[False Promise To Marry] Court Must Ensure That Not Only Are 'Women Not Misused, But Equally That Law Is Not Misused Against Men': Madras HC

Justice M Dhandapani observed that while dealing with cases of such nature, the courts had a two-fold duty- firstly to see that women are not misused and secondly and equally that the law is not misused against the male folk. The court noted that though the courts had to give a soft touch to the evidence of the victims on the premise that women would not be the aggressors against males, it was also important to note that no innocent male was subjected to the vagaries of the women folk.

“It cannot be lost sight of that under the pretext of false promises, women are wrongly utilised in various acts, including the act of eternal submission to satisfy the carnal and physical desires of the opposite gender, even with their consent and in many cases against their wish, either by sugar coated words or by brute force. But not always, it is to be stated that, it is only the male who misuse the women folk, but in the legal conundrum, vicious persons belonging to the female folk, do misuse the law to their advantage and, therefore, in cases of such nature, the duty cast on the court is two-fold, not only to see that women are not misused but equally, the law is not misused against the male folk as well,” the court observed.

In the present case, the appellant was found guilty of offences under Sections 375 and 376 read with Sections 90 and 417 of the IPC. The case against the appellant was that he was in love with the victim and after luring her with the promise of marriage, had a forceful physical relationship with her. When the victim informed her family who then approached the appellant's family asking him to marry her, the appellant and his family abused the victim and her family in filthy language and threatened them.

The appellant claimed that even if it were admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the victim, it would not fall within the four corners of rape as the victim had consented and voluntarily subjected herself. He added that the victim's consent could not be treated as one given under a misconception or fear of injury to attract Section 90 of the IPC.

The court noted that for Section 90 to apply it should be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact and it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given as a result of such misconception.

In the present case, from the deposition of the victim, the court concluded that she was aware of the appellant's existing marriage at the time of the incident and also knew that he had a daughter from the wedlock. The court also noted that there were glaring discrepancies and contradictions in the deposition of some of the witnesses and there were interpolations in the evidence of the witness. The court noted that the prosecution had failed to prove that the appellant's act fell within the periphery of Section 90 or that the victim's consent was out of misconception of fact.

The court noted that the misconception of marriage was not a possibility in the present case, as the victim was already aware of the existing marriage. The court noted that the victim could not have had any misconception as her marriage with the appellant could not have reached a conclusion as he was already a married man.

“The deposition of P.W.1 [victim] clearly reveals that before the date of the first sexual intercourse of A-1 with P.W.1, which is alleged to be on 1.12.2019, she was very well aware of the fact that A-1 was married. Therefore, such being the case, the misconception of promise of marriage would not be a possibility and the same could not be brought within misconception for P.W.1 to misconstrue the same, as A-1 was well married at the crucial point of time and, therefore, the promise of marriage could not reach its logical end. Therefore, there would have been no misconception on the part of P.W.1 with regard to the promise of marriage with A-1 as her marriage with A-1 cannot go through as A-1 was already a married man. Therefore, it is clear that P.W.1 could not have had any misconception with regard to the marriage,” the court observed.

The court also noted that there was no material to show that the appellant knew or believed that the victim was subjecting herself only to the misconception that the appellant would marry her. The court further noted that since the victim was a consenting party to the sexual act, the act would not attract Section 375.

Thus, noting that the allegations against the appellant cannot be countenances, the court deemed it fit to interfere with the order of the trial court and acquitted the appellant.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr. R.Karthik

Counsel for the Respondent: Mrs. G.V.Kasthuri, APP

Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (Mad) 257

Case Title: Rahul Gandhi v State

Case No: CRL. A. NO. 548 OF 2021