the given range of Section 29(2).

The Kerela High Court while interpreting the scope of Section 21 (5) of the NIA Act, which is a specific act, held that the express mention of the word 'shall' and the absence of any clause allowing for condonation of delay is sufficient to prove that the said Section has excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The court further relied on the parallels made with other specific statutes, like in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited. Section 21(5) of the NIA Act includes the word 'shall' and therefore must be read as a mandatory provision to be followed. The courts cannot by entering into an interpretative process re-write the mandatory provision, as that, would amount to legislation by courts, and would lead to an unnecessary burden of litigation.

The Case for the Extension of Limitation Period Beyond 90 Days

With the expanding horizons of fundamental rights in India, the Indian judiciary has evolved jurisprudence concerning the extension of the deadline enlisted in Section 21(5).

Section 21(5) allows for condonation of delay up to 90 days on the presence of 'sufficient cause' that had led to the delay. Going even beyond the 90-day limit as provided by the statute, the Court has been generous in considering appeals that have a delay extending 90 days.

The Delhi HC in the case of FarhanShaikh v State (National Investigation Agency) reasoned this extension elaborately. There was a delay of 44 days beyond the limit of 90 days. It was argued that the Supreme Court in the case of State of UP vBaburam Upadhyay had observed that while determining whether a provision should be read in a mandatory nature or not, the intention of the Legislature becomes paramount. Going by the objects and reasons of the NIA Act, it is clear that mandatory construction of Section 21(5) has no nexus with the object the Act seeks to achieve.

Further, it was contended that the NIA Act is not a complete code in itself and was dependent on other statutes, therefore excluding the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would go against the scheme of the act and would rob the accused/convict of his right to appeal which was said to be a "universal requirement of guarantee of life and liberty" by the judiciary.

Lastly, it was submitted that even in the presence of a statutory bar on entertaining a particular remedy, the HC can exercise its inherent, extraordinary powers given under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. or Articles 226 and 227, relying on the judgment in Krishnan vKrishnaveni.

The Delhi HC took a liberal stand and allowed for an extension beyond 90 days. The HC reasoned its judgment by saying that neither an advantage was gained by the appellant by the delay nor was a prejudice suffered by the State on the account of the delay.

In the recent case of National Investigation Agency v 3rd Additional Sessions Judge District Court, the Jammu & Kashmir HC relied on the stance taken by the Delhi HC and allowed an extension beyond 90 days.

In conclusion, the concept of "sufficient cause" for the condonation of delay in legal proceedings plays a crucial role in ensuring that substantive rights are not unjustly compromised by rigid rules of limitation. By emphasizing the need to focus on the sufficiency and satisfactory explanation rather than the mere length of delay, the courts have upheld the principle of advancing substantial justice. The courts have recognized that while a reasonable and satisfactory explanation is crucial, the absence of negligence on the part of the applicant also plays a significant role in determining whether delay should be condoned.

Although, while granting judges the discretion to decide on condonation of delay, it also carries the inherent risk of potential misuse and inconsistency in the application of the law. Varying stances taken by different courts regarding the same issue are seen today which can lead to confusion and uncertainty among litigants. The discretionary power vested in judges may result in different interpretations and outcomes, depending on individual judicial perspectives and preferences.

However, it is essential to recognize that each case is unique, and the discretion to decide whether to grant condonation or not is essential, as a judge can rightly assess the merits of the explanation provided on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately, the determination of whether condonation of delay should be granted or not remains a question of fact and not a question of law, dependent on the specific circumstances and the strength of the explanation provided.

In light of these considerations, it is worth pondering whether a standardized approach or a more flexible case-by-case analysis is preferable when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. What balance should be struck between protecting substantive rights and maintaining the integrity of legal proceedings? These questions remain open-ended, inviting further exploration and deliberation in the pursuit of fair and equitable administration of justice.

The authors are students at National Law University, Jodhpur. Views are personal.