Principle Of Res-Judicata Not Applicable To Reliefs Of Alimony, Stridhan Which Can Be Claimed At Any Subsequent Stage: Rajasthan High Court
Nupur Agrawal
26 Nov 2024 9:00 AM IST
Applying the Golden Rule for purposive interpretation of Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Jodhpur bench of the Rajasthan High Court ruled that the Doctrine of Res Judicata is not applicable on the reliefs of permanent alimony and stridhan as provided in the provision.
In doing so the court underlined that res judicata is not applicable since the reliefs sought under Section 25 could be claimed "at any subsequent stage" as well and could be granted by any Court having jurisdiction under the Act. By way of this ruling the high court underscored that when it comes to welfare provisions like Section 25, the golden rule of interpretation ensures that laws designed to "uplift vulnerable populations are applied in a way that reflects their true intent".
The division bench of Justice Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Justice Munnuri Laxman in its order said that Section 25 Hindu Marriage Act (pertaining to Permanent alimony and maintenance) was a social welfare legislation for securing the rights of women and thus it was Court's duty to advance this cause of social justice by interpreting it in light of its purpose.
"The purpose is to achieve “social justice” which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India...Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance the cause of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society," it underscored.
Referring to the language of Section 25 the high court held that since it used the phrase “or at any time subsequent thereto”, it was not a static provision. The Court ruled that the two phrases “at the time of passing any decree” and “or at any time subsequent thereto” were connected by a disjunctive (or) and not a conjunctive (and) and thus both had to be read independently along with the remaining wordings of the Section.
"..a disjunctive reading of Section 25, empowers any court having jurisdiction under the Act of 1955 to grant the relief of permanent alimony to the wife, in turn is in line with the legislative intent," the court underlined.
The Court further referred to Section 19 of the Act which laid down the court to which petition under the Act shall be presented and said that it included the District Court of where the wife was residing, adding that the "legislative intent underscoring the aforementioned provisions is to enable a wife to claim reliefs at the place of her residence and to not make her run from pillar to post in the search of fundamental reliefs which are bestowed to her under the Act".
Hence, the Court held that a disjunctive reading of Section 25 coupled with Section 19 would enable the Court in Udaipur to grant permanent alimony to the appellant instead of making her run from one court to another especially when alimony was required for her basic sustenance.
“procedure is the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. Merely due to technical difficulties, a woman should not be made to run from pillar to post… When procedural law is interpreted with excessive rigidity, it risks overshadowing the fundamental purpose of justice—ensuring fairness and equity in the resolution of disputes. Strict adherence to procedural rules, without considering the underlying principles of justice, can lead to outcomes where technicalities outweigh substantive rights, leaving parties without meaningful recourse," the court said.
It was stated that it was appropriate to employ the rule of Golden Interpretation as per which if an ordinary meaning of a provision lead to an illogical outcome, contrary to the legislature's intent, the Court may deviate from literal meaning and adopt a "more sensible construction".
Reference was made to the Supreme Court case of Badshah v Urmila Badshah Godse in which it was held:
“Of late, in this very direction, it is emphasised that the courts have to adopt different approaches in “social Justice adjudication”…as mere “adversarial approach” may not be very appropriate…social context judging' is essentially the application of equality jurisprudence…where unequal parties are pitted in adversarial proceedings and where courts are called upon to dispense equal justice…In such a situation, the Judge has to be not only sensitive to the inequalities of parties involved but also positively inclined to the weaker party if the imbalance were not to result in miscarriage of justice”.
Observing that process becomes an end when procedural law is interpreted rigidly the court said, "Therefore, the argument vis-a-vis the invocation and applicability of the Doctrine of Res Judicata is not applicable on the reliefs of permanent alimony and stridhan as the reliefs under Section 25 can be claimed by way of an application at any subsequent stage as well and any court having jurisdiction under the Act can grant the same, thereby entitling the appellant in the present case to seek permanent alimony".
Background
The court was hearing a woman's appeal against a family court's order which had rejected her application seeking alimony and stridhan on the ground that the same was barred by Res Judicata on account of an ex-parte divorce decree passed by a District Court in Gujarat in her husband's favour.
The appellant claimed that few days after their marriage, the respondent husband started subjecting the appellant to mental harassment, in connection with demand of certain gold ornaments belonging to her. On January 25, 2018, the respondent ousted the appellant from her matrimonial home, without any reasonable cause, whereafter the appellant started living with her parents.
As per the appellant, the respondent is living in District Gandhinagar (Gujarat). Subsequently, the appellant came to know about the ex parte divorce decree having been passed on 08.03.2021, in favour of the respondent, by the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Gandhinagar (Gujarat).
Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Sections 13(1) (ia)(ib), 25 and 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act for the grant of divorce and permanent alimony and for possession of her stridhan before the Family Court, Udaipur. The said application was dismissed by the Family Court on February 7 on the ground that it was barred by the principle of res judicata as per Section 11CPC, because the divorce decree had already been passed by the Gujarat Court. Against this the wife appealed before the high court.
Findings
On the question of stridhan, the Court reiterated the well settled position of law by referring to the Supreme Court case of Maya Gopinath v Anoop S.B. and Anr. (2022) in which it was held that the husband had no control over the properties gifted to women before, at the time of marriage, or at the time of bidding farewell or thereafter. These were the properties solely of the woman and did not become joint property of the wife and the husband, the apex court had said.
Hence, in this light, the respondent was directed to return the stridhan to the appellant.
"Therefore, in the instant case, as far as the issue of entitlement to Stridhan is concerned, all the movable and immovable properties belonging to the appellant or given to her before or at the time of or at any subsequent time of the marriage are her stridhan properties, of which she is an absolute owner by virtue Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 read with Section 27 of the Act of 1955 and the same shall be returned to her by the Respondent," the court directed.
Finally, the Court observed that the ex-parte divorce decree could be challenged only before the Appellate court, hence, the same was not taken up by the Court. It said that since the divorce decree was granted by the court in Gujarat, then the same relief cannot be claimed by the other party before any other Court against the same party, as which it said is clearly barred by the principle of the res judicata under Section 11 CPC.
Accordingly, the appeal was partially allowed by quashing the order of the Family Court to the extent of its dismissal of the application for permanent alimony and stridhan.
The bench in its ruling further observed that in Rajasthan, as in many parts of India, women often face significant social and financial barriers that restrict their autonomy, particularly when it comes to travel. This the court said is rooted in "deeply engrained cultural norms and patriarchal structures" and the expectation that women should remain within the confines of their homes or local communities is pervasive.
Pointing out the difference in mobility enjoyed by men as compared to women the bench said,"In many rural and semi-urban areas, women depend on male relatives— fathers, brothers, husbands—for permission and logistical support to venture beyond their immediate surroundings. Financial independence remains a distant reality for a large segment of women, with limited access to well-paying jobs, personal savings, or control over resources. Even if some women manage to earn a living, societal expectations often deem it inappropriate or unsafe for them to travel alone, further buttressing a cycle of dependence. The lack of accessible transportation options, coupled with concerns over safety, often makes travel to other cities or regions a distant aspiration rather than a practical possibility. This creates a stark contrast to the mobility enjoyed by men, and accentuates the broader issue of gender inequality that affects not only women's personal freedom but also their broader social and economic participation".
It further said that since the appellant wife is residing in Udaipur, it will not be in interest of justice to make her run from one court to another which is located in the district "far away" from the State where she is residing, especially when the alimony is required for her basic sustenance and she is unable to travel due to "various socioeconomic constraints".
Disposing of the plea the high court remanded the matter back to the Family Court, Udaipur to decide on the limited question of permanent alimony and possession of stridhan. The high court directed the family court to decide the application afresh with respect to the appellant's claim while duly considering the observations made in the high court's order about her entitlement to permanent alimony and possession of her stridhan under the law.
