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Explainer: Why Supreme Court Held That Officers Designated U/s 53 NDPS Act Are 'Police Officers' ?

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK
31 Oct 2020 7:25 AM GMT
Explainer: Why Supreme Court Held That Officers Designated U/s 53 NDPS Act Are Police Officers ?
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In an important judgment delivered on Thursday (29th October 2020), the Supreme Court (by 2:1 majority) has held that the officers who are invested with powers under section 53 of the NDPS Act are "police officers" within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act. (ii) That a statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. This piece explains the reasons given in the judgment authored by Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman.

In Tofan Singh, the three judge bench was called upon to answer two legal issues: 1) Whether the officer investigating the matter under the NDPS Act would qualify as a police officer or not? 2) Whether the statement recorded by the investigating officer under Section 67 of the Act can be treated as a confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as a police officer.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

Section 67 deals with the power to call for information. It reads thus: Any officer referred to in section 42 who is authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government may, during the course of any enquiry in connection with the contravention of any provision of this Act,— (a) call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder; (b) require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to the enquiry; (c) examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. [ The officers referred to in this Section are appointed under Section 53 by the Central or State Government which is given the power to invest officers of certain departments with powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station.] Section 25 of the Evidence Act states that no confession made to a police-office, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. This is how the question whether the officers or class of officers designated under Section 53 are police officers or not, becomes relevant.

Survey of Precedents
To answer this, the bench referred to State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram (1962) 3 SCR 338 in which the Supreme Court, by a 2:1 majority, held that a Customs Officer under the Land Customs Act, 1924 is not a "police officer" within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. The court then referred to Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (1964) 2 SCR 752; which held that a confession made to an Excise Inspector under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act of 1915, would be a confession made to a police officer for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act. The bench also made reference to the following judgments which discusses the above two judgments:
Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore
(1966) 3 SCR 698; Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal (1969) 2 SCR 461; Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras (1969) 2 SCR 613; and Balkishan A. Devidayal v. State of Maharashtra (1980) 4 SCC 600. It observed:
"The golden thread running through all these decisions – some of these being decisions of five-Judge Benches which are binding upon us – beginning with Barkat Ram (supra), is that where limited powers of investigation are given to officers primarily or predominantly for some purpose other than the prevention and detection of crime, such persons cannot be said to be police officers under section 25 of the Evidence Act. What must be remembered is the discussion in Barkat Ram (supra) that a "police officer" does not have to be a police officer in the narrow sense of being a person who is a police officer so designated attached to a police station. The broad view has been accepted, and never dissented from, in all the aforesaid judgments, namely, that where a person who is not a police officer properly so-called is invested with all powers of investigation, which culminates in the filing of a police report, such officers can be said to be police officers within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as when they prevent and detect crime, they are in a position to extort confessions, and thus are able to achieve their object through a shortcut method of extracting involuntary confessions."
Overruling of Raj Kumar Karwal & Kanhaiyalal
The division bench which referred these issues to the three judge bench, in fact, did so while doubting the correctness of Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 409 and Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India (2008) 4 SCC 668. Both of these judgments had held that the officers designated under Section 53 are not police officers.
In Raj Kumar Karwal, the court had rejected the contention that an officer appointed under Section 53 of the Act, other than a police officer, is entitled to exercise 'all' the powers under Chapter XII of the Code, including the power to submit a report or charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code. The court had also noticed that, the Constitution Bench in
Badku Joti Savant vs State Of Mysore AIR 1991 SC 45
had observed that unless an officer is invested under any special law with the powers of investigation under the Code, including the power to submit a report under Section 173, he cannot be described to be a 'police officer' under Section 25, Evidence Act. It was held that there is nothing in the provisions of the Act to show that the legislature desired to vest in the officers appointed under Section 53 of the Act, all the powers of Chapter XII, including the power to submit a report under Section 173 of the Code. Referring to Section 36A(d), the court had observed thus: "This clause makes it clear that if the investigation is conducted by the police, it would conclude in a police report but if the investigation is made by an officer of any other department including the DRI, the Special Court would take cognizance of the offence upon a formal complaint made by such authorised officer of the concerned government. Needless to say that such a complaint would have to be under Section 190 of the Code. "
The court, in Tofan Singh, pointed out various anomalies in the above observations made in Raj Kumar Karwal (Supra) and held that that all the investigative powers vested in an officer in charge of a police station under the CrPC, including the power to file a charge-sheet, are vested in the officers designated under section 53 of the NDPS Act when dealing with an offence under the NDPS Act. The court said:
"That section 53 is located in a statute which contains provisions for the prevention, detection and punishment of crimes of a very serious nature. Even if the NDPS Act is to be construed as a statute which regulates and exercises control over narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the prevention, detection and punishment of crimes related thereto cannot be said to be ancillary to such object, but is the single most important and effective means of achieving such object. This is unlike the revenue statutes where the main object was the due realisation of customs duties and the consequent ancillary checking of smuggling of goods (as in the Land Customs Act, 1924, the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and the Customs Act, 1962); the levy and collection of excise duties (as in the Central Excise Act, 1944); or as in the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession Act), 1966, the better protection and security of Railway property. Second, unlike the revenue statutes and the Railway Act, all the offences to be investigated by the officers under the NDPS Act are cognizable. Third, that section 53 of the NDPS Act, unlike the aforesaid statutes, does not prescribe any limitation upon the powers of the officer to investigate an offence under the Act, and therefore, it is clear that all the investigative powers vested in an officer in charge of a police station under the CrPC – including the power to file a charge-sheet – are vested in these officers when dealing with an offence under the NDPS Act."

The court in Kanhaiyalal, in order to hold that the confessional statement under Section 67 is admissible the Court drew a parallel between the provisions of section 67 of the NDPS Act and sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, section 32 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 and section 15 of the TADA. While overruling this, the court referred to provisions of these statutes, and observed that there is no parallel whatsoever between section 67 of the NDPS Act and those provisions. It said:

To arrive at the conclusion that a confessional statement made before an officer designated under section 42 or section 53 can be the basis to convict a person under the NDPS Act, without any non obstante clause doing away with section 25 of the Evidence Act, and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The Court also observed that interpretation of a statute like the NDPS Act must be in conformity and in tune with the spirit of the broad fundamental right not to incriminate oneself, and the right to privacy. It was observed thus:

The NDPS Act is to be construed in the backdrop of Article 20(3) and Article 21, Parliament being aware of the fundamental rights of the citizen and the judgments of this Court interpreting them, as a result of which a delicate balance is maintained between the power of the State to maintain law and order, and the fundamental rights chapter which protects the liberty of the individual. Several safeguards are thus contained in the NDPS Act, which is of an extremely drastic and draconian nature, as has been contended by the counsel for the Appellants before us. Also, the fundamental rights contained in Articles 20(3) and 21 are given pride of place in the Constitution. After the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution was done away with by the 44th Amendment, it is now provided that even in an Emergency, these rights cannot be suspended – see Article 359(1). The interpretation of a statute like the NDPS Act must needs be in conformity and in tune with the spirit of the broad fundamental right not to incriminate oneself, and the right to privacy, as has been found in the recent judgments of this Court.



Case: TOFAN SINGH vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.152 OF 2013 ]
Coram: Justices RF Nariman, Navin Sinha and Indira Banerjee
Counsel: Sr. Adv, Sushil Kumar Jain, Sr. Adv Anand Grover, Sr. Adv S. Nagamuthu, Adv Puneet Jain, Adv Uday Gupta, Adv Sanjay Jain, for appellants; Adv Aniruddha Mayee, AAG Saurabh Mishra, ASG Aman Lekhi, for respondents (state and centre)


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