Appointing Authority Has Discretion To Appoint/ Reject Persons Involved In Moral Turpitude Offences, Even If They Are Acquitted: MP High Court

The Madhya Pradesh High Court has said that the appointing authority has the "entire discretion" to appoint or not appoint a person who is involved in an offence concerning moral turpitude even if that person is acquitted.

The high court said that the acquittal would not automatically entitle such a person for employment. The court said that in the case before it, the concerned authority had given proper hearing to the petitioner–accused of attempt to murder–and it could not be said that the authority had made any mistake in rejecting the petitioner's candidature. 

The division bench of Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice Anuradha Shukla observed that the respondents had granted reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and passed a reasoned and speaking order following the Supreme Court's directions contained in Avatar Singh vs. Union of India & Ors. (2016).

"On perusal of the impugned order dated 17.04.2023, it can be very well seen that the respondent authorities have granted reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and thereafter, passed a reasoned and speaking order following directions contained in Avatar Singh (supra) case and also gave reasons for not reinstating the petitioner and have rejected the prayer for imposition of lesser penalty other than termination/dismissal/removal," the bench said.

Taking note of the various judgments of the Supreme Court on the issue the bench said, "this Court can very well conclude that it is the entire discretion of the appointing authority to appoint or not to appoint a person who is involved in an offence involving moral turpitude even if that person is acquitted giving him benefit of doubt etc., it would not automatically entitled him for the employment. The disciplinary authority having exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law and after giving full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, it cannot be said that he has committed any mistake in rejecting the candidature of the petitioner".

Background

The petitioner–who was initially appointed as a Casual Labour in 1982 and subsequently promoted to promoted as Technician Grade-II by the respondent University, was prosecuted under Section 307 of IPC where he was found guilty and was sentenced for three years rigorous imprisonment with fine by a Sessions Court in 2000. As a result, the petitioner was dismissed from service under Rule 9 of the M.P. Civil Rules (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.

Against the Sessions Court's order, the petitioner had approached the High Court which dismissed its plea. He then moved the Supreme Court which upheld the conviction but reduced the sentenced awarded to the sentence already undergone. The petitioner also challenged the order of dismissal from service before the High Court  on the ground that principle of natural justice was not followed.

The High Court quashed the order of dismissal directing the disciplinary authority to afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to petitioner and thereafter, pass a reasoned and speaking order in accordance with law, keeping in mind that punishment under Rule 9 need not be removal or dismissal from service but can be of lesser major penalty. The disciplinary authority after granting reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, maintained the order of dismissal from service. Aggrieved by the authority's April 2023 order, the petitioner moved the present plea before the high court. 

The counsel for petitioner contended that the action of the disciplinary authority in rejecting the oral request of the petitioner with regard to quantum of punishment is per-se illegal, arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable and liable to the set aside. He further argued that respondents have failed to assign any reason for not considering the question of quantum of penalty and have totally ignored the observations made by the Court that some lesser punishment may also be imposed.

The counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioner has rightly been dismissed from service since he stood convicted under Section 307 of IPC. Referring to judgements of the Apex Court the counsel argued that conviction under Section 307 of IPC would amount to moral turpitude.

The bench referred to the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another vs. Mehar Singh where the apex court had said, “A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening Committee will be within its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police force.”

The high court thereafter refused to interfere with the disciplinary authority's order and dismissed the plea. 

Case Title: Rajendra Prasad Chourey (dead) through LRs Chitralekha Chourey & Others v. Union of India & Others

WRIT PETITION No. 10134 of 2023

Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 241

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