Incapacity Of A Non-Party To Lis Can Be Equated To 'Legal Disability' Under Sections 6 & 7 Of Limitation Act: Telangana High Court

The Telangana High Court has held that the incapacity of a non-party to a legal proceeding can be equated to 'legal disability' under sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The order was passed by a division bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice M.G.Priyadarsini in an I.A. filed in an appeal suit, praying to condone the delay of 428 days in filing the appeal. The petitioner/appellants pleaded that they were third parties who were not originally parties to the suit before the trial court and hence were not aware about the proceedings.

“The incapacity of a non-party may be equated to the legal disability under sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act since the absence of lack of knowledge is an impairment of the non-party's right to seek legal redress within the prescribed timelines. It may even be said that a non-party's prayer for condonation of delay should be assessed on a wholly different template. While a party to a lis is expected to be diligent in approaching the Appellate forum, a non-party cannot be put through the same regimen of limitation as well as of expected conduct. It should also be borne in mind that the Suit filed by the respondent No.1 was decreed without the rigour of trial and/or contest. The window of knowledge for timely-action to the appellants was hence further curtailed,” the bench held.

Backgrounds:

The case arose from a suit filed by a buyer (1^st respondent) against sellers (respondent Nos. 2-11) for specific performance of an alleged agreement of sale dated executed in March 2013. The suit was decreed without contest in September 2021.

The appellants claimed to be prior purchasers of the land and also claimed to be in possession of the same. They stated, that only in July, 2023, when respondent no.1 took aggressive steps to execute the decree and evict them from the property, is when they found out that, a decree had been passed in favour of the 1^st respondent.

Subsequently, the appellants filed the present appeal on 04.08.2023, seeking leave to appeal along with a prayer for condonation of delay of 428 days.

The respondent No. 1 objected to the condonation of delay, citing the pendency of multiple proceedings. Further, that leave to appeal should have been granted only after condonation of delay.

After hearing both sides, the Court concluded that the law of limitation must be applied differently to parties who were kept outside the original legal proceedings. The Court noted that the prescribed periods for approaching courts are a matter of public policy, aimed at discouraging laches and acquiescence on the part of litigants. Additionally, that these timeframes serve the salutary objective of instilling discipline in non-vigilant litigants and ensuring that causes of action is given a 'shelf-life'.

However, the Court pointed out that public policy demands relaxation of prescribed timelines in appropriate exigencies. The Court cited examples such as legal disabilities covered under sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, where parties are physically or mentally unable to approach a court. It also mentioned the relaxation of statutory timelines during the Covid-19 pandemic as an instance of courts adapting to unusual circumstances.

“The Limitation Act, 1963 is for the salutary objective of inculcating discipline in non-vigilant litigants. It is also for the purpose of ensuring that a cause of action has a shelf-life in the sense of being kept alive and relevant for filing a Suit or proceeding in a Court of law. Public policy however also demands that the prescribed timelines be relaxed in appropriate exigencies. The Limitation Act makes room for such exigencies in the form of legal disabilities where a party is physically or mentally unable to approach a Court – sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act.”

Lastly, the bench noted, that when considering a plea for condonation of delay raised by a non-party to a lis, Courts are merely to appreciate whether or not 'sufficient cause' was made out for filing the Appeal. The Court found that the appellants had shown sufficient cause for the delay. It noted that they were unaware of the original suit and the decree, and filed their appeal promptly upon learning of these facts. The Court also considered that the original suit was decreed without a full trial, further limiting the appellants' opportunity for timely action.

Thus, in the peculiar circumstances, the Court allowed the i.A for condonation of delay, holding, that such a relief should be granted as a 'matter of right' (ex debito justitiae) to the petitioner/appellant

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