NIA Act | High Courts Cannot Expand Scope Of Interpretation, Condone Delay Beyond Permissible Limit: Madras High Court

The bench of Justice SM Subramaniam and Justice V Sivagnanam held that when there is no constitutional challenge to an enactment, the courts could not read down the provision differently than what the constitution had intended. The court added that the language employed in the provision under the NIA Act was unambiguous and thus the courts could not condone the delay beyond the permissible limits.

“Courts are expected to read the provision as it is and on the intention of the legislature. Section 21(5) of the NIA Act is unambiguous and the intention of the Parliament is also explicit. There is no further scope to expand the interpretation in the matter of preferring an appeal and to condone the delay under Section 21(5) of the NIA Act. Courts creating distinction between appellant under Section 21(5) of the NIA Act for condoning the delay in preferring an appeal, would absolutely fall beyond the realm of the rule of interpretation,” the court observed.

The court added that the right to appeal was not an inherent right but one created by a statute and thus the right of appeal was to be available in accordance with the conditions stipulated in the statute. The court thus noted that the parties were to prefer appeals within the period of limitation prescribed under the Statute.

“There is no inherent right for any citizen to prefer an appeal before the Appellate Forum. Right to appeal is created through an enactment. Such right is to be conferred by a Statute. In the absence of any such right conferred under the Statute, no right of appeal would arise. When right to appeal is a Statutory Right, it cannot be construed as an inherent right. Consequently, such right of appeal would be available in accordance with the conditions stipulated for preferring an appeal including the period of limitation contemplated,” the court said.

The court was hearing an appeal filed by the National Investigating Agency to set aside the bail granted to two accused in a case. The appeal was filed with a delay and the NIA sought to condone the delay on the ground that it was beyond the control of the NIA . it was submitted that the bail in the present case was granted based on another order of the division bench of the High Court which was later set aside by the Supreme Court and this necessitated NIA to prefer the appeal with a delay.

The respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the appeals were filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the NIA Act.

Though the NIA relied on Article 21 of the Constitution, the court noted that Article 21 of the Constitution could not be invoked in presence of a special enactment to deal with offences. The court observed that when the parliament itself had conferred appellate jurisdiction to the High Court under the special enactment, the High Court could not be expected to expand the scope of jurisdiction and read down the provisions of the enactment.

The court thus took a different view than what had been previously taken by the High Court wherein the High Court had held that the delay in filing an appeal could be condoned if it is filed by the accused but not when it is filed by the prosecution. The bench held that the courts could not create a distinction between the appellants under Section 21(5) of the NIA Act for condoning the delay as it would be beyond the realm of the rule of interpretation.

Thus, holding that the courts could not condone the delay beyond the permissible limit, the dismissed the NIA's appeal on the ground of limitation.

Counsel for the Appellant: Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan Additional Solicitor General of India Assisted by Mr.R.Karthikeyan Special Public Prosecutor [For National Investigation Agency]

Counsel for the Respondents: Mr. I.Abdul Basith

Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (Mad) 431

Case Title: Union of India v Abdul Razak and Others

Case No: CRL.A.Nos.1224 & 1225 of 2024