- Home
- /
- High Courts
- /
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
- /
- 'Unbecoming Of Police Official':...
'Unbecoming Of Police Official': Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses To Stay Policeman's Conviction For Repeatedly Raping SC Woman
Aiman J. Chishti
29 Jun 2024 2:25 PM IST
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has refused to stay the conviction of a Haryana Police Officer for repeatedly committing rape on a woman belonging to Schedule Caste community.“Here's the smell of the blood still: all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little Hand,” quoted the judge from Shakespeare's Macbeth to underscore that even if punishment is handed out and a...
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has refused to stay the conviction of a Haryana Police Officer for repeatedly committing rape on a woman belonging to Schedule Caste community.
“Here's the smell of the blood still: all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little Hand,” quoted the judge from Shakespeare's Macbeth to underscore that even if punishment is handed out and a certain contrition is exacted by the erring person, the shaken public confidence may not recuperate.
While refusing to stay the conviction, Justice Sumeet Goel observed, "The applicant-appellant, who was working as a police official, has been convicted by the trial Court for serious offence(s) of sexual assault which is found, by the trial Court, to have been committed by him by misusing his official position. The victim belongs to the Scheduled Caste community. More so, the applicant-appellant was a married man having three children. The conduct of the applicant-appellant, in this factual backdrop, is grossly unbecoming of a police official."
The Court further said, the reason that the Police Officer is unable to continue in service, in a case of the kind as is the instant one, is no compelling ground to stay the conviction, more so, when the applicant-appellant already stands dismissed from service.
These observations were made while hearing the plea of a Haryana Police official who was convicted under sections 376 (2) (n) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay a fine of rupees twenty five thousand, under Section 506 IPC to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of rupees five thousand, Section 201 IPC for one year imprisonment and under Section 3(1)(w)(i) of the Scheduled Castes and The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of rupees five thousand.
In February, appellant was extended the concession of suspension of his remaining sentence and he was accordingly directed to be released on bail during the pendency of the appeal.
By way of present application he had sought for staying the impugned judgment of conviction passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Special Court Kaithal, Haryana.
After hearing the submissions, the Court considered the question whether the grant of stay of conviction is same as the order granting suspension of sentence thereby releasing the applicant-appellant on bail.
It answered that, "The power of an appellate Court to grant an order of suspension of sentence is distinct from the power of such an appellate Court to grant an order for stay of conviction."
"In case an appellate Court grants an order of suspension of sentence, such an order neither implies that an order for stay of conviction is also ipso facto granted by way of such an order for suspension of sentence nor that an order for stay of conviction has to be mandatorily granted on this score itself. The Court is required to pass an order for suspension of conviction, separately, from the order granting suspension of sentence (and consequential release of appellant from custody). Such an order ought to be a well reasoned speaking order," it added.
The Court further added that an order granting stay of conviction should be passed under exceptional circumstances.
It said that the factors required for consideration of such a plea are the likely "severe and irreversible consequences which may entail upon the convict-appellant by way of the judgment of the conviction resulting into manifest injustice; exceptional hardship being faced by the convict-appellant on account of such conviction; the material available which may reflect that the convict-appellant was proceeded against, in a mala fide manner, by prosecution/complainant; nature of offence(s) for which appellant has been convicted; antecedents of the appellant; likely adverse societal/public impact of conviction in question; the illegality of judgment of conviction being writ large on face of it & other factors of akin nature."
The factor that a convict-appellant may loose his job shall ordinarily not be a ground by itself to the grant stay of conviction, more so if the convict-appellant is a public servant who has been convicted for the offence of corruption, it added.
Furthermore, the Court said that "the litmus test for such a plea is that the Court should be satisfied that, there exist rare/exceptional circumstances, wherein declining of the stay of conviction would inevitably result in irreparable loss to the appellant coupled with irreversible consequences causing injustice nay grave injustice."
In the present case, while noting that the police official as been convicted by the trial Court for serious offence of sexual assault by misusing his official position, the Court said, "The conduct of the applicant-appellant, in this factual backdrop, is grossly unbecoming of a police official."
Justice Goel opined that, "the reason that the applicant-appellant is unable to continue in service, in a case of the kind as is the instant one, is no compelling ground to stay the conviction, more so, when the applicant-appellant already stands dismissed from service..."
Adding that no cause much less plausible cause is made out, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to stay the judgment of conviction. Therefore, the application in hand deserves rejection, the Court opined.
In the light above, the plea was dismissed.
Mr. Sushil Jain, Advocate for the applicant-appellant.
Ms. Mahima Yashpal, DAG, Haryana.
XXX v. XXX [CRM-21064-2024 IN CRA-S-1736-2023 ]
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (PH) 230